

by L. T. HOBHOUSE

Elements of Social Justice
The Metaphysical Theory of the State

L T HOBHOUSE

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

ITS NATURE AND CONDITIONS

With a new Foreword by
MORRIS GINSBERG, F.B.A.
Emeritus Professor of Sociology
in the University of London

London

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1924
REPRINTED WITH NEW FOREWORD IN 1966

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no portion may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publisher

Foreword © George Allen and Unwin Ltd , 1966

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY JOHN DICKENS AND CO LTD
NORTHAMPTON

FOREWORD

THIS book was first published in 1924. In assessing its relevance to-day it is necessary to refer to current attitudes to theories of social development. Three main trends can, I think, be distinguished. There is, first, the theory of historical materialism of the Marxists for which large claims are still made despite the fact that its main tenets have been severely shaken by the many sided criticisms which have been directed against it by philosophers and historians. There are, secondly, the sceptics who call in question the whole notion of development. These include such writers as Pareto and Sorokin who maintain that social and political history shows no regularity in development but rather a series of cyclical fluctuations. Other critics have stressed the uniqueness and plurality of civilizations and have doubted the possibility of establishing any lines of development in the history of humanity as a whole. Finally, there are the anthropologists among some of whom the "downfall of evolutionism" has become a sort of dogma.

Thirdly, there are now signs that ideas of development are again coming into prominence. The rise of new nations in Asia and Africa and the social transformations due to advances in technology and the social revolutions of our time have intensified interest in comparative or cross-cultural studies, as they are now called, and have raised again the problem of levels of development. Economists are now interpreting the patterns of growth in advanced and "underdeveloped" societies and have been necessarily led to inquire into their social conditions and repercussions. It has become apparent that the social and economic factors involved are correlated in different ways at different levels and cannot be understood without asking what is meant by over-all development and by what criteria it is to be estimated. The field of inquiry is now much wider and the techniques of investigation much more refined than in Hobhouse's day, yet his approach is not without its lessons for the broader comparative studies now undertaken by historians and economists.

We can now look at Hobhouse's work in the light of these movements of thought. First, it is clear that he was never impressed by the theory of historical materialism. He regarded it as a striking example of one-sidedness which it was the business of sociology to correct. As a matter of method, it was a fundamental thesis of sociology that the way in which the different parts of society interact cannot be determined *a priori* and that in advance of inductive inquiry no pre-eminence over the remainder can be claimed for any one element. Indeed, it was highly probable that the question of the relative importance of

the various factors at work would receive a different answer in relation to different societies and different periods. Turning from methodology to facts, it was easy to show even without very elaborate inquiry that they lent no support to the claim that economic processes are moved by an immanent dialectic, determining and not determined by the rest of the social structure. Thus, to give but one example, the technological advances which have revolutionised the industrial structure of modern societies in many cases owed their origin to purely theoretical researches, as can be seen by considering the work of Gauss, Weber, Volta or Clerk-Maxwell. On the other hand, Hobhouse saw clearly that to say that the intellectual factor alone determined the application of science to industry would be to fall into the opposite error. Up to a point the development of science is self-dependent, one discovery leading to another, but it is conditioned by many social factors, for example, religious freedom, the facility of inter-communication, the pressure of economic interests, the social appraisal of intellectual work. Criticisms of Marxism of this order of generality are found at various points in Hobhouse's writings. Of far greater importance is the impact of his own independent studies of the trends of development in the principal domains of human achievement. They show that the various developments in knowledge, the control over the forces of nature, in morals and religion, in social organization have a partial independence and that in any event there is no law of automatic or necessary progress. If Hobhouse saw little substance in the claims of the Marxists to have discovered the laws of social development, he had even less sympathy with historical materialism as a basis for social policy. It called to be rejected on the ground that it rested on the assumption of a clear-cut distinction between social classes which did not in fact exist and, above all, because it made insufficient provision for liberty. This was made clear in his book on *Liberalism* and in other early political writings.

The anthropologists' criticism of what they call "classical evolutionism" can be quickly dismissed as having little relevance in relation to Hobhouse's work. It must be obvious to readers of this book that he was not open to the charge of identifying evolution with progress and that the notion of stages following each other in regular sequence was wholly foreign to his outlook.

As to cyclical theories, it must be remembered that the bulk of Hobhouse's work was done before the days of Sorokin or Spengler and he appears to have known little of Pareto's sociological writings. Approaching the problem in his own way he saw little evidence of any cyclical tendencies in human history. There were, of course, instances of communities falling into decay. But in some cases at least the main causes were traceable and they pointed to no cyclical patterns. Among these he mentions changes in trade routes, the rise of overwhelming external powers, disruption due

to unbalanced growth of the parts at the expense of the central elements, the concentration of talents in particular spheres resulting in the withdrawal of the finest energies from the public service. On the other hand, he thought, that for the most general development of societies the most favourable conditions were to be found in a system of relatively independent yet inter-related centres of life. He saw that these conditions were also apt to make for war or the fear of war and to engender a permanent attitude of "defensive offensiveness" hindering future development. The applicability of these ideas to present conditions is plain.

The arguments of those who stress the uniqueness and plurality of civilizations are no doubt inspired by a desire to overcome the "cultural imperialism" of the West, in other words, to correct the tendency to set up Western or European-American civilization as a standard and to identify its development with the development of humanity. This is clearly a healthy reaction, but the case can be overstated. Hobhouse was well aware that cultures had their peculiarities and developed in different ways. But he showed that they always acted upon each other and that interaction had itself grown in the course of development. There are, in his view, two types of development, development *in* a unity and development *of* or *towards* a unity. In the former, for example, in the growth of an organism, traits or characters differentiate out of a unity in which they were at first merged. In the second the unity is not there at the beginning but comes into being by synthesis. In the history of mankind there is development in the sense that the various developments which may take place in independent centres and be shaped in part by immanent factors tend to converge and become increasingly interdependent. A broad survey of these developments will be found in chapters X and XI. As to the future Hobhouse was far from optimistic. Writing in 1924 he saw a world divided by opposing tendencies. There were forces making for further achievements in the control of nature and the ordering of human relations within societies and between them. But there were also forces making for tyranny, confusion and the recrudescence of warfare in a form calculated to bring the entire structure of civilization to a violent end. Were he writing to-day he would have had to take into account the break-down of empires, the association of communism and nationalism and, above all, the enormous impact of advances in technology and in the destructive power of armaments. In the following years he saw little change in the balance of forces and in 1927 he again summed up the world situation in words which *mutatis mutandis* unfortunately still apply to-day.

From the practical point of view, hope is on the whole, a better counsellor than fear, but we are looking at the matter as it bears on social theory and theoretically we are compelled simply to register a *non liquet*. We can only say that the alter-

native appears to be not merely the cessation of progress, but the break-up of our distinctive civilization. Humanity would have to go back upon its traces and find some other way. All that has been said of modern achievement must be held subject to this overhanging doubt. (*Development and Purpose*, p. 232)

In his earlier writings Hobhouse attempted no direct definition of what he understood by social development. He faced this task explicitly in the article on *Sociology* that he contributed to Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Reprinted in Ch. 2 of the Centenary volume of Hobhouse's *Essays and Articles* recently published by the London School of Economics with the title *Sociology and Philosophy*) and more fully in Ch. IV in this book. Using the analysis of the concept of development which he has given in his psychological and philosophical works he shows that a community may be said to develop as it advances in (a) scale, (b) efficiency, (c) freedom and (d) mutuality. Full development would consist in the realisation of all the powers and tendencies of men so far as mutually consistent on the largest scale and most efficient form. In actual fact development has been partial and one-sided. Communities have increased in size without becoming more efficient or in efficiency without more freedom or in freedom without more efficiency and frequently gain in one respect has involved loss in another. The various possibilities are analysed and illustrated in some detail and the fruitfulness of the criteria is shown by the light they throw not only on the conditions of advance but also on those tending to arrest, retrogression or decay.

I cannot enter here on any examination of the way in which Hobhouse used these criteria in his survey of the main phases of civilization and will make only two observations. Firstly, I cannot agree with the critics who have urged that his theory confuses evolution with progress on the ground that two of his criteria, namely, freedom and mutuality have ethical implications. This is based on a misunderstanding. Hobhouse took the greatest pains to define his criteria in non-ethical terms and though he believed that full development would be in harmony with ethical requirements, he insisted that ethical standards had to be independently established and could not be deduced from the sheer facts of social development.

Secondly, recent studies of development have at their disposal far more abundant data and far more refined methods of investigation than were available to Hobhouse. Yet the criteria he employed may still prove serviceable if defined more precisely. An example of what can be done in this direction is to be found in the work done by Professor Simon Kuznets on the economic growth of small nations (See *The Challenge of Development*, 1958, Ed. A. Bonné, p. 9—25). His analysis bears out Hobhouse's contention that increase in scale has to be considered in relation

to the resources available and the opportunities for diversification Kuznets shows in some detail in what ways the economic development of small communities is related to their sense of community, their readiness to bring about changes by social consensus rather than by compulsion, their willingness to spread the fruits of economic growth more widely among their populations. In Hobhouse's terminology the question here raised is how scale of organization is related to efficiency, freedom and mutuality. It would be interesting to see what the technique used by Professor Kuznets in relation to economic development would yield if applied to the political viability of small nations and more generally to the problem of the effects of size on governmental efficiency and freedom.

There are many more aspects of development in which more exact inquiry is needed than that undertaken by Hobhouse. Thus for example, it is important to examine the mutual relations between advances in science and technology and the rate of their application to the industrial arts and to compare the long range effects of fundamental research with the effect of research concentrating on immediate or short-range practical interests. Another set of problems concerns the relation between law and morals and particularly the way in which changes in the law are related to changes in religious and moral outlook. In all these ways Hobhouse's pioneer efforts might well be helpful in arriving at over-all criteria of development and so supplementing the criteria now employed by economists and historians.

Chapters VII and VIII are among the most instructive in this book and taken together with the relevant chapters in *Mind in Evolution, Development and Purpose* and *The Rational Good* give an impressive account of the psychological basis of social life. There are elements in this account which seem to me of special importance.

Firstly, his theory of the root interests in man provides a far better approach to the interpretation of human behaviour than the theory of instincts which was becoming influential when Hobhouse began his work and a good deal of tedious controversy could well have been avoided had this approach been followed up. Secondly, his analysis of the springs of action refuted the widely held belief that reason was concerned only with means and not with ends and threw a flood of light on the relations between instinct, reason and self-interest. Thirdly, his account of group mentality has the merit of rejecting all mystical theories of a group mind. He gave a careful analysis of group action at various levels of conation and introduced important distinctions, such as between common impulses, common purposes, drifts of opinion or tendency, common character. It is, I think, a matter for regret that more use has not been made of his analysis by writers on political and social psychology. Fourthly, it should be noted that

he gave as much attention to factors making for hostility and antagonism as to those making for friendliness and co-operation. He laid stress on what he called the duality of human relations, mutual needs crossed by mutual pressure and constraint, and he gave a subtle and profound analysis of the way in which these elements are interwoven in human affairs.

Finally, something must be said of Hobhouse's attitude to psychoanalysis. He made only occasional references to it in his writings, but it is clear that he found the concepts of repression and sublimation useful and he dwelt frequently on the deceptions and distortions to which conscious thought is liable. On the other hand, he differed radically from the psychoanalysts in his view of the sex impulses. He distinguished carefully between sex instincts in the strict sense as drives with determinate stimuli, responses and satisfaction and sex love, in which these drives are fused with the general craving for mutual response. He maintained that the Freudians had been led astray by their failure to recognise this fundamental duality in love.

In general, Hobhouse did not take much interest in the detailed account given by psychoanalysts of the structure of the mind, though he always insisted that there was more in the mind than appeared in consciousness. His own views were independently reached and were firmly rooted in his studies of comparative psychology and the experience gained by direct participation in the social and political movements of his day. Witness his analysis of the springs of action, of the sentiments binding the individual to the community, of the structure of the conscience, of the sense of obligation and justice. On all these matters much is to be learnt from Hobhouse's other writings, but in the chapters here devoted to them they are set out in more systematic form and related more closely to his studies of social structure and development.

The massive evidence and arguments adduced by Hobhouse in support of his conclusions have received less attention than their importance warranted. They have not, I think, been seriously shaken by later studies. His delineation of the struggle of the human mind towards rationality in thought and action is of abiding value and his analysis of the main lines of development in social organization, in knowledge and in religion and morals holds good though it now calls for wider application. It remains to be added that his insistence on the principle that in all social investigations and more especially in the framing of policy it is necessary to distinguish clearly between questions of fact and questions of value is of greater relevance to-day than in his own time.

MORRIS GINSBERG

CONTENTS

<i>Foreword by Morris Ginsberg</i> . . .	PAGE 3
INTRODUCTION . . .	II
CHAPTER I	
THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITIES . . .	17
1 The development of society among the Simpler Peoples 2 in ancient civilization, and 3 in modern civilization 4 The factors in development 5 The question of its value	
CHAPTER II	
SOCIETY AND THE COMMUNITY . . .	38
1 Society is the tissue of human relations out of which arise durable structures. 2 Among these we distinguish as most important, first, the kindred 3 Next is the community, founded on the common rule of life 4 The probable origin of the community and the conditions of its development 5 The foundation of common rules, custom and law 6 Institutions and Associations 7 The State as Institution and as Association	
CHAPTER III	
THE BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY . . .	55
1 The theory of Fear 2 The theory of Consent 3 The theory of identity of interest 4 The 'organic' element in social life 5 Points of contrast between the community and the individual 6 Constraint, indifference, and disharmony 7 Harmony as the organic principle and the basis of vitality	
CHAPTER IV	
DEVELOPMENT . . .	74
1 The elements of social development 2 Misjudgments arising from the separation of society from the individual 3 Complete and one-sided development The former rests on the principle of co-operation 4 An alternative view criticised 5 Complete social development corresponds with the ethical ideal, partial developments do not 6 The place of a theory of value in the study of development	
CHAPTER V	
THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT . . .	95
1 Four conditions of development 2 The Environment Action and Re-action between man and nature 3 The environment as a condition of historic national differentiations 4 General effects of the environment on industry, physique, and intercourse 5 Biological conditions (a) The struggle for existence is the antithesis to social progress, (b) even as operating between groups (c) The possible scope of rational selection 6 Eugenic and dysgenic tendencies in contemporary society Institutions have a selective, 7 and possibly a more direct action 8 The question of radical characters	

CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS. I FROM IMPULSE TO WILL . 131

The social aspect of Psychology includes two questions The first (A) concerns the psychological basis of social relations, and opens the question of reason and impulse 1 The nature of Impulse-feeling 2 Instincts and Root-Interests 3 Emotion and Sentiment 4. Root-Interest, Thought, and Will

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS II. THE ROOT-INTERESTS OF MAN 145

1 The conditions of Development 2 The Selfish and the Social 3 Social Interest and Instinct 4 Sympathy 5 Specific Forms of the Social Interest 6 Forms of Self-Interest 7 Anti-social Impulses 8 Other root-interests 9 Rationality and the Whole 10 Personal and Collective achievements 11 Summary of the last two chapters The structure and development of Mind

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERACTION OF MINDS 176

The second question (B) distinguished in Chapter VI is that of the action of individual minds on one another and the results thereof 1 Selection and Mutual Stimulus 2 The Meaning of Common Purpose 3 Group Mentality 4. Elements of Common Action 5 Drift and Plan 6 The Final Purpose. 7. Purpose as an Operative Force 8 The Social Aspect of Mind in Evolution

CHAPTER IX

THE SOCIAL FACTOR 210

1 Interaction and its products 2 The Living Tradition 3 The Problems and Methods of Sociology

CHAPTER X

INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 217

1 Methods of Inquiry 2 Conditions of Intellectual Development 3 The First Phase of Thought—Beginnings 4 Evolution in Ideas 5 Religion and Ethics in the First Phase of Development 6 The Phases of Advance 7 The Development of Critical Method 8 Ethico-Religious Developments 9 Experimental Construction 10 Science, Ethics and Religion

CHAPTER XI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS 246

1 The organised community and its government 2. Enlarged order and subordination 3 Experiments in 'free' government 4 Custom and Law 5 The problem of justice 6 The development of public justice 7 Its extension and humanisation 8 Social differentiation 9 Principles of Equality and freedom in agreement 10 The Economic problem—The Simpler Peoples 11 Modern conditions 12 The problem of Internationalism

CONTENTS

II

CHAPTER XII

THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT . 301

- 1 The correlation of intellectual and social development, 2 Causes of development and arrest 3 Operation of intercourse and tradition 4 Conclusion

CHAPTER XIII

SOCIAL LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE . 316

- 1 The possibility of social science 2 The question of free will, 3 and of individuality 4 The relation between human will and social law

CHAPTER XIV

CONSISTENCY IN DEVELOPMENT . 327

- 1 Biological, 2 and economic difficulties 3 Competition and harmony 4 Differentiation and personality 5 Uncertainty of existing civilisation 6 Progress dependent on human will 7 A phase in the development of mind

INDEX . 345

INTRODUCTION

ESSENTIALLY the subject-matter of Sociology is the interaction of individual minds, each in a manner cased in its own shell for ever divided from its nearest, yet reaching out to one another, responding and craving response, co-operating willingly and unwillingly, consciously and unconsciously, yet at the same time jostling, thrusting one another aside, tramping down the weaker, with partial aims vividly realised and deeper common needs imperfectly understood, moving in the mass on lines which no foresight of theirs has traced, yet not without eventual power of self-guidance and an emergent vision of the true goal. All these contending elements and discrepant principles the dispassionate student must face. To each he must assign its due weight and proportioned value, extenuating nothing and setting down nought in malice, but, since after all society exists and on the whole has grown through the ages, confident that there must be some unity which holds the jarring elements together. The more firmly he holds this underlying truth the less willing will he be to be rushed into the acceptance of any specious and easy formulation of its nature. He has to resist intellectual fashions almost as tyrannous to the thinker as to the milliner, imposing on him the very language that he must use in criticising them, treating man at one time (now remote) as essentially rational, and then again as all animal, seeing society as the embodiment of a quasi-divine will, and then again as the arena of a brute struggle for existence, insistent now on the economic factor everywhere, now the racial and now the environmental, taking up each new thing as it comes from any other science, and refusing to look at anything else as long as the paint is fresh upon the toy. The philosopher

and the sociologist are common sufferers from the tendency of new discoveries in special sciences to popularise an idea or a method and extend it perhaps by far-fetched analogies to the whole field of thought and human life. People cannot even make discoveries—quite real and genuine discoveries—in morbid psychology without attempting to annex the whole realm of mind in their name. Now the sociologist is on his guard against the pretensions of any single factor, for he sees any society as a whole of many elements, subtly interfused in an individuality which baffles all easy generalisation and yet embodies principles running through the whole field of his enquiry. The method of science in such a case is first by comparison and analysis to lay bare the generic elements, and to set out their specific variations. Next it has to ask whether among these variations any line or lines of development can be found, and, if it is successful in describing development, to proceed at length to the conditions upon which it rests and the causes of arrest and decay. It is by such methods that in the sciences dealing with living things the mass of miscellaneous detail has found its place in an intelligible framework of thought.

At this point it may be objected that the true method of social enquiry is not scientific at all but philosophic. The heart of social life is human purpose, and purpose is to be interpreted not like an event in nature through its causes but in terms of its wisdom or unwisdom, its goodness or badness, in a word its value. The question of method thus raised is discussed briefly in the body of the book (Chapter IV). Here it is only necessary to say that in the writer's view. (1) A theory of the End, Purpose, or Value of social life is one thing and a theory of its actual conditions another. Dealing with the same subject-matter they are intimately related, but must never be confused. That a thing is good is one proposition, that it exists or will exist is another. But (2) both inquiries are not only legitimate but necessary to the full understanding of social life, and (3) the question of supreme interest is the relation between their respective results. It is only when we have a clear appreciation of the End and unbiassed description of the facts that we can

describe finally how far the End is realised in the facts, or how far appreciation of the End is an operative condition in the actual movement of society. In two previous volumes the writer has dealt with social values, in the first, *The Rational Good*, with the theory of the ultimate end of human action, in the second, *The Elements of Social Justice*, with the application of the theory to social relations. The object of the present volume concluding the little series is to deal with the actual nature of social life and the conditions of its development, to bring the fact into comparison with the ideal.

The plan of the book is briefly as follows. An Introductory chapter indicates summarily certain great phases of civilisation and suggests a broad connection between the growth of knowledge and its applications on the one hand, and the extent and character of social organisation on the other. This suggested correlation is the starting point of the inquiry, which begins in Chapter II with an analysis of Society and in particular of the Community as the organised basis of social relations. Chapter III examines the conditions governing the life of communities and finds them in the duality of human relations, mutual need crossed by mutual pressure and constraint. Chapter IV dealing with Social Development shows that the social principle of mutual need carried to completion would yield a harmonious development of humanity as a whole which corresponds to the ethical ideal, but that the actual movements of societies reveal partial developments which are not always in harmony with each other or with ethical requirements, as well as periods of mere stagnation, arrest and decay. In the following chapters the conditions of social development are considered under four heads, the Environmental, Biological, Psychological and Social proper. Chapter V discusses the first two heads and emphasises the distinction between social and biological change. Chapter VI deals with the factors of impulse, reason and will in human conduct, and Chapter VII with the Root Interests underlying them, and in particular with the Social Interest, the main effect being to show that Social Development is conditioned by the growth of Rational

Will The interaction of mind and mind is then examined in Chapter VIII and the sense in which a common will can be asserted and the steps by which it advances are distinguished. The effort of Mind, it is argued, is towards a harmony of which it becomes more clearly aware in proportion as its thought advances in articulation and scope, the movement of thought being related to social life through religious and ethical ideas on the one hand and industrial applications on the other. The factor of Interaction, which is the Social Factor proper, is considered on its own account in Chapter IX with special reference to the action of the existing order upon the new generation and the conditions of the maintenance and change of Institutions. The actual structure of society is conceived as the tentative or partial solution of the problem of living together under the conditions of the environment, and Development as the effort after a better solution. In the two following chapters this view is tested by a comparison of the development of thought with that of social organisation, in which the rough general statements of the Introductory sketch are analysed as far as the requirements of a general survey permit. In Chapter X we consider the development of thought and its expression in Ethics and Religion. In Chapter XI we deal with a number of fundamental institutions and find that they, in fact, exhibit a development corresponding in vital points with the development of thought. We have, however, to accept the fact that the development is incomplete, and in the present state of the world in danger of arrest. Nevertheless, the broad effect of the comparison set out in Chapter XII is to justify the view that the development of society in its completeness is conditioned by the available fund of moral wisdom. This brings us to the question of Social Determinism, and it is argued in Chapter XIII that a scientific view of society far from reducing the will to impotence reveals the wills of men as true causes of social change, and their intelligent co-operation as the sole cause on which progress can, for a permanence, depend. The conception of automatic progress is dismissed but it is contended that the conditions of social life reviewed as a whole show the

achievement of the ethical ideal to be within the compass of human effort. In Chapter XIV it is argued that supposed contradictions and impossibilities in the realisation of the ideal are imaginary, and it is maintained in conclusion that social development is a phase in the cosmic process of the development of Mind under conditions which it can never abolish, but can and gradually does subdue to its own ends.

I have to thank Professor E. J. Urwick, Dr. B. Malinowski and Mr. M. Ginsberg for reading early drafts of this work and for invaluable criticisms which led to a good deal of remodelling. I have also to thank Professor A. J. Toynbee for reading the work as it stands and for many useful criticisms and suggestions, and Mrs. Ormsby for criticism on Chapter V. Dr. Malinowski and Mr. Ginsberg have increased my obligations to them by reading the work in proof. The obligations of a writer touching so many matters are too numerous to detail, but I cannot conclude this introduction without a word of recognition of the stimulus derived from the writings of Professor Westermarck, Professor McDougall, Professor McIver, Professor Graham Wallas, Mr. Ginsberg, and Professor Carr Saunders.

L. T. H.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER I

THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITIES

I. ORGANISED government and law are the products of civilisation, but without them the most primitive peoples known live a social and a regulated life. Anthropology reveals to us no isolated families, still less any isolated individual. What may have been the life of Eolithic or Chellean or Mousterian man, we do not know, and imagination and dogma have the field to themselves. But of the most primitive men whom we can actually study some things can be said in general terms. They live in groups which in some cases are very small but include more than one natural family¹. They occupy or wander over a defined piece of land on which they live mainly by gathering herbs, roots, fruits, etc., which is the work of the women, and by hunting and snaring all sorts of small game (including the lesser vermin, etc.) which is largely the work of the men. The land may be common to the whole group, as among the Central Australians, or parts may be reserved for the use of the 'natural' family as among the Veddas. But population is very sparse and there is no land question. Very frequently food is shared out by prescribed rules, which even go into exact detail as to the portion of a kill which belongs to the hunter, his wife, his mother-in-law, and so on. Neighbouring groups are generally in touch with one another, and in many

¹ I use the term for the family of parents and children alone as opposed to the enlarged family which, beginning with grandparents and married children, may come to include several scores of relations.

cases assemble at times in much larger gatherings, numbering some hundreds, for ceremonial purposes. These larger groups often form distinctive, though very loosely bound, unities, which anthropologists recognise as Tribes, and relations beyond the tribe are less easy, though not necessarily unfriendly. Families within each group, and groups within the tribe are connected primarily by ties of descent and inter-marriage, but also in many cases by an occult bond, such as that of the totem, constituting a kind of brotherhood, and giving rise to definite obligations and restrictions. The individual within the group and the group within the tribe are subjects of what in civilised language we call rights and duties clearly laid down by immemorial custom. There are primitive analogues of the law of persons and of property, while sex relations are carefully prescribed, often in minute detail. No regular machinery exists for the enforcement of these laws, nor is there in general any regular government. But among the Australians the older men form councils which direct ceremonies, guide the movements of the group, and sometimes plan and execute the punishment of an offender. Elsewhere there is ordinarily a leading man, who is generally said to act more by influence and persuasion than by regular authority, and has in fact but little power against the recalcitrant individual.¹ A breach of the tribal marriage law or a murder by magic will generally excite the wrath or fear of an entire group, and common action will be taken against the offender. Indeed, any offence within the local group may be so dealt with. But an offence by a member of one group against another will probably give rise to a challenge, and possibly, if not expiated by some atonement or ceremonial purification, to a fight. The Australians in particular have elaborate regulations applicable to such cases, which tend to prevent the serious effusion of blood. In these disputes it is a common rule that the kindred—as kindred is counted in the tribe²—stand together, and retaliation in consequence is often collective or vicarious.

¹ Cf. The account of the Punans in Hose and McDougall's *Borneo*

² And it may be fictive kindred as among the tribal brothers and sisters in Australia

The limits of the kindred, and in consequence the whole structure of the little society, stand in close relation with the rules of marriage. These vary greatly in detail, but in general their effect is to divide society into exogamous sections. Whether as the son of his father or of his mother (according as the system of descent is patrilineal or matrilineal) a man finds himself the member of a section within which he must not take a wife. His destined mate is to be found within another section, and perhaps within a narrowly prescribed group. Thus among the Veddas she should be one of his father's sister's daughters, or one of his mother's brother's daughters—but on no account his mother's sister's daughter. Among this matrilineal people this lady belongs to his own side of the group for marriage purposes as though she were his sister. The aversion to marriage between parents and children and full brothers and sisters if not strictly universal is very widespread. It is probably this impulse which has checked any tendency to the isolation of families, and has determined the rise and continued existence of primitive social groups. Conversely the endogamous tendency, the objection to marriage with a stranger, or anyone of very different family, tradition, cult, and so on, is the great separating influence in human society tending to group exclusiveness. These two tendencies run through society from first to last, and the latter is of high importance, particularly in relation to the colour question at the present day. It is hardly too much to say that early communities are founded on exogamy and separated from one another by endogamy.

Of the ideas and beliefs underlying this primitive social organisation it is difficult to speak in general terms. Among the Australians magical practices are strongly developed while there is also a widespread belief in ancestral spirits which are constantly reincarnated in children, and in some cases as that of Baiame among the South Australians one of these deceased tribal headmen approaches the rank of a God. The dead live on vaguely and their ghosts are feared, propitiated, or driven off with spears. Among the Veddas few traces of magical belief appear. The dead

seem to live only while they are remembered, and there is no one approaching the rank of Baiame. Of the Kubu and the Wild Semang nothing certain can be said. We should resist dogmatism as to the original creed of mankind and the priority of magic or some form of animism or animatism. Of the two magic has at this stage the larger social value as a support of customary rules, for the broken taboo works magic misfortune, and the curse of an injured man, though he be physically impotent, is feared. An angry ghost is also dreaded, but this can hardly be called a religious sanction, while the censure of a Baiame is vague, and moreover it would seem quite exceptional¹.

These little communities it will be seen have a very definite structure, but very little organisation. No doubt a tiny group plan a hunt, or perhaps a vendetta, but their government and their justice are occasional. They organise to meet a need, and they organise on a very small scale. There is very little differentiation. The distinction of chief and follower is but slightly marked. There are no nobles, no serfs or slaves. Even the sexes seem less differentiated, and in many cases, as among the Veddas, the position of women is relatively good. Monogamy is the most frequent rule among the jungle peoples, and even where allowed as among the Australians, Botocudos, Fuegians, etc., polygamy is not strongly developed. As we begin to mount the scale differentiation appears. The chief acquires a larger authority, and at length a recognised and decisive power, which often becomes hereditary. Soon we begin to hear of a chief of the tribe, distinguished from the mere headman of the local group. Again a population larger than that of the primitive tribe may occupy one settlement in which each kindred, itself as large as the primitive local group, lives a common life in its own 'Long House'. The men now hunt big game, the bison or the bear, the seal or walrus, according to locality. The women perhaps gather wild rice, like the Dakota, and begin to attend to the growing

¹ All through Northern and Central Australia, Messrs. Spencer and Gillen find no spiritual being with any significant interest in what we should call morality.

crop. Finally they discover that by scratching the ground with a sharp stick and planting seed they can secure a crop, and when this is found out bits of the common land are apportioned each season among the joint families for the purpose. Or, as an alternative, the men begin to tend cattle, sheep, or goats, and milk and cheese, wool and hides become important elements in the economy. Agriculture is at first women's work, and it is only by degrees that men come into it. The larger animals on the other hand generally fall in the male sphere of influence and it is probably for this reason that the pastoral societies show a marked ascendancy of the patriarchal family, and a lowered status of women, while under agriculture the women maintain a better position. In the pastoral societies, moreover, economic differentiation is more marked. The flocks and herds of one patriarchal family are fruitful and multiply, while another's are stricken with murrain, and the family is reduced to destitution, and perhaps to dependence. In early agriculture on the other hand there is less room for inequality. The proportion of the tilled land is small, and is changed every year or two, since rotation of crops is unknown. But as agricultural methods improve, the crops begin to take the first place in the economy of the people. The men come into it and hunting and fishing fall to the second rank. The soil begins to be really cultivated, the house and garden plot around it become stable, and the right over them recognised and permanent. The allocation of lots for tillage becomes a more serious matter, and as population grows the easy way of passing from one clearing to another no longer suffices. A family wants to keep for itself the bit that it has cleared and improved. Hence the distribution must now be taken more seriously, and the allotment once made tends to be permanent. The waste land remains common,¹ and at the stage where oxen have been brought into use suitable land will be set apart for meadow and hay, but the tilled land will be divided among the families on a tenure which by custom becomes permanent. In some sort the community may

¹ The question of common property with its well-known difficulties is briefly discussed at a later stage (Chapter XI, pp 282-288)

still be regarded as owner of the land as a whole, and the joint family of the private land. But the position of the head of the family may vary from that of a steward to that of an almost absolute owner, and very nearly the same thing may be said of the chief. We find every gradation from the case in which he merely supervises the apportionment of land acknowledged as the property of the tribe to that in which he acts as a regular landlord.

In the course of this development mere economic progress is a sufficient cause of social differentiation. Where there are industry and accumulation some will grow rich and others will remain poor, and by the operation of inheritance the gulf widens. But other causes co-operate to harden the differences of class. The community which has possessions has something to defend, something which others may covet, and moreover may see in the possessions or the persons of others a means of adding to its own prosperity. Military organisation becomes necessary, and military organisation requires order, authority, a powerful chief and officers under him. Fear readily takes the offensive, and the family or clan feuds of the earliest time evolve into little wars. Success goes on the whole to the best organised, and the best organisation at this stage is hierarchic. Further, in war the economic motive comes into play. Women may be taken captives for their beauty, but they may also be made to serve, and their children, who are readily spared, will grow up in a dependent position. Finally, as labour becomes desirable the beaten men as well will be preserved as slaves, or the entire defeated community may be reduced to a tributary position. We hear of one such case even among the hunting peoples of South America, where the Guaycuru regularly raid the agricultural Guana and exact tribute of them. More often the pastoral peoples, whose habits lend themselves more readily to the simpler forms of military organisation, prey upon the quieter and more sedentary agriculturists and levy blackmail upon them until some fine day they determine to settle down among them for good and all as a conquering and governing caste.

Thus as we ascend the scale of agricultural and pastoral

life social gradations become more and more marked. More and more often we hear of nobles, commoners, serfs or slaves, or of whole populations in a dependent or tributary position. Not infrequently the nobles now monopolise the land, and the cultivators are in semi-serfdom, or pay some rent in kind. At the same time the political community will have grown in size, and there is more of organisation and order. True, the kindreds are still powerful. Their solidarity underlies the whole system of justice, and most ordinary cases of homicide, robbery or adultery are regarded as essentially wrongs done by one kindred to another requiring collective redress. But the rulers take an increasing interest in maintaining internal peace. Feuds are obviated by the mechanism of compensation, and courts are formed, with regular procedure by the oath and the ordeal. Meanwhile, as the community extends, the chief grows into a little king. He stands higher above the mass and acquires divine consecration. He may be himself a god, or he may be, like the kings of the heroic age, one of divine descent. He has magic power, *mana*, and he controls the weather and makes the crops grow—wherein if he fails too conspicuously his position is the more precarious on account of its very pretensions. The vaguer early conceptions develop into elaborate practices of magic and animism. Survival after death is generally recognised, and in a fair proportion of instances ideas of retribution begin to germinate. The undying family is held together by its ancestor worship, and among the mass of undistinguished spirits there emerge more definite personalities, heroes, and gods cast in the heroic mould, one of whom may finally take his place as supreme god of the people, and even as a ruler and judge of mankind.

2. Such a community is on the threshold of civilisation,¹

¹ In passing from the Simpler Peoples of the modern world to the beginnings of civilisation we invert the time order, and the question will arise whether this is legitimate in a study of development. If the Simpler Peoples, or some among them, represent a still more ancient mode of life the question answers itself. But it may be asked whether this is a warrantable assumption. Undoubtedly great caution is required in 'equating' the stages of prehistoric development with the known culture of later times. But the method here followed makes no assumptions on these points. The theory of social development, as explained later, is to be formed by combining the analysis

and with the development of writing, especially if it accompanies the introduction of metals, it may be said to cross the limit. Written records and accounts first make an elaborate bureaucracy a real possibility. They give a people the rudiments of a history, and therewith a clearer consciousness of its unity. They transmute the rule-of-thumb traditions of the arts and crafts into ascertained rules out of which grow treatises on arithmetic and practical geometry. Astronomical observations are recorded. Time measurements are made, and we have in fine the first substructures of science. Sociologically the processes described above continue and are accentuated. Villages become towns, each perhaps the centre of a petty state, and after a period of intestine warfare the little states are united under a conqueror. The new king is naturally greater than his predecessors and more removed from the mass of his subjects, and by his side in ambiguous relation to him is a powerful priesthood. He must govern the extended territory through delegated power, and here is a function for the nobility. The noble governor may hold of the king, but he may well be in a position to render himself half independent and his office hereditary, so that as in some periods of Egyptian history the feudal Court mimics the palace of Pharaoh in authority and splendour. Outside the established territory of the monarch wars of conquest are undertaken, partly for slaves, who are sometimes brought in in great numbers to build pyramids or execute great public works, sometimes for tribute or the control of trade routes. Such conquests sweep over peoples leaving temporary desolation but little permanent effect. The new power is superimposed on the archaic institutions,

of the permanent factors in social life with the comparative examination of the known types of culture. Such examination yields an order of classification in which when complete we shall find the highest and lowest types and the intervening links. It then becomes a question of the historical and archaeological record how far the actual movements in time have been from the one to the other or in other directions. As a fact the record indicates that the first historic civilisations occupy a fairly high point in the scale, that earlier cultures stood lower, that they were in some respects at least analogous to some of the known forms of simple culture, while at the beginning they would seem to have stood lower than anything that has survived.

the village and the clans which continue to be true and solid vehicles of the common life. In the conquering community itself, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, the mass of the people are politically helpless and inert. Order and organisation are strengthened and carried over a wider area, but freedom and equality are unknown. Society is based on subordination. The remains of anything resembling a common life are to be found only in the tough primitive institutions on which the structure of government is superimposed. Finally, though the ancient river valley civilisations vary greatly in their detail from the Hoang Ho to the Nile they have one and all been exposed to the repeated incursions of the pastoral peoples of the steppes, who from time to time have violently interrupted the course of settled civilisation, and have sometimes usurped the Government, thus accentuating the contrast between rulers and ruled, till they have either been expelled (like the Hyksos) by a violent reaction, or absorbed into the life of the civilised peoples.

The early civilisations were not confined to the river valleys. In particular from about the beginning of the third millennium B.C., or somewhat earlier, a civilisation arose in the *Ægean* region, particularly in Crete, which spread eventually to the mainland of Greece. Into its ancient cities in the closing centuries of the second millennium immigrants from Thessaly and the North made their way as conquerors, introducing the various dialects of the Greek language. A good deal of the old civilisation survived, particularly in Ionia, and the immigrants introduced some new elements, in especial the use of iron. After a long and stormy period of 'Migrations' the 'classical' period of Greek history began. The ancient cities divided by mountain ranges, connected by water, and well situated for trade, offered favourable conditions for the combination of local independence with lively intercommunication, and a many-sided cultural movement went forward along with a determined struggle for political and economic freedom. From this struggle emerged between the eighth and sixth centuries B.C. the conception of a well-ordered organised community,

based not on superior authority, but on the will of that portion small or great of the people that were regarded as full citizens. Government no longer consisted in the ordinances of kings, nobles and priests. It was a civic function, and the only thing above the mass of living citizens was the law, the incarnation of the traditional life of the State. The free man owed service and obedience, but to the State and the law, not to another man. To work this out as a theory was, of course, the later task of philosophers, but that the rudiments of the theory were more widely apprehended is clear from the evidence of the orators and historians. The conception of a constitutional State, which is essentially a community or partnership of free men, is well understood.

That the city State eventually failed to maintain itself was due to three serious limitations. In the first place it was very small, and in spite of efforts at wider union no really organic relations between State and State on any considerable scale could arise and maintain themselves. The Athenian, Spartan and Theban supremacies only provoked resentments which brought them successively to the ground, and the States which for a moment could combine so gloriously against the Persians were too exhausted by successive wars and persistent jealousies to withstand the nearer power of Macedon. Among the great military kingdoms the cities even if allowed to retain internal freedom sank to a very secondary place, and could no longer be the centre of the free man's joy and pride. Secondly, the principle of citizenship was never carried through. It was a privilege of birth or special conferment rather than a right of manhood, and neither slaves nor, in democratic Athens, women participated in its gifts. Thirdly, the conflict of rich and poor might occasionally slumber, but was never really laid to rest. At any moment faction might get the upper hand of patriotism, and Athenian or Spartan conquerors be assisted by the democrats or aristocrats within the walls.

Meanwhile two great movements had occurred which determined the whole course of subsequent history. In the East, principally in India, men had begun to think

seriously and continuously about the problems of life, the nature of being, the position of man in the universe. We cannot here attempt to trace the interconnections or decide how far they extended, but from China to Palestine teachers were arising who under various forms were urging a higher ethics or a more spiritual religion. Their teaching at its best insisted primarily on a higher life for man than that of the ordinary path of the good father, honest dealer and kindly neighbour. It offered him salvation in the subdual of self. As a consequence it broke the limitations of kinship, rank, and political loyalty in favour of obligations applicable to all mankind, and service due from man to man as such. Thirdly, so far as it was theistic it insisted on a spiritual deity as much removed from the anthropomorphic god appeasable by sacrifice as he had been from the most degraded spirit of the lowest savagery. There arose the possibility of a world-religion uniting mankind in the pursuit of a higher life.

While this light arose in the East, in Greece the free spirit manifested itself in the no less original form of disinterested inquiry into the nature of things, and the problems of human society. A succession of schools worked out a body of positive knowledge and raised the fundamental issues of philosophy. In these directions they went far beyond the most enlightened Orientals, but on the moral and religious issues their work converged to the same point, assisted in the later, if not also in the earlier, stages by direct or indirect intercourse. The conception of a higher ethics, a more spiritual religion, and a world community were at hand to take the place of the decaying city State. The Stoic philosophy was ready to give some moral nobility and unity of meaning to the advancing Empire of Rome.

Italy, like Greece, had had her city States, but when the most powerful of them entered on her career of conquest the limitations of this form of freedom became once again apparent under new conditions. Rome attempted an extension of her citizenship, only to find that under the conditions extension was incompatible with active political life, and that in a State which lives through conquest the real power

must fall to the soldiers. None the less through the tenacity of the old civic ideas, modified and enlarged by the stoic teaching, Rome did succeed in forming an Empire of a high type, in which the idea of a world order, resting on the supremacy of impartial law, and the equal participation in civil rights by conquerors and subjects enjoyed for a couple of centuries a genuine and fruitful application. There emerged in her policy the idea of consolidating conquest by the extension of citizenship, an idea perhaps traceable first in the Latin League and extended first to Italy, then to Cisalpine Gaul and Sicily, and finally by stages to the whole Empire. But active citizenship on an extended scale was incompatible with the limits of the city State, and all the time the real Government of Rome was tending more and more to the military despotism, which became more crudely apparent from the time of Septimius Severus. The Roman Empire was an authoritarian system, but it retained so much of the civic spirit as to bequeath to posterity the idea of a world State, based on the final supremacy of law. It preserved the conception of citizenship, enlarged with Stoic principles of equality transcending differences of race, and it went far to break up old tribal and local units, and to make incorporation in the Imperial organisation a real thing. What it lacked was just that unity of spirit which enables a community to repair disasters. The great apologist of Cæsar has admitted that what his hero founded was a magnificent mechanism—great in scope and efficient in organisation, destitute of organic character. When power went to the army there was not even one army but several, and there was neither a central authority nor a general sense of civic allegiance to keep the peace between them. Slavery was a more serious evil than it had been in Greece, and though softened by the Stoic jurists was not effectively combated either by them or their successors, the Churchmen. Great aggregations of wealth based on slave labour involved the depression of the free man, who sank in the towns to the level of a pampered proletariat, and in the country to a position of vassalage, and eventually of serfdom. The fiscal requirements of the

overloaded Imperial establishment, and of the perpetual rebellions and wars, forced society into artificial caste-like divisions, and transformed such active citizenship as remained from a privilege to a burden. What grew to maturity to take the place of the dying Empire was the new form of the world religion, which, founded on the Oriental principle of spiritual godhead and salvation in a higher mode of life had absorbed something of the Greek feeling for personality and much of the Roman conception of the supremacy of law in a world-wide order. The world Church was to try its hand at the task in which the world State had failed.

3 Narrative, even in outline, is not here our concern, and we must not attempt to tell of the barbaric invasions, the painful rebirth of order, the feudal monarchies, the revived city States, the ideal of a united and missionary Christendom, the Empire its body and the Church its soul, the perpetuation and extension of Greek science by the Arabs and its eventual resuscitation in the West. Nor can we attempt to review the later phases of Oriental culture. We must confine ourselves to the modern civilisation of the West, where we find a type of culture marked off from all its predecessors by the development and application of science and an order of society which, as it evolved from the mediaeval system, also assumed some distinctive features. With the religious schism the idea of a united Christendom had perished, but as some compensation the leading countries became more firmly united under their monarchies. The social order was hierarchical. Though serfdom was dying or dead the mass of the people were in greater or less subjection, and particularly in England suffered a gradual loss of status by successive waves of agrarian change. From the mid-eighteenth century onwards the industrial revolution accentuated economic inequalities. On the other hand in one country after another by reform or revolution some form of political freedom was attained, and with it the fundamental equality of citizens under the law. The civic principle came to life again and was pushed through more consistently than in Greece. For at least apart from the colour question

it has been applied to all classes of the State—women being at length brought in most countries within the civic circle—and operating on the far larger scale of the modern community has a broader basis, and is so far more stable and secure. This principle has been intimately affected by the ethical and religious development which was only beginning in the ancient world while to the modern it is already an old tradition, and which inculcates a regard for human personality as such, a respect for conscience, a forbearance in the region of opinion, a duty to the young, the aged and the weak, a feeling for the right of everything human to its fair chance, which were very embryonic in ancient thought. On the other hand though class privileges have been overthrown, the clash of economic interest, the contrasts of wealth and poverty, the tendencies to sheer industrial disorder, menace us as they did the Greeks. Many States are still more deeply divided by the colour line, and all alike suffer from the anarchy of international relations as the Greeks suffered through the inter-State feuds. It is on these international relations that the fortunes of the modern State must turn. Our political system had by 1914 gone further than any other towards a synthesis of freedom and organisation, of equality of rights with the vast differences which emerge in the growth of wealth, of a genuinely felt civic loyalty with extent of territory and diversity of interests. But it had not gone far enough to prepare against disaster, or even for recuperation when the catastrophe was past. It embodied fragments and beginnings of a higher ethics, and a positive religion to be founded securely on the new knowledge. But it could not bring them together or breathe into them the life of the whole. Hence it has no assured future, but stands in peril, not diminishing as the months go by, of a more complete and final ruin. The world almost against its will has become one vast society in which all communities are members one of another, seeing that any one of them may be vitally affected by that which is most remote, but it has neither the spirit of unity, nor the clear sense of a common interest, nor an adequate mechanism which might at least maintain the externals of orderly peace.

4 Thus for those of our time history ends in a problem. We are in no position to review social evolution as a completed process, with its assignable beginning middle and end. For the beginning is in the mists, and the end beyond the farthest horizon. We may plot out successive points occupied by a body in motion, and construct its curve. We may describe the life history of an organism through successive phases from the fertilised ovum to birth, and from birth to maturity and death. Here we have an orbit of growth, maturity, and decay, all definable and exact. We know what the whole matter comes to. We can describe the cycle of life. Of the history of particular nations, or institutions, or even of entire civilisations in the past, as much might be said if we could make our knowledge as concrete and complete. But with social evolution as a whole it is otherwise. To this vaster movement the lives of nations are as the lives of individuals to national history. Empires rise and fall, creeds and institutions flourish and decay, whole civilisations have their exits and their entrances upon the stage. Is there any unity or significance in the drama as a whole? The one thing certain is that the play is not played out, is so far from being played out that we cannot even say what act we are in at this moment of history, though it would seem to be one of the critical stages of the piece. Furthermore we are not spectators merely, but actors, and our living interests are deeply engaged. Can we under all these difficulties form any notion of the plot? Are we sure that there is a plot at all, and that our play is not a tale told by an idiot signifying nothing? These as I conceive the subject are the questions which sociology has to resolve.

Let us try to define the issues a little more closely. Our glance at social evolution has served to indicate, what full investigation reveals more completely, a certain correlation between two broad groups of facts. On the one hand there is the advance in knowledge, the evolution of intellectual method, and in dependence thereon the mastery of practical arts, and the increasing control of nature. On the other hand there are changes in the structure of communities, which though far from regular, do on analysis reveal a certain

trend which can be stated in general terms. Leaving aside for the time detailed changes in institutions, and confining ourselves to the broadest features of social organisation, we find in general correlation with the advance in knowledge first and most obviously a great increase in the scale of the community. We begin with little groups of three or four 'natural' families, and end with political organisations covering scores and even hundreds of millions. The advance is not perfectly regular, for some of the great Empires of the middle culture have exceeded in area and population States of higher general civilisation, and in particular the city States of antiquity and the Middle Ages were of relatively small size. We shall return to this point. But let us in the meanwhile set down that communities differ vastly in scale, and that upon the whole the larger communities belong to the more advanced civilisations. And let us not hastily assume that mere size is a superficial attribute. On the contrary we shall see immediately that it is closely connected with differences affecting the whole structure and character of a community.

For, secondly, communities differ widely in their power of maintaining themselves and the lives of their members against external enemies, or internal disorder and the forces of nature, in the power to serve their needs and execute whatever purposes their members conceive, in what we may call in a word Efficiency. At the base of their efficiency lies the available body of knowledge and method, with the consequent power over natural forces, all that the word civilisation readily suggests. But the use of this power turns in large part on the structure of the community itself, while it also brings about modifications in such structure. From an early stage onwards efficiency involves differentiation, division of labour, specialisation, and as their obverse, integration through organised control.

We naturally think of the organisation of a community as a function of government, and as a measure of its development we compare the petty chief exerting a precarious influence over a handful of tribesmen with the great bureaucratic machine, say, of pre-war Germany. But for our

purposes the term should be used in a much wider sense. British industry before the war was much more highly organised than it had been in Cobden's time, and in Cobden's time than it had been in the eighteenth century, not so much because there was more legal control, but because the typical business concern had become a more specialised and more efficient unit, while the machinery linking the different elements of business, and adjusting industrial relations, had been extended and improved. All this was in the main the work not of the State but of individuals and associations within the State, and the result was that, apart altogether from a certain coincident increase of State control, economic life was becoming more and more organised. Thus when we measure organisation we are not to think only of that which is created and maintained deliberately by or for the community as a whole, but of all the organisation that arises within a community and helps to maintain its life.

Efficiency is a necessity of civilised life, but the organisation which it requires is achieved at no small human cost. Human personality is a concrete whole, and division of labour splits it up, and tends to reduce the man to a function. A great number of the men it may reduce to a very lowly and monotonous function. From the outset it introduces command and obedience and those who have merely to obey become the majority. The collective output of organised work increases with every new sub-division, and every step to the perfection of control, and each advance threatens human personality with fresh curtailment. This opposition constitutes the main problem of civilisation. Are we to accept Treitschke's dictum that the many must for ever dig and weave and forge in order that the few may learn and paint and write, or can we conceive a society in which the generality of men may do their best service by fulfilling their own lives?

This question will run through our whole discussion. Let us here remark a further antithesis involved in the evolution of efficiency. It is much easier to organise things on a small than on a large scale. Hence, in particular, little communities may be quite effectively organised for their limited

purposes, because within them by long and unfailing tradition everyone knows his place, and they may carry out a common operation—a hunt for instance—or stand together most effectively for mutual defence or collective revenge, because each knows what he is to expect and what is expected of him. As the community grows a much higher technique is required to secure any effective co-operation. Hence in the lower grades of culture the larger aggregates, though they may have a certain recognisable unity, are relatively loose and unorganised, the vitality is in their lesser constituent parts. So again the great Empires of the middle culture have no real strength in proportion to their size. They are, as we said above, superimposed on archaic units much more firmly knit than themselves. We found exceptions to the broad rule that the scale of the community increases with civilisation. We should find fewer if we postulate equal efficiency in the communities that we compare.

We are thus brought to the deeper question of the relations between the community and its members, and we must ask whether in this regard there is any significant trend to be traced in the growth of civilisation. Now we have seen that efficient organisation begins with subordination, and for the majority of individuals that implies a certain loss of status. In the simpler communities the individual appears at first sight as a free man and equal, while at a slightly higher stage he may be a slave or a slave driver. In point of fact the equality which the primitive enjoys is the equality of the undifferentiated and unenterprising, while his freedom is somewhat illusory, for the primitive man, though he may have no individual superior has little chance of any personal life apart from his group, and little initiative apart from its traditions. It is solidarity rather than free co-operation which is the character of the primitive groups. But this solidarity with such elements of freedom and equality as it allows is more and more completely lost as communities become organised on the principle of subordination.¹ In the higher civilisations, however, a more

¹ Lost, that is, in the political organisation as a whole, it survives as indicated above in the archaic elements, hundreds, clans and villages, upon which a central government is superimposed.

genuine freedom is sought and with it an equality of rights, despite all differences of function. We say sought, for they have never been more than partially attained, but even this partial attainment is the most important departure in social development since the beginning of differentiation. We have observed it in the two phases of the city State and the modern State, the difference turning on scale and on relative thoroughness in the application of the principle. We have also seen that modern civilisation has reached a point at which it must either go through with these principles or collapse into some more primitive and more barbaric form of life.

When we speak of true freedom as restricted to the higher communities we mean a freedom that has become a part of the principle of government. There is, of course, a measure of freedom resulting from mere slackness of control—freedom as the alternative to efficiency. But there is also a freedom which is the soundest basis of efficiency—the willing partnership of the citizen in the common life, not cramping, but enlarging and enriching the individual personality. Such freedom is only possible if each man effectually feels the common good to be in some sort his own, that is, it implies some kind or measure of equality in partnership. This is not the place for the more detailed analysis either of liberty or equality in their relations to the unity of social life. For the moment our point is that in the higher civilisations both of antiquity and of modern times persistent endeavours have been made to establish these principles as against the principles of class subordination and passive obedience. In antiquity the principle was applied partially and on the small scale. In the modern world it has received a fuller definition and its scale of operation is much greater, yet it is still far from assured success, and its nature seems to be such that if it does not advance it will go back, and free civilisation will once again be swallowed up in the night of despotism or anarchy.

5 Thus the story of civilisation breaks off at a critical point, and in default of the chapters that have yet to be written we are thrown back on the examination of the

characters and their situation. In other words we must pass from history to the analysis of society. We must consider the generic character of social life, the nature of the social nexus, the forces operative in social change. From them, with the aid of the historical data, we may hope to discover the nature, conditions and potentialities of social development. We must ask where the essentials of such development lie, whether (as some see them) in magnitude of scale and power—the world's map painted red—or as others prefer, in the delicate articulation of highly differentiated functions, or again in the more complete fulfilment of common purposes. With this last view we approach a line of deep cleavage in sociological method. To many the realisation of human values is the one thing that matters. They recognise the growth of knowledge and power, the extension of civilisation, the vastness of Empire, the reticulated delicacy of interrelated economic functions. "But what good came of it at last?" is their cry. Does knowledge for all its accumulated material and elaboration of method give us the heart of reality.¹ It gives us power, but do we turn power to human uses? Has it made our life better, happier, fuller, even in essentials, richer? Materially our power is to that of Periclean Athens as the dreadnought to the trireme. In terms of human well-being it is needless to discuss whether on balance we come out well or ill from the comparison. The glaring fact is that the balance of loss or gain is close enough to be argued. We have to face the conclusion that although mankind is for ever seeking to satisfy its needs, and succeeding beyond hope in finding new ways of doing so, yet after generations and centuries the broad result remains in doubt. We seem no nearer to the goal of desire than to the heart of reality. As to social institutions we can build great Empires and perfect the machinery of organisation, but with questionable advantage to the individual,

¹ At bottom this is the fundamental question of metaphysics, yet its importance to sociology may be gauged by the fact that Comte founded his whole system on a negative answer. The wisdom of the positive stage lay in recognising that we are not in touch with ultimate reality. The question cannot be properly treated in a sociological work, but it is so vital that I shall have to recur to it at a later stage.

who is reduced to the position of a cog in wheel work which he does not understand. Such are the questions with which the social philosopher probes the claims of progress. On the other side the whole conception of ends and values is anathema to the more rigid exponent of sociology as a science. To him the facts of science are one thing and the ends of man quite another. Seeing however, that our particular science has the web of human purpose as its main subject the question how far these purposes fulfil themselves cannot well be expunged from its survey. What place they are to occupy may be discussed later. Suffice it for the moment to have shown that the very conception of social development requires definition, and that the problem of defining it at once raises one of the most vital questions of sociological method.

We have then to consider the nature of society and the meaning of social development. This meaning once ascertained we have to compare it with the actual movements that have been summarily indicated, and will be more closely considered as occasion arises.

CHAPTER II

SOCIETY AND THE COMMUNITY

I. EVERY man is a centre of an indefinite number of relations to others, which may be called generically social. In a simple society these relations are relatively few. In a larger and more complex society they become exceedingly numerous and diversified. Some of them, like the relations of parent and child, husband and wife, go to the roots of life. Others, like the casual intercourse of the club or the train, are as fleeting and superficial as may be. Of many the subject is himself unaware, for every one of us is affected by the doings of unnumbered men of whom we know nothing individually and may never even have heard. For example, the price we have to pay for our coal, boots or sugar is determined by numerical relations between the amounts people want to buy and the amounts other people can produce. The ordinary purchaser knows nothing of these numbers, but is none the less rigidly circumscribed in his dealings by their operation. Relationships of this sort have no precise limitation of time or space within the earth. Physical communication has rendered the nations, whether they like it or not, members of one another, and an English maker of nets—I quote an actual case—is unemployed because troubles in Russia have dislocated one branch of the fishing trade. The impoverishment of the individual net-maker has in turn its reactions upon his family, on the tradesmen from whom he buys, and the producers who supply the tradesmen, and so the train of cause and effect goes on without end. Social relations so conceived form no definite bounded whole, but rather a

tissue that extends indefinitely, and has no marked beginning or end.

Within this amorphous tissue, however, we easily discern collections or pluralities of human beings whose relations to one another are durable and defined. Any such plurality constitutes what we may call generically a society. Here, again the epithets used must be taken as admitting every possible degree of more or less. For example a society in its ordinary popular usage of a number of people in friendly intercourse has no precise limits. Mrs. B is on visiting terms both with Mrs. A and Mrs. C, but A and C are just too remote, either geographically or socially, to 'know' one another. Nor has society in this sense any very distinct organisation, though there are plenty of understandings by which its internal relations are regulated. Again, a society organised for a definite purpose, e.g. a literary society, may have but a variable membership and perhaps but a fleeting existence. In civilised life most of us belong to several social groupings, some of them as our family, our church and our nation, of high importance, durability and definiteness, others of slight and occasional character. It is our business to deal with the more important of these societies, never forgetting, however, that none of them constitute absolutely closed circles, but all alike subsist within the ubiquitous system of social relations, whereby their inner lives are constantly affected. A good deal has been written about the origin of society. In strictness there is no such thing—no such thing, that is, as distinct from the origin of man himself, or of some pre-human ancestor, for man evolved as the social relation evolved. He is a dependent being, and his development is the development of a nexus of relations to which his own nature must point by point adapt itself. The origin of any particular form of society is another matter, and one capable of investigation by the ordinary historical and comparative methods.

The network of relations in which a man stands to his fellows includes, of course, all those making in any way for mutual antagonism as well as those making for co-operation. On a very broad view the form which societies assume

is determined by the relations between these two factors. In any durable society friendly or at lowest co-operative relations¹ must be pre-potent, and the unfriendly brought under some sort of control. Thus the basis of co-operative relationships will be the basis of the main forms of society.

2 Of all ties between human beings the most deep-seated and universal are those of sex and parenthood, the durable, if not lifelong, association of man, wife and children being common to all known societies. Our business for the moment is not to analyse this tie, but to consider the social structure to which it gives rise. Through the ramifications of descent and intermarriage it brings every individual into relation with quite a number of others, but how far this number will form an organised whole is another question. As an organised structure it can scarcely be said among ourselves to extend beyond the 'natural family' of parents and children, and even within these limits it tends to break up as the children go out into the world. What remains is a network of relations, very important, engaging strong feelings, and manifesting itself in mutual aid, disposition of property and the like, but essentially a mass of relations, fluctuating from case to case, rather than a defined structure. In most earlier societies kindred gave rise to more extensive organisations, often comprising the whole of those claiming blood relationship through the male or through the female according as descent was reckoned, sometimes possessed of corporate property, or dependent on property owned by its head, and performing religious rites in common. The forms that the kindred has assumed are various, and the controversies that surround their genesis and significance too involved to permit of full, or to justify incidental treatment. We merely observe that here is a type of social structure which in one or other of its numerous forms persists throughout the history of mankind as founded on innate impulses. Among these impulses parental rather than conjugal feeling probably plays the first part, while

¹ The relation of master and slave is in general co-operative. It is not necessarily unfriendly, but it would be paradoxical to class it as a species of the genus friendliness.

beyond them both there is something more—a sense of continuity, or enlarged identity, which takes shape in consciousness as family pride and solidarity, and which is the simplest and most natural way whereby the ordinary man feels himself rooted in the past, and reaching out towards the future

3. Among some of the simpler peoples effective co-operation hardly extends beyond the kindred as constituted by descent and intermarriage. But even among the simpler peoples that is the exception, and in the civilised world the recognised kindred is reduced to a tiny fraction of the whole number of those living peaceably together. The fundamental necessity of such peaceable and orderly relationship is a definite understanding on the part of each man of what he may do in relation to others and of what they may do to him. This is the foundation of mutual trust, and therefore of mutual service. Orderly society, then, rests on a system of common rules of behaviour which are generally understood by each member, so far at least as they affect him, and are generally supported whether by the sentiment of the society, or, as in State law, by some definite organ of control

The whole population owning a common rule may be designated a Community. The name, however, would suggest something more than a rule in common. It would suggest a common sentiment and a common interest, and it must be asked whether it is applicable to a population only held together by the authority of a foreign power, or to one in which the majority are the unwilling subjects of a powerful oligarchy. The question how far this is possible, how far the writ of government would actually run if it is opposed to sentiment, has been and remains a live issue of politics, and the only general answer to be given is that it is certainly possible—to a limit. But the position of the limit varies very greatly in proportion to the strength of potential factors of resistance, which can only be determined by dismal and often disastrous experiment. As a matter of cold nomenclature, it will be convenient for purposes of comparison to give the term Community

the widest possible extension, and therefore to consider all populations living under a common rule as political communities, though they have only the bare bones of a common life.

The entire population of a territory, large or small, will then constitute a community if it owns a common rule. But if, e.g. two hordes wander over the same area but own no common rule, or if two groups with no common rule are close neighbours, they are two communities and not one. Nor is it enough that there should be regular social relationships between them. Social relations may ramify indefinitely, but unless they give rise to a social structure with some distinctive unity they do not constitute what we are calling a community. Society at this stage is rather the material out of which the community is composed than the formed community itself. We might call it a pre-community. The community proper must be an assignable body of people possessing accordingly distinct limits.

In every developed community there are regular methods for the performance of two essential functions, the common defence and the maintenance of the common rule. In the primitive community we often find that there is no regular organ for either purpose. In particular the enforcement of the common rule is largely, if not entirely, left to the kindred, or to some other portion of the entire body, and there may be no effective government of the whole. Nevertheless, careful observation in numerous cases has shown that the common rule may be, to say the least, as faithfully observed as in a civilised society with all its police. Common government, then, is not essential to a community. What is essential is a common rule habitually observed throughout a population of distinct structure with assignable limits.

4. This distinctive unity does not prevent a community from being part of a larger community. To be distinct it must have rules, or the power to make rules of its own, and these it may enjoy, although its relations to other parts, and perhaps some internal matters of common importance, have to be determined by mutual consultation, or in a

common parliament. Community and sovereignty are quite distinct conceptions. Politically we are familiar with this structure in the modern world. Among the simpler peoples we find groups within the community which often have more vitality than the community as a whole. Often the kindred is such an inner community, substantially self-governing, touched by no outsider in its internal relations. At this stage the common rules are largely concerned with the relations between kindreds, in particular with the disputes that arise between them, and consequent questions of revenge or compensation. It is a mark of the development of the community that it overcomes this autonomy of the kindred, regulates its internal relations and finally protects the individual, wife, or infant, if need be, against its own kin.

In some very early stages the kindred is itself the only community that there is, and the early history of the community certainly turns on its relations to kindred. It is, however, a mistake to infer that the community originates through the enlargement of a family by processes of natural increase, helped out by adoption and the incorporation of slaves. By the side of common descent there is intermarriage involving the union of distinct lines. For from the simplest societies upwards prohibitions deeply felt and strongly enforced compel the younger generation as it grows up to find mates outside the immediate family circle, and generally indicate the particular group within which a mate is to be found in such a manner that the entire community must become and remain united by countless threads of affinity. The most probable hypothesis of the origin of the community is that it is a circle of intermarrying families.¹ This circle may be closed, for there is through-

¹ I cannot here go into the complex argument which this statement will suggest to many. I have discussed the matter more fully in *Morals and Evolution*, Part I, chapter 11. The main objection is the arbitrary and fluctuating nature of the rules of exogamy, which do not seem to agree with any general and permanent instinct. If, however, we take as the core of the whole matter a deep-seated aversion to intercourse with a parent, and particularly with the mother, it will be quite in accordance with the operation of ideas in the lower cultures that the aversion should be arbitrarily extended

out human society an endogamous tendency running athwart the exogamous. It is the endogamous tendency which keeps many early societies small and separate, just as among civilised people it maintains the social isolation of classes, castes and races. But the circle may be and often is open. For this there are two reasons: sex attraction, which operates independently of institutions, and the advantages of neighbourly co-operation which, when they can overcome suspicion, bring about friendly association, irrespective of the blood or marriage tie. Now such association in all societies opens the question: Will the associates be allowed to marry one another's sisters and daughters? If yes, they will spontaneously grow into one society. If no, they will only be kept together by some other constraining bond, and in spite of this bond a deep internal cleavage will remain. In the civilised community such bonds exist, but in the early community the association is not likely to be permanent without intermarriage, and he who is not actually mated within the circle is at least of a marriageable class¹. Still in some very simple communities we find members who are not more nearly akin to the rest than they are to those of other groups. The local tie counts. The group is a group of neighbours as well as kinsfolk. Further, if the circle is not closed, frequent and extensive intermarriage may unite one group with others, and if there is also similarity of ideas the groups may gather together for ceremonial purposes and begin to think of themselves as one. The tendency of such union—and here again we touch on a factor that has operated in all stages of history—is to distinguish them collectively from their neighbours, and thus the combined groups crystallise out as a distinct community which will now beyond

(e.g. to anyone connected with the mother as by bearing the same name or the same totem), while it may not be applied, e.g., to children of the same father

¹ Among some North-American Indians a stranger, even a captive enemy, might be adopted, and would then be given a wife within the group—possibly by way of compensation (or revenge?) the widow of the man he has killed. The Australian aborigines on the borderline of distinct marriage systems take pains to dovetail one into the other so that it is known whom a man of a neighbouring group may lawfully marry.

doubt include many who are not related to one another at all. A may be related to B, B to C, and so on, but between A and Z there will be no recognised kinship. What unites them all now is a common rule behind which the ties of blood and intermarriage, notwithstanding the vast social importance which they always retain, fall into the second place. It is on the sheer survival value of the common rule as the foundation of peaceful human co-operation that the community rests, and it is because this principle operates, whether we recognise it or not, that communities come into being, flourish and develop, without conscious design. For it is certain that communities in the first instance are not made, but grow. As they develop, no doubt conscious processes play a larger part. Conquest and territorial extension are deliberately planned, and voluntary unions take place on terms. But even so the life of the community goes on, and its structure silently changes without plan, and without even the full awareness of any individual or organisation. Only a very advanced systematic science could grasp the life of a community in its fullness, and no such science has advanced beyond the initial stages.

5. The life of the community rests on the system of common rules, and just as the community grows unconsciously and then begins to be made or modified by conscious effort, so do its rules grow unconsciously and then fall within the scope of deliberate purpose. The typical unconscious rule is custom. It is important to appreciate precisely what is meant by calling it unconscious. The man whether civilised or uncivilised who conforms to custom is not acting like an automaton. He is perfectly well aware of what he is doing at the moment. He knows that it is expected of him, and he himself would expect it of another placed in similar circumstances. He knows, for instance, that he must give a week's or a month's notice, as the case may be, if he wishes to leave his employment, and he knows correlatively that he is entitled to the same notice if he is dismissed. He knows it as what he is told, what he sees others doing, what nobody questions. He does not (we assume) question it. He knows

no why or wherefore, does not ask how the custom has arisen, whether it is the same in all occupations or in all places, whether it is just or reasonable. The custom is not a matter for criticism or inquiry, is not even defined in general terms with precise limitations. It is not consciously reviewed by those who conform to it. Where custom comes into contact with law the case is different. Its precise character and exact limitations, possibly its origin and logical grounds will now be passed under review, and the particular case will be criticised in relation to the general rule. Still more if the custom begins to be resented it will be an object of very direct attention, compared with other customs, viewed in its effect upon life as a whole. But it is only at certain turning points that custom thus becomes an object of criticism. In its ordinary course life moves on noiseless wheels and the oil is custom.

How, then, does custom originate? We can best understand that by considering how it changes. Without repudiating custom, men seek their own ends under its ægis as best they can. They squeeze it a little this way or that. They 'try it on,' and if the experiment is not resented it becomes a precedent. The process begins in the nursery. The small child begs to sit up an extra ten minutes on a special occasion. Next evening the unsuspecting parent finds that the privilege has become a precedent. So is it probably with origins. In any new situation a man of initiative acts as suits his wishes there and then. If his action is not opposed he repeats it. It is an example for others, and in a short time it is 'what has always been done.' If it is opposed, he halts, makes a turn and tries another way. Meanwhile others are adapting themselves by similar methods, and in the end either there is somewhere a collision and the point at issue is decided by discussion or force, or, more often, things settle down so that people move in relation to each other on the lines of least resistance. Custom, then, is something to which people have adapted themselves, a basis on which life can be carried on, and this is the real ground of its authority. Alter it anywhere and you do not quite know what will

happen, so that the fear of the unknown is against you. If, in fact, men were all equal in strength and wisdom, and if circumstances never changed, custom would be an automatic solution of all social problems because it would represent the lines which each chose for himself, having regard to the equal claims of others. But as a fact in the formation of custom, the stronger party will get the best accommodation, and when circumstances change old customs may be a serious obstacle to adjustment. It is under such circumstances that custom comes before consciousness as an object of critical examination.

However, custom as custom is a rule accepted uncritically and supported in any case that arises by general sentiment, and the mass of custom forms the groundwork of social life, in which its function has been compared, aptly enough, to the function of instinct in the life of the individual. Law undoubtedly arises out of custom, but is essentially a rule declared and enforced by a constituted authority. There is, indeed, a transitional stage at which a court declares the law without enforcing it, but it is a matter of words whether we decide to call such a rule custom because it will be enforced by sentiment or the action of the successful party, or law because it is authoritatively announced. The rule is, in fact, at the transitional point between custom and law. Developed law is the rule which a court will enforce.¹ In law every rule is strictly defined and limited, whereas in custom the edges are generally left ragged, and in this precision there is both gain and loss. Law is more certain, and for the same reason more rigid, and the necessary adaptation to the circumstances is left to lawyers, and is too often biased by the sentiments of the legal class. However, the ultimate authority of law is the same as that of custom. It is the rule of the authority acting for the community, and to disobey it is by implication to revolt against the communal life as at present consti-

¹ The point is now important mainly in regard to international law, which it is fairly easy to get declared but not at all easy to get enforced. Pragmatically, it is desirable to extend the more authoritative term law to that which is formally asserted as the rule applying to nations, but we are all aware of the further step that is required.

tuted—a revolt which can be justified only if that constitution is radically bad. The power of amending law without touching the constitution of the community is therefore a necessity in the interests of social conservation.

6. Laws and customs are often spoken of as institutions. Is this usage appropriate, and how does it consort with other meanings of institution? Property is an institution, but we could not call it a custom, and though there are laws of property, no turn of language could justify the proposition that property is a law. To shake hands and remark on the weather when we meet are customs. Are they institutions? Again, a church, a university, a village reading-room are 'institutions,' and with them we seem to enter quite a different area of meaning. The term, in fact, is so variously used that it is doubtful if it has a single root meaning common to all its applications. Perhaps we get nearest to such a common element if we regard an institution as the whole or any part of the established and recognised apparatus of social life—whether the life of the community as a whole or of some special part of it. This would include actual laws and customs—the latter so far as definitely recognised and established¹—their basis, and the complexes which a number of them form. Thus property is the institution operating in the processes of acquisition and exchange, and in all the laws and customs regulating them. It is the idea and the fact common to them all, with which all are concerned. The law itself is not a law, but an institution. If further we ask what sort of thing the institution of law is, the answer would naturally take the form that it is a system of rules regulating the behaviour of men laid down and enforced in such and such ways. If, however, we rejoin that rules are abstractions, and we want to know the concrete reality embodied in law,

¹ Thus some form of greeting may be fairly regarded as a social institution. The subject of the weather as a conversational opening is really almost an institution in England. It is its triviality which makes the designation inappropriate. An institution is something important, and so we use it humorously of an individual who is a fixture in some humble position and is also a character. James the waiter or the porter is an institution because along with his permanence he has a quaint and charming importance of his own.

any further answer must take the shape of an indication of law courts, judges, advocates, police—persons, in short, and groups of persons. In the case of the law, I do not think this would be the natural answer to a request for a definition. But in the case of the Church it is otherwise, for a Church does seem to be a body of persons united by a creed and by certain consequent practices. But the Church also conforms to our previous description of an institution, for it is part of the established¹ and recognised apparatus of social life regulating a whole mass of human relations. If now we turn back to the law we may reflect that if there is no definite body of men who constitute 'the law,' there are several definite bodies specially concerned with the declaration and enforcement of law—the Bench, the Bar, the Incorporated Law Society, the police. They are related not by any corporate organisation, but merely by the fact that in various ways they serve the same function. In this case, therefore, it is the function that we think of as the institution, while in the case of the Church we might think either of the function or of those who serve it because they form a definite body. If, lastly, the village reading-room is thought of as an institution, it is because here the material building is the meeting point of unity. A committee no doubt governs it, a vague changing number of people use it. The room itself is what unites them and takes its place in the forefront when we think of the institution.

The term institution then covers (1) recognised and established usages governing certain relations of men, (2) an entire complex of such usages and the principles governing it, and (3) the organisation (if such exists) supporting such a complex. On the one side the reference is to certain relations between human beings, on the other, to human beings themselves united by the fulfilment of some particular function. It is convenient to divide these meanings in our terminology, and retaining 'institution' for relations, their complexes and their principles, to find another term for human beings united for a specific purpose

¹ The term here, of course, is not restricted to an establishment by law.

or in the performance of a specific function. Such a union might be called an Association^{*} The term must therefore be applied to a partnership, an entire business concern, a school, a university, and also to an organised profession, a trade union, a political party, even a literary society. Some of these purposes are slight ; others touch the fundamentals of life—most conspicuously industrial relations on the one side, and religious associations on the other. It will be seen, however, that the association as existing for a specific purpose is not complete in itself, but is one part of the life of the community. It will be seen also that an institution may have an association, or a number of connected associations for its maintenance. Where there is but one such association and the institution is nothing but its activity, the two terms express the same entity, the one in its abstract, the other in its human aspect.

7. We have remarked that a civilised community always has a regular organ or organs to maintain its common rules. This organ or system of organs in its entirety is what we know as the State. That is to say, by the community we understand the people owning a common rule in all their varied lives and relationships, by the State, the fabric of law, government and defence by which the rule is maintained. The State, therefore, is not the community, but a system of institutions, and therefore regarded as a union of human beings, an association. Now the State system includes along with the machinery of law and administration the constituent authority on which government rests. Thus in very democratic countries the persons comprised in the State system include all the adult members of the community, and by stretching a point, adding children for their prospects, and ignoring the insane and the criminal, we might say that the State and the community are composed of the same people—that the State is the community,

^{*} I follow Professor McIver in this usage. It will be observed that the marriage union falls literally within the definition, but the children of the marriage—as it is sometimes necessary to remind parents—are not parties to the bargain, and through them, as well as through relations to their own families, the married couple—though considered by themselves they might be regarded as an association—form essentially a part of a kindred.

organised for certain purposes. But State institutions are only a fraction of the common life, and there are numerous cases in which no stretching can produce coincidence of membership. In any undemocratic country the State is not the organised community, but an organisation within, or even without the community. It may, as in a conquered country, be the organ of a foreign Power, it may be in the hands of a close oligarchy, and rigidly exclude the mass of the people from all functions except that of obedience. It is as ludicrous as it is mischievous to conceive law and policy in such cases as derived from or expressing the will of the community.¹ Lastly, among many of the simpler communities there is no State. A single chief does not constitute a State, and among some peoples even a chief is lacking.

The precise point at which a community may be regarded as equipped with State organisation is not in fact easy to determine. Indeed, the definition of statehood from this point of view has hardly received the attention it deserves. People have been content to dismiss the cruder forms of government as Tribalism, and to allow the name of State only to communities of a certain degree of civilisation and settled order. We might reserve the term State for political organisations which are either democratic or have at least made some substantial advances towards democracy, and this restriction seems to be implied in Green's famous dictum that will, not force, is the basis of the State. But the restriction does not seem to accord sufficiently well with general usage, nor to mark clearly enough the boundary between States and other forms of government. It may perhaps be suggested that a State is a fabric in which the principal functions of government, the declaration of law, its execution, and the common

¹ It is, perhaps, only the war mind which could (a) condemn the German people for slavish subjection to the Kaiser, and require that he should be executed as the author of Europe's misery, and (b) after the deposition of the Kaiser justify the punishment of the whole German people (including babies born after 1914) as collectively answerable for the war. But the identification of the State with the actual people forming the community which it controls gives a certain appearance of logic to this absurdity.

defence, are differentiated and co-ordinated. This would exclude the chief who can wield all powers in his single hand, or who only performs certain functions, like the distinct war chiefs and peace chiefs of certain tribes. It supposes some system in the matter of government, some organisation and stability of relations, and here there may be at any rate the beginnings of statehood. The more important point for us is that the State as a system of organs maintained for a purpose is an institution, and its human basis, accordingly, of the nature of an association. The association may, as we have seen, approach in its membership to coincidence with the community. Where this is the case the State may without essential fallacy be regarded as the organised community, otherwise the State is an organisation within or even imposed upon the community for the performance of specific purposes.

On this view theories of the origin and basis of the State appear in a different light from that in which they have been seen in historic controversies. The State as here defined has not as a rule any definite beginning, but emerges in the growth of an ordered government and a stable constitution, and its history will differ from case to case. Particular States have even been formed at definite dates and by agreement, as e.g. the United States of America. Communities have also been consolidated and extended by force, and then have received their organisation, or parts of the acquired territory, like the British Dominions, have been constituted by legislative acts into distinct sub-States. The process has differed as widely as the history of different peoples, and force, agreement, geographical and economic conditions, national peculiarities and beliefs, have all played their part. There is no question really of the origin of the State, but of the historical formation and growth of States, and if we will, of the relative importance of the various factors that have operated therein with varying force at different times and places. With regard to the basis of the State, however, more general terms may be used. States have grown and flourished because communities require organisation. The organised community

will beat the unorganised in the struggle for existence. Now the organisation of human beings postulates in general two things—on the one hand a universal and clear understanding on the part of each man, of his place, his function, his rights, what he may expect, and what is expected of him, on the other a certain power of compulsion to secure the fulfilment of this expectation against any individual recalcitrant. A's work dovetails into B's, and A can only carry on effectually if he has confidence that B is playing up to him. The foundations of this security are laid by the State organisation, for the whole system has to be maintained against the possibility of assault from without, and disorder within.

The hope to eliminate force altogether from the State is Utopian, because it implies that the will to conform to the conditions of common life should become not merely general but rigidly universal. A single pervert altogether uncontrolled could work endless mischief. But force is only a reserve. The main function of the State is regulation which the bulk of us willingly accept when we know definitely what it requires of us. With the best will in the world we could not live together in a complex society without definition of our rights and duties, and of these the most general and necessary must be prescribed universally.

In more general terms the State has to serve such functions as require the organised resources of the community as a whole. The function most generally recognised and important in promoting the power and growth of States has of course been that of defence (internal and external), a function which passes easily—too easily many think—into that of securing territorial expansion and domination. The use of organised resources for the advancement of internal welfare is rarer and belongs to a higher civilisation. How States may usefully develop their powers in this direction is a question raising complex issues which need not be discussed in this place. Suffice it that in general the State is required as the organ of the community for the execution of all purposes for which common force or the common resources are essential.

To sum up the results of the discussion in the fewest possible words. Relationships of man to man, conscious or unconscious, co-operative or antagonistic, pervade all life, and form a tissue without definite beginning or end. But some of them serve to bind numbers of men together in distinct and durable societies. The simplest of these are the parental and conjugal ties out of which the kindred arises. It is probably through the extension of intermarriage that different families grow into one community. But, however formed, the community becomes a distinctive union based on a common rule, and in general a common sentiment or interest. Within the community groups of all sorts may be formed, and those which serve any special purpose or function we call Associations. The orderly life of the community implies that in their relations to one another, men fall, or are brought, into certain definite ways of action which while left to sentiment and common sense are customs, when authoritatively defined and enforced become laws. Any recognised relation or system of relations may be called an institution, and every developed community has an institutional system called the State, which supervises internal order and external relations, while it may also organise the resources of the community for any purposes of general interest. The State is not identical with the community, nor the community with society, but a life resting on a common rule, whether enforced by central authority or not, is the medium within which all internal relations move, and by which the reaction to external impact is determined.

CHAPTER III

THE BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY

1. THEORIES of the basis of the community have suffered from the confusion between community and State. This applies almost equally to the rival theories which between them have occupied the greater part of the field—the theories of Consent and of Force. As a matter of history, some State constitutions have been formed by agreement. It is even true that new political communities have been shaped by deliberate union or division. But such deliberate procedure implies a large measure of mutual understanding and customs of deliberation and co-operation. It comes about, therefore, only within or between communities already formed, and has no plausible application to the original growth of communities. Nor, apart from origins, is that a very sound community which may at any time be dissolved by a majority vote. The division of State power, on the other hand, is always matter for discussion, and may be the best method of fortifying the vital union of the community. The use of forcible compulsion, again, we have seen to be an attribute of the State, and a necessary instrument of the developed community. But life is not based on the instruments which it employs, and the State with all its power is but the community's organ. True, many political communities have no doubt been unified in the first instance by force, but the fallacy that force as such is the basis of the community as such results from an anti-social view of human nature, and a lack of elementary analysis of the terms used. It assumes that people would not live peaceably together unless they were compelled

to do so by an external authority, yet this external authority can only consist of men with like passions to their own. The philosophical anarchist is nearer the truth in that he at least recognises that the ordinary man in his ordinary behaviour comports himself of good will and without constraint as a decent member of society—that if, for example, he makes an agreement, he keeps it not because penalties attach to its breach, but because it does not occur to him to break faith. Where the anarchist goes wrong is in ignoring the fact that there are men below the ordinary, and temptations above the ordinary, and that a little breach is the letting out of great waters which may easily submerge an entire order. But the philosopher of force is more gravely wrong in taking the exception for the rule, and regarding human nature as unsocial because there are a few men of low social standard, and a few occasions on which better men are tempted to anti-social acts. What the exponent of force really has in mind is not the community as such, but the kind of community in which force has already been too freely used to plant the feet of a minority on the shoulders of the rest. In such a case it is only too true that force must remain the basis unless or until men become willing to accept a more equitable system. In such a society there is always a suppressed fear of the mass diffused among the more fortunate, and all sorts of ill nature and ill designs are readily attributed to them. Force is not the foundation of the community, but has an importance in communities which stands in inverse relation to the degree of justice which they embody.

What is force in social affairs? It is not muscular strength. It cannot, if the community passes the bounds of a tiny group, reside in the superior energy or cunning of one man. Far from being the ground or basis of organisation, it rests upon organisation, and postulates the willing adherence of a number to the common action. In the last analysis even the discipline of an army rests on the will of the soldiers. Doubtless the swift and immediate punishment of the first insubordination can hold up mutiny—to a point. It is once again the stoppage of the breach

which is easy while the breach is small. But in inflicting punishment on one soldier the General relies on the obedience of the rest, and if there comes a point where discontent is general he has no force behind him. Force, then, for social purposes rests on a union of wills, and, though it may preserve this union against a temporary breach, at bottom it does not sustain but is sustained by it. Force can actually govern a community only in this sense. There are certain groups within the community either relying on their own organisation or on outside power, able to dominate the remainder and bind them to their will. Now such communities have existed. Communities in which some such relation of governors and governed is blended in more or less satisfactory compromise with other principles, are numerous. But to lay down that the community as such rests on force is to generalise the relation in the naked form in which it seldom persists under the cover of a distorted view of human nature, and a false analysis of the terms used.

To translate the theory of force into scientific terms, for force we should write fear. Now fear in the background rather than the forefront is a very pervasive element in human conduct, and therefore in social relations among the rest. It has very diverse effects according to its degree and the manner in which it is blended with other impulses. Thus a certain underlying fear may make a man conciliatory in his relations to another, and dispose him to a reasonable adjustment of such relations, or it may make him suspicious and alert, ready to get his blow in first. On the whole fear, which Dr. McDougall has picturesquely called 'the great inhibitor,' is the inhibitor among other things of social relations. In so far as they fear one another, men shut themselves up. But a common fear draws men together, just as mutual fear holds them apart. One may say of the simpler community that it is formed by overcoming fear, and yet it is cemented by fear of the outside world, and our modern patriotism is still half fear of the foreigner. This particular influence of fear, however, presupposes communities already formed, and we are asking

about their formation. Here any plausible theory of fear must mean that some one or some few are able to impose unity on others and hold them through fear. This would be quite untrue of the simpler communities, but it is not without a genuine application to communities based on conquest. Fear, partly sublimated into awe, supports the authority of king, priesthood, caste or nobility, and supplies a certain permanence and security which could never be achieved by sheer naked force. But this is not to say that fear is the basis of the community. It is only the basis of a kind of social order that does not appear desirable to the majority of the members of a community. As a matter of fact, even in the most authoritarian communities there are quite other elements. Every feudal system, for example, has in it an element of mutual aid, protection by the superior given and sometimes voluntarily sought in return for service by the inferior, and this is the more fundamental relation, since when the superior ceases to function he gradually loses the awe and majesty that do hedge him. Finally the theory of fear ignores—and means to ignore—the civic State, which is essentially an attempt to found great communities not on awe of a superior, but on unity of wills. No such attempt, an enemy may contend, has yet fully and finally succeeded. That is matter for argument, but the life of the civic State is not to be cut short by a definition. The test of the philosophy of Fear is War, and war on the greatest scale has shown that it is not principalities and powers, not generals or machinery of organisation, but the resolute union of wills that wins.

Fear, then, plays on the whole a disruptive part. It keeps men and communities apart. On the other hand, it renders communities more compact, underlies the authoritarian form of the community and opposes the civic principle. Clearly its function is secondary, and, on balance, perverse.

2. What is the alternative principle to force and fear? The word 'consent' at once suggests itself, but the suggestion is not to be accepted too hastily. To begin with,

we must, as always, distinguish between the fact and the ideal. Whatever may be right or wrong it is clear consent in its full sense is not a condition of membership. In an ordered community people are not asked whether they wish to be citizens, but have to obey the law as long as they are in the jurisdiction. Perhaps they may emigrate, but the State has not always conceded to them the right to do so. If they have the right it may not be within their power to exercise it, and exile itself may be a heavy penalty. The community, in fact, is not a voluntary association which men can enter and leave as they choose, but its organisation is a necessity of social life, and imposes itself accordingly on the reluctant. The doctrine that men do, in fact, consent to the life and requirements, and more, to the public deeds of the community to which they belong is, as has already been hinted, capable of harsh and very unjust interpretation. For the most part men cannot help themselves, and have not even that partial responsibility which they incur for the consequences of a lifelong partnership like marriage—a partnership which, however unpredictable in its outcome, is at any rate entered into by their deliberate act. If we are to find any reality in the doctrine of consent on this side it is in some deeper sense which the word does not naturally convey. Some of the simpler peoples have refused their consent to civilisation, and in particular to slavery, in that they died out under it. The negro, on the contrary, did not carry his resistance to this point. He could tolerate slavery which for the most part the American-Indian could not. But consent is not the word to use here. What we see is that there are limits in human nature—and different limits in the nature of different individuals and races—to the constraint of social institutions. No Treitschke can compel all men to all things, but institutions must be in some degree adapted to the requirements of those who live under them.

The doctrine of consent proper has a closer application to masses of men than to individuals, but here it is primarily an ethical doctrine rather than an analysis of facts. The familiar principle that government ought to be by the

consent of the governed has no sense if the consent of every individual, however wilful, perverse or criminal, is intended. It would then mean that there was to be no compulsion except in cases where no compulsion is required. What the doctrine contemplates, of course, is a population desirous of an ordered common life, but no less desirous to choose its own order and form its own organised community. Here we certainly strike the natural antithesis to force, and if, and in so far as, force is not the basis of communal organisation, it is in consent so interpreted that the basis must be found. But the problems of political ethics involved in the principle are tangled in the extreme. For what precise section has a right of independence? And how far may its independence be carried to the prejudice of other people? No single abstract principle suffices of itself to answer these questions. What ethics has to say is that here as elsewhere we cannot take one claim of right absolutely by itself as governing the entire situation. The interests of all parties must be borne in mind, and if, for example, we have a people like the Irish desiring to break off from another, what is required is first mutual consent, or that failing, reference to an impartial tribunal. The principle which must govern the tribunal is to determine what under the circumstances of the case are the interests which are common and indissoluble, and which are separate, and to provide forms of government which meet both requirements alike.

These questions, however, belong rather to political ethics than to the analysis of the actual conditions on which communities repose. What is the truth underlying the doctrine of consent as an analysis of these conditions? If we analyse the idea of a social compact to its lowest terms, it seems to mean that the formation of a community is of the nature of a bargain, in that each party gives something for something. He gives up his unchartered freedom and he receives security, or, as Paine says, he gives up certain natural rights and receives civil rights in exchange. He is the gainer because his natural rights he has no power to enforce. His civil rights are more restricted, but they

are solid value. Now it is certainly true that in all concerted action men must give up something of their individual wills. Perhaps no one has felt this more acutely than the absolute monarch or the all-powerful minister. But it is a mistake to conceive the admission to social life as essentially a giving up. On the contrary, as Rousseau really saw—and would have seen more clearly if no compact theory had hampered him—it is essentially an enlargement and a gain. Men need society not merely to protect themselves, but as the field of their own lives. We cannot be ourselves without others. "How can I cut without a knife, how can I marry without a wife?" the rhyme pertinently asks. If I am to be all that my capacities for the family affections would have me be, I must live in a family, and if I would be any of the things that would make me a man I must for their completeness live in a society. I must do so, not primarily for what I get from society but rather for what I give, not for what I receive but for what I spend, for my own impulses, cravings, capacities that I fulfil in social life. It is in this sense that society grows out of human nature. True, we can conceive society without the organised community, but as a fact it has been and still is through the organised community that social relations have been maintained, and it is this which attaches the community, and through the common life the State, to the individual.

3 One early school of economists interpreted this relation as an ultimate identity of interest. The individual was supposed to be governed exclusively by interests of his own. But if he were sufficiently enlightened he discovered that these interests coincided with those of others. This applied particularly in the economic sphere. Not only was the trader interested in the good order of society, but in the prosperity of his customers. It might pay him to overreach them in a particular bargain, but in the long run it paid him better that they should prosper and be able to buy of him. If landlords and tenants, employers and workers, were perfectly free to let and hire, buy and sell, as they thought best, and if they were intelligent and in-

structed each party would always get the top price, and give in return the most useful service possible in the conditions of the hour. Free exchange benefited both parties alike. Thus the worker freely selling his services at the best rate that he could obtain derived from the economic system the most that he could expect of it, and the employer buying his services with equal freedom was putting his labour to just those uses which the economic system required. The argument assumes an amount of intelligence and deliberation which cannot in fact be realised. But it also assumes a practical equality and mobility which can only be secured by high social organisation. It completely fails if either party in the bargain is limited in his range of choice, e.g. by the pressure of immediate necessities forbidding him to look round before he decides, and it assumes too readily that the effective demand for a thing—e.g. alcohol or sensationalism—is the same thing as its social utility. Moreover, it introduces the social principle unawares. It cannot seriously be contended that if we look to his material interests alone, a man is always benefited by the course which serves society. On cool calculation a profiteer may make a fortune out of the unnecessary prolongation of a war, and it may pay him very well to subscribe to the patriotic Press for that reason. Honesty is in the main the best policy commercially, yet on occasion honesty means loss, and possibly bankruptcy. Now it is perfectly true that dishonesty all round means loss to everybody, including probably the most dishonest. It is perfectly true that profiteer's methods, if generally followed, would lead to general ruin, but in these considerations we are passing from the individual to the social point of view. We are like Kant, asking the individual to universalise his line of action, and this is precisely what the individual, as long as he adheres to his own interest, refuses to do. It is clear, therefore, that self-interest is not the sole and sufficient basis of social action. On the other hand, put negatively, the theory contains an important truth. It shows that even as regards our more personal and exclusive interests there is no permanent and inevitable contradiction

between the well-being of one and of all. It is no law of society that A can gain only by the loss of B. On the contrary, in the long run, and upon the whole, men gain or lose, stand or fall, grow richer or poorer together. Sound goods are on a long view more profitable to the manufacturer than shoddy, good wages pay better than sweated rates, but it requires a long and a broad view to grasp, and collective organisation to realise, the general benefit. On the short and narrow view it remains too often true that selfishness is justified by its own tests in its own court.¹

We conclude first that life in a community is not as such something forced on the reluctant individual in permanent and necessary opposition to his personal interests and inclinations. Neither does it necessarily satisfy all his personal interests and inclinations. On the contrary, these are often at odds, and without compulsory regulation their strife would break up the common order. Pure self-interest would not maintain society, pure disinterestedness might do so, but would be far from explaining the social structures that we actually find. The fundamental fact is that man needs society for the fulfilment of his own being. His impulses, his affections, his purposes, even his vanities, bear him out towards others, and the interests which he calls his own include the fortunes of other people. On the other hand, though thus a social animal, he does not see social life steadily and see it whole. His interests are fragmentary and often inconsistent. So far as pivoted on self and its pride and its narrowness, or on the sectional interest with which it is identified, they may clash or confuse or destroy one another. It is not the clash of independent atoms, but rather of overlapping interests and the failure of insight and understanding that constitutes the tragedy of social

¹ It is, for example, too optimistic to assume that high wages must necessarily benefit the individual employer who maintains a better standard than his competitors. High wages make possible a better standard of life, hence they react on the efficiency of labour, but their full effect is slow in coming about. It needs at least a generation to mature, for its greatest result is that the children grow up under better conditions. Meanwhile, nothing prevents the well-paid man from leaving the employer if it suits him. It is the community which gains, and the community which loses by suffering under-payment to continue.

history The material of a higher society is always present, but the sense of the whole in which the material falling into due shape and order would yield its final value is rare

4. Nevertheless, every community that endures is a structure in which the parts, upon the whole, work together. Farmer, tailor, shoemaker, lawyer and doctor perform their several functions, not thinking of very much beyond them, and in the broad result the community gets itself clothed and fed and kept in passable health and peace. The community, then, is a structure which in general maintains itself, and that not like a stock or a stone without the necessity of any internal activity, but like an organism by the continuous output of energy and regular interchanges between its parts. Moreover, we have seen that each part, each ultimate individual, however full of his own life, is capable of a wider interest. If he does not see the whole and serve it consciously, yet he sees beyond himself, and is consciously interested in something more than his own body. These facts have suggested the famous organic analogy. The community is thought of as an organism related to its constituent individuals, as the individual himself is related to the cells of his own body. So stated, the analogy fails because the community is constituted of members having powers of self-direction which the cells of the body do not possess, while conversely the individual has a body which is physically not divided, and a mind which is normally one in contrast with the plurality of minds in the community, which, however they may agree, remain of necessity distinct.¹ The community, then, is not an 'organism,' if to be an organism means for it to be an enlarged animal—a great leviathan.

If, however, for the substantive organism we substitute

¹ In the pursuit of the organic analogy, some stress has been laid on the divisions within the individual consciousness, multiple personality and the like. The point is interesting, but those who urge it overlook, I think, the fact that to society plurality of persons is essential, and its development lies not in overleaping the boundaries but in giving to each distinct personality its full value. To personality, on the other hand, division is the reverse of necessary, and its development lies rather in the direction, among other things, of a completer unity.

the adjective organic a more fruitful line of investigation opens. We may think of the 'organic' as a character, admitting of more or less, a character which even living beings only exhibit in varying degrees of perfection, and which may be shared by other things which are not either animals or plants. What, then, is this character? It is not the same thing as interdependence. The trade of two countries may, in fact, be interdependent, and may be brought to the ground by the narrow and selfish policy of one of them which refuses to recognise the truth. We should not call this relation organic. Again, a machine may be constructed of interdependent parts. The piston through connecting rods and eccentrics opens and closes valves by which the steam which moves the piston is admitted and released. But we generally oppose the mechanical relation to the organic because we consider each part of the machine to be 'in itself' indifferent to its connections, and to operate as it does merely because it has been put into its place and riveted or jointed in with the other parts by the purely external agency of the engineer. Organic interdependence is something more intimate than this. A thing that is dependent upon another is, of course, incomplete in itself. That it should come into being and maintain itself requires some condition not fulfilled by its own internal constitution but by the action of the other thing. If the requirement is mutual there is interdependence. If finally mutual requirements, without the aid of an external agency govern the growth and continued activity of each part, then the relation is organic. The organic whole is the system formed by several such parts in permanent relation, and it is one in which each part is determined—in a degree at least sufficient for the maintenance of the system—by the requirements of the whole, while the whole is determined in respect of some of its features by the requirements of each part. Thus the lungs evolve in response to the needs of the body for the oxidation of its food, and the elimination of carbon dioxide, and they act so as to meet the need supplying more or less oxygen as the tissues require. The needs of

the lungs in respect of nourishment and elimination of waste are met in turn by the pulmonary arteries and veins. Analogous conditions hold of the other bodily organs as long as health is maintained. Similarly the needs of society determine the rise of a class of workers, and are the permanent condition of its activities. How this condition operates, how much it involves of conation, and even of consciousness and purpose, is the great underlying problem of the organism. In relation to physical organisms, it involves the issues between vitalism and mechanism. In relation to social organisation, it raises the question of social purpose. But in either case, the solution of the question, whatever it be, must begin with the fact that by whatever method, direct or circuitous, the parts of an organism are in fact conditioned by its requirements, and respond to its needs—one part to the needs of another, and so to the needs of the whole as its appropriate stimulus to action.

5. In the physical organism as it grows from germ to maturity, the parts arise in accordance with a definite disposition of forces, certain lines of tension, which are partially revealed to us by the microscope. The parts thus constantly growing out of the whole are determined by its constitutional requirements at each stage, and though they progressively acquire a more distinctive character as they differentiate into organs, they do not become more independent, but rather lose independence as the organic unity develops. Here there is a double difference between the physical and the social, for (1) the community, however organic, is constituted of distinct individuals who are and remain in large measure self-determining, and (2) it is not the parent of the individuals in the same way as the germ is the parent of the developed organism. For in the first place the community often owes a part of its members to conquest, fusion and immigration, and in the second place, even if it has been for ages self-contained, it does not—outside a platonic Utopia—produce its members on a fixed plan to meet its needs. They are born into it by the will of individuals, and that they are so born is but one conse-

quence of a self-determination which social development does not tend to diminish. In fact this is its most paradoxical quality, the quality which both in theory and in practice is the root of the deepest sociological difficulties, that though social development does increase interdependence, it also in the end exalts the apparently contradictory quality of self-determination. The root solution of this antithesis which meets us in one shape or another in every social problem, is of course that impulses and feelings directed towards others make up the content of the individual personality, so that in his self-determination, that is in living his own life, he is operating as a member of society. Interdependence and self-determination then are reconciled in proportion as the actual structure of a community rests upon and expresses the free operation of the social impulse of individuals.

Thus there are great and permanent differences between the operation of the organic principle in the physical world and in society, which may be expressed broadly in the formula that in the physical organism the whole is primary and in the main determines the parts, while in social relationships the parts are primary and combine to constitute the whole. Similarly, if we consider that the fertilised ovum is the germ of every part of the developed individual, so conversely we might say that in his social potentialities each constituent individual holds the germ of the whole social order. Behind this far-reaching difference there is still the true analogy that, by whatever method the result is reached, in the end we have a whole of parts conditioned by mutual requirements. From this relation arise the fundamental features of organic life found alike in physical organisms and in societies. Essentially life is a process of interchanges which can only maintain itself because point by point the action of each element in the living thing is conditioned by the ever-changing requirements of other elements, and so of the whole, in the existing situation. For this reason life overcomes obstacles and is braced rather than weakened by resistance, repairs injuries, adapts itself by suitable modification to new and strange circumstances.

For the same reason, too, changes introduced at any one point may shift the balance of the whole and cause far-reaching alterations which are impossible to predict, but are in the main of conservative tendency.

6. But the organic relationship does not explain the whole of social life. (1) In the first place the parts retain a measure of independence. They are in greater or less degree self-centred and mutually indifferent. This may apply whether by parts we mean individuals or families or other groups. Under primitive conditions a group can easily live apart from its tribe and even an enlarged family from its group but little affected by the breach of relations. Under such conditions the tribe has so little distinctive character that it is not always easy to say why we speak of it as one. The whole approximates to a mere sum of the parts. Analogously in the physical organism among some of the lower metazoa the lower cells when severed are capable of independent life, and the life of the whole differs so little from that of the parts that it becomes difficult to decide where the individual begins and ends. Thus in proportion as the individuals remain unaffected by the union, the union itself lacks distinctive character and individuality. Conversely in the higher animal organism no part except (at a certain stage) the cells specialised for reproduction can live for any length of time apart from the whole, and the whole then has an individuality which is distinct beyond cavil. So also in the more fully organised community there are, on the one hand, differentiations of function which increase the dependence of the individual on others, and on the other hand collective products—of industry, art, government, etc.—qualitatively different from any which unorganised individuals can produce. The distinctive character of the whole, then, goes along with the interdependence of the parts. But this interdependence varies materially in degree from case to case.

(2) The organic relation is one of mutual service. In its most complete expression it is a harmony wherein the intrinsic tendencies of each part assist one another in their fulfilment, or (to be perhaps more exact) co-operate spon-

taneously in a system by which in turn their own energies are maintained. But in the actual structure of society service may be one-sided instead of mutual, and the faculties of the individual may be inhibited and suppressed instead of being stimulated and developed. There is a limit to such disharmony, for if a man is to serve he must live, but within this limit there is a wide field for the activities of selfishness and stupidity. Moved by their several impulses, following out their own lives, human beings cross one another's paths, impinge on one another's activities and at many a point cramp and distort one another's development. Nor is this pervasive pressure—of which actual conflict is but a crude and comparatively rare form—due to selfish individualism alone. In the subtle interdependence of personalities every change calls forth reactions that may penetrate the entire system. In any little circle you will see how some dominant personality absorbing every initiative into itself quite innocently and unconsciously depresses the remainder. In wider social relations a new process, valuable for the general increase of wealth, throws on the industrial scrap-heap honest men whose skill has hitherto enabled them to maintain themselves comfortably by good service to the community. The needs of the common life are multifarious, and any one of them may conflict with any other. To add the utmost to the aggregate of wealth extreme specialisation may be required, but a man is more than a function, and when his working life is narrowed down to one monotonous task he is losing his personality in the service of society. Nothing short of omniscience could establish a perfect harmony in all social relations at once. There is a foundation in human nature, in the needs that men have of one another. There is a check on utter disharmony in the final dislocation of functions, the arrest of co-operation and the break-up of the social order. But in the main, what is built on the foundation is the work of human will seeking to make the best of its conditions, and the actual degree of harmonious development attained is the measure, as we shall see more fully, of the available amount of moral wisdom.

In living together, consciously and unconsciously we exert pressure and constraint upon one another, and consciously and unconsciously we co-operate and draw out from each other capacities which would otherwise lie dormant. If human nature and human relations were such that everyone by the free internal development of his own powers served without let or flaw the whole fabric of social life, and if this fabric were such as to stimulate and sustain him in such development, we should have a perfect organic harmony, and it is easy to see—given certain conditions to which we shall refer later—that such a harmony is not only a social but an ethical ideal. But an ideal it is, and not an actuality. In every actual society harmony is shot through with disharmony, and in the social relations there is more or less of constraint, distortion, or mere indifference.

7. An idealised type, however, has its value in science as indicating a line of comparison. There is in any given community a more or a less of harmony, and on this more or less a good deal turns. A community—we go back to our first account—is a system of parts maintaining themselves by their interactions. The parts in their various functions must be co-ordinated—otherwise the community will not endure. It is on such differentiation and integration that a strongly marked common life, a definite collective achievement, in the first instance depend. But with any given co-ordination of functions it makes a vast difference whether the social structure engages the will and calls out the faculties of individuals or thwarts and represses them. Human beings held in subordination may be used as instruments in a cleverly contrived organisation, but such organisation has no more vitality than it derives from the will power of the few who control it. In case of any strain or stress it can rely on no support, and may encounter violent opposition, eagerly springing to its chance, from the bulk of its members. Even if through the wonderful power of accommodation men have adapted themselves to such a system, if they hug their chains and rend the would-be liberator, if they have lost all sense of

wider possibilities of a fuller life, then though there is no danger of revolt the system will have wasted all the potential energy of intelligent will power that might have been available to parry any difficulty or meet a common danger.¹ It is without reserves. The vitality of a community, i.e. its power of self-preservation and further growth depends not only on the efficiency of its organisation, but on the amount of energy available to work it. This is simply the summed energy of co-operation between its parts, which again depends on the degree in which the energies of each part have been developed and are continuing to work in harmony. Thus with a given adequacy of co-ordination the vitality of a community is as its internal harmony.

It should be noted here that since vitality lies in energy of co-operation, it may vary greatly in the manner of its diffusion through a community. It may permeate the whole structure, inspiring it with a common loyalty, as in a patriotic democracy; it may be concentrated in the centre, as in an energetic aristocracy; or it may be scattered in distinct nuclei, as in the clans of a tribe, where the clan spirit is strong and the tribal unity feebly expressed. In such cases, and they are not infrequent at higher levels, the community as a community may break up, and yet leave the social structure comparatively unaffected. In them the organic principle is rather in the parts than in the whole.

Having all these differences in view, we cannot simply define the community as an organism, but it is in general correct to attribute to it a certain kind and degree of organic character. The foundation of this character is the need that men have of one another, for so far as they are merely

¹ Such a community appears on the surface harmonious in contrast with one in which the revolutionary ferment has begun to work. But this is an illusion. The tranquil order masks a more profound disharmony since constraint has been so successful as to extirpate or obliterate those rudiments of free co-operation which in the disturbed society are reviving. Our case, then, illustrates the interdependence of parts where harmony is at the minimum point required by the mere preservation of the whole.

held together by a common superior we judge the union mechanical. But while men have need of one another they also limit and obstruct one another, and it is on this double relation and on the multifariousness of social needs that the characteristics of communities, their harmonies and disharmonies depend. Each man following out his own purposes in the conditions in which he finds himself falls into relations with his fellows, which as they become regular and recognised harden into customs and institutions, and yet are always subject to the pressure of fresh men and new wants. Every change arising from such pressure operating through countless interactions calls for further efforts of accommodation, and through the response to such needs the whole structure is conserved, and so far as it grows, grows through changes adapted to one another. This constant mutual accommodation is the outstanding feature of social change. The process goes forward in the first place without being grasped, and, *a fortiori*, without being directed as a whole by any conscious intelligence, though as we have hinted, it is on the rise of such intelligence that its fuller developments depend. But at the basis of the social process is just the accommodation sought by each man in his own little sphere of hopes and fears, affections and rivalries. Thus in the process certain human needs must be met, and yet owing to the causes mentioned the effect may be largely to cramp and suppress human faculty. In particular, new needs are most readily met by specialisation, and this involves mutual dependence, and therefore a more intimate union, but it also threatens to reduce the man to the status of an instrument. Thus there may be a development of collective unity and achievement with no corresponding development of harmony. But such development tends to reduce social life to a mechanism, while a more harmonious system giving larger play to human faculty would have a greater sum of co-operative intelligence behind it, and therefore a greater elasticity and vitality.

These considerations suggest that as there are distinct and even opposed forces operating in society, so there may

be more than one line of development. We must now consider whether this is to be our final view, or whether reviewing the phenomena as a whole we can still frame a single consistent and comprehensive definition of social development.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT

WE saw in Chapter I that with the increase of applied knowledge communities tend to acquire more efficient organisation, and that on a larger scale. Efficiency at certain stages involves subordination, but at higher stages we found a move towards freedom and equality of partnership. Let us consider the significance of these changes for the definition of social development.

1. Mere quantitative growth taken by itself hardly amounts to development, but taken in connection with efficiency of organisation it has material importance. Increase of scale gives more scope for differentiation, and renders the task of integration more difficult. Thus given equal efficiency the organisation of a great community is a larger and more comprehensive achievement than that of a small community. Efficiency on its side requires specialisation, but it is a mistake to regard the complexity into which specialisation wanders as a direct criterion of development. On the contrary there is often a return from the complex to the simple to the advantage of efficiency. Development from this point of view consists in the enlargement of the common achievement by the emergence of new functions, or the more adequate performance of old functions in more accurate adjustment to one another. Now development of this kind might be predicated of a mechanical invention, and in fact collective efficiency may be pursued in a manner depressing to the personal development of many, perhaps the majority, of the individual members of the community. In that case, though on the surface the great machine may work without

apparent friction and may produce striking results, there is an underlying discrepancy, a waste, a mutual inhibition of the powers stored up in individuals, which taken together make the sum of the potential energy available for the support of the common life, and should these energies find a vent the machine will go to pieces. Here we see the importance of the third series of changes. Freedom, as scope for thought, initiative and character, allows each member of the community to develop his own nature, and equality secures for him a partnership in the common achievement. Once again, taken by themselves these conditions give no complete account of social development, for freedom might mean merely a removal of restraint through the weakening of the common life, and equality might, and in primitive societies we may almost say it does, arise from the absence of any serious effort or large achievement. If on the other hand we suppose high efficiency of organisation on a great scale resting on the free and intelligent acceptance of those who work it and securing benefits in which all share in accordance with their needs and the functions they perform, we have a synthesis which gives a more complete account of social development than any of its elements taken severally. For we have efficient organisation with all its power of collective achievement based on the intelligent will of individuals because it meets their needs, and relying on their support in all difficulties. We have, that is, all that potential energy of which we spoke above rendered available for the furtherance of the common life, and in turn nourished and developed by the common achievement. That is to say, we have an organic relation in place of a machine, spontaneity in place of enforced obedience, intelligent co-operation in place of unthinking routine. This is what I understand as social development in its full sense.

2 False and partial views of social development (as I conceive them) are formed by taking persons apart from the society which they form, or society apart from the persons who form it. On the one view individual character and achievement become the test, and more and more as this view is pressed, the peculiarly personal aspects of character.

Initiative, resolution, fortitude, intelligence, genius, take the centre of the stage—all admirable qualities, but not exhaustive as an account of social relations. Society is not saved because it has a few, or even because it has many righteous men within it. It is saved if these men succeed in organising its relations and so guiding its collective life in accordance with their righteousness. The opposite view which takes the fabric of society in abstraction from its living members is equally fallacious, and perhaps more dangerous. Appraised in themselves by abstract logic, with no living sense of the men and women whom they so intimately affect, social institutions, collective wealth, power and magnificence become bloodless and inhuman, and yet have something of the glamour which for many minds attaches only to the unreal. To the psychological side of the subject I shall return. In this place it is enough to say that a society is simply the whole of its members throughout successive generations in their mutual relations. It is not its members as they would be in isolation or in different relations. Still less is it something other than its interrelated members. The social is a relation of man to man, not man apart from the relation, nor the relation apart from the man, and social development is the development of men in their mutual relations. The relations of men may spring from the natures of those engaged in them, and may return upon them heightening and fulfilling their natural capacities. This is what we have called harmony in social relationship. Or again, they may involve a greater or less degree of constraint exercised by some of the parties upon others. High organisation may be achieved on these lines, but at a cost to social vitality proportioned to the degree of constraint exerted, and in the extreme case ruinous. Hence the permanent line of development does not lie in this direction.

Given a measure of harmony the scale on which it is realised becomes highly important, for (a) internally the life of a community is richer in proportion to the number and variety of its elements, and (b) every community is in contact with others and the nature of this contact closely affects its own life, and even its safety. Hostile relations

force defence into the first place, and subordinate the all-round development of the organic principle to the narrow ends of military organisation. The smaller the State the more lively the fear¹ In larger States the majority of the population are farther away from the potential enemy, and peaceful security becomes the normal course of life. Nevertheless, as long as there are independent States with no means but war of finally adjusting disputes, military questions remain, and military considerations impede free and many-sided development. Hence relations between communities become no less important than the growth of the community itself. These relations may become more or less organised over a certain area. The Greek States, for example, notwithstanding, or perhaps in consequence of, constant wars, recognised a certain comity of Hellas, and evolved regular customs of war and peace and systematic methods of arbitration. Similar relations arose in mediaeval Christendom under the ægis of its religious unity, so that from one point of view the West of Europe at that epoch might even be regarded as one very loosely organised community. Modern international law conceived a code applicable to all civilisation, and what the world is now discovering is that in the absence of power to enforce such a code the whole structure of civilisation is threatened. In fact, to make free internal development secure we need either a world State, or such organic relations between communities as amount in the end to the same thing as a looser super-State. Growth in scale at this point—where no external force remains—involves a change of kind in the character of the community and its organisation.

The external relations of a community, however, vital as they are, do not depend on its character alone, but on others as well. We cannot, therefore, well take them as one of the criteria of the development of a given community. But we have throughout recognised communities within communities, and where we have some partial organisation

¹ But in this regard, a friendly critic points out, size is relative to the means of attack. The aeroplane has made uncomfortable neighbours of London, Paris and Berlin.

of inter-State relations, as in the instances cited above, we may whenever convenient think of the whole group of related communities as forming a single, though slenderly organised, community of wider scope, and take its existence into account for whatever it may be worth in estimating the level of social development attained.

3. With these considerations before us we may conclude that a community develops as it advances in

- (1) scale,
- (2) efficiency,
- (3) freedom and
- (4) mutuality

of service. By scale is meant number of population, by efficiency the adequate apportionment and co-ordination of functions in the service of an end, whatever the end may be, and whether it be or be not understood by those who contribute to it. By freedom is meant scope for thought, character and initiative on the part of members of the community, by mutuality service of an end in which each who serves participates. Communities differ greatly in all these respects. They are of all sizes. Functions may be well or ill apportioned, well or ill co-ordinated from the point of view of any result to which they contribute. The scope for independent thought and action allowed by social relationships to each member may be small or great. The services may be one-sidedly imposed for ends enjoyed only by certain members, or they may be rendered according to capacity to ends enjoyed by all alike. Further, mutual services may be slight or considerable, and they may be gravely or less seriously impaired by disservices.

No one of these criteria is of itself a sufficient measure of the development of the community. The community might grow in population while in other respects its organisation remained rudimentary. It might be efficiently organised, e.g. by a powerful class, for the purpose for maintaining and augmenting the wealth, power or dignity of that class. It might offer considerable scope to individuals because its organisation is loose and inefficient, and reversely it may

require exact performance of service to the common safety, or the augmentation of the common stock without allowing criticism or originality of conduct. If, on the other hand, the social system calls only for services to a common good which all enjoy, if such service is rendered of free good will, if it is apportioned according to capacity and co-ordinated as success requires, and if such a system is extended as far as possible to all who come into contact, we have the development of the community carried forward as a whole.

In actual fact development is usually one-sided and partial. Thus freedom—that is, scope for thought, initiative and character—is not in itself service. Still less is it organisation. Indeed, organisation might leave room for a certain kind of freedom merely because it is loose and ineffective,¹ and the common life accordingly ill developed. Again, there may be systems of society very efficiently organised for certain purposes, e.g. for the attainment of wealth, power, knowledge or art, but rather imposed upon a community by some of its members than springing from the will of its members generally. This may be because such systems fail to meet the needs of many, and therefore do not stimulate them to willing service, or because while admirably contrived to meet other needs they are not so conceived as to afford

¹ Where families or little groups are mainly self-dependent, but yet combine at need for the common safety or to keep the peace, they enjoy a good deal of freedom, and we cannot radically deny them organisation. But it is a slight and limited organisation not efficient for the full satisfaction of human needs. Freedom here is inversely as efficiency. In general, we must recognise that a society may be such that men are quite willing to organise to a point and for some purposes, but resist the efforts and restraints involved in further organisation. Such a community as it stands has a certain organic character. If its members really have no further impulse to fulfilment it may even be said to have attained the natural term of its growth. Possibly we can see something of this sort in those primitive societies of gentle, inoffensive people who seem to live harmoniously enough. If so, such a community secures as much development as the inherent character of its members allows, but obviously much less than would be possible if the human material were richer.

A very different case is that of a community in which relations are close, but there is lax social control. Here there is likely to be freedom for the strong, but it may be turned to the oppression of the weak. This is the partial and inconsistent freedom of individualism. Where relations are close, consistent freedom implies at least as much efficiency as secures opportunity of self-development for all.

scope for character and initiative, or lastly because the individual members have it not in them to respond. In any of these cases the contention is that such a system, however admirably organised for its own purpose, lacks the essential of vitality, the power of meeting difficulties and dangers and the capacity of further development which depends on initiative.¹ Hence efficiency of organisation without freedom is incomplete, and this would hold even if the organisation is most equitably directed to the satisfaction of mutual needs, if these needs do not include scope for thought and character. Even in the service of mutuality efficiency without freedom remains incomplete.

But though these developments may be independent and at points even antagonistic, there are also points at which they are closely involved one with another. Particularly is this the case with freedom and mutual service. It is only the service of common and mutual needs which will command general allegiance freely rendered, and conversely one of the greatest common needs is mutual respect for scope for intelligence and character. Thus in their ideal development freedom and mutuality are one, and indeed all along the line freedom in service is conditioned by mutuality. So far does this hold that we may in general take freedom in an efficiently organised community as a sufficient evidence of mutuality. On the other hand, if we consider freedom in its strict sense of scope there are cases in which its development is distinct from and even opposed to that of mutual service. Consider, for instance, a sparse frontier population where the situation calls for much initiative and resource

¹ It may be objected that political freedom has not in fact evinced great vitality, but on the contrary has tended to relapse into some form of subordination. The objection, however, misses the point. Freedom in this argument means the spontaneous devotion of intelligent energy to the common life. This is not compassed by anything so simple as the acceptance of a democratic form of government. When such forms develop from within, it is in general a sign that freedom has made some progress. But it needs a high degree of freedom to maintain them in full effect, and unless this spirit is widely diffused things easily slip back under the control of the more concentrated and organised energy of a section. Conversely very various forms of organisation may make a strong appeal to a few, to many, or even to all, and as is the strength of the appeal so is their vitality. Hence the paradox. Freedom is the most delicate of organisms, but the source of robustness in all

on the part of each family, but allows little contact. We must not radically deny it organisation, for it will act as one on occasion, but there is a low development of organised relations correlated with a very real measure of freedom. Take again a community in which there are much closer relations, but which lacks social control. Here there is likely to be freedom for the strong, but it may be turned to the oppression of the weak. This is the partial and inconsistent freedom of individualism, but though partial and inconsistent it is still to a point freedom. Suppose it superseded by a close regulation leaving no room for initiative, certain common needs are much more fully secured against egoistic aggression, but seemingly at the cost of such partial freedom as obtained before. Conceive this system again superseded by one which, while preventing all partial oppression, should leave agreements otherwise free and provide scope for talent and originality. Then a more general freedom and a fuller mutual service are secured at the same time. Thus at the higher stage freedom and mutual needs unite, but there is a lower stage at which they part. Again, a community might be efficiently organised for purposes of external defence, internal peace and the supply of material needs to all its members, and always on a mechanical system making no call on the intelligent devotion of its members generally. Certain very real common needs are thus met, and in such a community the beginnings of freedom might impair or break up the efficient machine. Yet a higher development of character emerging through freedom would restore it, only bringing deeper mutual needs into account. Thus freedom and mutuality are united in their ideal development, closely connected at all stages, but divergent at certain points and under certain aspects. Taken together they imply that each gives spontaneously to the common well-being and draws therefrom the needed stimulus and support of his own personal development. This constitutes what we have called the character of organic harmony in the community.

Efficiency again is frequently opposed to freedom, particularly where it limits the majority to inferior functions.

But if its aim is the true common good in which all are to share, then freedom is an essential element therein, and conversely other things equal, the organisation which commands the support of the free intelligence is infinitely more efficient than that which is submissively served by automata

Lastly, though freedom and efficiency in mutual service are most easily realised on a small scale—in a city State for instance—yet if there are several communities in each of which these principles have a firm grip they will naturally draw together, and through the development of friendly relations form a super-community. The full development of such principles in all communities in fact involves, as we have seen, a federative community of the world. Thus at the highest remove all our criteria would meet.

In the intermediate stages, however, communities may and do develop in any one respect without the others, grow in size without becoming more efficient, or in efficiency without more freedom, or in freedom without more efficiency. This is development, but one-sided development. If the one-sided gain involves no corresponding loss the community may through it be said to develop on the whole, but if there is such loss the case is ambiguous and can only be judged in the concrete by reference to the probable bearing of the entire change on the potentialities of further development. If, e.g., efficiency is improved at such cost of freedom as to destroy initiative, the community loses by it on balance and will probably decay.

The partial character of actual developments appears quite clearly even from our slight introductory sketch. For example, a small group of kinsfolk living under primitive conditions may share the benefits of a common life, and may be whole-hearted in their devotion to the little commonwealth. There is for certain purposes true mutual aid, and moreover it is given spontaneously so that there is one element of freedom. There is little more, however, for the very solidarity of the group forbids all initiative and any development of individual character. There is none of the division and co-ordination of functions that make for efficiency,

and the scale is of the smallest. The little group will not accept the discipline and continuous industry necessary to improve its condition, nor tolerate the criticism which might dissipate its most uncomfortable superstitions, nor still the suspicions and sink the rancours which prevent it from co-operating with neighbouring groups for common purposes, in particular for mutual defence. Hence it can achieve no large fulfilment of human purposes. Mere solidarity then is not enough. We must ask what sort of social order it is that commands this willing allegiance.

Turn to the opposite pole. A great military empire has much that the primitive group lacks. It unites great masses of men over a wide territory, and combines them for its own purposes with high efficiency. It makes great advances in the conquest of nature, and in the technique of social organisation. But all these achievements—to say nothing of their bearing on foreign communities—may be paid for by large sacrifices of personal freedom and initiative. Life becomes one-sided, and even if the masses acquiesce it may be because under prolonged hopelessness their capacities of self-direction are atrophied. Here then we have true development in efficiency and in scale, and certain contributions are made thereby to the sum of human achievement, but we have abandoned primitive solidarity, and still more are moving away all the time from freedom, and therefore from social development in its concrete fulness. Again, a community may be a loose aggregate in which there is the negative freedom of diminished control, but no general and spontaneous contribution to the common life. Under the peace maintained in such a State many partial developments may go forward, but the common life is feeble, and either men are scattered and largely self-dependent and mutually indifferent or if relations are closer the lack of control will result in freedom for some at the expense of subjection of others. Once again a city State may combine a sturdy and efficiently ordered common life with a many-sided freedom, but fail to maintain itself because its boundaries are narrow and its relations to neighbours ill regulated. Even if it does not perish outright the fear

of the external enemy may destroy the freedom that has grown up within. Thus on every side history presents us not with a balanced movement towards the full development of communal life, but with a diverse multitude of partial advances and countervailing losses which spell eventual arrest, retrogression and decay. These consequences, it is contended, become intelligible in the light of our definition, which for the fulness and therefore the sureness of social development requires advances in four respects. Co-operation in the satisfaction of mutual needs freely rendered because stimulating and maintaining the wills that support it is organic harmony, and requires only efficient direction and extension in scale to make it the fulfilment of social potentiality.

4. It will be observed that if in the above account we drop all the terms of purely sociological import we are left with the generic criteria of development as such. For a system develops in proportion . (a) As it absorbs a larger amount of energy into its being (scale) ; (b) as this energy is more adequately directed to the maintenance and further growth—if growth is still admissible—of the system (efficiency) , (c) as each part is so formed as to respond most exactly to the needs, permanent or variable of others with the least loss of energy through mutual constraint (freedom) , and (d) thereby secures its own support (mutuality). That is to say, Energy, Organisation, Vital Harmony¹ are the marks of development in general. Our definition then merely exhibits social development as a specific instance of a general conception.

Primarily our definition is based on the 'social' as the term is used in the second and more exact of the two senses distinguished at the outset,² that is, as the co-operative element in human relations. It contemplates the widest extension and most complete realisation of this principle, since it implies as its goal the fulfilment by co-operative interaction of all powers and tendencies of men so far as mutually consistent on the largest scale and in the most effective form.

¹ In which the two last criteria are combined

² Chapter II, § 1

But the social has also a wider sense including the hostile and conflicting as well as the co-operative, and in the community there is pressure and constraint as well as mutual need. Are we safe in ruling out any conception of development based on this element? Mere conflict and contradiction, indeed, cannot lead to anything, but some have seen in the constraining will of the strong organised as governmental power the true line of social development. Is this a tenable alternative? On the face of it power as such appears incomplete. It is rather a means of meeting a need than a substantive need in and by itself. If nevertheless regarded as a need, the question arises why it should be preferred to other needs. The system which should meet all the needs so far as mutually consistent of those who constitute and maintain it, is a more complete development of their tendencies and capacities than that which only meets some needs or one need. Particularly is this the case if that one need is power, since power must be used, and of what use is it if not for the fulfilment of needs? But by the same logic the system which fulfils all the needs so far as mutually compatible of all the members of a community is a larger fulfilment of its potentialities than that which only achieves this for some of its members. But here the reply may be "we men of capacity and power understand one another. Our needs are compatible, and by fulfilling them we attain something great, but we can do so only by using the rest as instruments. If we bring their needs equally into the account nothing will be done" Very well, then, you achieve by this method a development of something, but do not call it a development of the community as a whole. By your admission the development affects no one outside your class. If you rejoin that what you achieve is something higher and better, that is a claim of value which must be discussed in its place. It may be more or less valuable than the development of the community, but it is not the development of the community. "But," you pursue, "it is a social development, the development of our class." So regard it. Then that social development is precisely, within its own limits, a free and efficient organisation to meet common

needs. So far as it has this character it is social development. So far as it has the opposed character it is not. On the contrary, it is arrest. Outside your class your energies must be expended in inhibiting initiative, and your community has only so much vitality as your own free co-operation gives it. Whence you must further grant this, that if any other society has all that you have, but meets needs of its humbler members which you refuse, and obtains from them a measure of willing support that you cannot command, it is your superior in vitality, in the prospect of further development, and, in short, in the development of the community as a community. If, lastly, your contention is that your object is the common life, but that the mass are too feeble in intelligence or character to understand or serve it so that you must impose it on them, your assertion will take a good deal of proving to those who do not meet it half way. But suppose it proved. What you establish is that for men in general only those needs can be met which require no response of intelligence and character. If this be so, then the development of the community must always reside in the free co-operation of a few, and it can never have a broad base or a high vitality. It is in that case doomed to remain an exotic, delicately poised.¹ At no point do you shake the contention that the vitality of a community is as the free co-operation of intelligent will power which it commands. If this vanishes the social body becomes a system of restraints which may be highly developed in the sense of being intricately contrived for the maintenance of some imposing end, but is different in kind from the structure which endures and grows by the spontaneous efforts of its parts to meet the requirements of one another and the whole. It is possible to contend that no population as a whole is capable of this

¹ A spurious case of freedom should be noted here. By accommodation to a servile order once firmly established men may lose all moral energy, take things as they find them, and prefer the evils that they know to the proffer of a larger life which they do not understand. Their will such as it has come to be supports the existing order, but only because scope for character and initiative has long been denied them. This is not freedom. The system has a certain vitality because it rests on an acquiescent will, but it has neither the present strength nor the future capabilities of one in which there is more energy of mind at the service of common needs.

vitality of organic growth. This is a question to be solved by experience. But if the contention is true it only proves that no community as a whole is capable of the most complete kind of social development. It does not shake the definition of development nor the inference that such development will be carried further by every extension—even though it may never reach completeness—of free co-operation.¹

5. Social development, then, rests not on the element of constraint in social life, but on the element of co-operation resting on mutual need. It may be shown that by its means we secure the development of human nature as a whole in the only sense in which the term has intelligible and consistent meaning. In the light of what has been said it is not difficult to apply this test. Development is advancing fulfilment. What in general is meant by fulfilment? An impulse we consider is fulfilled when it is carried out, a purpose when its object is achieved. Every purpose attained fulfils something within us. But it may be that in yielding to one impulse, or carrying out one purpose, we find that we have been only too successful. We have defeated ourselves, maimed our lives in some other respect. As a whole our personality cannot be fulfilled in purposes which are thus incoherent and conflicting, but only in those which in their operation are mutually consistent. Subject to this consistency the greatest possible scope of our impulses and purposes is the most complete fulfilment of our personality. But again in thus fulfilling our own personality we may trample on others. Our development though consistent within is then inconsistent with the corresponding development of other people. On the other hand, there may be a line of development for each of us which on the whole stimulates and furthers a line of development for others,

¹ The case for efficiency without freedom may also take this form. By developing art, science or material culture a community gains something permanent of value, not for itself, but for the civilised world which would have been lost had it waited at every step for general consent. A servile economy may support great achievements. So to plead is to admit that the life of the community is sacrificed to ends outside itself. The world may historically have gained thereby, but if so it is no proof of development actually realised in the life of the community in question, but is an admission to the contrary.

and general development on such lines would lead to the one possible fulfilment of human capacity universal in the society considered. The furtherance of such fulfilment depends on the wills of men, and the strength and persistence of the will in each on the degree in which it is stimulated and sustained by the whole. This is the organic harmony which our definition required. Such harmony within the community, then, is the basis of the consistent and universal development of human capacity.

It is readily apparent that for the harmonious realisation of human capacity two conditions are required to supplement the development of the principle of social harmony in the community. First, as no community can lead a purely self-contained life its relations to other communities must be co-operative. Indeed, the whole world must form in some sort one community whatever the number and vigour of the distinct communities comprised within it. Advances in this direction may be made partly by the growth of communities, partly, as shown above, by the organisation of the relations between communities that remain distinct. Secondly, to express himself freely man must control the conditions of nature, including the nature of his own mind and character and the operation of social forces, i.e. all that arises from the organised action of groups, or the still more penetrative effects of the unorganised and unreflective operation of numbers. Briefly, there must be a means of controlling the conditions of life. The measure of this control we have called efficiency. Thus efficiency on the one hand, and growth or interrelation on the other, are factors in development along with the realisation of the harmonious principle within the community. Thus by another route we arrive at the same criteria.

Social development thus conceived corresponds in its concrete entirety to the requirements of rational ethics. For a rational ethics starting with the web of human impulses is forced to discard those which are blind or contradictory,¹

¹ The grounds of incompatibility, which of course may be inward and spiritual, as well as external, need not concern us here. My own view has been set out in *The Rational Good*, but I am here endeavouring to put in the fewest words the essentials of any rationalist theory.

and retain as reasonable those only which form a consistent whole. In this body of purpose, and in all that makes for its realisation, it must find the good. It cannot confine the good to any section of humanity, because its principles being rational are universal in their application, and abhor inconsistency. For it the realisation of purposes is good so far as consistent, and no farther. Hence it requires control of the conditions of life internal and external, physical, psychological and social, without which purposes cannot be realised. Hence also it sets the consistent body of human purposes before each individual as the good, which he as a rational being must recognise and support, and within which alone can his own good be reasonably sought. The good of all others enters into his own, and by the same logic his good enters into theirs. Thus the rational system in the end is one of mutual furtherance, or what we have called harmony. Finally, its appeal is to rational conviction and not to extraneous motives or the compulsion of a superior. That is, its aim is a life of full partnership co-extensive with humanity, resting on the inward convictions of the free man, and in control of the conditions of its maintenance. This coincides with the criteria of social development in their entirety as stated above.

Thus social development and ethical development are at the end the same. They have a common goal. But it does not follow that they coincide all along the line of their advance, still less that the process of history can be treated as the continuous working out of an ethical idea. There is plenty and to spare in the historic process that cannot be regarded as development from either point of view, but merely as relapse, backsliding, disintegration or downfall. What is more serious, the four conditions of social development which to satisfy ethical requirements must be united, may in actual operation fall apart, so that we may get what is undoubtedly a social development in one direction, along with arrest or even retrogression in another. Of this ever-recurring tendency several illustrations have been given. We may subjoin here that in general growth in area and population is difficult to reconcile with efficiency—it is

obviously easier to organise on the small scale—and efficiency with all the division and subordination that it entails is even more difficult to reconcile with freedom, while every partial freedom may obstruct the only consistent freedom of universal application. If these difficulties were insuperable there would be no complete social development, but only a choice between one line of advance and another. The difficult, however, is not the impossible. Subordination is the first basis of efficiency, but at a later stage it turns out that even from this point of view free co-operation is superior. Hence this particular line of historic process doubles back upon itself. For a long while subordination grows with each increment of efficiency or scale, then a point is reached at which freedom begins to assert itself, and a reverse process ensues in which with many oscillations back and forth some material advance has been made.

Thus while social development in its completeness corresponds to the ideal of a rational ethics, partial developments may diverge from it, and the divergence amounts at some stages to antagonism. Further, the historic course of change includes what from either point of view is mere arrest, retrogression or decay. Hence if progress means the gradual realisation of an ethical ideal no continuous progress is revealed by the course of history. Yet when the balance is struck something substantial has been achieved.

6. The place of ethical ideals in sociological inquiry is an old subject of contention. The subject-matter of investigation is the interplay of human impulse, the conditions under which it operates, and the results which it produces. To one party the central question is the meaning of it all. What articulate purposes arise out of impulse? To what common end do they point? From what supreme or general good do they derive? These are questions of value, of ends, what we call in a somewhat restricted sense of the term, questions of philosophy. For those who oppose science to philosophy and claim for sociology rank as a science, such questions must be rigorously excluded. For them the question is not whether purposes are good or bad, but

how they are formed and how they act. How far do men act purposively? On what conditions do their purposes co-operate or conflict? What are the causes and results? What is the actual part played by human activity in the shaping of social life? and as a preliminary to these questions of causation, what are the bare facts of social life? How are social institutions to be analysed and classified? What can be discovered of the order of their growth? All these are questions of fact, which it is held can only be pursued in a dry light if kept resolutely apart from all considerations of value. The good and bad is one contrast, the real and the unreal another.

About this controversy two things are clear and certain. The first is that both methods of inquiry are perfectly natural and legitimate. Of any purpose we may, and often must, ask its meaning, legitimacy, value, and the philosophical inquiry is just this question systematically carried through. Any purpose again may be treated without regard to its value, as a fact, an event in someone's history, and we may inquire into its conditions and its actual effectiveness. In any field of facts in which the purposes of conscious beings play a part, we must if we are studying the field know what the purposes are, how much they really effect and what other forces are at work. This systematically pursued is the scientific method. We need not accept this division of science and philosophy as ultimate, but for a distinction of aspects which holds good to a point the terms may serve, and for our purposes we may regard social philosophy as an analysis of values and social science as a study of facts. The first proposition, then, that may be laid down with confidence is that social philosophy and social science are legitimate and rational methods of investigating social phenomena.

The second proposition which is equally clear is that they must not be confused. We must avoid thinking either that things happen because they are good, or are good because they happen. Otherwise our statements of fact will be biased and our judgments of value corrupted. The confusion is easily recognisable in the abstract, yet fatally

easy in the actual operation of our thought. Our dislike of the unpleasant habitually takes one of two forms. If we can we ignore it and seek to blot it out of reality. If it is too strong for this treatment we attempt accommodation. We find a soul of goodness in things evil. They become necessary incidents in a process so great and noble that we can but imperfectly grasp its significance. They are shadows which throw up the light, and so forth. Finally, the historic process becomes the good because it is the historic process, and the question whether it makes for well-being or otherwise is settled by a circular argument. Against all this the scientific spirit makes a just and necessary protest. Let us know what are facts and what are values, and when we are after facts let us pursue them remorselessly, not covering them with an ethical varnish, but setting down all alike for what they are. This disengagement, I agree, is an absolute essential to science. I would add, first, that it is no less essential to philosophy, whose valuations of experience must equally be maintained uncorrupted by the lures of actual success and failure and must prepare us if necessary to face the fact that the heavens are more likely to fall than justice to be done. Good must remain good though everything real is evil and going to be worse. Secondly, when science and philosophy have both done their work, when we know the facts and have our values fixed, it is legitimate to compare the two results, and to ask how far, if at all, the facts conform to the standard which we have established. Upon this final question of supreme interest the scientific and philosophical methods converge. Both are thus not only legitimate but necessary to a completed sociology.

As much as this might have been said before we began our investigation. But the progress of the investigation has brought the relation between the philosophic and scientific methods one step nearer. For our analysis of social development was made without regard to any theory of values. We merely asked what a society is, and what development is, and arrived at a conception of a fully developed social life as a harmonious realisation of human capacity. We

then saw that this in its completeness accords with the ethical ideal, an ideal arrived at purely by an analysis of values. This coincidence is not due to any dialectical trick of surreptitiously introducing value into terms supposedly descriptive of facts but to the peculiar relation of the social to the ethical. Its basis is in the first place a dual analysis. Analysing a society as an existent fact, we find in it a co-operative principle. Analysing the good as a system of values, we again find the co-operative principle. So far there is coincidence; there is an element of value in social life. The social principle is an aspect of the ethical. But the social forces—the forces operating in society—are not all ethical. Some of them, or some of their manifestations are even anti-ethical. Hence there is a dissidence. There are forms and tendencies of social development which are by no means in line with the ethical ideal. What we have tried to show is that the fullest development of the social principle organises all these forces, which might otherwise conflict and cancel one another, for its own ends, and in so doing moves towards the ethical ideal. The un-ethical development is still a development. It is even (under the conditions and limitations above noted) a social development, but it is one-sided and not social development in its fulness. In its fulness, but only in its fulness, social development is ethical development.

Finally, for both coincidence and dissidence there is a basis in a simple but fundamental truth, namely, that the good is the principle of organic harmony in things, and is therefore realised in life and in society as far as they embody that principle. As a fact, we find an organic element in society, and we find the strict meaning of social development to be the extension of this principle in its most thorough-going form of harmony. Hence the ultimate coincidence. But the principle germinates in as many centres as there are communities, we may almost say as there are individuals, and its extension on several sides follows distinct lines which do not always run parallel, but often cut across one another. Hence the dissidence.

In sum, as a whole and in its completeness social develop-

ment coincides with ethical development. But social development is a union of partial developments which do not necessarily go together, and may be opposed. Such partial development is not adequate to ethical requirements, and may through the said opposition be in antagonism to them. In the history of civilisation the development that has occurred is of this uneven character, but in development as a whole a substantive advance has been made.¹

It remains for us to examine the conditions under which this incomplete and irregular process takes place. What are the general conditions of social development? This is purely a question of social science, for every word that has been said of ethical values and ideals might be expunged and our definition of social development would still stand. We can speak unambiguously even of 'higher' and 'lower' development with no ethical reference, but merely on the strength of the extent and completeness of organisation. The system whatever it be which applies the most efficient methods on the largest scale to the maintenance of its characteristic being, may without ethical reference be called the most highly organised, and the system in which the parts co-operate spontaneously and spontaneously adapt themselves to varying common and mutual needs, has means of maintaining itself which are qualitatively superior to those of a rigid contrivance made once for all and imposed by external constraint. Where constraint and spontaneity are intermingled there is point by point for every replacement of constraint by spontaneity a liberation of so much energy for the maintenance of the whole. In the case of society the organisation which is 'higher' in these respects is also 'higher' ethically. But if we doubt or choose to ignore this proposition the distinction between stages of higher or lower development remains, and it is the conditions of development which we have now to seek.

¹ In respect to the argument developed in this chapter I must record a sense of obligation to Professor MacIver's *Community*, and also to the concluding chapter of Professor Pollard's brilliant little volume on *The History of England* in the Home University Library.

CHAPTER V

THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

1. A SOCIAL change of any kind is like a stone thrown into a pond. Waves of consequential change will radiate in all directions. The difference is that in the pond they radiate uniformly by a law which we can calculate. In society their configuration varies from case to case, and the general laws which can be laid down with any precision are few. One thing, however, may be stated with certainty. The effects of a change are not limited to the department of social life in which it occurs. An industrial change will have effects going far beyond the sphere of industry. It may alter the relations of classes and the balance of political power. It may bring new organisations into life, stimulate new hopes and fears for the future of man, and so be reflected in literature and philosophy. The possibilities of cheap literature affect the very style of writing, and the cinema reacts upon the drama. So when we consider the conditions of development in general terms we must begin with the reservation that no condition will act alone. To proceed methodically we must distinguish, but we must never forget that distinction in thought is not separation in actuality.

With this in mind we may ask what are the main generic conditions under which all communities live, and within which singly or in combination the causes of their development, arrest or decay must be found. The answer is that the life of every community must be affected in greater or less degree by its physical environment, by the biological laws to which man as an animal is subject, by the psychological equipment of its component individuals, and finally

by their interactions with one another, and of the community as a whole with its neighbours. Thus the conditions of development are Environmental, Biological, Psychological and more distinctively Sociological. To appreciate the three former conditions, sociology has to levy toll on several independent sciences, while the elaboration of the fourth set is largely in the hands of specialisms like economics, which it is the aim of sociology to bring into correlation with one another. In this chapter we shall consider (a) Environmental, and (b) Biological conditions.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.

2 Every plant and every sub-human species of animal must adapt itself to its habitat or perish. Animals have some power, at cost, of leaving their habitat if it becomes unfavourable, but they must find another which will suit them. Within a certain range they can accommodate themselves to variations, as is shown by the differences between allied species or varieties inhabiting arctic, temperate or tropical regions. But their power of reacting upon their environment and modifying it to suit their needs is small. The human race begins its existence under the same conditions. But it early discovers methods of obtaining warmth, clothing and shelter, which lessen its dependence on the caprices of climate, and it soon learns how to protect itself against dangerous wild beasts, and may modify one feature of its habitat materially by extinguishing them. With every advance of applied knowledge and social organisation the reactions upon the environment are extended. Barren land is cultivated; forests are cut down; rivers are canalised; the sea from an insuperable barrier becomes the great communicator, even the rigours of climate are softened. At the same time gifts of nature—minerals for instance—unknown and useless to earlier generations, acquire economic value. There is therefore no fixity in the geographical factor, but its operation is a very complex function of its own structure and the development of the arts of man. We have seen in our time how for political purposes the geographical situation of our

own country has been vitally altered by the progress of invention. Again, one of the most important factors in the rise and fall of cities and of States has been their position on trade routes, but trade routes shift with the advance of geographical discovery, with the laying down of railways, the piercing of tunnels and the advancement of navigation. Climate itself, in the narrower sense, has quite different effects under changed social conditions. The humid atmosphere of the Western Pennine slopes, which, brooding over a heavy clay soil, made Lancashire an inhospitable home for a mainly agricultural people, has been an important factor in the development of the cotton industry, which has made that region one of the most densely peopled in the world.

At every stage the physical environment whether by stimulating or inhibiting industrial effort, by determining the success or failure of experiment, affects the economic structure, and through it bears on the whole life of society. But the physical environment—apart from climatic or other variations in nature itself—ceases to be a fixed quantity. It begins to be in part an artefact. Nor is it at any stage proper to say that the physical environment of itself determines the social structure as though humanity were merely wax to its seal. It is man with his desires, his knowledge, his powers of organisation, habits of industry and the like, to which the physical environment sets a problem, and it is in strictness the solution of this problem which *inter alia* conditions development. Biologically, we know that it is an error to conceive the environment as directly stamping qualities on a race. What the environment does is partly to stimulate, but more particularly to determine success and failure, and it is through this indirect method of selection that the type accommodates itself to its habitat. In principle the sociological effect is not far different. The environment never makes arts or institutions, these proceed from the energy of human thought and will, but the environment does go to determine the lines on which human energy can succeed, and so to decide what experiments and tentative beginnings will ripen into institutions.

In the lower cultures the limits set by the physical conditions are pretty rigid because human reaction is feeble. In the higher it is easy to exaggerate them. Reviewing the actual achievements of a people we may too readily be led *ex post facto* to see the potentiality of them in the habitat. It is easy to see in the position and formation of Greece a natural basis for the ancient Hellenic civilisation, the intricate mountain ranges cutting off the little city States and fostering their individual life without severing intercourse between them ; the sea border, the numerous islands and the indented coast of Asia Minor, providing a network of independent or semi-independent inter-communicating peoples, the commercial relations with the Black Sea on the one side and with Egypt on the other developing normally in accordance with the art of navigation as then understood. But these conditions are very far from explaining Greece. They have been there all the time "The mountains look on Marathon, and Marathon looks on the sea" now, as they did two thousand years ago and as they did two thousand years before Darius and Xerxes. But the great period of Greece was short-lived and has never returned. A whole complex of conditions must have met to determine that unique contribution to human culture, and of these the most essential must have been human rather than physical, the physical conditions being themselves affected in their operation by other factors of human origin, the fortunes of the Oriental empires, the rise of Rome, and the consequent shifting of commercial and political influences.

3 The points last mentioned remind us that if we would estimate the importance of the environment aright we must be clear as to what we are including in the term. There is the physical environment as it originally was unaltered by man. There is the physical environment as altered by man, but yet physical.¹ There is the whole environment, physical, social and political, on which depends, e.g., the importance of a trade route. It hardly needs saying that

¹ Including, e.g., buildings, railways and canals, with which we should, I think, associate such natural resources as minerals, not created but rendered accessible by human skill and acquiring value from human knowledge

the two latter as involving the human factor grow in importance in comparison with the former as civilisation advances. In particular contact with other peoples—of course, dependent on geographical conditions—is often the means by which arts are introduced and institutions changed. Culture contacts are the most pervasive influence in civilisation. But even here we are not to suppose a community to be a purely passive recipient. It reacts and it selects. The Japanese have taken from Europe not what Europe chose to give, but what Japan chose to accept.

The influence of the environment in these wider senses clearly does not diminish. On the contrary, the environment itself gets wider and richer in content and complexity. Our question is what, if anything, can be said in general terms as to the environmental conditions that favour or hinder development. Clearly the reply must be very different according as we have in view the development of a particular community, or the development of communities in general. Civilisation in a particular community may be explained by its exposure to the influence of other civilised communities, but this is not to explain civilisation in general. We cannot even lay down that exposure to civilised influences is the way to become civilised, for some peoples so exposed not only gain nothing but even lose that which they had. A community may also lose its importance and cease to be a centre of civilised achievement because other peoples have grown or decayed, and the centres and paths of intercourse have shifted, and unless we keep this caution in mind we may easily be led into attributing to internal causes a growth or decay which are due to external changes.

In general terms we may see in the geographical situation—political as well as physical conditions being brought into the account—the main factor determining individual differences as between nations of much the same mental equipment and on the same level of general culture. What pride of race claims for itself impartial science is more likely to assign to causes which it will find clearly set out on the map. If England in the end superseded France, Spain and Holland as the main colonising power, do we need any

explanation beyond England's island position? If by a miracle of metempsychosis the entire British population could have exchanged faculties with the entire population of France, say in the sixteenth century, would the course of oversea trade and empire have altered its channel? A fantastic question, it may be said, which science has no right to pose and no need to answer. Let us then put it in this fashion. To assume for the sake of argument that there are differences of nuance psychologically between the average Briton and the average Frenchman, is there any evidence that they are such as to weigh in the balance against the geographical advantages of the island power? Supposing the two nations gifted with equal colonising genius—whatever that may be—could the result of the rivalry between them be in doubt when the one had its attention occupied primarily with Continental rivals and ambitions, which to the other were never more than secondary? The limitations of this argument must be carefully borne in mind. Our metempsychosis was between English and French, white peoples of much the same cultural level, not between Englishmen and Australian aborigines, and our proposition is simply that between nations of a common culture the individuality of history and institutions is primarily a function of political and physical geography.¹

In fact, it is clear enough that if the sea had never pierced the Straits of Dover, and England had remained united with

¹ Since the above was written I have found almost the same image, only in the form of an exchange of babies instead of souls, employed by Dr. McDougall (in his *National Welfare and National Decay*, chaps. II and VI), but to the opposite purpose. Dr. McDougall's point is that if one argues in this way as between English and French one might argue in the same way as between English and Hottentots. Surely that depends on one's view of the relative importance of the racial differences, and Dr. McDougall would be the last to deny that that will vary very much from case to case.

Of course we cannot argue from an image, the use of which is merely to make the meaning of an abstraction as clear as possible. The point of logic is this—and it is one on which I apprehend no difference with Dr. McDougall—Are we to begin with plain and verifiable facts (in this case geographical conditions) and consider whether with no other assumptions they suffice to explain certain effects, resorting to the unknown, uncertain and undefinable only when we have established a discrepancy, or are we to begin with assumptions in this doubtful region, and be content if we can maintain them without manifest contradiction?

the Continent, the history of this country and its reactions on Europe must have been quite other than they have actually been. It is easy to see that we owe not merely our oversea empire, but our relatively early attainment of national unity, our comparative freedom from militarism, and as a consequence our stronger development of personal liberty, to the immunity secured until the other day by our island position. It is also clear that our normal attitude to European politics, our interest in the balance of power, and our objection to a preponderant force upon the Continent, are traceable to the same situation, since, while we are an island, we are close to the Continent and of small size relatively to its great mass. Thus our immunity has always been felt to be contingent and under given circumstances precarious; hence it is that we repeatedly acted as the make-weight in the European scale.

Thus the geographer can without difficulty trace both in general outline and in detail the interweaving of geographical conditions in social and political development, and he is fully within his right if he protests that much that is superficially ascribed to race or perhaps to political institutions is in reality the outcome of situation. He may be mistaken only (1) if he assumes the geographical conditions to be as unvarying in their operation upon social development as they are in their own physical structure, and (2) if he treats them as positive causes of human movements where they are conditions and not inelastic conditions within which human efforts make their way.

4. If, reverting to the larger question, we try to state the contribution of environment to social development in general terms we shall find that what can usefully be said reduces itself to somewhat narrow limits

(a) In relation to the industrial arts environment may be favourable or unfavourable to human effort. As a rule it is not favourable if nature is too barren or too lavish. But both these statements are so subject to correction as to be of little value of themselves. For example, barren soil may be provocative of invention and application such as that which has laid down gardens upon sand dunes;

and the lavishness of nature may by wise use be made to set free a portion of human activity for the non-material needs of man. After all, early civilisations flourished in fertile oases and river valleys, primarily, it would seem, because in each case a theocracy succeeded in drawing from a rural population a sufficient surplus to admit of the cultivation of the earlier arts and sciences.¹ A condition of progress on the higher side of life is that there shall be some surplus over physical needs, liberating a proportion of human energies for the task of advancement.

In general terms it is contended that the environment must condition the prevailing industries of a society and through these industries must affect the whole of its social structure. But this proposition holds good, as has been shown above, only when the progress of the industrial arts is taken into account, and the operation of the environment is double edged, for its untoward side, by presenting a special problem to be solved, may be the stimulus to considerable industrial advance. There is, however, one particular circumstance affecting the whole course of the early and middle civilisation, which may be mentioned here. Civilisation arose in the great river valleys and on the sea borders, while on the steppes and pasture-land the semi-nomadic people continued to rove. Their intercourse with civilisation, their periodical descents on the cultivated land, sometimes as raiders, sometimes as more or less permanent conquerors, has been one of the greatest disturbing factors of civilised development. The ploughed land has had to absorb the pasture-land, the agriculturist has had to maintain himself against and finally subdue the pastoralist.²

¹ Swamps and wild beasts would at the beginning of civilisation present dangers and difficulties, but the wealth was there to be won by arts within the compass of human knowledge at the time. The potentialities of irrigation were also favourable to a unified social order.

² In M. Demolins's brilliant and seductive work *Comment la route crée la type sociale*, the Le Play school has given a conjectural account of the history of mankind as determined by the successive habitats of each race. Of the initial assumptions I say nothing beyond recording some perplexity. What I have to note is first the blending of very charming descriptive work based, I take it, on sheer observation, with accounts of migrations, halts and advances in which it is difficult to distinguish the historical from the conjectural.

(b) The environment may be favourable or unfavourable to human physique. The most important question that arises here is that of acquired immunity to disease. Great tracts of the tropics have hitherto been forbidden to the white man as a permanent dwelling-place, owing to the diseases to which the natives have become immune. The growth of urban civilisation again seems to depend on the acquirement of partial immunity to some infectious diseases. In this respect it seems probable that the application of modern scientific discoveries may work a complete revolution, and that endemic and epidemic diseases may cease to affect the distribution of population. Historically, however, we may say that environmental conditions have directly or indirectly, principally by some process of racial adaptation, gone far to determine the distribution of peoples over the habitable globe and have tended to preserve isolation and prevent free intermixture. It is possible that the further development of ethnology will bring to light many subtle and far-reaching instances of the adaptation of the human type to physical environment. The bald proposition, which is all we can lay down in general terms, that the type must be

Secondly, the perpetuation of institutions is extremely hard to reconcile with the theory of their origin from adaptation to environment. Admit for the sake of argument that the patriarchal family arises on the steppe as the appropriate method of holding flocks and herds under simple conditions. Admit the possibility, whatever you may think of the probability, that the great agricultural civilisations were founded by pastoral immigrants. How do you account for the patriarchate persisting for several thousand years in China and India? Either the patriarchate must be equally well adapted to an agricultural economy at a certain stage, in which case there is no need to assume a pastoral origin, or a fundamental institution may persist indefinitely in an environment to which it is not peculiarly adapted, in which case the whole theory of the determination of institutions by the physical environment is shattered. M. Demolins's theory, if I read it aright, seems to make successive stages of a people's alleged wanderings responsible for successive layers of their institutions, and even of their psychology, but it gives no indication of the method by which some of these traits become fixed, while others are clearly evanescent. If, per impossible, the individual enterprise of the Northern races is really due to the shape of the Norwegian fjords breaking up the patriarchal family, why does it persist so many centuries after they left Norway, and why do we not find equal initiative and material progress in the highly 'particularist' family of, for instance, the primitive Veddá. (For some development of these criticisms with a more favourable view of the whole theory, see McDougall, *The Group Mind*.)

adjusted to its environment, may prove to have many interesting and important applications.

(c) Geographical conditions may be favourable or unfavourable to security and intercourse, either or both. Mountains and rivers, desert and sea shut off primitive communities from one another, and offer the opportunity of peaceful internal development, but will they develop if left to themselves, free from the stimulus of rivalry and possible danger from without? This is perhaps an unsolved question. So far as we can see, the most trustworthy generalisation as to the conditions favourable to development is that they are those which most readily combine security with ease and variety of intercourse between distinct centres. It is needless to say that geographical conditions taken in relation to the existent methods of communication, and also the arts of war, bear closely upon this point. This is written very clearly in the history of ancient Greece, in that of the Italian city States up to the period of Roman supremacy, and it may be said in the entire subsequent history of Europe. When the city wall was a sufficient supplement to the natural defence of the Acropolis, the little town enjoyed comparative security within, and yet had plenty of intercourse, friendly and hostile, with neighbours like itself, but sufficiently different to supply all the stimulus of rivalry. And the greater nations of modern Europe have enjoyed a measure of security due in large part to geographical barriers, at the same time maintaining a no less lively communication of the same chequered character. As a purely physical fact the production of the different requirements of human beings in different parts of the world must be reckoned as one of the most important.

In fine, the most pervasive and important contribution of geography to human development may be found in its effects upon intercommunication and defence.

BIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

5. In a sense the biological factor conditions all others, for in any society a man must live, and, that he may live, he must satisfy his physical needs, maintain his health

and perpetuate his stock. On the other hand, the conditions which are common to men and animals are those which least serve to explain the differences which part men from animals. Thus it is not in the biological conditions that we should look for causes of the development of man, still less of the higher forms of civilisation. We may expect rather to find in them limiting conditions to progress, barriers against which the human spirit beats, or it may be succeeds little by little in pushing back

Biological Theories of Society—The doctrine of organic evolution has profoundly affected the theory of society, and it will be well to review the principal phases through which this theory has passed since the publication of *The Origin of Species*.

(a) *The Struggle for Existence*—The theory that the highly developed forms of living species were evolved from simpler types by the continual appearance of small variations, of which 'the fittest survive,' was soon applied to human beings as well as to plants and animals. The process of selection, it was conceived, went on unceasingly among mankind as elsewhere. Every population at any moment could be regarded as an assemblage of individuals but slightly differing from one another in respect of various qualities, physical or mental, in such a way that some would be a little better and others a little worse fitted in this respect or that to meet the conditions of existence. In this situation, it was thought, progress was automatically secured, for, as the relatively fitter would survive to maturity and bear offspring, and as the least fit would perish—the influences of chance being cancelled out in the vast numbers to be taken into consideration—each generation would start a little higher in the scale than their fathers, and in that way the type of manhood would gradually evolve. But to this beneficent process there was one possible obstacle. The growth of civilisation promoted sentiments of justice which restrained the strong, and a humanity which preserved the weak. This development tended to limit the free scope of natural selection, diminishing the opportunities of survival for the most fit, and multiplying the opportunities for the

least fit. The argument, thus nakedly stated, ended therefore in a paradoxical position. Precisely those qualities which had been regarded as a mark of the higher civilisation were made to appear fatal to any permanent advance in civilisation; indeed in the more rigid view the suspension of selection was bound in the end to produce regression, and humane civilisation must defeat itself by extinguishing the types to which it owed its birth.

The truth is that the whole argument is based on an uncritical use of terms. It is presumably true that the fittest survive, but the fittest for what? Simply and solely for survival under the conditions which happen to obtain in their own generation. The use of an ambiguous term like 'fitness' suggests the possession of some desirable quality as judged by human standards, but no such suggestion is warranted by the premises upon which the whole argument depends. A man may get the better of a struggle with others because he is harder or meaner or more selfish; he may get the better because he is braver, more honourable, more devoted. It depends on his environment; and it is only in an environment in which some measure of justice and humanity is already attained that justice and humanity will be qualities tending to survival. Taking the organic world throughout, mere fertility is one of the most potent factors in the survival of the stock, but the most fertile stocks are on the whole the lowest in point of development; and the 'higher' organisations¹ are repeatedly handicapped by decreasing fertility. In short, the conception of the survival of the fittest gives no guarantee of progress in any sense which is of interest to man, or of development in the sense in which it has been defined above. On the contrary, it must be maintained that all social organisation is by its nature opposed to the struggle for existence. There may be, and is, a struggle between organisations—to this we shall refer presently—but, as between individuals which belong to any kind of organisation, the bare struggle for existence

¹ This will be true, whether 'higher' means something which our human valuations prefer, or merely something more completely organised in its structure and life.

is, so far as the scope which that organisation reaches, abolished. The development of organisation is therefore the progressive suspension of the struggle for existence. In this development it is clear that many individuals would be kept alive who would otherwise perish, and accordingly stocks would be preserved which would otherwise be eliminated. These stocks are not necessarily unfit. On the contrary, the very fact that they are preserved proves them to be fit in the strict biological meaning of that term. The substantive question is whether good or bad stocks are thus preserved, or (if we prefer so to put it), stocks fitted to promote the further development of organisation or to retard it. The general answer to this is that every organisation constitutes for the individual an environment which expresses its own character, and that in so far as it affects survival and so far as the rate of survival is the principal factor in the modification of stock, the organisation will gradually mould the stock to suit its character. The type which can flourish in a society based upon essential principles of justice and freedom and humanity might perish under barbaric anarchy, religious tyranny or military despotism. It may be said that at any rate philanthropy preserves the weaklings who would be better dead. Many who are physically weak, however, have minds that may contribute much more than healthy bodies to the work of civilisation. That some who are on the whole worthless are preserved is probably true, but it is also true that many who are not only worthless but positively bad will find it easier to live and thrive in a society of low rather than one of high organisation. Taken as a whole, the best organised society is that which forms the best environment for those of the greatest social capacity, that is, for the most spiritual, the most intellectual, the least self-regarding and the most humane.

In sum, the theory that human progress depends on natural selection must be met by a direct negative. Human progress, regarded as an advance in organisation, involves the continual restriction of the sphere of the struggle for existence upon which natural selection depends

(b) *The Struggle of Groups*.—Faced by criticism of this

kind, biological theory gradually assumed a new shape. It was recognised that the bare doctrine of the struggle for existence as applied to human society meant anarchy, and that a theory of anarchy could not explain the growth of civilisation. It was therefore admitted that a community is an organised group of human beings within which the struggle for existence is suspended, but, it was urged, the struggle is suspended within only to be waged with greater effect without. Human society is a scene of struggles for existence between groups of men, among which the fittest group survives. Within the group there is every room for the practice of social virtues. The more men learn to be just, merciful, and if need be self-sacrificing, the more they will be loyal to the unity of the group, be it small or great, and the greater accordingly the effectiveness of the group as a whole as a fighting force. In place of the individual struggle for existence, we have the Mosaic precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy."

This theory, though more plausible than the first, does not stand the test either of analysis or of history.¹ It involves a dual standard of ethics which is possible to the natural but impossible to the reflective man. It is compatible with development up to a certain point but not beyond it. As all the higher ethics and more spiritual religions testify, every advance beyond primitive morality pivots on the conception of something that is due to man as man, whether it be conceived that all men are sons of God and all have souls capable of salvation, or simply that all are brothers capable of the like happiness and the like suffering. The group theory simply has to write off the entirety of these conceptions, that is to say, the whole spirit of the ethical and religious systems distinctive of the higher civilisation, as a sheer mistake, which is not a happy way of laying the foundation for the theory of civilisation.

But we may go a step farther than this, for even within

¹ I mean in its biological implications, and especially in its reliance on the struggle for existence. So far as it emphasised the survival value of good institutions to the social group the theory was a step in the right direction. See Chapter IX, § 3

the community, if we are dealing with the large and complex States of the civilised world, these principles are necessary. Every complex community tends to crystallise into subordinate groups, classes or castes, which gravitate towards a group morality of their own, hardening them against other classes. To perfect the spirit of unity within the community, appeal has constantly been made to just those principles of humanity which are here negated. The greater communities cannot in fact be unified, and the most cannot be made of their common life without the admission of principles which strike group egoism at its root. Conversely, if the group theory is once admitted, if it is held that social duties have only a limited application, there is no reason in principle why any group which feels itself a unity should not use the denial for its own purposes. As a matter of political fact, it will be found that hostile relations between communities reflect themselves in the internal structure of each community. The State that commits itself to a course of conquest, or even military rivalry, finds it is necessary to adapt its own internal structure accordingly. There may be advances in efficiency along this line, and, through conquest, in the size of the community, but the scope of organisation is necessarily limited to the things which make for political and military success, and the growth of an organic life of free co-operation is subordinated to the needs of an efficient machine.

The theory is also set aside by the comparative view of society. It is of course true that a great deal of history is made up of the competitions and struggles of communities with one another, but the development of society has been on one side a progressive enlargement of communities. In part no doubt this enlargement has been brought about by conquest, but even conquest has been permanently successful as a rule where it has produced either actual amalgamation or at least a contented acquiescence in unification. Every such unification diminishes the sphere of the struggle between communities, just as all organisation of the community diminishes the sphere of the struggle between individuals, and these enlargements have not been brought about by sheer force, but rather by statesmanship and

consideration on the part of the victor and the revival of the human tendencies making for co-operation and peaceful intercourse as soon as the stress of conflict is over. War and warlike organisation have of course called forth human virtues as have calamities of all kinds and the preparations for meeting them, but pestilence and famine have not been conditions making for civilisation nor has organised slaughter.

On the whole, then, the most advanced communities are those in which the widest and most organic forms of association have replaced the relative anarchy of hostile groups or the mechanical domination of military governments. This principle, which holds good by the generally admitted tests of civilisation, is explicitly confirmed by our own conception of development as a movement towards an organic unity of the widest scope, for this must ultimately be the unity of the race.

It must be subjoined that the group theory has but little title to the biological support which it claims. The biological principle is that progress depends on a selection of superior stocks and is thus determined by the preservation or extinction of individuals, but the conflict of groups does not necessarily exercise a selective action upon individuals. At some barbaric stages of warfare, it is true, the conquered may be exposed to a general massacre, but a stage is soon reached at which the women and children, and then the whole population, are either enslaved or are otherwise amalgamated with the conquering people.¹ The rate of

¹ Of the wars of the past it might be said that they tended to the mutual extinction of the most turbulent types, as the Wars of the Roses are held to have extinguished the old feudal nobility. In that way they might be defended as a form of blood-letting. But this would be an awkward argument for a policy of national competition as the goal of progress. National competition requires the very type which the blood-letting extinguishes as the raw material of the fighting mechanism. But I doubt whether at any stage of civilised warfare the thesis would hold true in general terms. War is essentially unscrupulous, and in it, on the whole, the unscrupulous man comes to the top. In old days he sat down upon the land of the conquered and constituted the new nobility. Under modern refinement he is the man who best understands how to represent himself as indispensable at home, and so makes the profits or gets the best positions in the Government service, while the others get maimed or killed. Briefly,

reproduction in a weaker race may, as some instances have shown, be increased by the imposition upon them of peace by a more organised power. And when we pass from the conquest of weaker by stronger races to warfare among States of equal civilisation, it is unfortunately too clear to us that war does not select the weakest individuals for extinction. The claim therefore of group morality to secure the survival of the highest stock is biologically quite unsound.

(c) *Rational Selection and Racial Progress*—Years of controversy have shown that the conception of natural selection cannot be used in relation to human values. In more recent times therefore the biological theory has assumed a new form. It is admitted that fitness to survive must be rationally determined and it is contended that the future of human progress depends upon a judicious selection of parents for each coming generation. Here we have at any rate got rid of the ambiguity of fitness. We are supposing that men form on rational principles a conception of the type of human being who is fit in the ethical sense and adapted to the furtherance of a life which is desirable to man. But with this change of meanings the whole controversy shifts its ground. The eugenic position may, I suppose, be summed up in general terms as follows. Social life depends on the characteristics of the individual members of society. Fundamentally these characteristics are determined by heredity. They improve in so far as a better type of parents produces better children, and in the converse case they deteriorate. The prime function of society is to see that the best are parents and that the worst are not. Progress is not a matter of environment, not therefore a question of the improvement of institutions. These things may be very good in themselves, but they do not affect the stock.

under modern war conditions the embusqué is the fittest to survive, and, what is more, to come to the top politically, socially and commercially. Among the actual fighters under old hand-to-hand conditions, probably the brave and able fighter, though he exposed himself more, had in the long run a better chance of survival than the coward, but bombs fall equally upon the brave and timid. It is only in the air that personal qualities continuously determine survival. But the airmen as a whole were a picked class, and their death-rate was extremely high.

Acquired characteristics are not inherited, and the children of educated men will neither be born educated nor even with greater intellectual capacity than the children of the uneducated. Diseases will not be extirpated by sanitary conditions, the rate of mortality will be lower so long as these conditions are active, but the hereditary liability to the diseases will continue. The only radical means of extinguishing a disease is to extirpate the stock carrying this liability. The same principle will apply to faults of character or lack of intelligence.

In this statement we are moving rather in the province of a social art than of a social science. We are concerned more with questions of the ways in which legislators might affect the future of society than with conditions that have actually determined development, for the theoretical study of heredity is still in its infancy, and though the selection of parentage has been advocated by various thinkers from Plato onwards, it never seems to have been put into force on any large scale. To this, I presume, the eugenist would reply that there has been a certain amount of unconscious and half-conscious selection exercised in one sense by individuals, particularly by women in their choice of husbands, and in another sense by institutions which have in fact contributed in some societies more or in others less to the selection of the better and the rejection of the worse stocks. If this argument is pressed, it will carry us back perilously near to the theory of natural selection, which has already been considered and rejected. But the whole principle upon which the eugenic theory rests must be more critically considered.

When the eugenist maintains that the life of society depends upon the characteristics of individuals who compose it, he is so far right that any society, as it stands to-day, is the product of the lives of countless past generations and of its present members, and those lives must be the expression of the inherited characteristics of each generation as they are modified by mutual intercommunication and their dealings with the physical environment. But it is a fallacy to infer that social progress or deterioration is reducible

to racial progress or deterioration. Given the same unchanging level of hereditary endowment in a community in any number of generations, the successive efforts of each generation will affect the social structure and progressively modify the lives actually lived by men. These changes may be for good or for ill, may be first in one direction and then in another. There is no difficulty in conceiving them over any given period as moving uniformly. Let us suppose a case in which they do so move, and for the sake of argument let us assume that the movement is in the direction of progress. In that case the organisation of the community will, after some generations, stand at a distinctly higher level, although there be no higher level of original hereditary endowment at the end than at the beginning. For example, a science may make a great progress through the centuries, although at the end of the time there may be no man of genius among its votaries greater than its original founders. The mathematician of the present day can, I suppose, solve problems which were beyond the reach of Newton. That is not because he is a greater man than Newton, but because he is using Newton's work, and that of many others who have come between. Social progress, in short, is, as we have seen, an expression for advancing organisation. Racial progress is an expression for the development of desirable hereditary qualities in the average individual. It is obvious that racial progress would facilitate social progress and that racial deterioration would retard it, but that is by no means the same as to say that they are identical.

Constancy of racial qualities has here been assumed mainly for the sake of argument. It is not to be supposed that no change actually occurs. The reverse is probably the case. But what changes there are in the germ plasm are probably slow and relatively superficial. History strongly suggests the permanence of the fundamental human traits, and the history of each nation a similar permanence of that which is nationally distinctive. Social changes are far more rapid than biological. Through how many phases, each of which might be deemed a change of specific value, has England passed since the Saxon conquest? No species of animal—and from

the biological point of view the English are merely a variety of one species of animal—accomplishes changes in the least degree comparable in such a period. There is no evidence in racial psychology that any important part is played by 'mutations' which set up new hereditary types. In particular, conspicuous mental ability, which is of course an historic factor in social revolutions, so far as it has been systematically examined (as by Galton), exhibits the phenomena of regression, indicating that it is not a 'mutation' but a 'fluctuation.' True psychological mutations may have occurred, but are at present unproven.

Two facts are overlooked or misunderstood by those who hold on a priori grounds that social change must be referred to changes in the hereditary endowment of individuals. The first is the extraordinary range of human potentiality. Every man, it has been said, has the capacity to be a saint or a villain. What the man ultimately becomes is the result of complex and subtle relations between his inner self and the result of his experience in which his relations with others are the principal factors. Can he or can he not find the place in social life in which his particular capacities will develop in harmony with his community? If so, it is well with him and good for his community. But if not, the very same qualities will wreck him, and perhaps the more surely if they are strongly marked, energetic qualities with much potentiality of good in them. The problem of each man's development is as much social as personal.

Secondly, what some writers have termed the 'social content' of the self is ignored. The relations of character to environment are exceedingly subtle, and I cannot hope to state them adequately. But they are hopelessly misrepresented if we regard individual character as a kind of physical organism developing by inherent laws of growth and acted upon from without by society. Human qualities have social meanings and obtain the actual direction of their development from the social surroundings.¹ It is not enough to say that they are exposed to a social atmosphere which nourishes some and inhibits others. The relation is more

¹ Compare A. Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre* (1923), chap. i, § 4.

intimate. They are intrinsically attitudes of thought and emotion regarding others, activities and interests concerned with incidents of the common life, not merely as means to their satisfaction, but as the substance or object of the satisfaction itself. This point may be best seen if we take some of the more obviously egoistic qualities such as vanity, or more generally the whole mass of qualities which make the approbation and respect of our fellows one of the most pervasive of human motives. This motive may lead a savage to collect skulls, or a financier to collect millions, or a scientific man to collect specimens or advance knowledge. It may work out to most destructive or most constructive issues. It operates—not of course as the only motive—on the recruit who enlists, and the conscientious objector who is sustained by the opinion of the only circle that he cares about in refusing. One and the same hereditary element may thus have the most contrary effects in accordance with the social content of meaning with which it becomes charged.

Reviewing these considerations we are confirmed in the view that social problems are essentially problems of organisation. 'Human nature' is a body of unorganised, undeveloped hereditary potentialities. What can be made of them depends on the way in which they can be adjusted to one another. They may so check and disturb each other that the resulting life is anarchic or mean or concentrated on paltry and limited ends, or they may so harmonise as to constitute a life rich in splendour of achievement. It is not a new human nature that is needed, but the best of the human nature that we have.

It remains, as of course, that the original inherited character of the human units composing a society must influence the life into which they are absorbed. Social organisation cannot get away from the character of individuals. If it begins to put too high a demand on them, it will not work. If it allows no room for some strenuous impulse, there will be a break somewhere, and such cases occur historically where some movement forced by enthusiasts on a reluctant mass come up against ineluctable predispositions which defeat or evade the results in detail if not by

frontal attacks. Thus the hereditary characteristics of particular stocks or of entire races are certainly factors in development. In particular, as a proposition bearing on social reform, we have no right to deny that there may be predispositions which are radically bad—hereditary liability to certain diseases, for instance—and if this is proved, the eugenicist is within his rights in maintaining that the only remedy is one analogous to a radical surgical operation. It is the removal of the tainted stock by the prohibition of parentage. The wider and less direct effects of such prohibitions have to be taken into account, but granted all the conditions required, we must admit the eugenic conclusion that, if that particular evil is to be removed, it must be through the hereditary factor. It is indeed improbable that we could ever operate on the qualities most dangerous to society. We might eliminate the feeble-minded, but who will ever eliminate the too strong-minded? The superman type, the junker, the profiteer, the soulless efficient, are between them the scourge of the earth. The rest of us who want to live in peace and get on with the work of civilised life may well feel that if it comes to elimination we are much less likely to eliminate than to be eliminated by them. The biological view, by emphasising individual strength and all the qualities contributory to personal success, has enabled this type to entrench itself behind a kind of scientific prestige. The eugenic tendencies of good government, free criticism and social justice in making life a little less easy for the destroyers are obscured, and instead of seeking advance in the further strengthening of our defences we are invited to join in the hunt of the weakling. The silly sheep rather than the fox or the wolf is represented as the enemy to the fold. Now silliness is a trial, and may be a burden, but one per cent. of feeble-minded in a population is a weight that can be borne, whereas a mere handful of supermen, perhaps a single one with his satellites, may wreck a civilisation.

The superman, it may be objected, has ground qualities which we cannot dispense with. He may make a bad use of them, but if we cut out energy of will and power of brain,

where would be our civilisation? It may be replied that many of the qualities associated with personal failure are equally exaggerations of something which in its elements has value. The kindly, easy-going disposition of the 'good fellow' who is 'no one's enemy but his own', the roving tendencies that make the tramp refuse a settled home, the sensibilities that seduce a man from the continuous grind of the office or the factory out on to moorland and sunshine, represent elements without which human nature would be poorer and life uglier. 'It takes all sorts to make a world' The well-constituted being is a balance of many qualities, and the disturbance of the balance leads sometimes to failure, sometimes to undue and ill-starred success. If we had to choose between a world of best-selected hard-efficients, and a world of easy-going jog-trots, it is a question how our decision would go. One would be all wire and steel, the other all cushions and pulp, one would keep getting on, but only to reach drier and stonier land, the other would vegetate comfortably for ever. We need each set of qualities to counteract the other. The best type is not a selection of one quality, but an organic unity of the greatest number and diversity of elements.

Contemporary studies of heredity have tended to emphasise the permanence of characters—to such a point indeed, that the whole doctrine of biological evolution has been threatened with the melting-pot. In sociology such a tendency is easily turned to the justification of caste. If there are some types deservedly outcast—in fact unfit to live—there are others so precious that everything must be done to preserve them pure and undiminished in number. As things stand, we are told this high caste is becoming sterile, and in the apprehension of some writers sterile because it has to pay rates and taxes for the benefit of the outcast. These writers have not made so close a study of public finance as of biology, or they would be aware that the great burden of taxation is due not to the maintenance of the needy, but to the military expenditure which is imputable in the last resort to national passions and the failure of the wise and eminent to control them. If public education is also

costly, a little knowledge of industrial history would convince them of the impossibility of securing the supply of intelligent workmanship which their admired efficiency needs without a wide diffusion of the elements of learning. The residual cost of the helpless and incompetent involves a relatively trifling burden on the income of the successful professional man—the Brahmin for whom all society is to offer up its sacrifices. Financially communities are much more encumbered with the charges of functionless wealth than with those of functionless poverty. We must revert to this point, merely remarking here that, while it is not within the province of the sociologist to offer an opinion on the fixity of types, he may be allowed to know something about caste, and he cannot study comparative institutions without recognising that even from the point of view of efficiency and quantitative growth—the harder and more external criteria of success—the flourishing societies are those which open the door widest to cross-fertilisation. Endogamy belongs to the backwaters of cultural history. For this the reason is not only that intermarriage enlarges the boundaries and strengthens the bonds of social peace, but also that it ensures a greater variety of type, and upon the whole a better balance and mutual supplementation of the qualities necessary to a developed human being. Thoroughbreds have their uses, but we have to fall back on the common stock to maintain the vigour of the race unimpaired.

The best environment, then, would not be that which selects some special quality for survival, but that which makes room for the greatest wealth of diversity. Certainly from such diversity there may be some radically bad tendencies which should be utterly eliminated. But we must be very cautious in inferring from failure and misdeeds in actual life to congenital defect, and even where there is congenital defect, it may be the marriage that is unfortunate rather than the element which each parent contributes. In any case, the society which can turn to good uses the greatest diversity of character is likely to lead the fullest life, and to have the richest human material always at its disposal. Hence, subject to the maintenance of good order,

the institutions which admit the greatest freedom, the largest scope for initiative, the most complete equality of opportunity, and in particular the widest field for sexual selection, are likely to be the most eugenic. But all these are the characteristics of a developed community in accordance with our definition. It follows that social development is generally favourable to racial development.

6. At this point eugenicists adduce features of our society which, as they think, point on the contrary to profound disharmony. In our civilisation, they argue, the well-to-do classes represent on the whole the abler stocks. They are dwindling, owing to late and infertile marriages, relatively to the poorer, who multiply the more rapidly the lower we go in the scale. Admitting everything that may be said of the necessity of balance in the stock, they must still insist that one most important element, general ability, is a wasting asset. In considering this argument we need not spend time in discussing whether ability is inherited. There is not the least reason to doubt that individuals differ in congenital capacity for all sort of things, or that such differences are inherited like any others. But what kind or kinds of ability go to determine economic and social position is another question. In the first place, wealth and position are still largely determined not by physical but by social heredity, and the stock may fall off in quality without commensurate loss of position. Secondly, they are maintained in no small degree by marriages of convenience which from the eugenic point of view would hardly be approved. Thirdly, so far as they are due to personal qualities, it is clear that these are qualities involving a capacity to succeed which is above the average. But, as already shown, such qualities are of very diversified character, some making for good and some for bad social organisation. Lastly, if it is true that some good stocks are diminishing, this may be due not to the good but to the bad elements in our social organisation.

Thus if and in so far as childlessness is due to false social ideals, to the preference of a life of pleasure, luxury and show to one of the family affections; to a preponderance

of cold calculation and worldly views over the warmer feelings, it reflects some of the worst elements in our social system, and so far as it reflects them of free choice, i.e. so far as the preference expresses congenital tendencies, then if the stock dies out for such reasons—*vile damnum*. We would hesitate to pass the same verdict on the temperament which so often contributed to the success of the middle-class type—that which leads it to prefer the secure maintenance of its standard of life to romance, early love and a full nursery. We must respect the merits of this type. Yet we cannot affect surprise if it is biologically less fit to survive than the warmer-blooded that take larger risks. But here perhaps our view may be qualified by considering the nature of the standard that is in question. If the difficulty is that the 'intellectual' cannot find the means of uniting family life with the conditions of intellectual work, then indeed there is something to complain of in the social system. But in that case the trouble is the very reverse of that which we were examining. It is not that the prosperous or wealthy fail to maintain their line, it is that the larger mass of intellectual workers are not prosperous or wealthy. In fact their function is not being properly supported, and the reason of this, as indicated above, is not the small percentage of their income which they pay in taxes to the poor, but the heavy burden on the economic system of militarism on the one hand, and functionless wealth on the other. If there were fewer great professional prizes, and more certainty of a maintenance adequate to the functions which he performs for every professional man of competence, we should hear less of childless marriages. But to secure more equable maintenance of valuable functions is one of the prime objects of economic justice.

It may be urged lastly that the social justice which has opened up careers for women is chargeable with the childlessness of many of the ablest of their sex. Whether there is any physical correlation of sterility (or sexual coldness) with intellectual power we need not here inquire. If so, it is a biological obstacle to progress that does not bear on our central question. That reflecting women will refuse

to bear children beyond their physical strength or power of maternal supervision is certain, and it is also socially desirable. The limit is not such as to bar the maintenance of the abler stocks in undiminished number. But I think it may be admitted that the ideals uppermost in the minds of women in the struggle for emancipation have been in some respects unfavourable to maternity, and that here the eugenicist has a right to represent the motherhood of the healthy and capable as a form of social service, a representation to which it is precisely the best women who will most readily respond. What is further needed to reconcile such women to family life is again not less social justice, but more—equality in marriage and parenthood, and more power of dissolving a loveless and unhappy union. Eugenically there is nothing to regret if women are no longer forced to bring children into the world in loveless marriages against their will. It is not mere sentimentality to suggest that willing maternity and unions of love are the most eugenic of agencies, for the former implies soundness of instinct, and the latter (in all probability) fundamental suitability of mating.

With regard to the other side of the eugenic complaint—the multiplication of the unfit—we do not accept relative poverty as a criterion of unfitness. But in any case the evidence goes to show that the fall of the birth-rate affects every class in proportion as it reaches a standard of economic comfort, which is worth some effort and some sacrifice to maintain. Here again, if and in so far as there is an evil, the cure is not less economic equality, but more. The fertility of the mentally defective is a question standing by itself. Improvements in the social system would bring them more under care and restraint, and as a part of such supervision it may be right and necessary for society to forbid them parenthood.

Thus, when the conditions of the differential birth-rate are considered, and essentially different cases distinguished, we find no ground for suggesting any permanent disharmony between social justice and racial excellence. In fact the complete agreement of the two at the highest

stage of organisation would be the natural development of the rough adjustment to the requirements of the social type which we must suppose to be the normal effect¹ of social selection. As a matter of fact this selection takes two forms, one biological, the other social, in a narrower sense. Biologically the race is affected by the direct elimination from parenthood through prolonged imprisonment or capital punishment of those radically unadapted to their society—martyrs, saints, rebels and criminals. Numerically, these all added together form but a small class, and the effects are often unfavourable as well as favourable to social development. More indirect is the effect of institutions on the procreation and bringing up of children. Ideals of celibacy have restricted the procreation of some of the best types. Economic circumstances, the standards of life, etc., affect relative numbers. The infantile death-rate is affected by poverty and wealth, good and bad sanitation and so forth. Upon the whole, if the most justly organised society is that which will secure to each honest worker for the common good the niche in which he can live a man's full life, which is among other things the life of a parent, if it gives scope to initiative and room for diversity, if it supplies to those with special functions to perform the conditions essential to their performance, and if it makes it difficult to live except by social service, then the useful citizen will be more likely than the unsocial and useless to perpetuate his stock. There can then be no final disharmony between social justice and racial excellence.

But it is probable that the racial adaptation to social requirements is extremely slow. Other effects of social selection are more marked and rapid. I refer to the changes in the composition of communities by migration, and of classes by supplantation. The former has been touched on

¹ I say normal, not universal. Contrary instances that may be suggested are the tendencies of a narrow class or caste endogamy to defeat itself by sterility, or of a great political and military despotism to court destruction by eliminating the men of ability required for its maintenance. I very well recollect the prediction made to me by Stepniak in 1889, that in a great European war the Russian Tsardom would be brought to the ground from this cause.

and will be mentioned again. As to the latter, the social conditions which determine the type of man that is to be on top politically, professionally or industrially, are of high importance. The qualities making for success vary from place to place and from time to time, but it is safe to say that they are always mixed. Industry, energy, initiative, always count except where caste rules. In a well-ordered society probity is generally necessary. But the tenderer and gentler virtues—considerateness, conscientiousness, delicacy of mind—are almost uniformly adverse, and though it would be a caricature of the leading men of the world to deny them all these, it remains true that to them such qualities are in general a handicap. The great statesman must be able to sleep o' nights without wondering whether it is through his act or default that a country is being deluged with blood, that widows are mourning and children crying for their bread. The successful business man must be able to forget the face of the competitor who went under, or must be ready to believe that he deserved it. Every improvement in the moral standards of society, however, tightens up the ethical requirements of success, and reduces the discrepancy between social position and personal worth. Thus the function of social selection is of importance not merely to the total racial composition of a community, but more immediately to the relative composition of the various classes within it and their adaptation to the functions which they have to fill.

7. Besides the indirect selective influence of institutions, there is the question of their direct action upon the racial stock.

In this relation the question of the effects of the environment in heredity becomes important. We touch here on questions on which the sociologist is a layman with no right to an opinion, but there is a distinction admitted by the more cautious of those biologists who deny the transmission of acquired characters which is of high significance in sociology. It is the preponderating opinion among biologists that such characters are not transmitted, that is to say, that children do not tend to resemble the parent in respect of a quality

which has been acquired adventitiously. But that is not to say that such qualities can have no effect upon the children. The children of a man who, with no special tendency to alcoholism, has taken to drink to drown his griefs may not themselves be drunkards, yet the alcohol may have affected the germ plasm injuriously just as much as other tissues, and the children may in consequence be debilitated and exhibit the results in quite other phenomena. We are not to expect that the educated parent will, because of his education, have a child of superior innate intellectual capacity, and yet it may well be that the parent who, by the use of his education has secured healthy conditions of life will, on the average have healthier children, better equipped on the whole for all-round development than the parent who has been less fortunate in his lot. If this is so—and the contrary remains to be proved—it will be true that, apart from the indirect effect of selection, on the whole good social organisation has a direct effect for good upon the race as well as on the living generation. The distinction is of the more importance because the current methods of studying heredity and the theory of particulate inheritance tend to concentrate attention on the several distinguishable qualities of man and to ignore the totality which is really human nature, and the unity of which is the decisive factor whether on the personal or the social side of life.

8. We come finally to the question of racial characters. Mill was wont to contend that there was no way of accounting for the behaviour or the institutions of a people so superficial as that which ascribed them to qualities of race. Since Mill's time the ascendancy of biological conceptions has transformed the situation and disposed people to think that, while other differences are superficial, it must be primarily race characters that are fundamental. Yet while physical differences of race are often apparent to the eye, the exposition of psychological differences, which are those that count in sociology, has hardly emancipated itself from the hands of the rhetorician. They are part of the stock in trade of political controversy which often betrays complete ignorance of the difference between a race and a nation, or between

a nation and a State. The wildest excesses of rhetorical pseudo-science are applied to prove by a friend that his own race is responsible for everything good under the sun, by the simple expedient of claiming everyone who has done anything good as being in some way, however cryptic, a scion of the race, or they are applied by an enemy to persuade us that whatever thing is done by a people is the outcome of an inherent vice, as shown by a collection of all the worst records in their history. In reality races are so intermixed and opposite qualities are so blended in every human society, that it is not until that distant time when passions can be eliminated from these things that we shall begin to have the open field for a scientific analysis of racial qualities. Not till people begin by bearing steadily in mind that, for example, German, French and British are names of nations and not of races, that Germans are largely Slav by race, and French partly German, and British German, Celt and pre-Celtic, will they begin to state the problem in the right terms. Meanwhile, it may be well to set down certain provisional views which may reasonably be held and which bear on our general inquiry.

(1) On general grounds of probability we may suppose that as races differ physically they also differ psychologically. Comparative investigation seems to show that the fundamental human traits are universal, though unequally developed in degree.

(2) This inequality is (a) very difficult to measure, (b) still more difficult to apportion to social and biological causes, respectively. The education of 'natives' in white institutions is an inadequate test because the educated native is taken from his own surroundings and traditions, not growing up among them as the educated white man is doing. There is also much intermixture of blood. If any good is found in a 'coloured' man, it is sure to be attributed to a 'white' strain in the ancestry, and the allegation is impossible to disprove¹. Any assimilation between two races living in

¹ In a work of high authority we find it written that the Mediterranean and Alpine races are "brilliant, quick-witted, excitable and impulsive, sociable and courteous, but fickle, untrustworthy and even treacherous often atrociously cruel. . . . Æsthetic sense highly, ethic slightly developed,

the same country will be attributed to intermarriages, even if these are known to be rare, and the impossibility of determining their exact frequency in the past or tracing the ancestry of the individuals of the one race which most approximate to the other leaves the question of causation obscure and affords a free range for dogmatism

(3) Mere difference of race is no bar to physical intermixture, although for reasons which in detail are unknown, but which in general are readily intelligible in the light of recent studies of inheritance, some mixtures are much more fortunate than others. One race may supplement another. Very mixed races like the British may form distinctive nations with marked unity of feeling. Race and nationality are quite distinct ideas.

Thus, even if we could arrive at a scientifically valuable description of national character, we should have to inquire further how much of it is due (1) to tradition and geographical and political circumstances, (2) to the particular blend constituting the national group, (3) to the distinctive qualities of the true component races. To put the matter at its best for racial psychology, the blended whole might be regarded as a new race, but (a) it is a blend of very uncertain composition, for in the presence of barriers of class, faith and locality, who knows how far the intermixtures have gone, and (b) it is subject to constant changes by migration. No wonder that the most authoritative textbook on the subject concludes that "the notion of race as a zoological expression in the sense of a pure breed or strain falls still more into the background," and as Virchow aptly remarks, "this term which always implied something vague has . . . become in the highest degree uncertain."¹

all brave, imaginative, musical, and richly endowed intellectually" The Nordic, on the other hand, are "earnest, energetic and enterprising, steadfast, solid and stolid, outwardly reserved, thoughtful and deeply religious, humane, firm, but not normally cruel" Can we draw any serious scientific and exact conclusion from all this, except that the writer is himself of Nordic race?

¹ *Man, Past and Present*, by A. H. Keane, revised by A. Hingston Quiggin and A. C. Haddon, 1920, p. 38. The pseudo-scientific dogmas of race are torn to shreds by Mr. J. M. Robertson in his decisive work *The Germans*.

(4) If racial characters are relatively permanent, they are also presumably subject, like other characters, to gradual changes. The extent of such change in the average inherited endowment of the race is not likely to be noticeable within the relatively short periods of history. It is possible that in nations, or in geographical groupings, more rapid changes are due to selective migration. If for a special cause a section of the people, possessing some marked characteristics, are led or forced to emigrate (or are massacred or otherwise disposed of), there is a change of balance in the psychological composition of the people. The religious persecutions have had consequences of this kind; for example, the French Huguenot settlements in England. The enforced drain of the more energetic and independent individuals away from the English rural districts for three generations is perhaps responsible for the backwardness of the labourer in those districts to-day. Possibly the emigration of numbers of Germans who disliked military discipline left the German population divided between the extremes of masterfulness and docility. The continuous selective pressure of institutions may produce similar changes more slowly and on a smaller scale.

(5) On the other hand, nationalities often undergo great and often rapid changes, particularly in response to stimulus from other nationalities. It is highly unscientific to infer from the fact that a people has not spontaneously evolved, say, free institutions or the machine industry that it is incapable of acquiring such institutions or such an industry. This is the opposite fallacy to that of supposing that it can do so without difficulty by a simple and mechanical process of imitation. The successful adoption of new institutions involves complex responses on the part of a people which may or may not be forthcoming. In general it is impossible to predict how a people will react to a new stimulus on the strength of their past history when that stimulus was absent. When the Japanese began to 'westernise' themselves, the West was extremely sceptical, and on the basis of the fixity of racial and social types it was possible to argue strongly that the experiment was doomed to failure. Yet within a

generation Japan had, in fact, transformed herself into a military and industrial Power which counted seriously in the Western system. It would have been easy for a Roman of Tacitus's time to dismiss certain shrewd hints of that great historian and anthropologist about the possible future of the Germans on the ground that in all time the Germanic tribes had remained in a backward condition, showing them to be racially unfit for civilisation. For if racially capable, why had they not civilised themselves as the Hellenic and Latin stocks had done? So might we argue to-day about negroes. Another eighteen centuries, it is true, have elapsed, but probably eighteen centuries are a negligible percentage of the time during which the black, white and yellow races have been distinguished. The peculiar developments of civilised cultures are all recent in comparison with the antiquity of man, and, I imagine, the differentiation of fundamental human types. In sum, races show considerable powers of adaptation, and the limits of these powers cannot be determined from any consideration of their history before the stimulus to adaptation occurred.

(6) Probably it is with many racial differences as it is with individual differences. They are variations on one theme. Thus peoples of different blood may work the same institutions and work them successfully—but with a difference. Similarly the Jew, it is said, always remains a Jew. It is equally true that the English Jew is an Englishman and the German Jew a German. The Jew whose family is thoroughly at home here will act, speak and think as an Englishman. An acute observer may detect, so to say, a Jewish accentuation, but it will not be a distinct and hostile quality standing out in contrast to the English qualities, but rather, what our metaphor suggests, a certain quality of those qualities.

(7) What are called the higher civilisations have been in the main the achievement of the white and yellow peoples. But the American Indian made certain independent advances in the same direction, and to attribute the entire civilisation of India to white immigrants would be the kind of dogmatism which we deprecate. As to the course of civilisation, there is not the smallest reason to suppose the racial factor pre-

dominant As between the numerous different peoples of the civilised world, there is no warrant for assuming any such radical difference as amounts to an inherited incapacity on the part of anyone for the arts and institutions achieved by another. Most, if not all peoples, are blends of different races, whose special contribution to the stock of qualities it is no longer possible to determine.

In sum, those averaged mixtures of qualities that we speak of as distinctive race characteristics must be taken to have had an influence on determining social development. The extent of this influence is not precisely measurable by any material in our hands. It must vary in proportion to the degree of difference, but except in the case of the most long-standing and deep-seated racial distinctions it is not probable that it has been of itself a leading factor.¹

¹ For the thoroughgoing examination of the questions touched in this chapter the reader is referred to the comprehensive work on *The Population Question*, by Professor Carr Saunders, in which the subject is for the first time handled by one who is equally equipped on its two sides.

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

I. FROM IMPULSE TO WILL.

FUNDAMENTALLY Society is a psychological structure. It is as feeling, thinking, willing, conscious beings far more than as physical beings that we interact. At lowest it is the mind that directs the interactions. Thus everything to do with mind affects society, and all psychology is of potential interest to the sociologist. Nevertheless sociology is not psychology, and to get a clear view of the relation between the two sciences is to make a sensible advance in the grasp of the conditions underlying social life. It is not precisely accurate to say that psychology studies mind in the individual and sociology mind in society. There is no mind in the individual that is not at every turn affected by social influences, and there is no mind in society other than the combined operation of numerous individual minds. The distinction is rather this: psychology seeks to describe the operations of minds on their own account; sociology the operation of mind on mind, and the effects of their combined action. Sociological truths will generally, if not always, be found to have a psychological basis, but they are directly concerned with what is built on that basis. To take one example, the consequences which ensue when a number of minds are similarly affected by similar circumstances are social rather than psychological. Thus economists formulate laws which describe the movement of prices in accordance with demand and supply. These laws would not hold at all if men did not upon the whole desire to supply themselves with their requirements as

cheaply as possible, and for the same reason to sell to others as advantageously as possible. The study of these motives belong to psychology; the extent to which they are crossed by other motives is primarily a psychological issue. If we seek to determine in a given society, say, the numbers of men in whom the motives of gain are preponderant and the numbers in which conflicting motives seriously deflect these, that is an inquiry which might be called indifferently psychological or sociological. But, if assuming the profit-seeking motive as for the time being a fixed quantity, we proceed to examine the results in a market of increases of demand or restriction of supply, that is a purely economic question, and economics is a part of sociology. It is concerned, that is to say, with the results of certain given psychological conditions as they operate upon numbers of men in their dealings with one another. That ground rents rise in great towns is not a psychological generalisation, though it does rest on the psychological fact that ground landlords, like other men, will avail themselves of the advantages of their position. But just because this law is common to ground landlords and to others, it does not explain the rise of rents in one place and their fall in another. That rise is due to certain movements of men in the mass and the consequent change in the character of their mutual relations.

But sociology is not confined to the description of consequences arising from psychological laws. It has also to deal with modifications in the minds of men themselves through their contact with one another. To take a very simple example. The processes of cognition are obviously matter for the psychologist, while the development of science is of interest primarily in the field of comparative sociology. A science is a mental acquisition built up by mental processes which the psychologist studies, but the processes are essentially the same at each stage of scientific development, and once known, they are known once for all. The actual structure of science, on the other hand, is in constant development owing to the conscious or unconscious collaboration of numbers of men in successive

generations. The nature of this development, and the conditions that have affected it, are of profound importance in the study of society.

Much more subtle interconnections form the subject of the infant study of social psychology which seems destined to connect the two sciences under discussion. We may take it that the two most important problems that lie before this science are—(A) What are the distinctive elements in the human mind which determine man's social relations? and (B) How do social relations react upon the mind, developing or modifying its inherent tendencies?

(C) In a sense, as we have seen, all that is in the mind, all its tendencies and even potentialities, must have a social bearing. The object of the social psychologist is to specify and describe the operation of those elements which bear most directly and intimately upon the relations of man and man.

Man, it is agreed, is a social being, but in virtue of what qualities in particular is he a social being? Is his sociability mainly a matter of reason or of instinct, of self-interest or of emotional impulses? What is the part played by affections and hatreds, sympathy and antipathy? How far is the collective life of men the work of an intelligent purpose, and how far of instincts modified and corrected by stubborn facts? To answer these questions we must arrive at some notion of the place of reason and instinct, purpose and impulse in human psychology.

1. *Impulse-feeling*.—In the life of any organism there is a ground plan determined by the hereditary structure on such lines as secure the maintenance of the species. The lower grades, indeed, live mainly by their immense fecundity, but as we advance in the animal scale we find fecundity diminishing, and behaviour growing in importance. The higher animal must find food, avoid enemies, obtain a mate, and attend to its young. Such, roughly speaking, is the ground plan, simple in outline, but in detail presenting the animal with a series of ever-changing situations in which it must comport itself aright if the plan is to succeed. How is this done? No one supposes that

the animal has any conception of the plan or its main divisions. It does not eat to maintain its life, but because it is hungry. But what is the biological interpretation of this very simple fact? It is that what the conditions of health require that the animal should eat, it does in fact experience an impulse to eat. Similarly, when it meets an enemy it has an impulse to fight, hide or fly. And in general though it knows nothing of any plan of life, it is so built as to meet the circumstances in which it is placed at a given moment with responses by which the needs of its life and those of its race are on the whole fulfilled. This adaptation, explained biologically by the mechanism of heredity, is in fact very imperfect, and many individual organisms perish accordingly, but such as it is let us consider its methods.

In the first place the response required may be secured by a purely mechanical process. Thus we blink when an object approaches our eyes, and this serves to protect them. But we do not blink consciously for the purpose of preserving our sight, but without or even against our will, because a physical mechanism of retinal cells, optic nerve, nerve centre, motor-nerves and muscles, is so formed that the stimulus of the approaching object causes contractions of the muscles of the eyelids. Such a mechanism is called a reflex arc, and by the compounding of reflexes adaptations of some complexity may be achieved. But mechanical explanations only carry us a small way in the interpretation of human and even of higher animal behaviour. For the main direction of life we look to mind, and we have to ask how far mind is to be regarded as a preformed structure determined by heredity so as to adapt behaviour to the ground plan, and how far it forms itself and fashions its own methods as life goes on.

The most elementary form of behaviour in which mind is engaged is the bare Impulse in which, though we are certainly conscious or aware of our situation or of some of its elements, we are not aware of the meaning, object or purpose of our act. In pure impulse we act first and think afterwards. We do not think, 'I will hurt that brute,'

and then hit him. We hit, and then are glad—or sorry—at the result. Impulse as such, then, is not determined by the end to which it in fact leads. What does determine it? An older psychology suggested a simple answer to this question. It was the feeling of pleasure or pain attendant on past experience. Certain objects looked on, smelt or tasted, gave pleasure, hence they were repeatedly tasted, smelt or looked upon. Others gave displeasure, and were avoided. To this theory it was rejoined that the impulse to look, smell or taste is primitive, and that unless one began by looking, smelling or tasting one would get neither the pleasure nor the pain resulting therefrom. This reply does not cover the whole of the facts. In point of time it is sometimes impulse and sometimes feeling that comes first. But it is true, and it suffices for our present purpose that both in human and in animal nature there is a body of impulses excitable by the appropriate stimuli in the environment, operating in the first instance without forethought, or knowledge, or prior experience of consequences. This body is, in fact, a part of the hereditary equipment by means of which behaviour is adapted to the ground plan of life. But though this body of impulse is not dependent on previous experience of feeling, there is a universal and intimate association between feeling and impulse. For on the one hand the feelings which result from action have a decisive effect on the action itself, the pleasures tending to confirm, and the displeasures to inhibit the impulses which yield them. And on the other hand, our consciousness testifies that impulse itself, however blind, is attended by a rush of feeling accompanying if not prompting it. The resentful impulse which is seen by an observer in the shape of a menace or a blow is felt by the actor in a wave of anger. The act of shrinking has its conscious counterpart in fear. Psychologically, impulse involves feeling. Remove feeling entirely, and there is left only the mechanical or reflex action. Now a reflex reaction recurs uniformly in relation to a uniform physical stimulus. Where conscious processes play a part there is a more detailed and individual adjustment of the response to the whole situation which has to

be dealt with. Thus the frightened man¹ does not merely start or shrink, but marks the precise path of the dangerous object, and avoids it by a movement which may have to be uniquely adjusted to unique changes in the surrounding objects. Nor is the feeling involved in the conscious impulse merely a concomitant of action—it is also a condition. Feeling discharges itself in impulse. Anger is relieved wholly or partially by a blow, or even by a violent gesture, or the swear word, and conversely (short of exhaustion or a change in the situation) the impulse is maintained till the feeling is satisfied. If the blow does not get home it is repeated. Further, the feeling to which the impulsive act gives rise affects the impulse itself in the future. A child will fear and shrink from things that are not in reality dangerous. Experience of such things and their innocuousness causes the fear to atrophy. On the other hand, the unburnt child does not dread the flame. Thus, as experience advances, hereditary tendencies of impulse-feeling become more and more modified by experienced feelings, and in fact acquire from experience their definiteness of direction. Finally, in human experience the direction—the end to which the act tends—takes shape in consciousness beforehand as an idea, and impulse evolves into purpose, the act performed with clear knowledge of its aim.

Thus in the simplest forms of action which are not mechanical we trace two elements, impulse and feeling, very closely allied, yet not identical. The element common to them may conveniently be called the interest in the situation, and this term may be taken to cover the cognitive aspect involved, the attention to or (at lowest) awareness of something with which we are dealing. In more developed behaviour as successive or simultaneous impulses become linked together it is the common interest that co-ordinates them. Thus a beast of prey prowls, lurks, pursues, springs, devours, following a series of type actions,² each

¹ If not too frightened. Excess of feeling distracts the attention necessary to adjustment, for reasons referred to below (p. 140)

² The term is used of actions characteristic of the species and dependent on hereditary structure without regard to the manner of their initiation or adaptation.

an impulsive (or reflex) response to the situation of the moment, but each directed, adjusted, graded and qualified by the continuing interest in the hunt. The feeling is surely not the same while the hungry beast is watching as when it is making its pounce, but the interest is one throughout, and the interest dominates both feeling and impulse.

2 *Instincts and Root-interests.*—An innate interest thus guiding impulses, one or many, to an end which is not foreseen is called an instinct. If the impulses employed are all innate, and the interest serves simply to maintain them or adjust them to one another, it is a 'pure' instinct. The hunting instinct may be of such a kind, but often original impulses are very inadequate to the needs of the interest, and in consequence feelings of dissatisfaction or positive pain result. Thus the young chick, as is well known, pecks at all manner of small objects, but finds many of them unpleasant and rejects them. Such objects it very soon leaves alone, while it continues its attention to the wholesome and tasty. Doubtless any hunting animal of fair intelligence learns similarly to discard fruitless or dangerous efforts, and to concentrate on those which give favourable results. The old dog is a better hunter than the young, and the experienced fox more difficult to run down. The interest which thus remodels its methods brings individual experience to bear on heredity, and may be called a mixed instinct.

We may think, then, of innate impulses and feeling reactions as the hereditary equipment serving interests, and as being maintained in inheritance because they serve interests. Again, we may think of any given interest, say, in hunting, as serving the root-interest or need of bodily maintenance, and as being maintained in inheritance because it serves that need. It is the root-interests or needs that directly constitute the ground plan of life. In the case of the higher animals the principal needs are for safety, food, warmth, mating and care for the young, and there is to each a correspondent core of interest or cluster of interests initiating impulses which tend to serve any one of these

needs, and checking and guiding them by feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction as the need is in fact served or obstructed. We may, if we choose, and popular speech often does, describe these root interests as instincts in a wide and abstract sense, e.g. we speak of the instinct of self-preservation which may be said to combine all the instincts centred on the body except those of sex, and the instinct of reproduction which combines the sex and parental instincts. We might go farther and speak of an instinct of racial preservation combining the former pair and dominating the entire life of an animal. But it should not escape our notice that the instincts considered above are special limitations of these root-interests involving hereditary adjustments of some precision and detail—greater or less as the case may be—while until the rise of intelligent prevision the root-interest has no such direct command of method. There is no instinct of self-preservation to tell an animal how to deal with dangers for which neither heredity nor experience have prepared it. Hence, in fact, in a strange habitat it will often eat unaccustomed foods which are poisonous.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to regard animal behaviour as limited to reflex and instinctive responses whether modified or unmodified by experience. Quite low down in the animal scale we find evidence of power to deal with the situation not merely by some established method, but in accordance with the requirements of the root-interest in the individual case. Present a child's spade to a common crab on the seashore. It will immediately bury itself completely with the exception of the eyes, which can just be seen by careful observation protruding from the sand and keeping watch upon the enemy. Dig the crab out with the spade without hurting or even touching it, and present the spade again. This time it will scurry away. Follow it up, and it will turn and fight, grasping the spade with its pincers. Disappointed of any effect on the spade, it will run away again, and this time it has fairly earned reprieve from any further annoyance. The crab has three different courses of action in the presence of a strange

object. The first is concealment, and this would seem to be the true specific instinct. But it is not tied to the instinct. As soon as this fails, it resorts to another type of action, and that failing, to a third. If the third succeeded, we know from similar cases that the crab would soon learn to prefer it to the other two. In fine, the crab deals with the situation as it affects one of its root-interests by the use of the available type actions, first following and then discarding an instinct because the underlying interest is not satisfied.

In this example we have a fair representation in miniature of the organisation of animal life. The animal deals with the situation as it affects one or more of its root-interests. It has no generally applicable instinct to tell it what the situation requires, but it has at its disposal several type actions determined by its structure, and an instinctive impulse to prefer one of them. It is not, however, tied down to one method, and if the situation is not met it remains uneasy, and under the stress of this feeling passes from one to another. In this last respect we must allow for wide variations from case to case. It may be that the instinct is very precise and very insistent, so that it becomes difficult or even impossible to throw it off. The animal, then, cannot get behind the instinct-interest to the root-interest. At the opposite extreme it may be that there is no true instinct to meet the case, but the animal deals or fails to deal with the situation by its type actions, as occurs in laboratory experiments, where the animal is set some trick uncongenial to its natural habits to solve in order to get food. Finally there is the intermediate case so important among the higher animals where the instinctive tendency, vague and general in itself, gets precision from experience by the elimination of responses which do not satisfy the root-interest and the encouragement of those which do so. In each case where any difficulty presents itself, there is apparently a feeling of stress continuing until the situation is in some way met, and then relaxing.¹

¹ Of course we do not know directly what passes in the animal mind, but the probable interpretation of its behaviour is that while it has not, like

3. *Emotion and Sentiment*—In man the situation as it bears on some object of permanent interest is clearly the dominant fact. Man has his innate impulses and tendencies to emotional reaction, and in his case, like the animal's, these are roughly correlated with the root-interests. But in his larger and more varied life the preformed impulse plays a smaller part, and apart from all cases of deeper reflection it is in ordinary life the requirements of the existing position as a whole that guide us. The interest which dominates the situation, however, operates at a lower and at a higher level of reflection. At the lower level, as already noted, it is not precisely the same thing as feeling, but rather that which determines both feeling and action, and generally a sequence of feelings and actions. Where we are interested we are braced up, attentive and alert. If there is an element of feeling which could be identified with interest as such, it is just the feeling of tenseness,¹ whether in the effort of attention or of action, a tenseness which has a pleasurable tone if things are going fairly well, and the reverse if they are going ill, while in cases of special effort or difficulty there is perhaps a double tone, pleasurable and painful at once. This vague and pervasive element of feeling, however, readily develops into something more definite the moment we stand apart from the action and contemplate the position. The meaning of the situation, its bearing on the object of interest, is now more definitely appreciated, and we feel elated or depressed, hopeful or fearful, angry or appeased. This is the higher level of reflection at which the object of our

man, any explicit idea of, say, self-preservation, it has a continuous feeling of anxiety and stress as long as danger appears to threaten, and this stress maintains its efforts and also causes their readjustment where they fail to bring relief. It operates just as the minor interests which it includes, e.g. in the case taken it passes from the flight instinct to the fighting, just as the flight instinct passes from concealment to flight proper. Of course the uneasiness must be prompted either by some hereditary tendency, or by experience, and the warning may be insufficient, so that in face of real danger the animal remains unsuspecting. It remains that this general alertness is something much wider and therefore closer to the root-interest than any specific instinct.

¹ Possibly we should say 'of excitement' to include the moment of satisfaction when the tenseness is relaxed.

interests itself enters our consciousness exciting directly and in their fulness the emotions which, while we are intent on action, are only on the fringe.

It is not, of course, suggested that emotions are reflective in their origin. They arise in the passing situation, as part of the instinctive response. But I am thinking of function, and at this stage there is in function a certain well-known opposition between emotion and action. In the heat of action we do not feel much emotion. We have just that tensivity of interest which has been described. Conversely, if emotion gets the upper hand it defeats action. We lose our heads with wrath or fear. While action is in process the proper place for emotion is, so to say, in the background, ready to reinforce at the pause. If it takes the centre prematurely we are undone. We cannot fly, because terror roots us to the spot. Indeed, it would seem that we do not fly because we fear, but fear because we know not where to fly or what else to do. In short, if emotion is too strong it will paralyse all co-ordination, and the same may be said of physical pain, which if sufficiently intense obstructs the intelligent effort to relieve it. Feeling has an optimum point of intensity at which it gives the greatest reinforcement to action, and emotion which is the heightened feeling directly representative in consciousness of the interest involved has the function of imparting energy to initiative and perseverance in any check,¹ while it falls into abeyance as long as execution is in progress.

Emotions relative to situations are of course as temporary and changeable as the situations themselves, but our real interests are centred upon objects which endure—ourselves, other people, our home, our occupations. All that touches these, though giving no immediate occasion for action, excites emotional interest, and of the most varied kind—fear, hope, elation, depression, anger, gratification, etc. The object is not responsible for one emotion merely,

¹ Hence it is also very intense if no form of helpful action suggests itself. It is when we see nothing that we can do that we are most harassed by anxiety or oppressed with fear.

but for many, according to the manner in which it comes before our minds. Psychology has adopted the name sentiment for our attitude to an object which is thus the centre of a cluster of emotions, that is to say, for an interest clearly conscious of its object

4 *Root-interest, Thought and Will.*—We contrast the interest which endures with the situation which is always changing. But there are interests and interests. You are profoundly interested for twenty minutes in a set of tennis, your interest dominating every stroke, but your interest in the set is the merely temporary effect of your general interest in the game, which again goes back to deeper, larger and more permanent interests, health, perhaps, or pride, and the desire to excel. At some point or other in analysis we should come to the root-interest covering masses of different interests and sentiments as each of these covers masses of detailed actions and feelings. The root-interests underlie every derivative interest, passing and superficial or enduring and profound. But in the course of life their main energies become engaged in certain large and comprehensive objects, which become the pivots of our life—wife and child, profession, home, etc. Around these objects a web of emotion, thought and action is woven through the constant activity of the root-interest. More strictly we should use the plural, for as a fact most of these great objects combine more than one root-interest, and it is this which makes human conduct a tangle difficult to unravel. We shall have to touch on this point again. For the moment we have merely to think of human life as in its main outline governed by a certain number of pivotal objects, engaging between them the main body of our root-interests, and the basis of most of the temporary purposes which occupy our consciousness from day to day.

These objects of our interest are discovered first by thought, for we act long before we consider where our true interests lie, and it is only by thought that we piece the elements of experience together, and so distinguish the permanent from the transitory. Hence it is through the operation of thought that we control impulse, postponing

immediate relief to the long view, preferring the final success of a plan to momentary triumph. In such cases it looks as though thought itself governed impulse and feeling, but this is an imperfect account. At the back of thought is the entire root-interest, not one impulse, but the tissue of feeling in which countless impulses are woven, which in fact dominates one great department of our lives. Thought has no force of its own. Its power lies in the connections which it establishes within the world of impulse feeling. It is, in fact, thought which enables us to understand our own interests, to recognise the objects for which we ourselves truly care as permanent and comprehensive aims, and it is also, of course, through thought that we bring the permanent object into relation with the details of action. It is in this manner that the passing impulse and desire are subordinated to large and comprehensive aims. In such control of impulse and desire we recognise the beginnings of will. Will in general is a stable attitude, founded on an enduring interest, directing action to an end or a system of ends in which that interest is satisfied. The will is not so much a new impulse as the entire mass of impulses and feelings excited by the object, organised as a whole, in which the significance and value of each element is for the first time made clear. The animal impulses to succour and defend the young obtain their meaning in the will which treats the child as a loved being with all the possibilities of a young life to be fulfilled. Will draws on the same source of impulse feeling, i.e. the same interest, as any momentary delight in watching the child, but expresses the interest more fully and coherently because resting on a more articulate thought.

Unhappily our deeper interests may come into conflict with one another, just as our desires do, and in that event the will is required at a higher remove. In point of fact, it may fail, i.e. the decision may go by the temporary strength of the appeal to one root-interest, but it is also possible, and in the most complete personality it is the case, that life is firmly based on certain governing principles which give consistency of direction to our behaviour. These

principles may have a narrow foundation in the definite predominance of some 'pivotal' object on which one or more root interests are centred, or they may represent a certain harmony of the various root-interests achieved through a rational appreciation of life as a many-sided whole. In either case they have at their back (a) the force of root-interests, one, some or all, and (b) the hard fact that life is a unity, which when rationally appreciated teaches that its different elements must either learn to live together or destroy one another.

The part that reason plays in practical life is overstated when it is supposed that there are certain abstract principles, apprehended like the truths of mathematics intuitively, and applicable by deduction to the details of conduct where their function is merely to control impulse and desire from outside. Reason thus detached from impulse has no motive force. On the other hand, the function of reason is equally understated when it is regarded as the servant of impulse confined to the clear formulation of its objects and the elucidation of the means to its achievement. The true function of reason in practice, as in theory, is harmonisation. In the world of theory it first makes articulate the judgments which we form under the prompting of experience, and then brings them into relation with one another, directing them and guiding them until they form a compact system. In the world of action it deals similarly with impulse, desire and will, works each partial aim or impulse into harmony with others, and thus achieves for the whole mass of human tendencies the most complete and harmonious expression of which they admit. No such system would be possible without clear and systematic formulation in articulate principles of thought, but the thought would carry no weight if it were not the process by which, and the form in which, the mass of human impulse takes organised shape, and stands at length at one with itself. Such a harmony is of course very remote from realisation, but so far as the rational impulse extends it is in the making. At any stage of its advance the practical reason has a power which is

that of the root-interests with all the impulses that they involve acting as an organised unity, because its principles are the most complete and consistent formulation that has been reached of objects in which these interests are concerned, and on which their satisfaction or frustration turns.

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

II. THE ROOT-INTERESTS OF MAN

1. *The Conditions of Development.*—The root interests of man, with their complex and bewildering interactions, would be quite unintelligible if we did not consider the conditions of their development. To appreciate them in their complexities and inconsistencies, we must think of the human mind as evolving under the conditions of the struggle for existence, but here at the outset we must guard against a misunderstanding. These conditions are not the originating source of mind and its characters, for its most distinctive characters are those which they do not explain. It is impossible to trace a survival value in the æsthetic interest. The higher scientific, philosophic, religious and ethical interests have no doubt survival value to the community in which they are sufficiently strong. But in their progressive advance they are generally disadvantageous and often fatal to their individual possessors. To explain their growth as an accumulation of small variations, or even as a series of definite mutations, is to encounter all the ordinary difficulties of evolutionary theory in an extreme form. For whatever shape this theory takes it must presuppose that each new stage of advance is directly and in itself advantageous to the stock possessing it in competition with its neighbours. Now we may readily admit that these qualities have at certain stages a positive survival value to their possessors. Thus, if we take curiosity as the germ of the scientific impulse, we can see that a child, or for that matter a kitten, which does not shrink in fear

from a strange object, but explores it with a boldness tempered with caution, or by parental supervision, learns in the long run much that will be useful to it in life. But even here we may ask how many of the first creatures that were curious perished as martyrs to protoscience. This we cannot determine. But we can say with some assurance that the child in whom curiosity is strongly developed usually gets itself snubbed for its pains, and that there have been few societies in which the independence of mind and originality into which this quality develops have not been dangerous gifts to their possessor. Thus if we grant some survival value to a limited intellectual activity established in relation to a system of checks and controls, we are still faced with the question how the tendency advances beyond these limits where every advance is dangerous. Much the same might be said, but even more strongly, of the religious and ethical interests. Communities no doubt must have some ethics if they are to hold together. So far the ethical interest has true survival value. But what of the man who pursues the ethical interest for its own sake, who takes its obligations more seriously than the rest of his fellows and will have none of those quaint compromises by which the average man lives? It is dangerous to be better than one's neighbours. For sheer survival value a clannish egoism wins. Not, it may be pleaded, if the community is taken into account. There must be social virtues if its life is to be vigorous. This is true to a limit, but at the point where the collective egoism of the community clashes with a wider humanity, the difficulty breaks out afresh. Nor does survival value to the community—and this is the vital point—serve as an adequate explanation of the growth of social feeling within it. For this, on the assumption that we are discussing, is a biological process. We are considering the theory that moral qualities arise through the accumulation under laws of physical inheritance of relatively small variations, each of which must be advantageous to the stock. But if each of these in each stock in which they first appear is on the whole disadvantageous to the possessor—even though if generalised they would be

advantageous to the entire community—it is very difficult to see how they get a start. We might suppose a general mutation affecting large numbers of a society at once. But apart from the objection that this explains nothing at all, it is not true to the facts of moral and social reform, which, as we see them in history, begin with the strenuous efforts of a handful of men, many of whom lose fortune, happiness and perhaps life, and make their way to success through opposition and the reluctant conversion of an indifferent or hostile world. Hence, however advantageous an ethical standard, once firmly established, may be to a community, we are left without explanation of the process of its growth in individual minds. The same may be said of religious movements, with the addition that religion is not so uniformly advantageous to society as ethics.

These 'disinterested interests' are in fact intelligible if and only if there is some element in human nature always pressing them forward, some impulse which like others is limited and hedged in by the conditions of existence and driven to make terms with them. These terms take shape in accepted codes, recognised methods, established doctrine, possessed of a survival value which makes it dangerous to deviate from them either upwards or downwards. They form positions, so to say, of stable equilibrium, while the advance from one to another is a giddy adventure. The cause of growth is the effort of mind itself, the complex yet single effort to understand, to master, to love and to enjoy, which may be summarily defined as the effort towards harmony. This effort proceeds not from a unitary central soul of society, but from many finite individual centres of consciousness—as many as there are separate organisms—each pressing towards its own mark with but a dim initial sense of its relation to other centres¹. It operates under the hard and chaotic conditions of existence which extinguish every type, no matter what its ulterior promise, that does not maintain itself by its realised efficacy then and

¹ This at least is true of mind as we know it in animal and social evolution. Of the nature of the more ultimate unity which the underlying relations of minds seem to postulate, I will not speak here.

there. Every new development is of the nature of an experiment which may hit or miss, and the successful hit probably depends on a happy combination of a variety of conditions. The conditions under which development proceeds do not then explain its general course. This is prescribed by the nature of mind itself. They explain rather the deviations, the arrest, the peculiarities, the stability and success of certain types, the fluidity and failure of others, the interrelation of various forms or phases of development at a given stage

2. *The Selfish and the Social*—Thus in primitive conditions of organic life the individual must fend for himself or perish, and so far as his existence depends on his efforts he must have the mentality appropriate to his situation. He must be moved by hunger and thirst, by fears appropriate to real dangers, and desires appropriate to suitable prey. If his line is to survive, he must be attracted to his mate. In whatever psychological shape feelings, impulses and emotions exist within him, they must be feelings, impulses and emotions centred on the kind of life thus indicated—self-preserving impulses, tempered only by the mating impulse. The care for the young, and probably following it, care for, as distinct from attraction to, the mate, is a new experiment which prospers and involves a new emotional focus. The fears, the predatory impulses, etc., previously centred on self now apply to all that concerns the family, and are modified accordingly. The timid hen that would run away from the dog if she had only her own tail feathers to protect, ruffles up and faces the intruder with chicks gathered under her wing. Love is born, and from birth wrestles with self for the mastery of life. The passions are now on the whole such as make for the preservation of the stock. It is 'I and mine' against the world.

This primitive mentality remains the substratum of human psychology, but is overlaid from the lowest grades known by the life of the community. In this life we recognise more definitely a reflection of the fundamental impulse of mind to relationship with its fellows. Some have called this the gregarious instinct, but this is strictly applicable

only to a much cruder and more primitive incarnation of the impulse. Man does not merely want to herd with his fellows and do as they do. The individual mind is inherently a centre of relationships to others, and craves these relationships if it does not find them. Even on its most egoistic side it wants others to feed its vanity, to dominate, to show off to. In its bare formation, then, the community is a product of the general and inherent trend of mind. Moreover, it represents that effort at a stage which has already passed the more primitive requirements of the family life, and in fact necessitates some chastening of the feelings for mate and child with which the direct sense of relation to another begins. On the other hand, the peculiar shape which the community takes from time to time, its indifference and potential hostility to outsiders, its internal disharmonies and antagonisms, are not products of the social effort as such, but compromises or adjustments with the conditions of its existence, and with the more primitive psychological substratum of passions and interests centred on self or on family. The compromise has its mythical expression in the social compact theory, its reality in conflicts, repressions and adjustments, that go on daily and hourly, some in the field of public discussion, some in the conscious deliberations of the individual, some deep below the threshold of conscious life.

The social compromise is the reflection of an interpenetrating duality into which the soul of man has grown in adapting itself to the conditions of its existence through the geological periods. The two elements, self-assertion on the one side, self-devotion on the other, are in themselves opposite as the poles, but they do not lie side by side as a mechanical mixture, but are blent with a subtlety and variety which no physical metaphor expresses. The self-feeling incorporates all the wider interests which really enter into the vital impulses. The emotions and sentiments that emerge from it—pride, sense of honour and the like—attach not merely to the naked self but to wife and child, to the family tree, the estate, the name, or still more widely to the class, the profession, the nation or the

Church, even in the academic world to the subject, and in the world of thought to the theory, the school, the dogma. There is an egoism of all these concrete and abstract interests, which means at bottom that self-feeling has incorporated wider ends in itself or (to invert the proposition) that elements of social service and devotion have steeped themselves in self-feeling. All the elements that make a man a good fighter for his own hand reappear at a higher remove when he fights for his cause, the same eagerness for victory, the same intolerance and pride, the same rancour and ill will, the same sophistication and self-righteousness. The tap root of these emotions and sentiments is not hard to distinguish; they are such as stimulate and maintain the struggle, celebrate victory and repair defeat.

3. *Social Interest and Instinct*.—The root of the opposite qualities has been a matter of controversy. Some trace it to parental and even maternal love, some to a more pervasive sympathy. As to the former view, it is probable that in point of time maternal love is the first form of altruism to appear, and the general rule that the oldest is also the deepest and most universal applies here as elsewhere. But to suppose that maternal love would of itself become biologically transmuted into a general benevolence is to encounter once again all those difficulties of transition which have been dwelt on above. It is true that in a woman we recognise a maternal feeling towards her husband, or her father, or anyone however remote who needs care, but does this imply the transfer of a specialised instinct to an object quite inappropriate to that instinct, or rather that the instinct itself is the specialised and intensified application of an impulse which is more generous and general? The latter view evades the serious difficulties of the transfer of an instinct, and accords better with known facts in the evolution of instinct itself—an evolution which proceeds from the general to the particular, from the undefined to the defined¹. The simplest hypothesis as to the evolution

¹ The new-born mammal sucks anything it can get into its mouth, and only learns to prefer the teat from experience of the ulterior satisfactions. The young lamb follows any sheep (or other animal) and learns to go with its mother.

of faculty and propensity is this: general and undefined tendencies become specialised in certain directions, partly by the response of particular objects, partly by their suitability under the existing conditions of the organism to the needs of the stock at the time. It is, then, very natural that instincts should first be formed to meet certain direct and elementary needs, e.g. of the young for sustenance. But the same general tendencies persist, and at a higher remove may concentrate themselves on a new class of objects. I take mother love, paternal love and family affection to be not the source but the prime examples of an impulse inherent in mind, and potentially as wide as the range of life, even, we may say, as the universe in its scope. The connection of the religious with the sex emotion has often been noted, but usually in the sense that religion is a form of the sex impulse, and in particular of its repressions. As a generalisation it would be true to say that they are species of one genus or branches of one tree. Sex love itself admits an astonishing range of variation from the animal to the spiritual, and when the young lover finds all the world fair, and is filled with good will to all mankind which he longs to display in some heroic deed, for which incidentally his lady shall crown him, this is not merely an illusory enthusiasm, though it may be transitory, nor the mere overflow of a personal passion. It is rather a momentary vision of the real meanings of individual life and its personal passions, and it is not the romantic youth but the prosaic world that flattens down his enthusiasm which is really in error. Fortunately it remains true that

Thoughts in hours of insight willed
May be through hours of gloom fulfilled,

so that though the vision fades, it may and often does indicate a path that is followed through life. It cannot of course be denied that more specific entanglements of the religious with the sexual occur, that at some stages religious rites become sexual orgies, while at others sex-repressions avenge themselves in more or less morbid forms of religious sentimentality, but the more fundamental

relation has nothing morbid in it. It is a question of the different forms and degrees in which the personal, individual life feels its relation to the whole.

4. *Sympathy*.—The relation to a whole may be felt directly as in patriotism, or may be established more indirectly as by emotions which link one to another who is similarly linked to a third, the chain ultimately connecting all members of a community. These personal links are sometimes described in terms of affection and sometimes of sympathy, and the two are not very clearly distinguished. But though we normally sympathise with those for whom we have affection, the two systems of feeling are not the same. A parent may love a child, and yet have little capacity for entering into its joys and sorrows. Affection, notwithstanding its apparent disinterestedness, may be selfish and domineering. Sympathy, again, may be felt for a hard case of which we read in the newspapers, where we know nothing of the individual. It is clear that any personal affection must be limited by the area of our acquaintance, so that for any wider emotional relation we must look elsewhere. Here, then, it was that the older psychologists proffered sympathy as a basis. In contemporary psychology the term is not popular. Sympathy seems to be thought of mainly as a secondary, not very important or admirable, tendency to be roused by the signs of feeling in another to a like feeling in one's self, and it is pointed out that in a certain order of mind this tendency may have ugly results. Such people turn away from signs of suffering, and even hate and seek to get rid of the sufferer, as some animals are said to destroy a wounded fellow creature. The fact cannot be denied, but the restriction of the term sympathy is excessive. Whether in popular or philosophic speech the term has been used with a consistent meaning of much wider and more human scope. That I sympathise with a sufferer means that I feel and am ready to do unto him what I would that he or anyone else under like circumstances should feel and do unto me. If I sympathise with the hungry, I do not feel hungry myself, but try to provide them with a meal. The actual irradiation of feeling, in

such wise that the feeling of another becomes mine, is a rarer, a more emotional, and sometimes it would seem a quasi-physical incarnation of the same fundamental impulse, which (like other effects of this order) sometimes works perversely. There are those who meet personal troubles by resolutely ignoring them, and (with more ease) treat the troubles of their friends in the same way. Sympathy here is emotionally real enough, but it is overlaid with a resolute selfishness, and is thus abortive before it reaches its true definition. The indictment lies not against sympathy, but against the opposite tendencies. Whether sympathy is something simple or composite, original or acquired, is fair matter of inquiry, and we shall presently endeavour to obtain some light upon the question. But in any case, we require a name for the propensity, very general, of various shapes, and of still more various strength, to treat others like ourselves in the sense of doing to them as we would be done by. For this propensity, then, we retain the name of sympathy.

The conditions and limitations of sympathy, then, become a very vital matter for social psychology. (a) It is clear that in general sympathy is heightened by affection though they are not the same thing. (b) It is heightened by comradeship and co-operation in a common cause, though these again are not the same thing. In working together Jones and Smith discover excellent points in one another¹, they learn to count on one another, and acquire habits of mutual service which cultivate corresponding emotions. Conversely, antagonism on the whole tends to paralyse and sometimes even to extinguish sympathy; but here some curious and subtle effects must be allowed for. I fancy that rival leaders under all their fulminations often have a sneaking sympathy for one another. Hostile generals

¹ We speak familiarly of sympathising with a man in respect of a common interest, e.g. in dislike of post-impressionism, or of bureaucratic control. The term here used covers (a) agreement in opinion or partnership in an object, (b) a sense of touch with another personality which possibly for the first time makes us feel him to be another self. This latter I take to be sympathy proper, and I conceive it to be not identical with the former but a natural consequence.

do not bombard one another's headquarters. The Jingoism of one country really respects the Jingoism of another, for without them their occupation would be gone. Perhaps this is the exception which proves the rule, for underlying the overt antagonism there is a real tacit co-operation of the violent spirits against the peaceable and moderate men of all nations. Thus, more generally, we may say that if a good fight leaves room for an underlying sympathy which in earlier history showed itself in a certain chivalry and in generosity to the vanquished, this is because the fighters *qua* fighters are necessary to one another. They are co-operating in the battle, since if either gave way it must come to an end. On the whole, then, co-operation and sympathy engender one another, while antagonism and sympathy are opposed, though not always mutually fatal. (c) Sympathy is heightened by mutual understanding. I must be able in some degree to put myself in the place of the object of my sympathy. Hence likeness, and in particular like-mindedness, is important. There are points on which it is hard for a man to sympathise genuinely with a woman, or the old with the young, or the rich with the poor. Even in the most elementary matters many white people seem unable to feel sympathy for the brown or black.¹ The deficiency may be partly corrected by experience, as when the old remember that, after all, they have been young themselves. But the real requirement is what we call imagination, a power part intellectual, part emotional, of transferring one's self to the other's point of view, a power aided by wide experience, but far transcending it in potentiality. Imagination thus becomes the most important variable in human intercourse. It is susceptible of cultivation in a higher degree than the moral impulses proper, and if it is only in a very secondary sense that virtue can be taught, it is in a very real sense that men can be brought to understand the more remote and impersonal bearings of their actions and their institutions. Our relations are best regu-

¹ This is of course due to inhibitions proceeding from racial pride and unacknowledged fear, and the necessity of palliating unjust treatment. But the initial weakness of the sympathetic impulse is their opportunity.

lated and most humane within the circle which we understand, among our own friends, in our own class, in regard to our own countrymen, and finally our own race and colour. As we get farther away from intimate acquaintance, the sympathy weakens and gives place to indifference, tempered with suspicion, fear and a nascent ill will. This is the more marked the narrower the experience and the lower the grade of intelligence. A primitive folk in Brazil have a saying that 'All evil comes from without,' that is outside their own tribe, and this is a characteristic view of simple people which survives in the cultivated world, though the circle is enlarged, and it is admitted that the outsiders also are 'God's creatures.' It remains that most of us draw an imaginary line round those 'of our own sort'—whether we take as a test that they dress for dinner, or are sound on their H's, or something more fundamental—and have difficulty in regarding those beyond the line as fully and truly human. With imagination and her handmaid, humour, we put these prepossessions in their right place, and these are the gifts most needed whether in the theory or the practice of sociology.

5 *Specific Forms of the Social Interest*—These considerations suggest that, however limited by the conditions of psychological and social development, sympathy belongs to the inherent tendency of mind to reach out towards its fellow. Is this the final truth? Is there a general innate impulse to treat others as we would have them treat us, or is this a special development of some simpler and wider impulse? What of the relation between sympathy as the desire to help and sympathy as the desire for response? What is the true relation of sympathy to affection? The social impulse as an elementary tendency of human nature may be considered as an impulse of reciprocity. Fundamentally what we want in others is that when we pipe to them they should dance, and fundamentally there is in us, if no other root-interest obstructs, a movement of responsiveness to their piping. We do not necessarily wish to do, feel, suffer or enjoy the same things or in the same way. This is only one manifestation among many

of something which is much more general. What we imperiously need, like our daily bread, is to be in relation with others. Without others, nine out of ten of our own activities and emotions are incomplete because lacking response. Primitively we may be as angry with the table which we strike as with the man who strikes us. But what comes of being angry with the table? The child finds it just dumb and immovable. The response which anger awakes—be it counter wrath or fear, is not there, and so anger just withers away. Our emotions crave response, and as they crave response, so also on the whole do they respond. The acts, and especially the manifestation of feelings by others, are stimuli to us of responsive acts and feelings—not necessarily the same acts or feelings, but related acts and feelings. How related? That will depend in the first instance on the situation, but behind the situation, on all the root-interests involved. If on a mountain climb I observe symptoms of anxiety or fear in the guide, it strikes a chill to my heart. If I observe the same symptoms in the novice of the party, they awaken the protective impulses and rather brace me up than otherwise. If I observe fear in my opponent, it encourages me. If he gets angry I may be cowed, or I may on the contrary be stimulated. These differences depend mainly on the relation of our own ego to the situation. Making due allowance for this factor, it may be said that in general we tend to give the response which is invited. This tendency is of course seen at its simplest where A signifies a want which B fulfils—as in general he will if no counter motive of hostility, suspicion or obstruction of his own interests comes into action. But it also underlies many hostile responses. The manifestations of hostility, anger and hate are as much a challenge as a direct attempt to cow and so prevail, and often there is a certain disappointment qualifying the satisfaction of success if the challenge is not taken up. Even the cool and calculated stroke of the commercial rival is made in anticipation of a counter stroke, and it is the counter stroke which keeps up the game. True, in all such cases the mere desire to prevail dominates the particular

act, but if we look beneath it to the root impulses we surely discover, as has been pointed out above, a profound interest in the game, and therefore by a logical implication, though not by conscious admission, in the opponent himself. We may, then, in antagonistic relations distinguish the egoistic impulse which would have our opponent give way, and a social interest which would have him fight it out, and respect him for fighting well. Thus the social impulse as such put in its simplest terms is that which asks for response from others,¹ and gives the response which is invited. The need of such response is felt on every side of our thought, action and feeling, and not merely direct co-operation, but the entire social interplay which results rests on one comprehensive root-interest. This interest has its specific modifications and developments, some of which we must review.

(a) Though a social interest may underlie them, antagonistic responses are of course dominated by another motive, Where no motive other than the condition of the person whom we are considering is present, and that condition invites some co-operative response on our part, the social impulse is identical with sympathy. Sympathy is not even etymologically 'feeling the same as,' but 'feeling with,' and the normal operation of the pure social impulse is to excite not a similar feeling, but the feeling or impulse which the situation requires. Sympathy, then, is the social impulse purified of antagonistic elements, and stimulated by another's need.

(b) Affection, as has been remarked above, is not the same thing as sympathy, being compatible with a plentiful lack of understanding (which sympathy requires) and even with a good deal of selfishness. Affection is a second development of the social impulse, being briefly its con-

¹ The response invited is that which furthers and completes a favourable, or relieves and removes an unfavourable situation. Where an antagonistic response is invited the interest requires opposition as explained. Pleasure in the small change of intercourse at the one end of the scale, and the assuagement of profound emotions by sympathetic comprehension at the other, are the clearest testimonies to the strength of the root-interest of fellowship as such.

centration on particular persons with whom we are in close and happy response. The more we can give, the more intimate and individual the responsive relationship, the larger the part which affection plays in our lives, and in place of the diffused and superficial response to all comers our social impulse may be concentrated, perhaps unduly concentrated, on a few intimates or a single being whom we really love. What we call here technically the social interest underlies the relations which popular speech calls most personal.

(c) This brings us to a third development of this root-interest—its bearing on sex. Stripped bare, the sex impulse is no more than a bodily need or appetite. Fused with the root impulse to give and seek response, it becomes the most intimate personal relation wherein we come most nearly to the ideal of finding another who, responding physically and mentally to our craving, will take all that we can give and give all that we need, making our 'own small life complete'. It has thus the combined force of two of our most powerful and pervasive impulses.¹

(d) Thus the social impulse, whether of itself or in concert with others, builds up pivotal objects in relation to which we experience clusters of emotions or sentiments. In general these objects involve some limitation of the impulse to a particular individual or group, but beyond them we should recognise as the last product of the social impulse that need be mentioned here the generalised sentiment for society as a whole, in which all our activities are realised and find their meaning. Here, fusing with the constructive impulse, it fashions social ideals co-extensive with life. Such expressions are of course appropriate only to a high

¹ It is the refusal to recognise the fundamental duality in love which first led the Freudians astray. To them every personal tie is sexual, and so parental love, friendship, mere camaraderie, and even love of abstract things, beauty or righteousness, are all at bottom sex, nascent, partially developed, or more or less disguised (sublimated). The reply to this is that sex as such is not love, but provides a raw material of need, emotion and possibilities of response which our craving for another self weaves into love. The antithesis is seen in the familiar fact that passionate love not merely inhibits the random sex impulse, but at the fulness of its power relegates the physical side of the relation to a secondary place.

level of reflection, but far lower down the interest concentrates on chief, lord or king on whom the social order seems to depend, or, in alliance with more egoistic interests, takes the form of respect and awe of social institutions and the tradition of the elders.¹

6. *Forms of Self-Interest* —What of the antithesis to the social interest, the self-regarding? To understand this we have to distinguish between the self as an exclusive centre, and the self as pervading everything within the reach of its activity and even of its thought. What then belongs to the self as something shut in within its own ring wall separate from all else? The body, no doubt, but how much of the mind? Where in our lives does self end and not-self begin? Every feeling, act or thought is the feeling, act or thought of some self. Every object, no matter how unselfish, is the object of the self. Thus self is an element pervading all our experiences, and so most closely identified with whatever object has most engaged its special efforts and emotions. How, then, can we disentangle it? First, we should recognise that the self in this broad sense is not a separate object but a distinct element in our objects generally. Secondly, it is that element in our objects which starts from and comes back to the stream of our own feeling. We had a case of this kind before us in dealing with selfish sympathy, the case in which a man will do a great deal to get the suffering of another out of sight and mind, but nothing if the suffering does not come home to him. By the constitution of his nature such a man goes outside his exclusive self. He cannot help feeling about the suffering that he sees, but he goes out of his self only to come back to it. He looks on the suffering as it affects his own feeling, and then, like Sir Willoughby Patterne, he causes the obnoxious object to disappear. This is the true self element in the social impulse. Thirdly, the self is all or any of our activities

¹ The causal relation is not thought out, but the king, as a psychologist would put it, is charged with the meaning of social life, and therefore concentrates the social interest on himself. Institutions being too abstract to be objects of direct emotion, it is at low stages the ceremonial which makes the appeal to consciousness, and the meaning is expressed though much distorted in magico-religious conception and explanatory myths.

because and so far as they are ours. One man identifies himself with his cause, another perhaps identifies the cause with himself. He sees it as the manifestation of his power, it is his work, none but he can or must carry it through. This is the commonest form of the larger self-feeling, the sense of power in what the self does, what it contributes to its object.

We see here two sources of self-regard. First, the series of feelings as feelings without regard to the objects which inspire them, but including the hopes and more especially the fears which they suggest; secondly, the series of impulses, their vigour and success, with the objects of the impulse thrown into the background. The former is more particularly the source of the exclusive self, for some of our feelings (those of the body) have no 'object' but only a stimulus.¹ The latter extends the self over the whole field of life. The actual self of our regard is a blend of the two in very variable proportions.

This sentiment is capable of becoming a disruptive force, all the more dangerous from its blending of the best and highest objects. But in its due proportion the wider self-regard is a stay and support of conduct. Rare natures may lose themselves in their objects, as mothers do in their children, but in general a backing of self-feeling is an element, and not an unhealthy element, in life. Pride, like other sentiments, may be exaggerated, and what is worse may rest on very false grounds, but a measure of pride is a necessary preservative to all but the few to whom love is enough. To break the last element of pride, self-respect, is ruin. Humility, the most insincerely praised of all the virtues, is in its true character a sense of humour or proportion which must make the greatest feel that complete as may be his mastery of his own kingdom, that realm is but a speck in the universe. Consistently with this admission, he may still feel that for him the due discharge of the part that has fallen to him is the first of all considera-

¹ Emotions as indicated above have a cognitive reference. We are angry with someone, fearful of something. The feeling is one of interest in something other than itself. This is not the case with bodily feelings.

tions. What is this but conscience, and where would the authority of conscience be if there were no self-feeling?

Self-regard is a root-interest, but must be distinguished from something still more elementary—self-assertiveness, for the common impulse of mind is to assert itself, fulfil its capacities, execute its purposes. This is as much the impulse of social feeling as of self-regard, of the highest and most organised activities of an association as of the meanest desires of sense. Hence between social feeling and self-assertion there is no conflict. On the other hand, social feeling may come into conflict with self-regard, and a wider social feeling with a narrower. These conflicts of the first sociological importance arise out of the conditions of the evolutionary process which begins with a chaos of unorganised relations and develops through partial unities, self, family, class, group, nationality. Each of these unities has its own self-assertiveness and potential antagonism to others. We may even say that it has its own self-regard, i.e. that its members feel about it the same pride, and for it the same ambitions and fears, that each may feel for self. With these the wider social feeling has to do repeated battle, and so develops an idea of self-negation—a necessary corrective, but one that must be seen in its due relation. Mind fulfils itself not by destroying its deepest impulses, but by finding for them their function in a harmonious whole. Similarly the social union, if truly organic, does not destroy the elements on which the deepest emotions are concentrated, but gives them the form in which their vigour redounds to the strength of the whole.*

The real contrast is not between egoism and altruism. Egoism is not a natural impulse. It is an artificial product of morbid reflection, and in its purity it is a product of the study, for no one is, in fact, so egoistic but that the

* The State organisation could supersede the functions of clan and kindred because they were secondary consequences of family feeling developed through the absence of higher organisation. Family feeling is also a difficulty in the way of certain social ideals, but the idealism which would for this reason destroy it beats vainly against a true root-interest.

mass of impulses in which he finds satisfaction includes some others in their scope at some points. The true contrast is rather between the partial or exclusive on the one hand, and the comprehensive and rational on the other. Parental feeling is not selfish, but may be recklessly anti-social. Religious enthusiasm, exalted patriotism, may wreck civilisation. Scientific ardour, turning to dogma, obscures the dry light of science. The group morality which was taught to them of old time is by no means egoistic, but it is the universalism of the higher ethics which represents the effort of reason to overcome conflict and achieve a working harmony of life. Whether in ethics, psychology or sociology, it is the relation of part to whole which lies at the centre of the problem.

7. *Anti-Social Impulses*—Self-interest, we now see, though distinct, is not as such opposed to the social interest, but is rather intertwined with it in the manner suggested. The question may be asked whether there is not in human nature something more positively anti-social lying at the root of antipathy and ill will. Are these impulses the same, and are they, like sympathy, fundamental and necessary to the mind, or are they secondary effects of discordant aims? (a) We should remark first that though antipathy readily gives rise to ill will, they do not appear to be the same thing. Old friendship, utterly incompatible with any inherent antipathy, may be turned to the hatred that would willingly kill by rivalry in love. Conversely, we may feel intensely antipathetic to another person, but wish him no harm, though if occasion of conflict should arise the inherent dislike would barb the arrows. Antipathies seem natural consequences of limited personalities, of the strongly marked exclusive self, devoid of the saving humour which enables it to see its own peculiarities from a less partial standpoint. In this sense, then, antipathy is inherent, not in mind as such, but in the finitude of mind, that finitude which it is the standing purpose of mind to overcome. It cannot be the final truth that Dante

loved well because he hated,
Hated wickedness that hinders loving

A complete man must have a capacity both for blazing and for steady wrath, but a wrath that is conditional and appeasable.

(b) Ill will, though largely founded on antipathies, and still more commonly on rivalries and antagonisms, plays, it is to be feared, a larger part in the background of human nature than we generally like to allow. Otherwise, why is a sub-malicious gossip the commonest of human recreations, and why are the newspapers that cater exclusively and intelligently for the popular taste full from end to end of the misfortunes and crimes of our fellow beings? We do not (as I think Mr Chesterton has somewhere remarked) see large headlines calling our attention to "Filial Conduct of a Tradesman in Hoxton," or "Benevolent Act of a Clergyman at Clapham." We read with avidity of the bad things men do, and we thoroughly enjoy our indignation and feel a moral satisfaction in their punishment. "What's one man's news is another man's misfortunes," says Mr. Dooley. Even our sympathies with suffering have a pleasurable glow, and in the comfort of our easy chair we revel in vicarious heroism as we read the letter from someone else's boy in the trenches, or dissolve in sentiment over the noble young life cut short by a bit of shrapnel. The cynic has said that even in the misfortunes of our friends there is a certain secret satisfaction. At any rate, it is to be feared that when we relieve suffering there is some emotional exaltation of the ego. Perhaps it is here that we touch the root of this subtle malice. "Lord, I thank Thee that I am not as other men are" If it is sweet by the great sea to watch from the shore the labouring of the storm-tossed ship, it is not, Lucretius tells us, because we directly wish ill to another, but for the sense of the safety in which we hug ourselves. So conversely a companion in misfortune lightens our own burden. There is a scene in *Monte Cristo* where two wretches are to be executed. Both endure the preparations with sullen fortitude, till one is unexpectedly reprieved, whereupon the other breaks out into a frenzy of denunciation. We measure ourselves by our fellows, our self-respect is impaired if we fall behind them, our belief in

ourselves, our judgment, our luck, is shaken if our misfortunes are exceptional. Indeed, if this is proved beyond doubt, our best refuge seems to be that of Joseph Poorgrass, to take pride in our uniqueness as a specimen of the feeble. So that all that raises our neighbour depresses us, and all that lowers him exalts us, unless indeed the lowering or the exaltation be our own act, and then we hate him because he is the living memorial of our wrong doing, or love him as the enduring witness of our goodness. When Hobbes wanted to be cynical, he should not have written that gratitude was a lively sense of favours to come—that could only be true of Mr. Collins—but rather that it was a firm resolution to be even with our benefactor, and so find means of forgiving him. Both in private, and even more in public matters, ill-will colours our judgments. We trace the actions of others, particularly of strangers, to the worse of the possible motives. We even impute bad motives in face of the evidence, for we are reluctant to think them as good as ourselves, and resolute not to think them better. We read with a luscious sorrow of a fleck in the character of the saint, and with active resentment of a good deed by a German and a sinner. Half our moral interest is in censure, for morality gives a charter to the hunting instincts and an inexpensive opening for the display of our own virtues. In particular, the sex repressions vent themselves in lashing the offender—repressed Sadism demanding the literal lash—and by a further complication the denunciation is in part sincere in as far as it is a denunciation of ourselves for similar desires, to which the ubiquitous interest in sex weaknesses is standing testimony.

This pervading background of ill-will thus appears to be not primary, like sympathy, but a secondary consequence of exclusive egoism, and is of course manifested in the various collective egoisms of family, or class or nationality. The self-feeling which is the emotional expression of the exclusive self-assertion cultivated by the evolutionary conditions, takes shape particularly under conditions of antagonism or of ignorance or misunderstanding in various

shades of hostile and sub-hostile feeling cutting across our more primitive and rational sympathy

Behind antipathy and self-feeling there is a more general interest which works out sometimes to good and sometimes to bad results. This is the craving for excitement which is pretty constantly operative in the absence of some steady purpose which holds attention until, being satiated, it gives way to the complementary desire for repose. Now the actions and passions of others interest us in accordance with the fundamental tendency of mind, and the strong expression of feeling, as well as any energetic activity on their part, stirs accordingly some excitement. Suffering, pain, resentment and allied groups of emotion and expression have more exciting power than their opposites, from the elementary fact that their function is to stimulate and maintain conation, while pleasure and happiness belong to its fruition. Now our own sufferings, though they certainly tend to absorb our minds, are likely to be too exciting to be pleasant. Even here there are well-known exceptions. Invalidism is the only occupation of people of a certain type, who would be lost if it was not for their headaches, their dyspepsia or their rheumatism. But the interest of suffering has its limits. To the lady in *The Old Wives' Tale*, 'my rheumatism' is an old familiar friend, while 'this sciatica,' the terrible newcomer, is resented and dreaded with effect. When 'this sciatica' arrives there is no ambiguity about our efforts to be rid of it. Generally the same is true of the suffering we actually witness, or that is brought home to us in such a manner as to invest it with reality for our imagination. Otherwise the sufferings and struggles of another have a dramatic interest, and perhaps we should rank this along with self-exaltation as a second root of the popular enjoyment of bad news. There are busy philanthropists who, it is to be feared, would find time hanging heavy on their hands in heaven. In morbid cases this interest in suffering degenerates into cruelty, and in the shape of vindictive punishment has even been justified by some moralists. Cruelty is thus sympathy turned inside out, and though a morbid develop-

ment, its germs exist in most of us, or why do we find the minor annoyances of others a matter for laughter. We chuckle over Mr. Pickwick pursuing his hat, though we feel justifiably annoyed when the wind plays the same trick upon us. Fortunately we have the saving grace of laughing at ourselves after the event if self-feeling is not seriously wounded, and to the normal man, with the limitations set out above, the 'exciting' power of suffering performs its proper function of stimulating pity and service.

8 *Other Root-Interests.*—To the sociologist the social impulse of man and its relation to the self naturally take the centre of the stage, but we must not suppose that these exhaust the root-interests. Without attempting a complete enumeration, two interests should be added here to those which have been mentioned, interests relating not to any specific class of objects but to the world at large, a constructive and what may be called a cognitive interest. The last of these is peculiar in the nature of its development. The young animal, kitten or puppy is exceedingly inquisitive, but its inquisitiveness is a passing phase, and apparently satisfied in regard to any object as soon as it has been tested by each of the senses. The human child is equally inquisitive, and carries its curiosity farther, asking the why and whence of things as well as the what. But in the ordinary man the impulse dies away, and it is only in the few that it survives as a permanent thirst for understanding. These seem objections, then, to regarding it as one of the root impulses of humanity, and yet it has played a large, perhaps the decisive, part in distinguishing human and particularly civilised life from other modes of existence. Nor can it be reduced to any of the other impulses, nor regarded as a mere means to the satisfaction of our comfort. These characteristics may be understood if we regard it as phylogenetically a late, and for that reason a very unevenly distributed impulse more readily atrophied than others. The child really ceases to be curious for the same reason as the kitten. When the kitten has examined the ball, patted it, played with it, submitted it to every sense and every movement within its power, it has no more to learn about the ball, no more

that its faculties can tell it. When the child has been told that steam drives the engine, it has learnt possibly all that its father knows, and is held up unless or until it can open quite new sources of information. As it grows up it constantly comes upon the limitations of knowledge, and is stuffed with ready-made dogmas to cover the obscure. Its investigating impulse is either frustrated or put to sleep, and even inquirers, and inquiring races like the Greek, cease to inquire when they have come to the limit of their instruments. Progress must then wait till some fortunate turn, some contact of different developments, or some combination of slowly-moving ideas evolves a new instrument. A fresh field is then opened, and the inquiring impulse is stimulated to new efforts.

The constructive impulse as a general interest is more nearly confined to man, for animals construct only upon a specific plan laid down by a definite instinct. We must, however, suppose some rudimentary constructive tendencies out of which these instincts develop. That they were so specialised would prevent the general tendency from developing into anything of importance to the species. In man, however, the constructive impulse is visible from the moment when the baby begins to pat the sand into shapes, and it persists in the form of hobbies even under the discouraging circumstances of ordinary life. Its utility is obvious, but so is its tendency to outstrip and disregard utility which testifies to its independent origin. Whether the æsthetic impulse should be regarded as equally independent, or as a fusion of the constructive with other emotional interests, I will not here inquire.

9. *The Whole*.—Thus, without pretending to complete enumeration, we have distinguished several root-interests dominating great departments of behaviour. There is the interest in self under which the care for the body and all its appetites must be ranged; there is the interest in others, or the social interest; and there is the interest in the order and structure of things—the cognitive interest in understanding them, the constructive in making or remaking. These interests interacting and interwoven in every possible manner

underlie the mass of impulse and feeling. In a very rough and raw way the impulses are what the interests require as material, and the feelings more directly reflect the bearing of a situation upon the interests. In the early stages of experience impulse remodelled by feeling takes a more definite direction as desire, and through further development of intelligence the interests are concentrated upon permanent objects or comprehensive purposes with reference to which each passing situation is judged and action is guided. These form the pivotal objects, and in the control which they exercise we have recognised the beginning of will. But lastly, as the interests are interwoven and life is one, it is necessary that there should be some means of final correlation between them all in any of their applications. This is the work of will in its full development. But on what basis is the will to proceed? What is the true unity which is to serve as the ground plan of correlation? We have seen that the self runs through all the interests, but if all root interests are interwoven with the self, the self in turn is a mere detail in the fabric of its own objects. If we could clearly discern the pattern of this fabric, there would be the true whole, and our attempts to do so form the philosophies and religions. As a matter of fact we get hold of certain leading elements of value, and they become our god, or his attributes and ordinances, and to this god as representing the true whole even self will bow the knee. The impulse of reason is the endeavour to overcome every such partial view, and to conceive the harmony of mind in all related individuals, and in all the world of its experience as itself the whole in which every partial effort may find its ultimate meaning. This impulse combines the cognitive, constructive and social impulses, while by the terms of its reference its scheme has to provide due place and function for those narrower impulses which the gods of the past have sometimes sought merely to override, due place too for the sentiment of self, which has the pride of contributing to a movement of immense scope and the chastening reflection that its contribution is but a mite in so vast a sum. In proportion as we effectively conceive and live for such a whole, we attain

a rational will based on the harmonious co-operation of all our root-interests, not only of mine within me and yours within you, but of yours and mine in those of all men.

The fact underlying rational will is that all impulses rest on various susceptibilities of one self, and all selves are of one world. Now any single impulse is realised in the accomplishment of its end, but how can a many-sided self of infinitely various and often conflicting impulses be realised? Only on two conditions. First, it must have an end, or system of ends which are mutually consistent, otherwise there is frustration. Secondly, though every passing impulse must be subordinated to the end by rigid control, no ineradicable impulse must be left chafing and frustrate, for if so the whole is not satisfied. These apparently contradictory requisites can be combined only if all the root impulses can be so modified as to become functions in the whole uniting system and be satisfied with their functions. This is what is meant by harmony as an inward condition, and is what is achieved by and expressed in the rational will. The rational will, then, has at its back the whole of the root impulses acting as an organised body.

Further, in all the root impulses, if we except the bodily appetites, there is something that points beyond the self. This is true not only of the social impulses that connect us with our fellows, and of the cognitive and constructive impulses that relate us to the entire external order, but also of the self-regarding impulses of pride and self-respect which imply a sense of our function in a larger whole. Thus the tie to a wider whole is common to all the specifically human interests, the point in which they all unite, or more probably from which they take their origin. For in the last analysis we are in presence of one ultimate impulse taking manifold forms in various directions. Rational development is the growth of this impulse into a clear and comprehensive purpose which is just the harmony of mind within itself and with its world. Impulses originating in a multitude of finite beings, each with its short range of view, battling confusedly with the conditions of existence, breed endless misunderstanding, maladjustment and

mutual frustration. Every advance in rationality introduces some rudiment or order and plan, but its work is gradual, and the partial objects which it succeeds in establishing are still the source of friction. It has therefore to persist in its work, constantly getting below the partial, arbitrary and self-centred to the underlying need for which it must find a place if the problem of harmony is to be solved. The actual life and institutions of any society are very far from being expressions of an objective reason, as some idealistic writers have supposed, but they do contain some fragments or rudiments of a rationality asserting itself in the clash of impulses, and it is by the measure of these fragments that they are valued.

10. *Personal and Collective Achievements*—In looking for the tie between the individual and the community we naturally think first of the social impulse. But we have now seen that other interests—even the self in some of its combinations—play their part, and we may now consider how any or all of them, singly or in combination, affect the attitude of the individual to the social system in which he lives.

As thought and will develop, man conceives purposes which are much too large for fulfilment by his own exertions, or even within the limits of his own life. For example, developing the cognitive impulse he makes the pursuit of truth his prime object. Primitively he might expect to attain all the truth that he cares about by very simple methods, most of which resolve themselves for the critic into some form of make-believe, but as the search for truth develops through the generation the individual student becomes aware not only that he is building on the past, but that he himself will never live to see the fabric complete. Science and thought become to him collective achievements to which he is content to make his humble contribution. In a less degree the same is true of art and literature. Though here the creator may produce something of absolute value, yet he and others will see it also as part of a whole of infinitely greater scope and moment than any single masterpiece. Still more clearly the Church-

man, the statesman, the social reformer, are concerned not only with the present, but the indefinite future of Church, State, or social progress. All these large collective interests doubtless work back into the individual lives which they affect, the lives it may be of countless millions. But in general it would be a mistake to regard sympathy as their main motive. The appeal is more direct. The scientific man is not primarily interested in the alleviation of the human lot by applied science, or even in the joy of enlightenment which remote generations may experience. But the rational interpretation of reality is for him in itself an end of superlative interest to which he would be only too glad to contribute his mite. The great lawyer is not necessarily a man of the most developed sympathies. Primarily he is interested in the working out of consistent and rational principles in the tangle of human affairs. Those affairs will certainly go better if his principles are sound. But he is not directly concerned to translate them into terms of human happiness. His system presents itself to him as something inherently attractive to the reason. The social reformer one might suppose to be directly moved by human sorrows, and no doubt that is the natural starting point of his thought. But again, the social system that he comes to conceive is apt to present itself to him as a thing of beauty in itself. Finally the statesman and the whole mass of patriotic citizens who support him think of their country's good, not directly in terms of the happiness of its individual members, but in whatever terms appeal most to their imagination as being on the greater scale the ends which their own impulses suggest to them, terms perhaps of greatness, power, and glory, as the embodiment the grandeur and magnificence which in their personal lives is denied to them.

On this side, then, the collective achievement appeals to the individual as his own aim writ large. So far as his aim is rational, then the collective achievement will be sound. It will be a necessary element in the true common good of humanity, and it will converge on the same point as the sympathetic impulses when their bearing is fully

thought out. For the fundamental aim of mind is to establish a comprehensive harmony of living experience in which the rational interpretation of reality, the organisation of effort, the creation of beauty, and the play of imaginative fellow-feeling, all have their necessary functions. And he to whom any one of these interests appeals may serve the whole by following his bent. Yet each of these interests pursued in abstraction may be devitalised or even turned to sinister ends. Science becomes cold and limited in its view of reality, art for art's sake turns to a thing of coteries and pretences, of large words and little meaning; sympathy to a sloppy sentimentality that refuses to follow things into their consequences. What more particularly concerns us is that the collective achievement, political or social, will always hold itself out as the common good. But will it in fact be common, actually shared by the human beings that form the community? The answer is in the affirmative if its appeal is to their rational and social impulses, in the negative if the common achievement is just to glorify egoism. The love of power and the attractions of magnificence and grandeur of achievement are veneered, not radically purged, by nationalisation. The men who build States on these lines may be no self-seekers, but they help to indoctrinate whole peoples with self-seeking. Further than this, the most charitable, humane, altruistic cause with which I thoroughly identify myself is in danger of being transfused into my egotism. I push it relentlessly perhaps, and regardless of other causes which may to the impartial eye have for the moment the better claim. The path of political progress is too often blocked by egoisms of this kind.

Thus we find two main lines of connection between self and society. First there are the sympathies, with the personal affections and comradeships which reinforce but may also limit them. These link us with others as individuals, and the condition of their effective extension is that highly variable magnitude our power of imaginative realisation, while self-feeling and all sorts of group feeling stand in the way. Secondly there is the enlargement of

our purposes which merges then in collective achievement. This links us rather with the community, or even with humanity as a collective whole. The two lines converge upon the common good in which all individuals share. But it is possible for either line to be pursued with too narrow a view, and so many purposes, each of high social value as a contribution to the whole, are found in conflict mutually destructive

II *Summary* — We have now considered the part played by instinct, reason, and will in human conduct, and the relative importance of egoistic, social, and other impulses in the life of society. We found it necessary at the outset to distinguish instincts from the root-interests which together constitute the general ground-plan of life. The instinct proper is a limited interest determining a particular course of behaviour without foresight of the end and in accordance primarily with hereditary methods of response. Root-interests singly or in relation determine the general trend of thought, feeling, and behaviour, whether acting with clear consciousness of direction and aim or not. Instincts are limited applications of root-interests that grow up through heredity in the absence of intelligent control and in response to special needs.

Intelligence begins to play a part with the definition of the objects in which our interests are concerned. When we clearly apprehend an object engaging wide and permanent interests, these interests govern passing impulses, and this constitutes what in general we call the action of will. In the development of will the various root-interests become focused on a number of pivotal objects, and the process of their mutual adjustment, so as to form a consistent working scheme, is the rational will. The true principle of this adjustment is harmony, which is that system of life in which the root-interests instead of conflicting, co-operate. The basis of the rational will is thus our nature in the shape in which it can act as an organised whole. There is no such thing as a control by reason without a basis of innate interest in the end. The develop-

ment of natural impulse to rational will consists first in the clear appreciation of the end with all its implications, and secondly in the subdual of the detached impulse to the permanent requirements of the whole. The rational will is the whole functioning as a whole.

Asking now what the root-interests of man actually are, we did not attempt a complete enumeration, but we distinguished the egoistic (including the bodily and therewith the sex impulses), the social, the cognitive, and the constructive. We urged that the social is a true root-interest which in one relation takes shape as sympathy with individual human beings, and in another as an interest in social life and the social structure as a whole. In the egoistic interest we distinguished a narrower and more exclusive meaning, in which it becomes the basis of antagonisms, and a wider meaning in which it is an aspect of all interests, even the most unselfish. We saw, however, that as this aspect becomes prominent, wider interests may become tinged with the exclusiveness and antagonistic spirit of the narrower egoism. Finally the fusion of the social interest in its collective form with other root-interests, such as the constructive, the cognitive, the sympathetic, and the egoistic provides the basis of a corporate feeling which in general unites a man to the society to which he belongs, but in a spirit which varies very greatly in accordance with the ingredients and temper of the fusion.

All the root-interests other than the more exclusive limitations of the egoistic include a world in which the individual is only a fraction, and in which other individuals form a part. The acceptance of some object or system of objects other than self alone dominating all life and all its interests is an effective religion. A code of conduct founded on the needs of such a wider whole is morality. Thus religious and ethical systems are the appropriate objects of a rational will.

Lastly, the emergence, clarification, and harmonisation of root-interests is the development of mind. The permanent cause of true development is the inherent energy of mind itself operating from every living individual as a

distinct centre, and always in relation to a physical environment. The conditions physical and social thus laid down are not the causes of development, but rather constitute the problem which mind has to solve. The particular form which social life assumes is to be understood as the adjustment which mind developed to a certain point is able to effect with the conditions of its life. The hereditary impulses and emotional tendencies of mankind have a social bearing. They are as much other regarding as self-regarding, but under the conditions of evolution their co-operative and integrating tendency is at first limited to the interests of a group, a party, or a specific purpose, and is shot through by a strain of self-assertion and antagonism. The higher developments of thought, reason, and will expand the sphere of activities and interests, and introduce into them a higher measure of consecutiveness, stability, and unity of aim.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERACTION OF MINDS.

IN spite of all its co-operative achievements Mind has its birth and its being in individuals, and whatever unity individual minds may form and however such unity may be best described, it is a product, not a pre-condition. But it is a product due to continuous interaction whereby the elements are in perpetual process of mutual modification. The development of thought and will in every individual is conditioned by the parallel development in others. This brings us to the second (*B*) of the two questions distinguished on p. 132. How do social relations in general react upon the mind?

1. *Selection and Mutual Stimulus.*—In the first place, then, the social milieu acts on the mind of the individual selectively. Its operation may be compared to that of the environment in the biological theory of natural selection. The growing mind follows its impulses this way and that. One impulse in the child is checked by its elders and companions, and another is encouraged. One finds a willing and cordial reception, another is chilled by neglect or visited with reprobation or punishment. In general some response on the part of others is to most of us an imperious craving, and that in us which fails to find it tends to wither away or possibly to be driven under into subterranean channels of our nature, where it has perhaps a distorting effect on our growth in other directions. The study of these balked impulses has opened out a new method in morbid psychology. Even our thought is dependent on the social milieu, not only for its outer expression but

ultimately for its inner life. We are conscious of thoughts that we cannot put into language because our mother tongue does not serve for an adequate vehicle. But such thoughts, even if fully formed, die away and are forgotten because they cannot get themselves fixed in any permanent expression. Not only can we not communicate them, but we cannot even retain them. The operative thought in a society must of necessity be that which is expressible in the language, art, or other symbolic system currently understood in the society in which we live, and much that we speak of as the peculiarities of national genius probably depends on the special adaptability of certain languages for the expression of the subtler and more elusive aspects of thought. Contrast, for example, German, English, French, and Greek as vehicles of philosophy, and you will find in the structure of the languages themselves the key to many of the differences of method followed by the philosophers who have used them. Language does not create thought, but it is its indispensable instrument, and, except so far as thought can improve this instrument, it is also its practical limitation. But the social environment is not only critical but also stimulative and constructive. Even opposition, reprobation, and punishment will stimulate the more resolute types of character to maintain and develop their position, but in general it will be found that the rebel has a society of rebels, however small, to back him. Absolute defiance of the world by the isolated individual is an exceptional phenomenon. On the other hand, given a community, however small, which is at one with itself, it is a familiar experience that the hostility of the outward world will tend rather to consolidate than destroy it. But here, too, there is a selective action. The weaker brethren drop off and the nonconformists are harder because they represent the selection of a harder type. In general, response is the condition of encouragement, the suggestion of half-belief growing into conviction as others accept it, and there is a reverberation which continues until all the members of the community are saturated with the conviction. The force of mutual suggestion is the

greater because, as it increases, it makes the way of criticism harder, and, as it approaches unanimity, it becomes less and less tolerant, so that finally the doubt which may form itself in the individual mind does not even get expression, and there is no avenue along which other influences can approach the community. In the less rational and most highly emotional expression of this tendency we have the phenomenon of crowd psychology, which has been made familiar by several writers, but it is a mistake to overestimate the value of crowd psychology in the life of society. All interchange of ideas is also mutual suggestion, and on it whatever is rational and orderly in human society depends no less than occasional ebullitions of anarchy and mass feeling.

2. *The Meaning of Common Purpose*—Nor are we to speak of society as shaping the individual without recollecting that each individual also reacts upon his society. As society may consist of many millions, its influence is naturally greater than that of any one man, but if we take all the millions in turn, the little which each contributes sums itself up into the actions of living society in so far as these are not determined by the still larger society, the more numerous millions in the past. We have to speak in sociology of the life, the well-being, the good of a community, of the common will, the public mind, the collective purpose. These are for the most part terms drawn originally from the life of the individual, and the question of their exact significance in relation to society has been a central difficulty in social theory. What is the precise meaning of the common will or a social purpose? There are two opposite fallacies to be guarded against. On the one hand, there is no common will that is not the actual will of some individual, no general will that is something over and above the will of members of the generality, or an expression for a real will underlying that which is actively operative as their consciousness. If there is a will common to a society of men, it is something on which they are all actually agreed. The agreement may be the result of controversy, and may represent a considerable modification of the original attitude of many,

perhaps of all the members of the society, but if in the end it is common to all, then all have decided to accept and abide by its ruling. They have committed themselves to it. The common will may thus be very different from that which the wills of the individuals constituting the community would be if they were not members of the community and did not try to think and act in partnership. Nevertheless, it is the conjoint result of their several wills as they come to be in the end after experiencing mutual modification.¹ These considerations indicate where the opposite fallacy lies. The common will is not the sum of individual wills lying side by side unaffected by each other, but wanting each for self a similar thing. The French king desired that every peasant should have a fowl in his pot. Probably every peasant desired it too. But the sum of the desires of each peasant for himself does not add up to the general desire expressed by the king. On the contrary, the efforts of each to secure his own end may thwart the similar efforts of others unless there is someone or at any rate some agency that organises them. Every member of a panic-stricken crowd wants to escape from a burning theatre, but unless there is someone who wants everyone to escape and so introduces order and controls the mass movement, the very urgency of each several desire blocks the egress and people are trampled to death. The common object is thus something realised by and for the community as a whole, and though it may include each man's object, it is the sum of such objects seen and willed as a whole, and not merely in its parts.

3. *Group Mentality*.—If all the members of a community have such an object clearly before them and co-operate consciously in its pursuit, it would be natural to attribute to them a common will. But this and similar expressions have given rise to much difficulty, turning partly on questions of fact, but still more on questions of interpretation. What sort of unity do such terms imply? Were we right in declaring the common will to be just the organised co-operation of many wills? Or is there, after all, a deeper,

¹ This is well brought out by Professor McIver in his *Community*

more substantial unity? In the former view the common will would seem to come into being with co-operation and disappear when it fails. On that hypothesis, what are we to make of the permanent elements of unity in social life, the order, the conformity to type, and the actual co-operation conscious or not, which is a normal feature of peaceful society? Is there not some basic psychological union here, and if so, how should it be described? Is there anything like a social consciousness or a group-mind? What, in fact, is the essential character of the subject-matter with which social psychology deals?

In group psychology as in other matters there are some things which are true generally, and others which depend on the nature of the group. Let us begin with a very simple case. Here is a committee of five charged with certain interests. It has been said of such a committee that if five wills are in operation in the discussion a sixth will emerges from them, which is the will of the committee. This statement requires careful consideration. We need not inquire whether one man dominates the five so that the decision is really his. That is a frequent occurrence, but is not of the essence of the matter. It is quite as likely that the decision is one which no one of the five would have reached if he had been left to himself. The essence of the matter if the committee is a reality is that the question is discussed, views exchanged, facts and arguments adduced. The five minds act upon one another, no doubt with very varying degrees of energy, and in the end there is a decision which the majority approve, and by which the minority, if they remain members of the committee, are more or less bound—more or less in accordance with understandings which would vary in different cases. If we are to speak of a will of the committee, it is not a sixth will added to the five, but that in which the wills of the majority, as they have come to be in the result of the discussion, agree. It is not another personal will, but a resolution of combined wills as modified in the processes of combining. It is a compound which has, however, two striking analogies to its elements. For like them it is deliberate, articulate,

and purposive, and like them it has a measure of continuity, since a committee too must have regard to past decisions and future contingencies, and will get into trouble if it pays no attention to consistency. Again, just as the personal will may be disturbed by recalcitrant impulses and may make a bad compromise with them, so a committee distracted between warring members may reach a decision so incoherent that its least intelligent member would reject it if he stood alone. Thus there are very close and real resemblances between the personal will and the corporate decision. None of these resemblances obliterate the fact that the corporate unity is formed by the co-operation of distinct and several selves, each an independent centre of initiative while the will is the active unity of a single self who has various and may be conflicting impulses but acts as one centrally controlled whole. It becomes important, then, to find terms which will indicate both the resemblances and the differences between the processes of the committee and those of its individual members. Dr. McDougall speaks of any group in which there is real intercourse as a mental system, and of the committee as we have described it this is a very fair description.¹

¹ When Dr. McDougall goes on to identify a mental system with a mind he raises a very definite question which compels those who, like myself, have used such terms as Social Mind to consider our terminology very carefully. For his discussion—by its very success in propounding a tangible meaning for what has been a hazy conception—makes it clear that the question raised is not merely nor even primarily one of the nature of society but of the nature of mind, or rather of its unity. Dr. McDougall emphasising the plurality of elements in the individual mind finds its unity in their systematic connection and, therefore, sees no such difference of principle as that suggested in the text. I am very well aware of the metaphysical and even the psychological difficulties surrounding the unity of the self and (as has already appeared) I agree that the self is a system of elements. But when I compare the unity of self with the unity of society I am impressed by this contrast. To society plurality is essential. There is no social relation, not even the most intimate, without separateness of selves. If lovers could really in one another's being mingle, love would perish. It is love's tragedy that it is a passion for unity which by the law of its own being must defeat itself. The more developed social life is the more it emphasises plurality, distinctness of individuality, and though it also unifies, the unity is of the type of the organic harmony in which distinct centres of conational energy are maintained and developed in and by co-

Before adopting it for general usage, however, let us look at one or two other cases. In our small committee everyone present was supposed to take part in the discussion, and to be at least aware of the corporate decision. The committee, or at any rate the majority, have a clear intention, a collective responsibility, a resolution to which each will adhere. If we enlarge the group so that only leading members take part in the discussion the contribution of others is proportionately less direct. If the committee is elected by a larger body the participation of the elector is again reduced. He knows less of the circumstances, he is not engaged in the critical discussions; decisions may be taken which he does not understand or perhaps approve. Finally the 'group' may be an organisation in which he plays some small part, but which as a whole is altogether operation. To the self, on the other hand, though many-sidedness is essential, it is not the many-sidedness of distinct centres each functioning in harmony. Its developing unity of system overcomes all autonomy, and though its different powers have each their legitimate scope they are all under one control. But so, you reply, is the law-abiding member of a well-ordered society. Yes, I rejoine, but the more developed the community the more its rules rest on his willing consent, given because he thinks of the bearing of his act on the whole. The impulse as impulse does not think. It is the thinking self which in the moment of emotion relates the impulse to the permanent well-being, and though harmony within the self is the aim as truly as harmony between selves, the inner harmony springs from the centre, the outer from each several personality.

It is true that in the lower organisms the parts may act separately, but this is a mark of low development which in the extreme case (as we noted above in Chapter IV) reaches a point at which a distinction between a single organism and a community of cells begins to waver. Similarly in human beings in the loss of control a limb may act on its own account, or an impulse or emotional cluster may be dissociated from the self. These cases are the negation of will. The development of will is towards the actual merger of every impulse in a single system of rich and harmonious variety. The development of society is towards a harmony to which each will of its own motion makes its own contribution. In the former case every impulse tends to become an act of will; in the latter case every action of the society tends to be the true choice of its individual members (cf. above, Chapter IV, pp. 66-68, on the distinction between the organic character as manifested in the community and its members). In all mind there is an ultimate potentiality of unity, but of the relational type of which organic harmony is the highest expression. Whether in the last resort we can conceive a synthesis in which personality and the trans-personal relation are held together so that the finitude of self is overcome and the 'tragedy of love' finds its solution is the final problem of the philosophy of religion upon which I cannot enter here.

outside his grasp, and he has not so much as a voice in choosing its directors. Yet he may still be in his way an active member, and his character and capacities contribute to the group's operations. Consider a great business, say, the production of a newspaper, in which each man knows his job and does it. All the parts work together by a plan which itself is almost as much a growth as an invention, having been worked out bit by bit as successive problems have arisen. At a given moment hardly anyone is thinking of the whole, unless it be the chief sub-editor, who is planning the arrangement of the columns, while the editor may be concerned with the bearing of some 'feature' on the general policy of the journal. For the rest, all are concentrated on writing, sub-editing, composing, stereotyping, etc., and the paper comes out as the composite result of all these wills, the great majority of which pay no attention to its appearance as a whole. Here is a hint of the working of society, and especially of the community on the large scale. Each man plays his own part intelligently enough, but it is only a part, and he does not see beyond it. But it may be said in the business organisation some one sees, or has seen, beyond it. The whole is planned for the workers, though they may not know it. It is just here that the community departs from the model, for whatever brains go into the conduct of a community it is certain that its general outlines have never been successfully planned. It has taken shape as men growing up or thrown together have found the lines of least resistance to the satisfaction of their various needs, and so have shaken down into a pattern of life which no one deliberately lays down. We reach here the conception of a society which is the antipodes of our deliberative committee, and we see that when men work together, it may be on a conscious system, that is, a system in which the workers are aware of it and of what they are doing in and with it, or it may be on an unconscious system, i.e. one in which they are not so aware. Clearly there may be any number of intermediate grades of partial awareness. In general it is an unconscious co-operation which lies at the basis of

the life of a community, though with development conscious direction becomes more and more necessary, while as scale and differentiation increase, it is also more difficult.

Unconscious co-operation might be called system, for the parts are interrelated and in the main work harmoniously. It might also be called a mental system in that its most essential elements are minds. But in both respects there is clearly a good deal of difference between it and the articulate interchange of ideas of our small committee. To carry the contrast farther, let us take yet another case. A science is built up by the co-operation, part conscious and part unconscious, of contemporary and successive students. A single modern science, to say nothing of the body of the sciences, is more than any one man can carry in his head. It is a social product, and it is a mental system in this very definite sense, that the data contributed by different individuals are systematised, tabulated, reduced to principles by mutual aid. Gauss contributes certain mathematical methods, Clerk Maxwell some fundamental physical conceptions, Lorentz elaborates certain formulæ, Minkowski a view of the relation of space and time, and they draw together in the work of Einstein. Here we have a mental system in the sense not only of an interconnection of minds, but of an articulation of thought, resulting therefrom. We have through co-operation a higher mental achievement than any that the unaided individual could attain. In the mere working of institutions we have no such result. They do not imply any higher articulation of thought than that which each individual achieves for himself. It is the interaction of mind and mind that is common to every group. It may be conscious or unconscious, co-operative or competitive. It may engender a wealth of articulate thought, imaginative range, practical organisation, infinitely beyond the capacity of any individual standing alone; or its effect may be merely that each mind with no enlargement of view follows its own ends on lines of least resistance knowing and caring for nothing beyond that segment of the line on which its own movements proceed. On this method it is perfectly

true that interaction builds up an order much greater than anything which the individual knows, but such an order is for that very reason anything but an articulate system of thought. But whether the product be high or low, every group is constituted of minds in a mesh of relations. It forms, one might say, a mental reticulum rather than a system. Now through the web of relations certain psychological characters appear. Within any group such and such ideas are familiar, such and such methods are in use, a certain habit of mind is prevalent and certain modes of judgment hold the field. The sum of these and similar elements taken together constitute not a mind but a mental condition widely dominating thought and action. Such a condition is conveniently (if not very beautifully) expressed by the term *mentality*, and social *mentality* will thus mean such a condition reached by, and effective in, the interaction of many minds.

In the view here taken, social *mentality* is the governing factor in social life, and its development therefore is the governing factor in social development. In this relation it is of especial importance to distinguish social *mentality* from individual faculty. Most physical sciences to-day stand far above any science of former times. This does not mean that scientific genius is developed, that Einstein is a greater individual than Newton. The sum of available innate ability, for all we know, may be constant, but if the same quantum of ability works co-operatively on a subject through successive generations, the sum of achievement is what no one genius could approach. It is a social product, every bit of it effected by an individual just as every brick is laid on by a single workman, but the whole, like the entire building, the work of many hands. A difference in each brick so slight that the bricklayer barely notices it may revolutionise the character of the building, and so from slight changes in each individual the resultant effect in social *mentality* may be very remarkable. On a slight and temporary preponderance of a certain temper among its members, even on their response to a particular event, a community may take a fateful decision affecting the

whole future course of its development. It is the interrelation which counts. Changes in the personal composition of a group—immigration and emigration, for instance—may of course affect its mentality. But this is by no means certain, for the group may absorb newcomers so completely that there is no palpable change. Conversely with no change of personnel a group by the continuance of its internal interactions may evolve new characters, and if in its course it enters on new situations the changes may be of the most drastic character.

Psychologically, then, we may regard any group as a mental network or reticulum. In this network there will be a certain equipment of ideas, modes of judgment and action, by which the inner life of the group, the mutual relations of its members and also the relations between the group as a whole and the outside world, will be determined. This is the group mentality. This mentality is conditioned not only by the nature of the constituent minds as they would be apart from the group relations—e.g. as they may actually function in other groups—but also by the relations constituting the group, and through these often enough by situations in which the group happens to find itself. There can be no change of group mentality without some modification of, or some event occurring in, individual minds, both as cause and effect, but the changes may be very slight in each individual, and yet sum up to something very considerable in the whole. Individuals may be aware only of a small segment of the whole, or some or even all of them may be aware of the whole as such. In the former case the whole is for the psychologist a network of minds operating each with its own ends in view. In the latter a higher and more comprehensive system of thought or life is developed by inter-mental relations, and the co-operative product is not merely a network of minds but a specific mental system to which each member makes a partial but articulate contribution.

The life of a community is in the main of the former type. The community is a network of associations and intelligent beings. But the network as a whole is not within any one

consciousness. Hence in particular since will is nothing if not the deliberate, conscious, and systematic pursuit of an end, we should not speak of such a mental network as a will. It is neither an individual will nor a common will, but a reticulum of wills related in a manner that is not willed. How such a reticulum is maintained, and how it may develop into something of the nature of a true common will we have now to consider.

4. *Elements of Common Action.*—Though common objects and the conditions of common welfare may not be clearly conceived by the many, they nevertheless affect their actions. They affect them, in the first place, by direct and indirect social control. The social fabric is a working scheme of life in which upon the whole each man, in pursuing his own aims, has to serve others—for example, when he makes goods for the market he earns his own bread. The economist shows us how, in the absence of organised control, the market adjusts itself so that—roughly, it is true, and not without loss and suffering—individuals seeking their own supply the common demand. Whether organisation might do the same thing better is not the question here. The point is that even in the absence of organisation it is done, however imperfectly, merely because men are, in fact, sharing a common life even if they do not know it, and their course is shaped by the channels of activity which that life opens to them. This is the great controlling force of society, operating in the main indirectly and unconsciously, but omnipresent. It is supplemented by the more direct and conscious control of custom and law. The individual is aware that in following his ends there is a path with limits which he must not overstep. He is aware that what he does will excite definite response in others, and that they expect definite things in given situations of him. We have here the fabric of traditional custom backed at critical points by the rule of law. Custom sways the mind by a double force. On the one hand there is the powerful influence of the expectation entertained of one by others; on the other, that of the expectation we entertain of ourselves. Custom has the force of suggestion.

A given situation calls for a given response, suggests to us the need of that response, and if it fails, even though we ourselves are responsible, we feel a breach in our mental constitution and a sense of maladjustment which is hard to surmount even if conscience and reason assure us that the breach is required. Custom therefore is the more dominant the lower the level of reflection, that is the more men are given up to quasi-automatic response to suggestion. A fabric of traditional custom is the sufficient support of the life of the simpler societies, and underhes those which are most organised, most plastic, and mentally active.

Further and beyond these controls there are social elements in the individual consciousness, even if there is not full and clear social purpose. The average man thinks of wife and children, friends and relations, as well as of himself. His interests ramify into the more general concerns of his trade or his locality, his church or his profession. Their social content brings them into relation with those of others. Elements of the common good are apprehended by many, though the whole may be clearly seen but by few, and there are slight gradations rather than sharp distinctions in the diffusion of social purpose. This avenue of approach to a common will, however, is cut across by the tendency of partial purposes to form minor organisations on their own account, sectional interests which acquire a corporate life and very active common will of their own, which may claim authority to interpret the good of the whole community. Thus the partial development of common purposes cuts both ways. It seems a necessary stage on the way to true common will, and yet it constantly threatens to obstruct further progress not by passive indifference but by active resistance, as when party is preferred to patriotism, and nationalism to internationalism. The problem is evidently the more acute the wider the community that we are considering, since at each step the interests of men become more various and the mental distance to be traversed between the individual mind and the general good is greater. Men realise that which is nearest to them, which they can sensibly affect and be affected by, and their

relations to the wider whole are relatively dim and unreal. It seems to be only by working through the narrower and more partial by successive stages to the wider that a true and permanent common will can be established for great communities, and in particular for the race of man.

But lastly, below the common will, less explicit and less easily grasped, is that which we call common character. Character in the individual is not the same thing as will, but includes all the tendencies innate and acquired, all the emotional susceptibilities, habits of control, modes of thinking and judging which go to determine the will. It is will together with its background. What is the character of a group, be it a nation, a class, a school, or even a period? The term means something, for we cannot but observe that groups act in distinctive ways. Is this something equivalent to the average character of the members of the group? This would be too simple a view. The behaviour of the group will be affected not only by the character of all its members, but by the nature of its organisation. The courage of an army is not a simple product of the bravery of individual soldiers, for each soldier will be affected in action by the confidence he feels in his comrades, his leaders, the supply of munitions behind the lines, and so forth. A lower average of personal courage may issue in a greater collective resolution if the organisation is good and known to be good. Generally the character of a group is a resultant of the character of component individuals in the interactions which belong to the group at that time. In a people there will be underlying hereditary features of character of great permanence, but changing circumstances, new ideas, new organisations bring different sides of this underlying character into play, and the mere reaction against a type that has become unduly dominant is a not unimportant cause of change. In their common nature the Englishmen of the Restoration cannot have differed materially from the Englishmen of the Commonwealth, but what was most repressed in 1655 was most triumphant in 1660. Institutions do not merely reflect the character of component individuals,

but mainly by unconscious processes select the type of individual which suits them.¹

On a review of these considerations it results that the life of a community is the expression of the common character, in which the permanent groundwork, relatively immune to change, is the character of the component individuals, while the dominant forces at a given time depend on the nature of the social organisation. Now social organisation, as we have argued, is predominantly mental or psychological. Its unit forces are minds, and the strands connecting them are woven of ideas, emotions, and the like. The whole constitutes what we have called a mental network, and in its operation there are grades which *mutatis mutandis* are fully comparable, as Dr. McDougall has well shown, to the grades of mind in the individual. The common life may proceed in dull inertia, or may be disturbed by blind impulses, or governed by a deliberate purpose, and its purposes may be co-ordinated by the steady principles of the organised common will. Among any one people any individual or group may have a highly developed mentality, conceiving the common life as a continuous whole, while the greater number are inert and have no views beyond a limited radius. Thus the evolution of a true common will is a complex process, and how far it has gone in any society is to be settled not by abstract considerations but by analysis of the actual operation of public opinion, law, and government. What

¹ A still more subtle process governs an institution like the popular Press. This Press owes its position to the power of reflecting the currents of interest in the popular mind. Yet in this country the appeal to the cold figures of the ballot box has more than once shown that the deliberate judgment of the majority of the people was opposed to the opinions of the Press which the majority read, and read because they preferred to read it. The explanation is that the popular Press appeals to the 'man in the street,' that is the man in slack moments of relaxation on the 'bus between business and home, when he does not want to think. That it is this side of man that gets the most continuous vocal expression is a very serious factor in the formation of public decisions. In a community of beings so mixed of incongruous elements much will depend on the elements which come to the surface, and in our society there is a tendency for the lighter elements to float. Such conditions are not favourable to the serious thought necessary for a stable attitude to the permanent conditions of social well-being, that is for the development of the true common will.

we can say generally is that in all communities there are binding forces at work, in the social 'content' of the individual mind, in the conditions which, whether with the will or against it, connect man with man, and in the control partly deliberate and organised but mainly unreflective and quasi-automatic exerted by custom and law. The explicit consciousness of unity, the recognition of a common welfare resting on definite and permanent conditions, and the resolve to maintain and strengthen such conditions operates on individuals, but that wide diffusion which constitutes a true common will is difficult to attain in a great and complex community. In such a community particular objects which touch springs of national character will indeed be pursued with a true collective determination. Of such a kind is, for example, victory in war. But these occasional purposes do not amount to a stable common will. The formation of such a will in a great community is moreover impeded by the very conditions of its growth. For it seems possible to make it effective only through the formation of sectional groups, and the independent centres so formed resist the higher synthesis which they might subserve. The compelling force in social development is mind, and the development of mind involves the formation of higher, clearer, and more comprehensive purposes, but the greater scope of society and the resulting wealth and complexity of its tissue—above all the increased rapidity of its changes—are for ever proving a harder problem to the social consciousness. Development does not defeat itself, but it does continually engender new difficulties requiring a still higher development to grapple with them.

In a great community the conduct of affairs becomes so complex that no single mind can ever review it in detail, and it is well if a few minds can so far grasp the public interest in its true unity as to maintain due relations between different departments. A mere handful of publicists and statesmen have a definite conception of a concrete and consistent course of public policy. More widely spread are (1) general ideas, more or less defined as the case may be, of national well-being, and (2) large interests appealing

definitely to certain classes or sections, and the interactions of these two influences originate and maintain political parties. In addition particular ends have an emotional appeal, and here mob psychology comes into play. Catchwords appealing to mere emotion, 'Hang the Kaiser,' and 'Make Germany pay,' sweep all reason off the board for the moment, and the nation is left to rue the result through subsequent years. This is not will but passion. Far saner is the use of personal experience, narrow and limited it may be, in the judgment of party programmes and the promises and performances of leaders. Here we must distinguish personal experience from self-interest. It is one thing to vote for something because it will benefit me, and another to vote for it because my personal experience commends it to me as just. Such experience may be narrow, but it is a legitimate element deserving of due consideration in the general decision. Now the ordinary voter is by no means incapable of this use of his experience. Current discussion constantly shows that the essence of success in a political appeal is not the titillation of any interest but contact with something which the average man understands because it comes home to him in concrete shape. In this manner the diversified concrete experience of all sections may and does contribute elements of judgment to the national decision. The broad lines of policy are seen from numerous angles of vision, and a large proportion of the people may have a real though indirect part in determining them. The mental system is not wholly unconscious, nor yet is it such that every individual within it has an equally deliberate and conscious share in the determination. It is rather that each may bring some element of experience, suggestion, or criticism to bear on a decision which will be definitely expressed and applied by the leading minds. In proportion as such a mental system extends throughout the people we may speak of the emergence of a common will.

In an organised political party such a mental system is fairly well defined. There are recognised leaders and accepted principles, and though these may tend to degenerate into catchwords they frequently get new life from personal

and sectional experience in the manner described. But what are we to say of the relations between parties, and above all of the man in the street, that ultimate arbiter of the fate of Governments, who belongs to no party, but by throwing his weight now into this scale and now into that determines electoral victory or defeat? Is there a common will below all this diversity? No doubt there is a common background of character and of national situation. How much there is of common will is a question which must be answered differently in different cases. It may be that there are some settled points which no party touches—constitutional questions, for instance, or questions of national safety. On these it would be reasonable to predicate a settled common will. It may be again that sectional wills are so violently divided that either would upset the constitution or let in the enemy rather than give way. In that case there is no common will. In any event we see that the common will is less defined and covers less ground than the party will. Having this in view we may usefully distinguish public will, which is a mental system supporting certain definite conceptions of permanent common well-being, extending over a great section of the community, and a common will proper as such a system approximating in its extent to universality.

We may observe lastly that as any section of a nation may have evolved a public will, that is a will common to itself, and yet there may be no common will of the nation, so in the same way any and every nation may have a true common national will, and yet there may be no common will of mankind. When nations come into living contact there is an unconscious co-operation, economical and spiritual, underlying the far more conscious antagonism. But unconscious operations we have excluded from will. In our time there is also a public will of mankind, explicit and widely diffused elements of opinion enforcing the community of world interests. How far these are from success in forming a true common will of the nations we can all see. Here, as within the nation, public will must grow in definiteness and extension and common will can only follow

The conditions of development are fundamentally the same

5. *Drift and Plan.*—It might be supposed that without an organised common will collective action must be rudderless, or, at best, guided by a few men of affairs. This is not the case. In no Government are the few superiors really independent of the mass-mentality, nor is collective action wholly destitute of direction because it lacks organised purpose. To obtain a true account of collective action at various stages of development we must look again to individual psychology. In this region, where no clear purpose is formed, there are two principal ways in which results are obtained which to the onlooker appear like purposed ends, and which may in fact carry the same sort of satisfaction or of real value to the agent as the accomplishment of a true purpose. The first way is that of a preformed impulsive response. This is in general fixed by heredity, though it is also modifiable by experience, and may be mechanical as in reflex action, or may involve some of the lower grades of conscious adjustment as in instinct. Both the physical and the foundations of the psychical structures are so far rough hewn by heredity into accord with the general needs of the organism that on suitable occasion they give appropriate response, such response, that is, as serves to maintain the race, and so corresponds to the end which a purposive intelligence having the needs of the race in view would set before itself as its end. In the animal world some of these responses are not merely rough hewn but shaped to great delicacy of adjustment, but as is intelligible from the nature of heredity such delicacy is only attainable in a very limited sphere, and the life which is to respond to numerous complex and often conflicting elements in the environment must govern itself and not be governed by pre-established necessities of response. Thus in man the element of inherited tendency becomes more general and plastic, a material which works itself into form in the course of its continuous activity. Man still has his specific instincts, but they are taken up into and assimilated by the structure of his personality which, hereditary in

its beginnings, moves in accordance with ideas and principles that animate the social structure. The predetermined response diminishes in importance as the development of true mind proceeds.

The second way in which results comparable to ends are achieved is the method known as Trial and Error. Here consciousness plays a part, but not the consciousness of Purpose. In a given situation the organism is dissatisfied. It is in pain or discomfort, or has a want of which it can give itself no clear account. In this position it is stimulated to activities which may be quite random, or which follow simple lines characteristic of its class under such circumstances. As these fail to give relief the stimulus persists and is intensified, but the activity is varied, each successive course of action being inhibited as it fails until perchance some one or some combination or adjustment is hit upon which begins to bring relief. This course is then followed with eagerness and with greater certainty and precision until a result is secured which for the time yields satisfaction. From an early stage in animal development it is found that the effect of such an experience tends to persist, and that when the situation recurs the course which has in fact proved appropriate is more readily chosen. To the casual observer the whole process when complete wears the aspect of a purposive series, but careful analysis shows that it is radically distinct. The part played by conscious feeling is that of acceptance and rejection, not that of anticipatory direction, and it is by a series of corrections that consciousness keeps effort on the path which does in fact yield it satisfaction.

It is important to note that the same principle applies at a higher remove. Many desires in the attainment of their partial objects yield a certain satisfaction. But this is compatible with a profound inner dissatisfaction if the main principle of personality is thwarted. A man who could not frame any clear definition of the aims of his life as it ought to be may yet reject one end and select another in accordance with a principle which the onlooker can perhaps interpret and so guide himself to a more satisfactory fulfil-

ment of the nature of which he is perhaps never fully aware. In anything short of its ideal development something of this procedure remains even in the rational will. Thus both in the formation and the interconnection of purposes there are less rational, less explicit processes underlying our lives out of which the practical reason in the strict sense is evolved.

All these processes operate only with greater complexity in the life of society. A community may act on impulse, even on a true, common impulse. A danger, a threat, an insult may set a whole population ablaze, the impulse of resentment or fear may be so general that nothing else counts, and we may rightly speak of it as a common impulse aroused in relation to a common object. Most often it is some external threat from an enemy which produces a reaction of this kind, but internal incidents, a crime, or even a blunder of administration, may produce a similar result. The impulse will rapidly take shape in purposes, but in its foundation it is emotional and unreflective, and it deals with the immediate and occasional.

Next, a community may follow a clearly marked course in a certain relation which to the onlooker, and certainly to the historian, leads inevitably to a predestined end. Yet it may be quite true that the community as a whole formed no clear conception of the end. What has happened is that the successive steps presented themselves as inevitable. Deviations proved, or at least appeared, disastrous. Alternatives at each point were at lowest inconvenient. From day to day and year to year that was acceptable which did in fact lead to the end, and that which led elsewhere was unacceptable. The real underlying causes here are communal character rather than will, and existing conditions rather than the definite anticipation of future gain. Other peoples looking on put a different interpretation on the process, and attribute to dark and deep-laid schemes what is often a tendency of this mixed and largely unconscious type. The Englishman thinks that he gained a great Empire in a fit of absence of mind. His critics think that he stretched out covetous hands and pursued year in and

year out a tortuous but consistent policy of unlimited aggression. The truer view would seem to be that individual Englishmen, pushing their trade or seeking settlement, have constantly confronted the Government with situations in which it has either had to back them or bid them withdraw. At a later stage dependent Governments have done similar things. National pride and commercial interests have generally pressed in the direction of support, and then there has been the seeming or real necessity of rounding off a territory, dealing with the next neighbours, and so forth. Conscious Imperialism has no doubt operated too, but it has seldom, if ever, possessed the nation as a whole. In the main these great drifts of policy are not matters of deliberate will, and the charges of hypocrisy to which they give rise are over-stated. In internal development the same distinctions apply. Did this country ever decide to become a democracy? There have been democratic parties and anti-democratic parties, but in the main the issue has been fought over particular changes in which the balance has swayed according as the conditions of the time made this or that event acceptable. The historian may discern a steady tendency in which the purposes of individuals, and even of organised parties, were factors, but what governs the whole is not a clear purpose of the community as a whole, but rather its character acting in the conditions in which from time to time it happened to be.

Further, a community may, as a whole, have this or that purpose without any settled and general plan of life to which it is adjusted. The winning of the war is an object so generally desired that without substantial inaccuracy we may call it a common purpose.¹ But after victory, what? Have we a clear view of the peace that we desire? Is it to be a Commonwealth of Nations and the end of militarism, or ascendancy for ourselves and the perpetuation of militarism? Is it a world of two alliances to which we look forward, or to a self-contained Empire, or to a

¹ The tense betrays the date at which this was written. I leave it as it stands in view of the questions that follow

League of Nations? The controversies of the day, as I write, show that while some may have formed clear ideas on these points, no general agreement exists, that is to say, there is no agreed plan of living, no settled conception of the general conditions of well-being which would be the appropriate object of a common will as distinct from a particular common purpose. Here, again, we shall probably drift along a course adjusting our action point by point as is suitable to our predilections or necessities at the time, to reach in the end a goal which in history will perhaps look like our settled purpose.

We must thus distinguish (1) a common impulse, (2) a particular common purpose, (3) a common drift or tendency, and (4) true common will. The matter is made more complex by the fact that in any case there may be and generally are individuals and even organisations with much clearer intentions than the nation as a whole, with purposes where in the mass there are only impulses, and with a consecutive policy where otherwise there is only a drift. There may be a public though not a common will. Governments may, though the study of politics does not suggest that they often do, move at the higher stage of reflection, but we should distinguish the governmental from the communal purpose or will as they may clash. In general, when we apply the above categories to the community we must bear in mind that the psychological conditions which they involve may be more or less widely diffused, common to a few, many, or all. In this respect what we call common is really a matter of degree, and unless we are thinking of a small community or, say, a small governing circle within a community, rarely applicable with precision and certainty.

6. *The Final Purpose*—The will rests on the same underlying conditions that call forth the impulses and partial purposes and determine what we have called the drift. What it does is to grasp these conditions as a whole, and so adjust partial efforts to one another. Borrowing another term from psychology, we may put it that the life of a community has a meaning, visible in glimpses in particular

actions which a fully developed will would grasp as a whole. Can we say in general terms what this meaning is, what is therefore the object of a common will so far as one is really formed? It is natural to identify it with the common well-being, but here we must remark that a community like an individual may have its false gods; it may, for instance, be given over to ideas of glory and domination which are perhaps fatal to its well-being, and finally to its very existence. A dominating class, again, may make the preservation of its authority its prime object, and direct the ship of State accordingly. It is then only its apparent well-being, not necessarily its real well-being, that the community means, and it may be willed. Again, well-being may be not falsely but too narrowly conceived, for example, if it is conceived in a form which would be quite sound if the community stood alone, but which takes no adequate account of its relation to others. Thus the question, What is the actual will of the community? would not admit of a single determinate answer in all cases, even if we suppose such a will to have been definitely formed. But if we ask what is the true meaning of the social principle in the common life, and to what object does it point as the object of a developed social will, the answer has already been given. It is the harmonious fulfilment of the life of mankind, or in other words the development of mind in man as a whole of accordant elements. Now in its completeness such an ideal and the methods of realising it are hardly to be understood beyond the circle of those who give their whole minds to such things. Nevertheless, harmony as such is something shared not merely by the enjoyment of its fruits but by active co-operation, and it is in this willing support that its vitality consists. By one channel or another it may soak into the minds of the generality and the more it does so the more 'organic' is its growth. Thus the advance towards the social end involves the diffusion of social will in widest commonality spread. In relation to this supreme end, even the will of an entire nation is something sectional and subordinate, just as the will of a class or a party is sectional and subordinate to the will of a nation. We

may value these sectional wills by the measure in which they embody the elements of the ideal, social, or rational will, and we may say that, accidents of fortune apart, the progress of a community and the contribution which it makes to 'the general deed of man' is ascertained by this standard. We took efficiency, scope, mutuality, and freedom as the four criteria of development. We now see that the psychological condition of all four is the growth of a common will in the four respects of power, range of view, impartiality of principle, and generality of participation.

7. *Purpose as an Operative Force*—It may be asked how far can purpose in fact control the life of society, and the answer is just as far as it is based on clearness of conception, unity of will, and knowledge of conditions. It is an illusion to suppose any contrariety between social law and voluntary control. If there is universal law, then, whether in the individual or society, purposes have emerged in accordance with law, and the law of the purpose itself is to achieve its ends. The knowledge of physical laws does not reduce man to the position of an impotent spectator, but is the source and measure of his mastery. An unsupported body must fall. That I cannot prevent, but my knowledge of the fact enables me to avoid its falling on my head. Certain effects of certain social conditions are unavoidable, but intelligent purpose may be just the agency which will modify the conditions or introduce new causes transforming the effects of the effects. Thus density of population will send up site values in a town. Nothing we can do will prevent this. But knowing it, we may either (a) check the aggregation, as by developing transit facilities, or (b) alter the destination of the accruing wealth as by taxation of site values.

But behind these criticisms lies a profound scepticism as to the psychological efficacy of reason, and in particular of the ethical reasoning involved in the higher social purposes. It is believed (a) that fundamentally human action rests on impulse, (b) that so far as it is rational it is dictated by self-interest. These views have already been rejected. But there is a certain combination of them, or confusion

between them, which demands additional notice in connection with the disparagement of rational theory in social affairs. We are asked to look at the social theories which have seemed efficacious in the modern world, and to admit that their power has been due not to their logic, which often does not bear full analysis, but to the passions or the interests which they formulate. The revolutionary theory of equality is taken to represent the protest of the French bourgeoisie against its exclusion from privilege, English Utilitarianism the commercial instincts and interests of the corresponding class, the opposition of the North to slavery, not the humanitarian feeling which it professed but the fear of competition by slave labour, and so forth. Nowhere is there any objective rationality which is practically efficacious. Special interests wrapped themselves up in high-sounding generalities claiming to be eternal principles of universal application. But when tested by applying them to circumstances in which they did not happen to suit the views of the particular group which organised them, that group lost all interest in them and they broke down. They were merely verbal defences against criticism, and never the driving force, which is always instinct or interest.

In this argument it may be remarked first that instinct and interest which are apt to be interchanged are quite distinct. Instinct, whatever else it may be, involves action without foresight, and interest in the sense contemplated involves foresight. So far as men are moved by their interests they are governed not by unreflecting impulse alone, but by at least some measure of reflection, and their action is so far rational. At this point we must avoid the opposite error, not less serious, of identifying reason and self-interest. Reason as an impulse to practical consistency or harmony in life as a whole is objective, and transcends every personal and partial point of view, and in its eyes neither personal nor family nor class nor national interest is ultimate where any wider interest comes into court. On the other hand, it is true that every group has common interests which may be opposed to those of other

groups in the absence of the deeper thought which would find a synthesis. These interests act powerfully on the minds of members of the group and colour their general outlook on life. In particular they act upon the thinking men who most fully realise the wider interest to which the group should be subservient and engender in them a process of unconscious sophistication, which in reality reverses the relation and judges the general interest by that of the group. Then the selective agencies of group psychology come into play. The demonstration justifying the group interest is applauded, and the critic or doubter is silenced or disregarded. It is in this way that in an organised vocal class group interests shape social theories. The process has some analogy to instinct in that the basis is largely unconscious, but it may be doubted if instinct is an appropriate term in application to any group psychology. It is a part of the hereditary equipment of the individual, while group life is shaped in a specific experience. It would be truer to speak of a group or a social impulse. A wider term than 'interest' is required, for groups, whether classes or nations, are led by impulses, for example, of collective pride and self-assertion which may be very much opposed to their interests in the sense which the term generally suggests. A nation might be much happier living at peace, but pride may urge it on paths of conquest. At any rate, if we use the term group interest for the forces shaping the activity and in particular the thought of its members, we must use it in the wide sense in which it covers the justification of any dominant impulse.

Let us grant then, that, for example, class interests have often determined the thought, professedly impartial and based on wide social principles, of publicists. What does this prove? It proves, if that requires proof, that not all that is plausible is sincere. But it also goes to prove the necessity that classes and nations, like individuals, feel for justification by objective ethical standards. Sophistication, to vary an adage, is the tribute which fallacy pays to reason. Men must think themselves in the right in order to act with combined resolution. Why should this

be if rational ethics are as powerless as is suggested? Why should not men throw themselves frankly on the 'will to power,' and the 'pro ratione voluntas'? The reply is that for normal men in a cool and calm hour this is not a situation that is endurable within. They are subjects of an allegiance which galls them even if they rebel, and to destroy the sophistication which has reconciled them to themselves is the bitterest injury. The popularity of false principles is evidence of the power which principles enjoy. Everyone can see the ill effects of bad theories. It is only about good theories that they are sceptical.

This is not a logical position. Articulate expression, the clear conception of an end, and the cool examination of its conditions is of the same efficacy in social as in individual life, and there is no reason why the ends of an entire community should not be rendered as articulate as those of a class, or the good of all humanity as that of a nation. At bottom the whole argument rests on that misunderstanding of the relation between reason and impulse which has been explained above. Reasoning divorced from the impulse of human character effects nothing, and it is in fact possible to construct theories verbally plausible and mutually consistent which are sterilised by such divorce. This is the intellectualist fallacy. The true function of practical reason is, as we have seen, to find the harmonious expression of the body of impulses at work among human beings, and the resulting theory will have the forces of human nature so far as they are capable of co-operation behind it. It is the business of reason to explore this capability. If reason without impulse is void, impulse without reason is blind, and therefore chaotic. Rational social theory is the exposition of the possible conditions of final harmony in development. The social consciousness which underlies any such theory has a certain unity, but not a unity like that of the personal will or the self. Mind, soul, or will exists in a multitude of independent centres of consciousness, each with its own being, its own feelings, its own aims. From every such centre a movement may start without regard to others, and hence the clash of wills, the waste, the elements of

disorder and injustice in social life. But the separate centres are not physical atoms moving in utter disregard of each other. There is between them something of a bond. They have need of one another for their own development, and briefly the growth of the social consciousness rests on this need and goes forward in proportion as it comes to be better understood. The common well-being, which is its appropriate object, may be as narrowly and imperfectly apprehended as personal well-being. To apprehend it as clearly and consistently as possible is the object of social theory, which so far as it succeeds will do just what clear thinking does in every department of practical life. It will co-ordinate on a consistent plan all the energies that otherwise work blindly to their mutual frustration. Theory may not make will, but will, if it is destined to any large and permanent achievement, must make something very like theory. Its ends are concrete, but they must be clearly apprehended, comprehensive, consistent, and connected, and of such is the theory of social practice. The practical man and the theorist start from different points, but they have the same material to deal with, the tangle of human experience, and the same problem to solve, to weave out of conflicting passions and partial aims the tissue of a harmonious life.

8 *The Social Aspect of Mind in Evolution.*—The general development of mind, both on the side of theory and practice—intellect and will—is easily seen to embrace a double movement—expansion of scope and articulateness of apprehension and adjustment. Firstly, the growing mind covers a wider ground, looks further before and after, and on the ethical side takes a wider range of human interest and evinces a more many-sided sensibility to human fortunes. If the pin-prick of momentary sensation, or perhaps rather a dull rumble of feeling less definite than sensation, is the germ of consciousness, the sense of all life as a whole and the recognition of its part in the embracing universe is its maturity. Secondly, while the field of vision widens, it is also more accurately mapped. Distinct objects arise out of the primitive blur, and with

distinctness mutual relations come into view. Impulse is thus transformed into purpose, and the deeper impulses underlying the first purposes are in their turn laid bare and their meaning brought to light. This interrelation of distinct elements is what is meant by articulateness, and it is the basis of unity in thought and action. Tracing the double development to its conclusion, we see that on the side of knowledge the goal of thought is an articulate system comprehending reality as a whole, on the side of action an articulate purpose or scheme of well-being comprehending life as a whole.

Reason is the impulse towards such articulate comprehension, but since reality and life are so vast as compared with the sphere which is at any time articulately understood, there is always scope for imaginative suggestion, the promptings of emotion, the flashes of insight shot up from the foundations of the mind beyond the confines of ascertained truth. The mind outruns reason, not illegitimately because experiment leads to progress, but at the cost of repeated errors because it is only the test of rational consistency that finally distinguishes truth and falsehood. Thus at any given time there is more in the mind than there is in consciousness, and *a fortiori* more than can be stated in intelligible terms and made matter of rational proof. None the less, as every such element develops, it takes more and more rational shape. The impulse becomes a purpose, the instinctive prompting is justified by an explicit judgment, the intuitive belief is either fitted into place in a reasoned system or rejected as a false light. It is the articulate system of thought and purpose that measures the solid achievement of mind.

This system works towards an ideal in which every part implies the whole and the whole necessitates every part. This mutual necessity on the side of truth is the test and basis of rational belief, on the side of action of rational approval. Thus both in thought and action the unity to which the reason moves as its goal is that of an organic whole embracing the entirety of reality in cognition, and of the life of conscious beings in action. What we have

called social mentality is in its highest form the appreciation of this ideal, and is itself not the expression of a fictitious unitary will, but the organic whole constituted by individual minds as they grow into full recognition of the mutual relations which foster and develop their individuality in the very process of cultivating their corporate power. In their ultimate goal, then, the movements of thought and purpose are at one. But here, as elsewhere, the development may be uneven. Neither in social nor in personal life does knowledge necessarily mean wisdom and justice, and a community which has made great advances in scientific culture and education may lag behind in its ethico-religious ideals. Further, there is the gap between ideals and practice. The accepted ideal of a community, for example the teaching of the established religion, is one thing, and its working code of law and custom another, rooted perhaps in a quite different past, and the relations between the two are complex, subtle, and quite impossible to predict on general principles. They cannot be indifferent to one another. The working code, which governs the actual dealings of men, must be somehow accommodated to their notions of good and bad, right and wrong. But the relation offers many possibilities. There may be ideals held sincerely by the few and perhaps accepted as matter of lip service by the many. These may leave existing social relations almost untouched or may themselves suffer contamination by some form of interpretation designed to reconcile them with the brute facts of the social order. In the most inhuman period of our early factory system employers who insisted on the justice and necessity of working little children twelve hours daily resented the suggestion that they kept the mills running on Sunday. Such was the influence on them of accepted Christian teaching. It would be untrue to say that it was naught, for the Sunday rest was worth something, but it had not much in common with the same religious teaching as understood by Sadler, Oastler, and Shaftesbury. To speak generally as far as may be, the working code has its roots in all the conditions, physical, economic, historical of the common life. What men feel

about conduct and generally about their relations to one another is only one of those conditions, and is, moreover, gravely modified by the relations to which they are accustomed, and in which they have grown up. What they are taught to think about right and wrong is again not necessarily the same as what they spontaneously feel, and reacts upon them only by effort, being made effective as a rule only by the organised and persistent effort of a minority of very sincere men. Hence the social structure has an evolution of its own affecting and affected by the evolution of ethical and religious ideas, but not the same evolution. Similarly ethico-religious development affects and is obviously at many points affected by the development of knowledge, but is not the same development. All these movements have the same ultimate goal, and can never be finally dissociated from one another. Yet they are not so closely united as to advance evenly at every stage. If society were, what some idealists have taken it to be, an embodiment of objective reason, there would be no discrepancy. The practical reason might require time and experience to come to maturity, but stage by stage, as it unfolded its meaning, human society would advance on a straightforward path, growing constantly in comprehensiveness, efficiency, and organic harmony. But social growth follows no such simple course, and the reason is very clear. It is that, though mind is the moving force in social change, it is not a unitary mind, but mind acting in millions of distinct centres, as many centres as there are individuals, that it is only so far as individuals understand one another that they come to act with one purpose, that the supreme problem is always to get them to understand one another, and that often the organisation which such understanding builds up becomes in time a centre of obstruction to the formation of still higher organisations and a cause of accentuated conflict. The history of humanity is not the story of the orderly and straightforward development of a spiritual principle, from germ to maturity, but of an unceasing conflict between the rational and irrational elements in the minds of multitudes, and to see how the conflict sways

to and fro and how the spiritual principle fares, we must go to the facts of comparative sociology.

We have a double question before us. We have to ask first whether on the whole and in the long run that enlargement of mind which engenders and is accomplished in the growth of articulate thought, involves also the ethical enlightenment which ultimately inspires a larger moral and social purpose, and secondly, how far such a larger purpose is embodied in the working customs and institutions of society. The importance of the question lies in this, that while the advance of humanity in mere knowledge is great and has every appearance of continuing to move more rapidly and surely in the future, its ethical and social development is far more questionable. At some points the two movements seem to be out of harmony—advances of knowledge or some of their consequences in the material arts being adverse to the soundness of social organisation. Yet at bottom the impulse of reason is the same in all directions. Knowledge does not as such mean wisdom or justice, yet if there is fundamental harmony in the nature of mind, that enlargement which is involved in the growth of understanding must bear with it in the end a wider and richer view of the things of the spirit. On these general grounds we may say this much. (1) There is no direct, step by step, connection between the growth of knowledge and the development of ethical ideals and the social structure, (2) but there is something common to all three in the enlargement and fuller expression of mental faculty. (3) In fact, it is clear that the state of general knowledge conditions religious belief in many ways, and through religion the ethical ideal. (4) Religion and ethics form a link between intellectual and social development, but the actual structure of a society is determined by many conditions, physical, economic, and others, of which the ethico-religious constitute a portion of variable importance. We must look to specific experience to fill in these generalities, and determine as far as possible the actual correlation between the development of knowledge and (a) that of ethics and religion, (b) that of the social structure. The study

THE INTERACTION OF MINDS 209

of this correlation brings us to the consideration of the social factor in development in the stricter sense of that term ¹

¹ In concluding these chapters on Psychological Conditions it is perhaps as superfluous to record, as it is difficult to measure with precision, the writer's indebtedness to the works of Dr McDougall and Professor Graham Wallas.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOCIAL FACTOR

1 *Interaction and Its Products.*—All the conditions that we have described are of course social in the sense that they operate in or upon the life of society. By the social factor in the strict sense we mean the interactions of man and man, organised and unorganised, simultaneous and successive, with their specific consequences, whether temporary or enduring through generations. Of this factor the three previously described are, strictly, antecedent conditions, for, in the first place, society exists in a physical environment in reference to which it must shape its life; and, secondly, it consists of individuals whose biological and psychological nature is the basis of all interactions between them. The interactions themselves constitute the actual life of society. In point of fact we were unable to describe the antecedent conditions without in some degree anticipating our description of the social factor. In considering the biological factor we saw that a society is not the same thing as a race, and that its characteristics, whatever limits the racial character may put to its development, are such as to allow considerable latitude for the cumulative effects of purely social changes, in a word, that social progress or retrogression is a very different thing from racial progress or retrogression. In relation to psychology we saw that the interaction of mind upon mind, and above all the pervasive effect of the social atmosphere upon each new individual that is born within it, modify both by selection and by suggestion the hereditary tendencies of the mind, and give them concrete shape and form. Hence the mental

systems actually operative in society constitute a distinctively social product, a moral capital, accumulating by tradition and interchange through the generations and available for each newcomer to utilise, to increase, or perchance to waste

In such action of the past on the present the social factor acting cumulatively produces its largest effects. But this is only one case of its operation. In general the action of man on man produces distinctive results which even where they mainly concern the individual could not be achieved by him alone, and are not to be treated as his 'characters,' biological or psychological, but as social products. Thus a man wishes to satisfy his needs, and will put a certain energy into the task. These are psychological characters. In virtue of them he makes goods and sells them at a price. The price is a social product. Determined, you will say, by the psychology of the individuals concerned? In general, doubtless, but in detail as the economist will show by laws of exchange in which the interactions (each no doubt with its psychological cause) are governed by various numerical relations between producers, consumers, available amounts of material things, alternative methods of production, alternative resources for the consumer. Rational curiosity again is a personal characteristic, science is a social product. Even the science lodged in one expert's brain, though a personal attainment, is also a social product. Emotions, selfish or generous, prompting a man in his behaviour to others, are personal attributes innate or modified. A rule of action, a custom or law, is a social product. The history of social products, their conditions, consequences, interactions, and further developments is the distinctive subject-matter of sociology.

Interaction may be unorganised as in a purely competitive industry, or it may be organised as in any society or organisation, or regulated as by the acceptance of customs or laws. All actual social life is part organised and part unorganised. Thus in a competitive industry, though it is without organisation as a whole, the competing units may be highly organised houses of business, and the play of their competition is subject to the law of the land, and

probably to a network of trade customs and understandings. Again, the products of interaction may be ideas, beliefs, imaginative creations, or they may be organisations, institutions, or customs embodied in groupings of human beings, modes of life and behaviour, and even in buildings and other material things. These two classes intermingle, for some ideas and beliefs, e.g. moral and religious doctrines, actually govern practice and even take partial shape in institutions, while all customs and institutions have ideas, more or less explicit, at their base. Nevertheless, the world of thought and the world of actual life and practice are not the same. They may develop unequally, and the main question which we have presently to ask concerns their correlation.

2 *The Living Tradition*—We remark first that, whether ideas or institutions are concerned, the mode of their propagation is much the same. Results once achieved are handed on, always subject to modification, in the manner already sketched in the psychological field. There is an interaction, silent and subtle, if not crude and avowed, between past and present. Institutions may seem to perpetuate themselves by mere automatism or inertia. But this seeming automatism consists in their taking up and absorbing the incoming generation, every individual of which is a living mind seeking its own within the conditions in which it finds itself, and modifying them if only by some strain or stress, this way or that, to suit its purposes. Thus the continuity of an institution, and of a whole social system, consists in a living tradition in which at any given time the institution is moulding the lives and minds of men, but is also being itself remoulded by them. Naturally the more active the mental forces the less is the inertia of tradition and the greater the range of adaptation. The forces making for change may focus themselves on a true social purpose of improvement, and these will excite an equally conscious resistance—traditionalism as opposed to tradition. Here as elsewhere development elicits a more explicit consciousness. But even the revolutionary theory is a growth to which successive minds contribute, and to gain any solidity must have its roots in the actual even if its apex is in the

ideal. The purpose which transforms tradition grows by a tradition of its own. Thus the proposition that the social structure is a living tradition holds generally, but the emphasis is now on the one term and now on the other, tradition must be kept distinct from traditionalism, and it must be borne in mind that the social tradition in its entirety is a system of many traditions, which as living movements may contend with one another for supremacy. As interaction is the distinctive social factor, so the continuing and cumulative effect of interactions, the living tradition, is the distinctive ground of social permanence and development, while if it loses vitality or becomes ill-adapted to new requirements it is no less the cause of decay or disruption.

3. *The Problem and Methods of Sociology.*—The various forms of interaction become the subject-matter of several special sciences. Thus competitive industry gave rise to economics, and the action and interaction of political institutions, organised parties, and unorganised individuals to modern political and social psychology. All such specialisms belong to the field of sociology which ideally would, I suppose, be their synthesis. As its immediate objective, sociology has in view the interpretation of social life, as, in spite of all such departmental distinctions, a unity. Thus, for example, while the economist investigates the conditions of the production and distribution of wealth, the sociologist as such is more directly interested in the life which people lead under these conditions, in wealth and poverty, luxury, comfort, and want; how these are apportioned in society, how they affect its well-being in other respects, and conversely, how economic activities are affected by political institutions, religious or moral ideals, how they touch and are touched by the literary and artistic side of life. That is to say, sociology is concerned with the relation of parts in a whole, and so with the concrete life that is actually enjoyed or suffered. The foundation of this part of the subject is full and accurate description, statistical in its bony framework, human in its detail, of a given people. Any complete account of the present, moreover, will always

carry us back into the past, and though we can seldom know the past with the same accuracy of detail, we must as far as possible discover how things came to be, in order to understand what they are. Thus description includes history, and so conceived is the indispensable complement of analysis in the interpretation of any given society.

For the general investigation of development, however, we need something more. Societies are numerous and variable, partly autonomous, partly interdependent in their evolution, and the final aim of science is to find some central conception in the light of which both what is uniform and what is variable would become intelligible. In the search we may proceed by analysis, as has been attempted in earlier chapters of this work, but we must test our analysis by a comparative view. The ideas and institutions of different communities admit of this treatment. Their varying forms may be distinguished and classified. There are such and such known forms of family structure, such and such methods of maintaining order and dispensing justice, and so forth. In every such department analysis reveals certain generic features and certain specific combinations, and making our classification on this basis we may form a social morphology which will do for the science of society what the great natural systems did for the science of life. We shall obtain several arrays of varying forms, and the question then arises whether the variations are in any way correlated. Now the analysis of the previous chapters has already suggested one mode of correlation which takes us to the roots of the social structure. It led us to conceive the community as a structure, maintaining itself through activity and change, and capable of a great range of variation in respect of scale, efficiency, and internal harmony. The forces maintaining it are the impulses and purposes of its constituent members under the conditions social and physical in which they find themselves. These conditions set them a problem to solve. At lowest the community has to be maintained through the correlated activities of many parts in very diverse directions. At higher grades the fulfilment of larger purposes resting on

the same complex of conditions comes into view. The several institutions of the community are so many solutions of these problems, its marriage laws a solution of sex desires, jealousies, attachments, responsibilities, of the bringing up of children and the maintenance of family ties, its law of property and of contract the solution of the problem of providing material needs from certain natural resources in such a way as to ensure a balance of peaceful co-operation over all the selfish and sectional forces that would rend social life. And so throughout. There is a problem set to every community by its internal constitution, its physical home, and its relation to neighbours, and in one way or another, well or ill, crudely or skilfully, the problem has at least its temporary solution, and this is the framework of institutions. If the solution fails the community goes under, if it gives rise to new problems there must be readaptation and there may be development. Now this account would be caricature if we were to personify the society and conceive it as one personal mind envisaging the problem as a whole, and proceeding to its solution in an atmosphere of calm deliberation. One may say, rather, that the central and persistent problem is to bring some such unity into the congeries of mental elements at work in society, even to make it as a whole aware that there is a problem to be solved. Nevertheless, the problem is there, and that which has to solve it, and is, however unawares, always at work upon it, is the sum of the mental forces operative in society, the living minds working with and upon the systems that are their capital.

If this is the key principle in social structure, we may expect to find in social development not the working out of a single governing idea, nor successive stages in the execution of a plan as we should if there were a unitary purposive intelligence at work, but rather some correlation between the general level of social mentality at any point and the broad characteristics of social organisation¹. Thus, by

¹ Strictly speaking, there are three possibilities of variation in the conditions of social structure, and therefore three lines along which we might look for correlation. (1) The problem, i.e. the conditions of social life may change, (2) social mentality may change, (3) social mentality by changing the

considering the nature of institutions and their place in the social structure, we are brought back to the question of the correlation between intellectual, religious, and social development suggested at the close of the last chapter, and on this we have now to see what comparative investigation has to say.

conditions may change the problem, e.g. by its own inventions it may find itself confronted with new problems of industrial organisation. As to (1) the only conditions set to mind definitely from without are the environmental. Variations of these undoubtedly affect social structure, but when we considered them above (Chapter IV) we saw that the study of correlation on these lines would only lead to very jejune and obvious conclusions unless we took full account of the reaction of mind on its environment, which would bring us to the third alternative. Biological conditions are also in part limiting conditions of mind, though at the same time integral to the development of mind itself in the race. In either case they are either unalterable, or if and so far as they vary, the one law of correlation that can reasonably be suggested is that the racial type is, by whatever means, in some degree adapted to the changes in the social and consequential changes in the physical environment. For the causes of social change we are thus again thrown back on the second and third alternatives, and it is clear that the third is only the second together with its implications and consequences. Hence the correlation of the mental system with the social structure is the true point for inquiry.

CHAPTER X

INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

1. *Methods of Inquiry.*—The study of correlation in development falls into two parts, the one covering the simpler, the other the 'cultured' peoples. The simpler communities are small, and while we know little of their historical development, they admit of comparison, and are numerous enough to be subjected for certain purposes, and—without great difficulties—to statistical treatment. The 'cultured' communities, though comprising larger numbers of individuals, are too few in number for the application of statistical methods, but we know something of their history and can so far trace their actual development in time. The line of demarcation practically depends on the invention of writing and the consequent preservation of records, so that at least for our purposes the difference between 'simple' and 'culture' people is the difference between those who have not and those who have a recorded history. In the case of the culture peoples we can get a fair measure of intellectual development from the actual record of their science and philosophy. In the case of the simpler peoples the best evidence is the state of the industrial and military arts, supplemented by what we know of their notions of magic and mythology, which are indications of their intellectual condition. Putting the evidence together, we are able to classify the simpler peoples in grades ascending from the lowest stages to the threshold of material civilisation, at which point the culture peoples of history take the stage. We are thus able to pass in review the grades of intellectual development from the lowest to the highest

known stages, and to examine the related forms of social organisation¹

Examining the simpler peoples we found it advisable to take the method of obtaining food as the starting point of a classification by material culture, correcting the results by evidence as to other arts—building, implements, weapons, clothing, etc. So proceeding we distinguished seven grades—Lower and Higher Hunters, Lower and Higher Pastoral Folk, Lower, Middle, and Higher Agriculturalists. The Pastoral Peoples are not intermediate between Hunters and Agriculturalists, but form a branch line of development, and in general culture the Lower Pastoralists rank with the Lower Agriculturalists, while the Higher Pastoralists are quite equal to the Higher Agriculturalists. The highest peoples in both these grades may be regarded as standing on the borderland of civilisation. Civilised culture has several well-known centres—how far independent is still

¹ It may be objected that this method does not take sufficient account of the distinction between what is original and what is acquired in culture (material or institutional). It is one thing to invent, another to imitate or adopt, though externally the results may be the same. The objection has force when we are estimating the position of a particular people, but not when we are examining in general correlation of intellectual energy and cultural achievement, since the borrowed culture is the product of such energy, though operating rather in the originators than the borrowers. If through taking institutions at their face value we are too generous to borrowers, the result will only be that we shall understate the correlation into which we are inquiring, and are so much the safer in accepting the correlation which we actually find. It must, however, be remarked that borrowing is not a purely passive proceeding, but, as indicated in Chapter V and shown clearly by our account of tradition in Chapter IX, implies response and selection on the borrower's part. Institutions do not persist like stocks and stones, but are maintained as elements of a living culture-complex, involving, as we have seen, a specific mentality. In particular in the extension of higher cultures the reaction of the lower is so powerful that it may become the dominant fact.

The examination of culture-complexes and the correlation of their elements yields firm ground for a judgment of the scope of culture-contact in general and of deterioration and development in particular. It is in fact far from suggesting a simple and continuous development varying only in rate in a single direction. Development is variable in direction; it is continually exposed to external influences, and suffers frequently from arrest, dissolution, and decay. It is not necessary to enter into these complications for our present purpose, which is merely to exhibit the known forms intermediate between the lowest and highest grades.

¹ Following Dr. Nieboer.

matter of controversy—and a recorded history extending in the lowest estimate over more than five thousand years. It is clear that to deal with such a subject adequately would require an encyclopædia rather than a treatise, and the combined knowledge of many students rather than that of one. What will be attempted here is merely to pick out some salient points bearing on the problem of correlation which is our subject.¹

2. *Conditions of Intellectual Development.*—In the study of intellectual development the bare facts are not intelligible without a general appreciation—which shall be set forth here in the briefest possible terms—of its underlying conditions. Thought does not evolve from principles of its own operating in the void, nor is it deduced from pure experience. It results from the impact of experience on a mind equipped with certain tendencies and susceptibilities of action and feeling ranged under a few root-interests. Of these the interest in examining, inquiring and comparing, with a view to knowledge or understanding is one, but only one. The first reaction of the organism is a felt impulse to act, and the first idea is an impulse shaped by foresight to an end. Impulse, feeling, and idea at this stage are not separate, but are aspects of, or elements in, one act. Now the growth of mind, as we have seen, depends on its power of bringing experiences to bear one upon another, and so co-ordinating them with its actions as to serve those permanent root-interests to which the passing impulses must be subordinated. The larger interest has need of articulate knowledge and cool judgment, and thus effects a detachment of ideas from immediate impulse, but only to employ them for its own purposes. It is but fitfully and uncertainly that the cognitive interest, which uses

¹ It is impossible to formulate any correlation without distinguishing 'phases' of thought and culture and the feasibility of any such distinction is open to question. On this point a few words are said below (pp. 302-304). The attempt which follows is mainly a summary of the data arranged in the writer's *Morals in Evolution*, together with those collected by him in co-operation with Messrs. Ginsberg and Wheeler in *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, aided by Professor Westernmark's great work on the *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, and on the economic side, Dr. Müller Lyers's *Phasen der Kultur*.

experience and ideas for the specific purpose of understanding the world and ascertaining truth, asserts its rights among all the other interests which stimulate and direct our thought, and it is not until we understand the function of the cognitive interest in life as a whole that we fully admit it to be supreme in its own sphere, and finally distinguish between the order of reality and the fabric of our own dispositions. In the abstract, no doubt, we may admit at a fairly early stage that were wishes horses beggars would ride, but the subtle power of the mind to construct phantom horses out of the most unlikely elements operates through all our would-be candour, and there is no turn or twist that the mind will not choose rather than abandon the discovery of truth nakedly and unreservedly to the interest in truth itself. The cognitive interest pursues truth through the analysis and comparison of experiential data. All the other interests require ideas and beliefs suited to their purpose and in harmony with their emotions. The cognitive interest wins where the facts are clear,¹ and it constantly extends the circle of clarity by the improvement of its methods and the accumulation of knowledge. The rest win in proportion as the facts are obscure or the method of dealing with them imperfect, and there is a region of compromise and also of sophistication in which both influences play a part. These dual elements in the formation and social propagation of ideas and beliefs operate all along the line in the history of human thought, but the power of the cognitive interest increases because it is able, particularly as adequate means of record and communication are devised, to use each acquisition as the starting point of further advance.

3. *The First Phase of Thought. Beginnings*—From the beginning the young could learn to do what their elders did; and so among the simpler peoples there is a body of traditional knowledge involved in the industrial arts, from the chipping of a flint or the shaping of a bone needle, to methods of ploughing and irrigation. But when you

¹ Except, of course, when, as in time of war or civic dissension, emotions are strong enough to ignore the most glaring facts.

have chipped a flint or built a canoe according to all the rules of art, an unknown factor, an element of individuality, remains. Somehow or another this particular flint does not cut as well as the last that you made; this particular canoe does not sail like your neighbour's. How are you to cope with this possibility? You want something over and above the definite rule that you understand. Cannot you somehow, by wishing very hard, make sure of success? Cannot you control the canoe, to make it balance properly? You make up your mind that it shall be a good one you declare it in words; you order it, as you might your child or your slave. Perhaps, not quite confident in your own power, you go to a man of impressive manner, whose words seem to carry weight, and ask him to speak for you. He does speak authoritatively, and, your confidence returning, you give the finishing touches, and behold! the canoe is a good one; it was all the doing of the wise man; either it was his special *mana*, the power which he can put into you or into things, or perhaps the power was in the words, and it is some particular formula which is required to supplement the rules of art. In any case, each apparent success will confirm one or other or both of these opinions, while the failures, being disconcerting, will be ignored, and a tradition grows. A certain spell is required to ensure a good canoe, and perhaps there is a particular person who knows and bequeaths to his son, or sister's son, the proper way to pronounce the spell. The function which this tradition performs is to remove anxiety and give confidence, and it can be performed only if any critical inquiry is suppressed. Again, rain is wanted by the whole group, and it will not come. Can we do nothing? We try spells that bind the clouds, but they do not work. It is intolerable to sit still here is water; we can actually make a little rain by squirting it. It is a relief to the tension. But what is the use, says an underlying criticism, if it does not bring rain? Very well, then, since it relieves our restlessness we mean to do it, and since it is absurd to do it unless it brings rain, it follows that it will bring rain, and if it does not, then someone—probably the rain-maker—is very much at fault, and

shall die. It is intolerable that I cannot stick a knife into my enemy. I must stick a knife into something. Here is a log of wood, that top bit is his accursed head, as you can see better if I turn it a little into shape, and then there will be his breast, and I stab it through. But how absurd if it does not hurt! Then it shall hurt him, and behold, he hears of it, and is anxious, and misses his stroke in a hunt, and is killed. There is in all these cases a dim connection of idea, a relation between the word uttered or the action done, and the thing required which eager emotion seizes upon and solidifies into a belief, and a tradition that the word or the act done will actually help to accomplish the thing desired.* On such foundations, which space forbids me to analyse further, rests the belief in magic, which owing to its relative indifference to the spiritual has been mistakenly identified with the beginnings of science, but is rather a false art resting essentially on the psychological comfort derived from spells and ritual procedure which, whether by resemblance to the end required or by some other touch of collective suggestion, seems to promise success and security.

There is, however, another method of dealing with the canoe. Instead of ordering it about, why not try inducement? Get it into a good temper. Enlist it on your side. How absurd, you say, if the canoe cannot hear or understand! But how do you know anything about that? We find the method effective with human beings, and we have not begun to consider seriously whether there is any difference between animate or inanimate things. We do not know what the words mean. All we know is that we very badly want our canoe to keep afloat, and when we want a thing like that we feel propitiatory, and have impulses to do something nice, particularly if we have first tried the opposite, imperious impulse and it has failed. So we follow this impulse, and if you bother us for reasons why

* I need hardly say that I am not attributing the actual arguments and absurdities set out above to primitive man. I suggest a play of imagination, impulse, and doubt which *if drawn out* would fall into something like the shape here given to it. On the whole subject, cf. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*.

we may end by saying definitely that the canoe does understand—how do you know anything to the contrary? See how it takes the wave like a living thing! But the theory is subsequent to the practice and justifies the impulse. Animatism, treating things as if they were alive, and animals as if they understood like men, is older and more widespread than the explicit idea that they have souls (which is a form of animism proper), for this is a justification of something which was first an impulse. But it is not the only possible justification, for there may be spirits of different origin whose aid we hope to secure, and if so it may be on them rather than the canoe that our propitiation is lavished.

In relation to our fellows, the impulses to coerce or placate, to share, to beg, etc., are justified in the main by the event, and we form an idea of a being who thinks and feels by quite a rational process of piecing experience together. When one of them dies there is, to begin with, a feeling of horror and repulsion, which is sometimes manifested among savages by deserting or throwing away the body and destroying the possessions of the deceased. But there are other emotions as well. affection, heightened and perhaps purified by loss, and something, perhaps, of indignation and resentment. The latter feeling is worked up among savages, through ignorance of the causes of death, into a suspicion that an enemy killed the man, and when there is no palpable enemy, and no sign of a fight it becomes clear that it must have been done by witchcraft, and revenge is required as an outlet for feeling. But, further, sentiment would make us do our utmost for the beloved dead who can no longer help themselves. We cover and bestow the body carefully, we make gifts and bring food, primarily, I think, just indulging impulse. But again, of what use all this, if the dead are no more? Incipient rationalism would inhibit the impulse, but the emotion must be served, and thought is driven along another course. The dead must survive; and since the body is clearly inert and begins to putrefy, what lives must be something that was in it but is now no longer there, the very thing, perhaps, that comes to us in a dream, or that we see reflected from our

own bodies in water. This is the beginning of the separable spirit, the evolution of which I must not attempt to follow here. I point out only that (1) like magical conceptions it probably originates in a child-like rationalisation of impulse and emotion; (2) that it constantly behaves in one relation as material and in another as immaterial; (3) that nevertheless it serves as a central point for many emotions, thoughts, and actions affecting the whole structure of the simpler societies, while it persists in all ages, being only just below the surface of our own thought, and often rising above it.

Magical and animistic (or animatistic) ideas constitute the main texture of thought for simpler peoples, as far as thought extends at all beyond actual experience and practical affairs. But we must further remember that in the lowest as in the highest stages men dream things and imagine things, and, catching up things from one another, repeat them with variations, so that stories grow—grow particularly if they fit in with sentiment or serve to explain anything peculiar. The checks of truth, painfully deficient even among ourselves, are still more lacking in early times, when moreover any story about a thing seems to pass current as a sufficient explanation of that thing. Early man, then, has his mythology of strange beings, and often his tales of the great long ago, the origin of customs, and even the beginning of things.

The leading characteristics of early psychology, then, are. (1) the prepotence of impulse-feeling in the determination of the currents of thought, (2) conversely the necessity of some thought, however perverted, to give coherence to impulse-feeling; (3) the non-existence of logical checks or of any sense of evidence, with the consequence that imagination is a chartered libertine; (4) failure to grasp the most elementary distinctions upon which articulate thought is founded, e.g. the distinction between image and object, or between connection in idea and physical cause and effect. We must not suppose these failures to be absolute. The savage thinks clearly and acts practically in relation to that which his experience has distinctly taught him, but his

experience is very narrow, and in his attempt to extend it or round it off these extravagances appear. We may regard the first known stage of the human intelligence as one in which the very rudiments of articulate thought are still in process of formation, and its characteristic products are magic, animatism, evolving into animism, and a very incoherent mythology based thereon.

4. *Evolution in Ideas.*—Among the simpler peoples, however, there are very great differences of culture. The mere economic advance implies a great extension of organised experience, and therefore of articulate thought. But let us consider what articulate thought in the first instance implies. In primitive thinking we find a wild confusion of categories—the stock or stone treated like a living thing, the animal like a man, the resemblance between an image and its original as though it were a physical connection. These confusions are not possible without repeated inconsistencies, for the real nature of the thing must assert itself, and yet, whenever inconvenient, is ignored.¹ This is only possible in a twilight of dim, flickering ideas, and the first stage onward is that ideas should acquire a definite outline and a permanent and recognisable identity. Long before abstract definition and scientific exactitude are attempted, this stage is reached in the picture-ideas or images of the plastic imagination and in the practical thinking of ordinary common sense. For practical purposes we know what a man is, though philosophers may still find it difficult to define him, and in all ordinary intercourse our use of the term is sure and consistent, though we might have difficulty at the edges of its application, e.g. in deciding whether it could be used of *Pithecanthropus* or of an acephalous monster. Common-sense ideas, then, are those which, without being defined in rigid terms, are consistently used in their normal application. Similarly common-sense method is that which, without any abstract logic, forms ideas by observation, comparison, and practical tests, and differentiates belief from desire. Now, something of such

¹ E.g. since the dead cannot really eat the food offerings the survivors may eat them ceremonially for him, as the child eats for its doll.

ideas and such method there must have been from the beginnings of humanity, for we trace their rudiments even among intelligent animals, and the savage who sharpens a spear-point *secundum artem* is applying them. But every extension of the industrial arts and every improvement in social efficiency implies an enlargement of this simple practical wisdom. We may regard its growth from germ to maturity as constituting the first great phase in the development of the human mind.¹

5. *Religion and Ethics in the First Phase of Development.*—What kind of religion and what kind of ethics belong to thought during this phase? By religion I understand the spiritual bond, that is to say, the interdependence which relates every element in the life of the mind to the whole. This interdependence, like other relations, is felt and acted upon before it is apprehended, and it is apprehended in rudiments and fragments before it is apprehended as a whole and in its truth. Now, in the early phases of thought and life, elements of religion so defined emerge: perhaps their true centre is not in any specific belief, but in the sanctity of custom, which is at that stage the bond of social life. But the theory of this sanctity which simple men render is not as a rule spiritual at the outset, but more akin to magic. It is the power of the taboo or the curse, the disease or ill fortune attending a breach, which figure most prominently as reasons for an observance. Nevertheless, there is in simple societies some conception of the spiritual, of the human soul as other than the body, of similar agencies directing natural objects or presiding over processes of importance to humanity. Among many of the simpler peoples these are the only elements of a belief in spirits that we can identify. More rarely, and less certainly—for the evidence is not clear—we find greater gods, Creators, Transformers, origina-

¹ Abstractly, we might distinguish an initial stage in which there is no thought beyond an emotional blur, and a later stage at which all thought is common sense without being anything more. These would be mere fictions, for the common-sense stage would be found riddled with lower, and illuminated with higher elements. The reality is rather a line that we draw by reference to these imaginary points, i.e. the process in which the common-sense elements develop. Instead of two stages, then, I prefer here to speak of one phase of growth.

tors of tribal custom. If these were certainly of independent origin, and if they were objects of worship and of a cult, early religion would be something much higher and more definite than animatism or animism; but the evidence on the first point is doubtful, and on the second negative. Mythology may contain the tale of a culture hero, or of a creator, but he is not worshipped. The cults concern the spirits presiding over the things of the day. As we ascend from the simplest stages we become aware of a certain change in this respect. The high gods begin to take a more definite shape. We have not only vague spirits, but beings with a definite personality, like Zeus or Yahveh; separate from natural things, and presiding over them (like Olorun among the Yoruba people), with a home maybe on Olympus or Mount Sinai, perhaps with family connections and finally a definite place in a complete theogony. How these higher gods remain entangled with the magic and animism out of which they evolve, how the problem or religious conservatism is solved by a variety of names, attributes, local habitations, or animal associations, how spirits become functions of a god, or a function an attendant spirit, how in some cases one god becomes the guardian of the people and his worship is preferred to every other; how in another case political integration involves a complicated identification of different gods, or a system of correlation like the Egyptian Enneads, is a long story which it must be left to Comparative Religion to tell. We note only that in the archaic civilisations we find in general gods of distinct personality usually presiding over some department of nature or human life and in some way related to one another, perhaps under the presidency of a supreme god. Magic and animism may still be the most vital elements of popular belief, and even of priestly ritual, but they begin to take a secondary place. An alternative possibility is that instead of high gods the more human side of religion takes the form of ancestor worship, expressing and reinforcing the solidarity of the patriarchal family, while the ancestral line of the ruling family may, like the Mikados, form a religious rallying point for an intense nationalism.

The spirits of the beginning of this phase are, as a rule, but slenderly concerned with morality. We cannot regard the resentment of a ghost against his slayer as a whit more moral or religious than the resentment of the living man if he had survived the attempt upon him. Again, when particular spirits avenge the broken oath or the violation of marriage taboo, there is a religious sanction for conduct. But in all probability these spirits are a secondary incarnation of curses and taboos. The characteristic basis of morals in theory—so far as there is theory—is magical rather than religious. As we advance, however, the ethical elements of religion begin to take more definite shape. The development is certainly very irregular. Morally the character of the high gods—of those gracious and noble Olympians, for example—leaves much to be desired. But (a) the gods may take over the social or moral functions of a magical process or an animistic spirit. Thus the curse put into a boundary-mark, which will break out on the man who moves it, may be transformed into an address to a tutelary deity who is expected to inflict just punishment. The protection of Zeus may reinforce the slighted beggar's curse, and his power inflict the penalty which the broken oath originally brought by an automatic process. (b) While the ghost of a parent slain merely avenges itself on the parricide, the ancestral spirits calmly and judicially punish all offences within the family, and a national god (if mainly interested in his own prerogatives) may visit any wrong within the nation with temporal punishment. (c) A future life becomes more frequently the scene of a systematic retribution. It is possible that conceptions of retribution arose among very simple peoples independently of civilised influences; but if they did so, it was but a rarity as compared with the various non-moral views of a future. At the end of this phase, on the other hand, the theory of retribution is sometimes quite elaborately worked out. In the Egyptian Book of the Dead, the archaic basis is a series of magical incantations and ritual, designed to secure the soul against demons, which is overlaid with more ethical elements half effecting its transformation into a judgment of Osiris. In

India, by another line of approach, survival by transmigration is made a means of securing automatic retribution through the persistent effect of acts which secure a horrible or a desirable incarnation, according to their quality. The essential is that retribution should be impartial, and in this respect I think we can, through all irregularities and differences of form, trace some advance, just as in secular custom we shall presently see an extension of impartial justice

As to the content of morals, the governing principle is their dependence on the group system. At the outset the group may be merely a kindred, but in any case it does not extend beyond the narrow circle of habitual personal intercourse. This group stands solid, and the individual has no effective scope of thought or action apart from its network of tradition. True, it often happens that there are regular relations of a friendly character beyond the group, so much so that it is seen as a fragment of a larger though indefinite society. These relations are also regulated by custom, but their character in comparison with relations inside the group raises special questions to which we shall presently return. For the moment we keep to the point that the outsider always stands on a different footing from the member of the group, and if he comes within it needs some special security, like the rites of hospitality, or, for a permanence, marriage with one of its women, to assure him of protection. Moral obligations are intra-group obligations.

The obligations recognised by custom are comprehensive enough. They cover all the main relations of life, sex, security of person, and the acquisition and tenure of property whether personal, gentile, or communal. Within the simplest group the relations which they secure are in general fairly humane, unless poisoned by the fear of witchcraft, which, however, is most often imputed by sentiment to an outsider. In detail, however, as in the treatment of women, children, and the infirm, there are great variations. What is common is that rights and duties alike depend on group membership, and are determined by traditional custom. As we advance,

the group enlarges into a wider community within which class differentiation appears. There is still a group-morality for the community as a whole differentiating its members from all others, but within it there is in addition a group morality of class, establishing grave differences of rights and duties as between superior and inferior. The primitive equality gives way to a subordination which is often oppressive and harsh. Respect for the human personality as such does not belong to this phase of thought.

6. *The Phases of Advance*—With the invention of writing, quite new possibilities of intellectual development are opened up. Records become possible. Every achievement or partial achievement of thought can be preserved, communicated, and handed on as a basis from which the next thinker starts. In the written work the mind reviews a series of statements or ideas and sees them in relation to one another, and with these instruments in its hands it begins to develop systematic thought. From the early Oriental civilisations we have the beginnings of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. We have Egyptian text-books of arithmetic dating from the seventeenth dynasty and pointing to earlier originals, and the Babylonian astronomical records go back to the fourth millennium B.C.¹ The use of metals is found in the higher grades of the simpler peoples. That of copper appears to have been one of the determining causes of the rise of civilisation in Sumer and Egypt. Metallurgy advances, though with very slow steps,² while agriculture, irrigation, architecture, the arts of war, and the elements of empirical chemistry are carried to a relatively high pitch. We may perhaps speak of this age intellectually as that of proto-science, during which many of the arts attained a systematic shape and the elements of the first sciences were incorporated in written treatises. In the second millennium B.C. we find evidences in Egyptian literature of more systematic and critical thinking about

¹ Though anything like an astronomical science appears to be of far later date

² Bronze was known in the Ægean from a very early time, but probably not in early Babylonia nor in Egypt till the Middle Kingdom (King, *Sumer and Accad*, p. 73. Hall, *Near East*, p. 33, etc.).

fundamental problems,¹ with a tendency now to monotheism, now to a pantheistic interpretation, but it is some centuries later, principally between the eighth and fifth centuries B.C., that we come upon clear evidence of a real movement of intellectual activity in several centres of Asiatic civilisation. We have the beginnings of Indian metaphysics, the monotheistic movement with an attendant social and almost humanitarian enthusiasm among the Hebrew prophets, the rise of the ethical view of life in China, and finally the great Buddhist movement, partly in reaction against, but essentially a development and refinement of Brahminism. Relatively to the great length of earlier civilisations, these movements are near in time, and we must suppose them to be connected, though the threads of relationship are for the most part lost. In any case, we are here in a new phase of development. We find civilised man with reflective theories of life, notions of discipline personal and social, a way of living which he seeks to impose on himself and on society, a religion, a metaphysics, or an ethics, or all three in one. Essentially the development is not in the direction of scientific investigation, but rather of an inward movement of reflection, to which man so far trusts for the attainment of truth and the guidance of life. The movements are as diversified as they are widespread—theological and social among the Hebrews, ethical and social with the Confucians, mystical with the Taoists, metaphysical in the Brahmin schools, ethical and spiritual with the Buddhists. They add little to the structure of science, though in India they evolve a logic and a systematic body of speculation, and stimulate the beginnings of higher mathematics. But in different ways they represent a new departure in the development of thought, which we may describe generically as that of Reflection on the fundamentals of Life and Being.

7. *The Development of Critical Method*—The earlier development of Greek thought might be classified among

¹ Indeed, if the dating of one inscription is correct, the beginnings must be carried back to the Old Kingdom (Breasted, *Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 45). The famous Akhenaton heresy (fourteenth century) implies a substantial body of criticism at that period.

these movements, though again the threads of connection are not easily disentangled. But the Greeks carry us farther, giving us not only a more developed metaphysics, but an ethics based for the first time on political freedom, and the foundations of science pursued systematically for its own sake. With the Greeks we arrive at length at a systematic Critical Method involving a regular organism of inquiry and proof; for though in the Oriental schools we have elements of Logic and fragments of very subtle dialectic, they do not—as I read the records—attain the systematic character famous in Greek thought. In association with this systematic method we have the formation of distinct and definite sciences. The method develops its power first in mathematics, metaphysics, and ethics, studies dependent on the subtle analysis of common ideas or elementary data of experience, and carried on by intricate processes of constructive reasoning from such data. Particularly in the Socratic method we have the principle laid down that the foundation of all true knowledge is the examination of the concepts employed. The loose ideas of common sense must be carefully considered in their diverse empirical applications with a view to strict identity of meaning. Elements that really spring from a common root must be referred to one concept; those which resemble them, but have a different source, to another, and in the Socratic schools it is this sifting of thought, and the interrelation of the concepts so obtained, which is the substance of philosophy and science. Previous thought had certainly aimed at clear, defined, and consistent concepts. Indian metaphysics is a series of efforts after such concepts as might explain the fundamentals of reality. But it is in the Socratic schools that the method of establishing any concept whatever by critical comparisons is fully set out, and the formation of a concept becomes a conscious process. With these schools, therefore, thought completes its traverse from the practical ideas of common sense to the articulate conceptual order. The common-sense idea, we have said, is clearly recognisable in any typical example, but, not being analysed into its elements, nor defined in relation to other

ideas, is not the material out of which a system can be established on consistent principles. Or, rather, it is the very raw material of such a system which must be cut delicately into shape before it can be joined together in a fabric which will stand. To understand anything is to discover the principles connecting its different elements, for which purpose principles and elements alike must be distinctly analysed.

8. *Ethico-Religious Developments.*—The archaic civilisations present no notable contrast with the higher barbarism on the side of religion and ethics. But the movement of reflection introduces us to a new world. We have noted the beginnings or the anticipation of such a movement in the speculations of the Egyptian priesthood. But it was apparently in India that metaphysical speculation first took regular shape and gave rise to a spiritual conception of reality. We must avoid sweeping generalisations about Indian philosophy, which includes systems of the most opposite character—idealist, realist, and sceptical. But the great contributions to be noted here include first the opposition of spirit and matter (whether matter be real or only the web of *Mâyâ*). The spirit which is smaller than the kernel of a canary seed and also greater than the sky is not in space at all. It is not an extended object. It is—and this is the second point—myself within the heart, and to find the true self is to be lord and master in all the worlds. The spirit of all things is immanent in the mind of man. The secret of life is simple: it is to throw aside the husk—that is all outward things, all bodily needs and external relations—and come to the inner kernel, which identifies us with all that is. Now this conception, seemingly simple and containing an element of indubitable truth, involves a most drastic abstraction, and what it leaves out comes back to revenge itself in all manner of ways—fantastic austerities, miraculous impostures, magical purgations of crime, mutilations of the best and dearest human relations. Many systems arose to correct these extravagances, most notable among them the protesting Buddhism, which saw the true way in the final extinction

of selfish desire, and the consequence of this extinction in the love of all that feels and suffers, and made a mode of life rather than a theory of being the centre of religious interest. On the whole, if we look below scholastic theory to the main operative conceptions, we find in this effort of thought three related ideas which raise religion and ethics to a higher plane. The first is the conception of the spiritual, whether as a ground of reality or as a principle of life, the second is the suppression of personal desire; and the third is the universality of love and its obligations.

If we now look back over the preceding stages we can measure the importance of this advance, for at the outset, as we read the evidence, religion is in the main un-ethical, the conception of spirit is unspiritual and material, and morality consists essentially in the observance of traditional obligations within a small group and the maintenance of its solidarity as against any wider society. Within the first phase of thought higher developments appear at first exceptionally and then in more systematic form. These higher developments consist, first in the emergence of anthropomorphic gods with distinct personality and history; second in the association of some of these gods with the guardianship of morality through retribution, either in this life or, more frequently and more definitely, in the next. Moral obligations enforced by the justice of a supreme authority become more impersonal and extend to a wider society. But both religion and morals are those of the 'natural' man who loves his neighbour and hates his enemy and makes God in his own image, if not in the image of things lower than himself. From such ideas it is a great departure—the passing of a turning point both in ethics and religion, when there emerges the conception of a spiritual god and a spiritual life above the ordinary ways of men, and claiming domination over the flesh. The law of this life is, on the one hand self-suppression, on the other love of all that lives. Its ethics are universalist, and its duties include a mission to convert the world, which becomes in ideal one 'household of faith'. In this phase the effort of the mind to union may be said to become conscious, and to be made

the basis, almost the sole basis, of life. In mysticism, by a withdrawal from all outward cares, and so far as possible from the body, the soul attains union with the universal spirit. In Buddhism the extinction (Nirvana) of self-feeling has universal love as its obverse. Personality in its finitude and self-assertion exists only to be overcome.

Greek philosophy does not start with this ideal before it, but proceeds rather from the concrete ethics of the natural man. Indeed, if any abstraction set it moving it was rather the insistence on the opposite principle, the claims of individual self-assertion, and the problem was to reconcile these claims with those of the organised community. Thus Greek ethics in its first phase, up to and including Aristotle, worked towards the conception of a harmony between the requirements of personality and the common life under the limitations of the City State.

The conception of harmony in which fulfilment rather than repression takes the centre of the stage is fundamental to ethical theory, but without more of the spirit of tenderness and love it misses the greater part of its practical significance. This spirit is never prominent in the teaching of the Greeks. But their ethics outgrow the civic limitations, for the emphasis on the good life guided by our own reason opened the door to the slave and the alien and all mankind if they chose to enter it, and by degrees substituted the conception of a world society for the City State ('Dear city of Zeus' for 'Dear city of Cecrops'), and of universal obligation for civic loyalty. Thus in Stoicism we reach the conception of universalism, if not of the law of love, of natural rights which precede and may be subverted by human institution, a system ordered of the Divine reason in which the god within us—our own reason—discovers for us the post which we have to fill. For the ethical development had a religious aspect which in Greece also proceeded on rational lines. The Olympians might not be dethroned, for the Greek thinkers were very wary in their dealings with tradition. But Greek thought began with a broad inquiry into the origin and basis of things; and Anaxagoras, "the first sober man in comparison with the random talkers

who preceded him," found it in the Intelligence which set chaos in order. Later thinkers might find it in the good which is not so much a specific being as the basis of reality in all that truly is, or in the pure Intelligence which as the object of the world's desire sets up the process of becoming, or in the divine Logos, whose rational ordinances constitute the orderly fabric of the world. Essentially the divine is the rational and ethics the behaviour of rational beings. The advance is parallel to that of Oriental thought in this sphere, but the starting point, the method, and the temper are markedly different. Each emphasises most what the other tends to leave out of count. We have contrasted, and at bottom complementary, views of life and the world.

9. *Experiential Construction*.—The conceptual order rests on the logic of consistency, for every one of its judgments must stand the racket of critical examination from every point of view, but it is possible, and within certain limits it happens, that a system of thought may be internally consistent, and yet as a whole untrue. This untruth will appear in a contradiction arising from some fact of experience, and we learn from it that logical thought is not necessarily valid as an interpretation of reality. From the concept, then, we go back to experience. But is experience a sufficient criterion of reality? Experience itself is undoubtedly real, but if we try to strip it bare of all thought it is just a passing affair of the moment, and as soon as we begin to apply thought to it we recognise that it is and remains fragmentary and dependent upon the peculiar structure of our minds and the angle from which each of us sees reality. How, then, on the basis of these detached and conflicting glimpses of the real are we to form a system of concepts which will interpret the whole? This becomes the central problem of inquiry, and as it develops we enter on the modern phase of thought, which we may call that of experiential synthesis.

Development in this phase depends on the discovery of instruments for interpreting and enlarging our experience, which fall into two main groups. First we require methods

of calculation enabling us to educe a general law from partial data. If we know the rate of a movement or of any other change, we can calculate the magnitude of the change in a given time or space, if it continues uniformly. This is very simple. But if the rate is not uniform, but is itself subject to change, it is much more complex, and to ascertain changes in a rate of change and base calculations upon them was a great triumph for mathematical analysis. Again, to take an example from a different field, in a world where innumerable forces impinge on one another, the concrete results as we observe them are rarely uniform, and the more closely we examine, the more sure we are to find minute differences. The oak has a typical growth, and its leaf a typical shape, but, closely considered, the individual tree and the individual leaf are found to exhibit slight individual variations, which every here and there mount up to something considerable. So that, particularly in dealing with living nature, we constantly find ourselves in presence of transitional cases, and our classifications become indistinct and uncertain. Here, again, mathematical method gives exactitude and coherence to our concepts by a statistical description of classes of objects, quantitative measure of the variations within them, and the exact correlation of one variation with another. These are merely a couple of illustrations of the manner in which mathematical methods enable us to build up comprehensive and yet exact conceptions on the basis of fluid and partial experiences.

Further, for the purpose of calculation, every observation must be quantitatively exact, and must be made under rigorously determined conditions. This requires physical instruments of measurement beyond the power of the unaided eye. What is more, the eye sees and the ear hears only so much of what is really passing in the world as their peculiar structure allows. To widen our experience it has been necessary to invent instruments immeasurably extending the scope of our senses.

It is on the combination of the logic of observation and experiment, mathematical analysis, and instruments of

measurement and detection that the development of the experiential synthesis depends. The Greek thinkers made a beginning on these lines. Special sciences are recognised and co-ordinated by Plato, and their logical position is carefully defined by Aristotle. The Aristotelian School made systematic use of observation, particularly in biology and politics, and Aristotle has been called the father of the experiential method. Astronomy continually progressed. The Copernican system was anticipated by Aristarchus, and mechanics were founded by Archimedes. Exact experiment, rare in the early days, must have been pursued to some purpose in the schools of Alexandria.¹ But, for whatever reason, the Greeks did not devise the combination of methods required in general for the systematic interrogation of experience. In the end the growing absorption in philosophical and mystical speculation combined with the break-up of the social order to arrest development in the Græco-Roman world, though it is at quite a late period that we get the most notable advances in algebraic method. The cult of science passed to the Arabs, who not only preserved much of Greek learning, but made or introduced into the West certain important advances. In the pursuit of the alchemy of the Egyptians, they became versed in the use of experiment. They developed the elements of algebra from Alexandrian and from Indian origins, and, what was perhaps still more important to the mathematician, they took over the Indian method of numeration in place of the Greek form, which made the simplest

¹ It must remain a question why the Alexandrian mechanical inventions never fructified. If the Romans could have applied the steam engine in practical shape to locomotion, there would have been no Barbarian invasions but these inventions hardly passed the stage of toys. There was no such contact between science and industry as that which has given its peculiar character to the modern world. Possibly the ultimate root of the division was slavery, which, it must be remembered, secured a cheap supply not only of hard muscular power but also of skill and even of professional brains. A rudimentary printing press, if invented, could not for a long time have competed with the simple process of dictating a book to some hundreds of slave copyists simultaneously. Dr Singer, whom I have to thank for some valuable criticisms, considers the Greek habit of recording results rather than methods mainly responsible for the lack of continuous progress in the physical sciences. See his *Greek Science and Modern Science*, especially pp 19-22.

operations cumbersome.¹ The impact of Arabic culture on the West brought about the thirteenth-century renaissance, and effectively initiated the phase of experiential synthesis.

This phase of thought, however, is so incomplete that even its methods are not assured. We are in general aware that thought not deduced logically from experience is precarious, but we have also learned that experience only gives us certain facets of reality. To explain what we find we have constantly to assume something, e.g. ether, beyond the limits of observation; and we proceed by making calculations on the basis of this assumption and comparing the results with observed and accurately measured data. Unfortunately, while it is possible to disprove a hypothesis once for all by this method, it is by no means so easy to say when it is proved. For experience has shown that a hypothesis may have a long life—perhaps with the aid of some medical patch-up at a weak point of its constitution—and yet perish in the end from the impact of some fact which no ingenuity can ward off. A great deal of energy is thus wasted in the defence of unprovable positions, and there is even a recurrent tendency to conceive science as, after all, concerned essentially with consistency of conceptions, and to regard its contact with reality as something external and inherently uncertain. These tendencies show that the true logic of experience is still to seek. They indicate that in spite of spectacular achievements the scientific interpretation of reality is yet in its childhood. Yet in mere bulk it has already grown so far as to require endless subdivision, and the resulting specialisation grievously interferes with its value as a basis of the broad generic truths required for the reorganisation of social life.

10. *Science, Ethics, and Religion*—The development of science soon brought it into hostile relations with theology. The contact of Greek and Oriental thought engendered numerous forms of religious ardour, among which Christianity in the end prevailed. Monotheism, especially if it have

¹ Cantor, I think, has said that a Greek mathematician, if he returned to earth, would be less surprised at the achievements of the infinitesimal calculus than that a schoolboy of mediocre intelligence can be taught long division.

an anthropomorphic tinge, is necessarily the most authoritarian of religions, and by consequence the most nervous about its position. The simple spiritual truths of the Christian religion were elaborated—owing to the contradictions involved in the spiritual governance of an evil world—into a peculiarly complex system of dogma, which was bound somewhere or other to break against facts as they came to be more fully understood. The struggle, though infinitely more important, was never so acute as that between rival dogmatists; for the scientific man did not believe that his eternal salvation depended on his theory, and was on the whole content to leave its vindication to the slow processes of time. It was perhaps not till the last generation that the victory was finally decided but it is now no longer possible to oppose observed fact or exact calculation on dogmatic grounds. A way of escape has to be sought by some method of interpretation. On religion, as distinct from theology, the historical effect of scientific method is not so easily stated. It has gone through various phases, and is even changing under our eyes. Exact methods were first applied with success to physical things, and their tendency was materialistic, they seemed to reduce the world to a play of atoms acting by mechanical laws, that is, with perfect indifference to results and values. Intellectually the tendency was combated by humanistic studies, literature, and art, and more explicitly by metaphysical systems which insisted on the partial character of science, the relativity of its truth, and the need for the study of a whole in which the final meaning of the fragments is to be found. Furthermore, scientific method itself began to be applied with growing success to the humanities, to history, to psychology, and to the various departments of social life. Religion itself can, in some of its aspects, be studied by the comparative method, its successive differentiations traced to a common root, and its forms thereby clearly distinguished from its spirit. All the while the meeting point of the mental and physical was being explored by biology. In these studies it is often supposed that the distinctive object of scientific as opposed to humanistic or philosophical treat-

ment is to resolve the mental into the material, the purposive into the mechanical, life and mind into physico-chemical forces. This is a mistake in definition. It is not in the distinctive character of science to assume any general explanation at the outset. It is the object of science to ascertain the facts with accuracy and completeness. Thus, when it enters the field of mind it has to ascertain not only how the mental process is conditioned by the bodily, but also how it differs from the bodily, not only how purpose is attached to impulse, but also how it reacts on impulse, not only how man resembles the animal, but also how he differs; not only how social relations arise out of individual wants, but also how they remodel individual wants. A severely impartial review reveals a teleological factor beginning in a humble fashion as a mere modification of mechanical processes and extending its control till it begins to occupy the position of a central organising power. Whatever be the ultimate nature of mind, the determination of behaviour by its relations to ends of value is established as a real process.

In recent years the antithesis between mind and matter which seemed so important an achievement in the beginnings of the 'spiritual' religions has been shaken in unexpected fashion by physical science itself. Matter is ceasing to be a hard and exclusive 'substance,' and becoming rather an expression for a certain form of energy, that is, at bottom for a mode of behaviour. Thus, in place of the old antithesis of two substances—which in spite of metaphysical disclaimers has always been in the background of thought—we get rather an interaction of two processes as the final problem of reality. The one is a process in which the behaviour of an element is conditioned by its bearing on the future of a system to which it belongs, the other a process in which the determining factors do not include such a condition. Since the teleological factor is a condition operating upon the others, the study of mind and society is a study of their interactions and combined result.

In this direction we may look for scientific justification of the tendencies which distinguish modern religious development, such as the tendency to emphasise the immanence

of the spiritual principle in the minds of men, to identify the spiritual with the ethical at their roots, and both of them with the law of love, to recognise frankly development in the spiritual world and to distinguish the permanent significance of religion from the forms of belief. When these tendencies are taken together and pushed through they suggest a conception of the spiritual rather as a dynamic force asserting itself with effort in reality than as a creator and ruler shaping and ordaining in accordance with perfectly rational laws imposed by plenary power

In ethics as in theology the Christian system grew up in the impact of Greek on Oriental thought, and though essentially based on the law of love preserved the self as an eternal soul whose salvation was the keystone of the arch of conduct. There lay implicit in this a profound claim on behalf of the self to match the exacting duties imposed upon it. For the alternatives before each man were of infinite moment in comparison with which no secular authority, no temporal punishment, could avail. A spiritual authority could indeed claim absolute submission, but only while it held the keys. The moment this was effectively doubted the individual fell back upon himself, and must and would work out his own salvation by such light as he could see. Thus in the end the absolute pretensions of authority were matched and outmatched by the absolute claim of the personal conscience, and the recognition of an inviolable inner kingdom which the social order may limit but cannot destroy and must not invade has become one of the governing principles of modern ethics. To define this principle adequately and adjust it to the requirements of social life has been the central problem of modern social philosophy. Regarded as a natural right of the individual, it seemed to put a limit to social co-operation. Regarded as a social principle, it is a recognition of the spiritual element in the life of the individual and of society. We can best define this principle by considering the subtle but profound change of attitude which it induces in the whole sphere of religion, morals, law, politics, and education. The essential comes to be not to impose a law, a system, or an idea, but to

elicit the intelligent will which appreciates and accepts them. The hope of improvement lies less in restraining the bad in human nature than in securing opportunity for the good. Certainly there must be order, but rather as the shell within which the living tissue develops unimpeded than as the life itself. The deeper appeal is not to fear 'the great inhibitor' of spiritual energy, but to hope, intelligence, affection, and loyalty, to the faith and trust that respond to frank and just dealing. In the same spirit the highest available wisdom recognises its own limitations. The teacher learns with and from the taught. The pretension to finality disappears. The wisdom of the social tradition is just as much as men have learned for themselves through trial and error and have taught one another by free communication, and the need of learning does not abate but goes on through the life of man and the generations of society. Finally the social ideal is not the rigidity of a uniform pattern, but a rich and growing harmony of abundant differences of individuality. In all social co-operation there must be some giving up of personal will, but it makes a great difference whether men give up their will of their own will at a deeper remove or under coercion with a sense of humiliation and injustice. Liberty, which to the claims of authority presents a stubborn negation, becomes in the society which accepts it as a principle the mainspring of vitality and progress.

There are other claims of personality which derive themselves more spontaneously from Christian principles. Salvation was open to all, Gentile as well as Jew, babe and suckling as well as the virtuous and wise. In this way Christianity taught a truer and deeper version of equality than the mere admission to a common political plane. It taught, further, the missionary duty of those of the household to offer the means of salvation to all men. In terms of this life this doctrine becomes in the first place a call to the relief of suffering. The social structure and the current moral ideas themselves are judged by their bearing on the happiness or misery of men and women, and ethical theories apart, sheer human pity, though it has often had

an uphill fight, has played a manful part in the transformation of the social order. In the second place, the human being has a personality to be respected, needs that must be met, faculties to be developed, and the social structure is condemned which overrides or ignores these needs in any class of the population. If the individual must serve the common good, so must the community care for the good of the individual. The one is not merged in the other, but developed by it.

The conception of the common good has been enlarged in modern ethics by the sense of power which is the gift of science, and by the idea of development. Human progress hardly figured in earlier thought, but by the mid-eighteenth century, under the influence of the mechanical inventions, the improved social order and the dawn of freedom it began to take a prominent place. Very sanguine anticipations were indulged, and were revived, after the Napoleonic cataclysm, in the nineteenth century, to be rudely shaken by the disasters of our own time. Progress itself is clearly not an end but a becoming; but the vista of becoming might light up prosaic endeavour with much larger hopes and give a deeper and more permanent significance to limited efforts and consolation for apparent failure. Human life, with its finitude, is in fact seen in a new aspect when it is regarded as part of a greater whole which is striving with the mechanical conditions of reality for the ascendancy of the spiritual. This whole takes a definite shape in the conception of humanity as the harmony of minds in which the contradictions of partial views and narrow efforts are resolved, and the conditions of life controlled. If this conception is justified, not merely human effort but the entire evolutionary process would be revealed as leading up to the dominance of a spiritual principle, and we should think of reality as the theatre not of a blind struggle nor of a providential order, but of a spiritual growth.

At any rate, the elements of such a conception have given much of their distinctive colour to the ethics and the efforts of the modern world. It is certain that the growth of human power enlarged the vision of collective achieve-

ment, while comparative science revealed each stage of social structure and belief, including our own, as a temporary phase of relative value in the development of mankind. But it must not be overlooked that such a combination is capable of a one-sided and even a hard and inhuman interpretation. In presence of large ends, and in face of the self-assertive energies which they stimulate, the 'law of love' and all the spiritual meaning with which the Orient had invested it might wither. The forbearance due to conscience, and the infinite consideration owed to personal suffering, are impatiently regarded in the pursuit of large collective aspirations. Yet collective achievements are utterly sterile and illusory if they do not incorporate the deepest needs of the individual flesh-and-blood human being. Humanity in the individual soul—the right to be treated "always as an end and never as means merely"—remains one pole of modern ethics, if the other pole is humanity the collective, the sum of possible human achievement through the generations. The two agree so far as the common life is essentially a harmony and enlargement of the personal. Such a harmony in its full intent will absorb all the spiritual gifts of the East, and all the constructive rationalism of the West, and in it these twain—the two main lines of mental development—must meet. The synthesis is not complete, but is in the making, and the progress which it has made is the distinctive achievement of modern thought on the side of ethics and religion.¹

¹ It may be objected that the synthesis contemplated is impossible because the heart of the Taoist-Buddhist-Christian teaching is non-resistance, with which it is impossible for the practical reason to make terms. The reply is that a good part of modern social philosophy has turned on the critical interpretation of the elements of sober truth in this doctrine—the helplessness of physical force, the vital energy of ideas, the development of social co-operation through liberty. "If thine enemy be an-hungred, feed him" is poetry. The deeper interests of enemies are identical, is its prose translation applied to politics. We are not to take imagery as a code, but it is the function of reason to find the code which most adequately embodies the meaning by which the imagery is inspired. Essentially the whole modern doctrine of liberty—still far from complete—is the attempt to give coherent practical expression to spiritual ideals. The stimuli of modern ethical thought have been the claims of conscience and the call of human suffering, and its problem is to adjust them to a coherent social order and a rational interpretation of the universe.

CHAPTER XI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS

1. FROM this bald outline of the movements of thought we turn to the development of social institutions. Here more than ever we must bear in mind the limitations of our method. Social evolution proceeds in an immense number of distinct centres, and in each case it is something individual. The various customs and institutions of a people are linked together, and what appears taken by itself as the same element in two cases may really have a very different significance in each owing to the differences of 'context'. Again, owing to the complexity of the subject-matter and the subtle gradations of change, anything like rigid generalisation is ruled out. We must beware of universal negatives. What we can reasonably attempt is to distinguish the principal forms which ideas and institutions have assumed and then inquire whether there is any correlation between those differences, complete or partial, direct or indirect. I propose here to apply this method to some of the basic institutions of society, and to examine into their relation to the phases of development just described. I begin with Government, under those aspects which reflect the general character and basis of the social organisation.

Among the very simplest peoples the community is often no more than a little group numbering all told anything from a couple of dozen to four or five score of persons who live together or habitually meet, innocent of differentiation except by age and sex, generally but not always united by kinship,¹ and if not akin, intermarriageable. Such a

¹ As kinship is reckoned among the people. It must be remembered that many primitive relationships are from our point of view fictive

little circle I call a primary group. Some such groups seem to live with little or no intercourse with outsiders. The primary group is then the community—there is nothing beyond. But more often we find it in active relations with neighbouring groups, visiting, exchanging gifts, meeting for ceremonial purposes, and in particular intermarrying on a recognised system. The primary group is then part of a wider society,¹ and if several such groups constitute a distinctive whole, we may say of a wider community. But the group often retains such functions of government and justice as there are to be found. Often there is no organ for the protection of the individual except his local group or his kin, but as social relations extend the mutual dealings of the groups become the concern of the wider community, and eventually the larger aggregate acquires a true government of its own, and reduces the primary group to a subordinate place. Thus we pass from an isolated group to one living in social relations with others, from this to a combination of several groups in a distinct community, and thence finally to a community with some common authority to which the groups are subordinate. At each point we find a certain kind of government and of justice within the group which becomes by successive stages related, and finally subject to the justice and government of a wider community. We must then distinguish the evolution of the justice and government of a primary group—whether it be independent or a part of a larger whole—from the justice and government of such a whole.

In general the primary group has a headman of restricted powers, or is guided by the older men collectively. There is nothing resembling the differentiation of classes, and there is very little division of functions except that the women do most of the gathering of fruits, herbs, etc., while the men hunt, fish, fight, or laze. Social relations may develop between the groups without essential change in these

¹ I.e. a primary group is either a kindred or a set of neighbours in habitual personal intercourse, without class differentiation, intermarriageable, and comparable to a kindred in number, and the term is applicable whether the group is locally separate or intermixed with others.

respects, but in proportion as a tribe becomes a distinct community there will be occasional, and finally regular, gatherings of the older men who will begin to constitute a tribal council, and there may eventually be recognised some headman of the whole. The growing unity of the tribe does not, however, weaken the tie of kinship. On the contrary, the bonds of common descent, whether through the male or female line, seem rather to tighten, and we often find numerous natural families living together in joint households of considerable size, or if living apart still recognising the blood tie as the basis of mutual protection and a common cult. The heads of such groups or clans may form a council in which the government of the community resides, or it may be that some particular clan obtains a predominance, and its head is recognised as hereditary chief. There is also the personal factor to be considered, reputation for wealth, magical knowledge, or military prowess, and there may be a division of functions, as between chief and medicine man, or war chief and peace chief. As the solidarity of the kindred tends to grow in strength with the general advancement, it is by slow and uncertain steps that a strong Government arises in the containing community.

2 There are two main reasons why such a Government is required. The first is that the power of the clans overshoots the mark, and vendettas arise which threaten the bare existence of the community. How these are dealt with we shall consider later, but we note here that the persistence of internal disorder at any stage of society will dispose the bulk of peaceful men to acquiesce in the rule of the strong hand, and therefore to support anyone who has pretensions to authority in making the most of it. This inclination is strongly reinforced if there is any fear of a common enemy, and the chief who aims at extending his power will make play with any such fear, or if fear there is none, may excite instead a common ambition, and unite his people for the first time in some aggression upon others. Many of the simplest societies have their feuds with one another. Some of the more militant, e.g. some of the North American Indians, choose picked warriors to lead the expedi-

tion in such a case. An able warrior may easily make himself into a permanent war chief, and the demands of discipline are all in favour of the growing power of such a leader, so that if it comes to a tussle between him and the old easy-going peace chief, it is easy to see where victory will lie. Further developments are now possible if the economic conditions are favourable. The warlike community may raid its neighbours for women, or if its industry is developing, for slaves or for tribute. We have occasional instances of these practices at lower grades, but it is among the higher agricultural and pastoral peoples that they begin to give rise to new forms of social structure. The tributary people may become permanently subservient to the stronger community, or they may be taken as slaves, while among the conquerors the governing power develops. The chief becomes a king, and his immediate followers are transformed into lieutenant-generals, high officials, and deputy chiefs, whose power by another natural turn of events may come to rival his own. It should be observed that for war at this stage the pastoral peoples have both an advantage in their superior mobility and a temptation in the stored wealth of agriculturalists—the more potent because their own flocks and herds are liable to occasional disasters, and they may suffer for long years from the effects of drought. The pastoral nomads have thus been able to prey successfully even on advanced civilisations, and it may suit them to settle down as conquerors and establish themselves for long ages at Constantinople or Peking. Lastly a variant of great historical importance should be observed. Instead of a whole community thus subjugating others, the early development of the war chief may take a more individualistic form. He gathers adventurous young men about him, and in old-fashioned phrase they commence pirates. Commencing pirates, like our honourable ancestors, they too may end as settlers, whether mating with the native women or bringing brides from home, and new communities are formed with the rule of a king and his companions or 'counts' superimposed on the original structure.

Something more than force, however, is required if the

new community is to endure. The secular arm must be reinforced with spiritual awe. The king must have magic powers, or else he must be divine, or at least of divine descent. A 'king' in heroic ages¹—that is, ages where migration or piracy has had peculiar opportunities—means not necessarily one who has a kingdom, but one who is by descent entitled to kingdom—a king by nature if not by the facts. Such a man if of any native ability finds roving spirits to gather round him, and sets forth to win for himself the kingdom which fortune has not given him. It is true that his relations to his followers are a little precarious, and sometimes he seems among them little more than *primus inter pares*. Again, he and the chiefs must announce their decisions to the mass of the followers, who will generally, like the Germans of Tacitus, approve a warlike decision with a clash of shields. Disaster will end such authority, but we do not see the votive tablets of the dethroned in the hall of history. Success will make good the claim to divinity, and hereditary tradition will put it beyond question.

In the community thus successfully established the whole social order is changed. There is at least for military purposes an effective organisation. It is the interest of the king to establish his peace, and with the common folk he has no great difficulty, though the pride of nobles and the strength of a powerful kin will long stand in his way. There is a nobility definitely raised above the commonalty, and presently endowed with territorial lordships which they strive to make independent of office and hereditary. There are the common people who retain perhaps a precarious freedom, and below them there are serfs, slaves, or just low-caste men of no account. In one way or another the simple undifferentiated group has given way to a much more extensive and in some respects more organised society based essentially on subordination. The beginnings of this development are well marked among the simpler peoples.

¹ The heroic ages of legend belong to the impact of barbarism on decadent civilisations which afford a magnificent field to the conqueror. But the ideas in question here are characteristic of barbarism as well as of the lower civilisations.

At the lowest economic levels there is a large proportion of cases in which little or no real government can be found even in the primary group, and a still larger proportion in which there is none to be found beyond it. These proportions diminish as we ascend the scale, till in the higher grades we find no communities without some effective government, while in three cases out of four such government extends to the wider community. This appears in the subjoined table, which gives the percentage of cases of effective government which we are able to enumerate in each grade —

	In the Primary Group	In a Wider Community.
Lower Hunters	53	25
Higher Hunters	75	30
Agric. I	73	22
Past I	87.5	62
Agric. II	90	45
Past II	100	78
Agric. III	100	77

It will be seen that the number of cases in which some effective government is found increases markedly as we advance, that in the lowest grade they barely exceed one-half of the whole even in the primary group, while it is only in one case out of four that regular government extends beyond the Primary Group. In the higher grades this proportion is reversed.

In the civilised world these tendencies are maintained. In the early civilisations the theocratic element is strongly marked. The king is himself a god, or the son of a god, or like the Sumerian patesi, the representative of the god who is the true king. Petty states make war on one another and soon or late fall under a conqueror who may succeed in establishing a durable union on a great scale—to say nothing of more extensive but shorter-lived empires beyond the economic and ethnographic limits of unity.

The invention of writing makes for efficiency of administration,¹ and the improvement of communications facilitates centralisation. So the area of union tends to grow, and

¹ As is well explained by Professor J. L. Myres, *Dawn of History*, p. 68 ff

the greatness of king and nobility grows along with it. In fine, the improvement and extension of the political order on the basis of subordination appears as the very natural and intelligible correlate of intellectual development up to this point.

As a matter of fact, we all know that this principle of government has on the whole prevailed not only in early but in almost all stages of civilisation. But it is also possible to base organised government on freedom and equality, and this has in fact been achieved in two principal forms.

Before examining these forms we should observe that the movement of 'reflection' in the religious and ethical sphere might without radically altering the secular structure introduce a new principle¹ into the direction of life—a spiritual order distinct from the temporal, but claiming a higher authority. Of such were the Buddhist Bikkhus, of such with a difference the Hebrew prophets; and, with a more radical difference, we may say the Confucian ethical schools. Of such, again with a difference, is the Church in Christendom. Now it is quite true that a spiritual body may wield a more dangerous because a subtler tyranny than any temporal government. Yet we ought to recognise that taken at its best the formation of a spiritual order with its missionary enthusiasm, its scheme of general redemption, and above all its assertion of the supremacy of mind over force, laid the foundations of moral progress and of the unity of mankind.

3. To return to our two forms of 'free' government. In the first place, as a circle of intermarrying clans forms a tribe, so a little group of tribes may allow intermarriage, cultivate peaceful intercourse, and grow into a certain unity without subordination of one to another. Acting together in common dangers and aggressions, they eventually need a king, but his power is held in check by the clans. The clan chiefs form his council, and all important decisions

¹ New, I think, in substance. The germ of the distinction can, no doubt, be found in the first distinction of priest (not shaman or medicine-man) and chief. The real novelty is the incorporation of a higher ideal of life in a recognised order of men.

go before a meeting of the clansmen. The centre of this union is probably a sanctuary and a point of defence, which grows into a town, and in such case there arises a city state with a constitution based on definite rights. The rights are originally those of the constituent clans, and these may hold a subject population under their control, or they may have slaves outside the system of civic rights. But for the members of the circle there arises the idea of a community wider than the clan or tribe, but resting not on common submission to a superior but on a nexus of reciprocal rights and duties.¹ We have here the beginnings of free government in an area wider than the village, offering scope for a more diversified and many-sided life, yet limited in the form familiar to us in ancient Greece and Italy to what is called the city state, that is, to a narrow strip of territory with a dominating urban centre,²—an organisation still compact

¹ The influence of the tribal structure in the developed city state has recently been brought out clearly in Sir P. Vinogradoff's *Historical Jurisprudence*, vol. II (Greece). See especially chap. v.

² City states in this geographical sense (as it may be termed) arose long before the days of classical Greece. The earliest known, I imagine, are those of Sumer, which were true theocracies, i.e. the city god was the theoretical ruler and the human 'patesi' ruled as his representative. It is characteristic that the reforms of Urakagina at Lagash are described as a restoration of the god (i.e. the temple) to the power selfishly usurped by the patesi (L. W. King, *Sumer and Accad*, p. 181). A city state may be just as despotically ruled as any other. A civic state is the organisation of government by free citizens, and this arose in the city state of the Greeks, with the limitations indicated. The Mediaeval city states had a different origin, growing up not out of tribal life, but rather as centres of freedom in opposition to established feudal authority. Their life, however, in many respects recalls that of the Greek cities.

The tribal republics which subsisted in India in early Buddhist times by the side of the advancing monarchies had, it would seem, a rudimentary state organisation, a police, a complicated system of justice, and an assembly of all the clansmen. In size the more important far exceeded the dimensions of a city state. The basis of organisation would seem to be tribal rather than civic, though our judgment of it must depend largely on our view of the stage reached at that time by caste distinctions. As to this there is some difference of opinion among students, and there must have been differences from place to place. If we think of these communities as elementary civic states they would supply another instance of the association of a partial political freedom with the germination of epoch-making ideas. These republics for the most part went down before the monarchies, but some survived the Maurya Empire (see Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, chap. II, and *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. I, pp. 174-8, 491, 528). In Southern

enough to admit of a personal gathering of the adult male citizens and direct government by the assembly in the last resort. Even within these limits and with the frank exclusion here of Helots, there of slaves, the Greek and Italian States could only secure a partial and uncertain success for democratic government. None the less the civic principle was an immense stimulus to social life and to the productive activity of the mind in thought and in art. The civic state, that is, the state based on the conception of mutual obligation, is the first expression of the idea of the community as an organic harmony, *κοινωνία*, or partnership arising straight out of the rational will of free men, and satisfying the true demands of human nature.

We are not to suppose that the organic life of society originated with the Greeks. On the contrary, as argued earlier, there is something of organic character in every community that endures without external support, and in the very simplest communities there is a very real organic element. The little primary group, the kindred in particular, that stands together as one man to protect the member or avenge his injuries, has one very vital characteristic of the organism. The collective reaction is universal and spontaneous. On the other hand, the group absorbs the individual, its customs dominate him, there is no freedom, no room for initiative, barely the possibility of life apart from it. Thus there is solidarity, but not that mutual furtherance of freely energising elements which we have called harmony. Furthermore, as the community advances in scale and efficiency its unity loses rather than gains in organic character. Order is imposed and protection secured.

India also we hear of some constitutional elements in the Tamil kingdoms (*ibid.*, p. 557).

It seems possible that several peoples may have reached a form of organisation roughly comparable to that of the Greek cities in the seventh century without their subsequent development of definite civic principles.

In the case of Greece, it should be noted that though the State was usually identified with the dominant city, it might include several towns, and the whole of the little territory might be unified like Attica or federated like Boeotia. The limit is not that of a single urban centre, but, as clearly stated by Aristotle, of facility for personal participation in the last resort in government.

from above, and the loyalty which authority can command is a questionable amount. True spontaneous common feeling is confined, as has been shown, to the little surviving archaic units at the base of the social pyramid. Now what the city state achieves in Greece is a true sense of a common life, (1) on a scale wider than that of the kindred or local band, and (2) in a form reconcilable with free initiative and many-sided activity—not merely solidarity but harmony, not merely a corporate entity but a partnership of free men

This experiment in free political organisation is associated in the Hellenic world with the highest development of thought, so far attained. Associated not as effect, but rather as cause, or, still better, as another effect of the same cause. For the same disciplined energy of mind which maintained and developed civic co-operation gave itself in other directions to artistic and literary creation or to philosophic and scientific thought.¹ In fact, there is a subtle interrelation between the different sides of the movement which it is difficult to trace in detail, but in its general effect makes a sufficiently clear impression. Greek thought is always limited by the finitude of Greek experience. The definite, the limit, plays a large part in its rational ideal. Euclid's straight line, a mathematical thinker has remarked, is that which is bounded by two extreme points, not a segment of an infinite line. The artistic ideal is one of static perfection rather than one of dynamic energy and boundless possibility. The very process of nature was the realisation of types which as types were unchanging and eternal, and sociologically there was one true type, the city state, which

¹ It would of course be absurd to suggest that the development of civic organisation under the peculiar limitations of the city is universally and essentially connected with a special stage of intellectual development. But the interrelation suggested in the text is in fact found in the two classes of free or partially free city states which we know best—those of classical antiquity and of Mediaeval Europe. (It must be remembered that even in England the mediaeval town enjoyed a remarkable measure of autonomous development.) It is moreover apparent that the great towns of our time merged in larger 'national' aggregates do not function in the same way as foci of creative energy. This holds not only of provincial cities but of capitals, with the possible exception of Paris.

the Greek had achieved once for all. When the city state sank—as notwithstanding any preservation of local autonomy it did sink—behind the Macedonian and post-Macedonian monarchies, wider social views came into being. Conversely, with the loss of free political self-direction, the confident spontaneous flow of intellectual energy was gradually arrested. The last great constructive thinker whose work still retains its living interest died within a year of his pupil, Alexander. The Stoic and Epicurean philosophies, it is true, belong to the next age, when Athens was still asserting much of her old political vigour, though now too manifestly in the second place.¹ The epoch of the greatest poetry, however, had already ended with the disastrous result of the Peloponnesian war. After the third century—apart from applications of the new ethics especially in jurisprudence—it is only science proper, mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics that goes forward on the great scale, for in pure science a momentum once acquired is longer maintained. But it is not too much to say that with the lost sense of fully independent self-direction some spring of creative originality had been cut.

The area of the common life in the city state was still very narrow, and the civic principle was far from being consistently applied. How the Greek State foundered on these limitations, and how the Romans made a partial and eventually a vain effort to surmount them, has been briefly noted in the first chapter. Free government arose upon a larger scale in Western Europe when extensive territories had been organised under monarchies which gradually vindicated the central authority at the expense of feudal separatism, and welded peoples into nations. Advancing absolutism sooner or later awakened stubborn resistance, whether from aristocrats or democrats, in the homeland or in dependencies. The modern civic state emerging out of these conflicts belongs to the latest experiential stage of intellectual development, and is in fact connected with it by a continual interchange of stimulus. Both are experi-

¹ For a spirited defence of the political and intellectual life of Athens at this period, see Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. iv.

mental rather than finished, efforts rather than results, largely conscious of imperfect success. As compared with the ancient city state, the free modern commonwealth is on a larger scale, and represents at lowest an attempt to carry through the principles of freedom and partnership in the common life with more consistency. The separation of the spiritual and temporal orders has left its effect. The State organisation has been more distinctly conceived as a mechanism which must protect spiritual liberty and afford continuous opportunity for personal initiative and the development of character. Disfranchisement in respect of creed, rank, sex, or race has in a large measure disappeared except—and it is a serious exception—where the colour line is still deeply graven. The State in general must observe and maintain the rights of personality, and serve rather than dominate the collective life which in essence is a spiritual growth.

These conceptions represent a great advance, and have been in large measure realised. On the other hand, there remain unsolved problems so grave as to threaten the whole fabric of civilisation. Through the growth of communications the whole world has become for important purposes one society, a continuous nexus of social relations, but it is still organised in separate communities. The conditions call aloud for the organisation of inter-State relations, but though we now witness the beginnings of systematic effort in this direction we are not yet in a position to review any achieved result with complacency. Secondly, the colour question has become urgent—in the United States as a social problem, in the British Empire as the political problem of the government of dependencies—for all States as the question whether the powerful white nations are to exploit the rest of the world, or to live with the yellow, brown, and black peoples on some terms of equal consideration. Can the principle of equal partnership be pushed across this final testing place? It can be if enough of us are sufficiently convinced of its necessity, but it would be the blindness of the ostrich to ignore the difficulties. Thirdly, the ill-defined idea of nationality stands in the way of free political

co-operation on the great scale. Deep-rooted sentiments, long-standing differences of tradition, accentuated and confused with pseudo-scientific theories of race, demand national independence where geographical or economic ties require some sort of union. The problem can always be solved with good will, but unfortunately the prior problem is to find good will. The British Commonwealth has solved several such questions, but only, as now appears clearly enough, by divesting itself of the character of a unitary authoritarian state, and transforming itself into a voluntary union for certain purposes of States which not merely conduct their internal affairs but have the last word on questions of war and peace.¹ Lastly, within every industrial community legal and political equality is confronted with the extravagant economic inequalities arising from the industrial structure, and until it finds means of dealing with them more successfully it cannot be said to have accomplished the greater part of its mission. To these points we must revert in considering social, international, and economic development. Here we merely note the difficulties and partial failures encountered in the attempt to give universal and consistent application to the civic principle. This, notwithstanding the effort towards civic universalism, is the characteristic of political development in the modern phase of thought.

Reviewing the evolution of the community on its political side, we distinguish three main phases. There are (1) the little communities of kinsfolk and neighbours, of high solidarity, but allowing little scope for development, (2) communities growing in size, importance, and efficiency of organisation with the advance of civilisation, based essentially on subordination. In the cruder stages of this development the constituent unitary groups have a semi-independence, but little affected by the superincumbent authority. In the higher stages the unity is more complete and discipline more rigorous. This type of organisation begins among

¹ This is made definite in the Irish Constitution which may be regarded as an official recognition of the fact that the participation of the Dominions in the Great War was a voluntary act of each of them.

the simpler peoples, predominates in the lower and middle civilisations, but particularly in association with the higher stages of intellectual development meets with (3) the civic state in which the common life begins to rely on moral force and the willing co-operation of free men. In antiquity and in the Middle Ages such communities arose on the scale of 'cities' In association with the modern intellectual movement they develop on the national and supernational scale. The future of civilisation evidently depends on the possibility of erecting a community of the world on the same basis.

4 From the political fabric of the community we pass to the social structure. The connecting link is the administration of justice, which becomes the main internal function of government and covers all the principal relations between man and man. Justice is the definition and maintenance of obligations, and obligations include what is due to people, their rights, and what is due from them, their duties. Ethically, both rights and duties form conditions of or elements in a common good, rights as conditions of well-being which it secures to individuals,¹ duties as the services, or more generally the respect, which it requires of them. An ideal system of obligations would then be the framework of an ideal society, and their adequate performance the active life of such a society. The actual system recognised, and on the whole maintained, is the framework of the actual life of a community. Thus the study of justice is potentially the study of the entire social order. But we may distinguish the question of the method by which obligations are defined and maintained from the question of the nature of the obligations themselves. As a matter of fact, the two inquiries impinge on one another, for one method is often applied to one kind of obligation and another to another. Still, the distinction so far holds that it is con-

¹ More strictly to any element of the community whether an individual, a group, or even the community itself as an organised whole. It is important to recognise that the community so considered may have both rights against and duties to its members.

venient to survey first what we may call the basis of social obligations, and then their content as it appears in different societies.

Obligations are defined in the first instance by custom, and more by the actual performance than by spoken words. We have referred to the sentiments on which custom rests, and their expression in magico-religious ideas, and have shown how custom needs no specific authority either to institute or to maintain it. Its natural repositories, however, are the elders of the family or the group, and they would apply it in any doubtful or disputed case. From the way in which they apply a rule the rule itself may be unconsciously modified, but in very simple communities intentional and deliberate innovations are exceptional if indeed they occur.¹ But with social differentiation varying customs may come into conflict, and an authority is required to decide between them. A conquering people may impose their own will, and their ruler may decide particular issues without regard to the customs of the conquered as suits his own interest. Any permanent government, however, must rest on something more than arbitrary rules, and so as a matter of fact codes are drawn up and set forth in which the doubtful points are authoritatively settled,² or courts are established in which experienced men gradually reduce local or racial variations of custom to a consistent set of rules which becomes the common law of the land. Law and custom then begin to draw apart, custom retaining its strong hold on sentiment, while law has behind it the force of government, and may also claim the authority of religion. Indeed, its exposition may, as in India, Palestine, and elsewhere, fall largely into the hands of the priesthood,

¹ Messrs Spencer and Gillen think that the old men of the Central Australian tribes sometimes modify customs with some degree of conscious intention. This is the only suggestion of the kind that I can recall in connection with any people of that grade of culture. Possibly it is alterations in the detail of magic ceremonies that the authors have in mind. There is no doubt that innovation is repugnant to the primitive mind.

² Codes like that of Hammurabi evidently take a good deal for granted, and we may suppose that the points emphasised are those about which divergence or dispute are possible. This would apply particularly to customs in process of being imposed by a conquering people.

and so clash at certain points with the rules which the secular authority desires. Whether the basis be religious or secular, anything like legislation is still an exceptional event.¹ The main business of authority is still to declare and apply the admitted law. In the civic state, on the other hand, the making and remaking of law becomes a recognised part of the business of government, partly because such States are founded on a more active and diffuse participation in public interest, partly because their development hitherto has always involved a struggle of opposing principles. The supernatural sanction is now weakened, and the appeal is frankly to the common good. More particularly in modern times since Bentham wrote, it has been recognised that the real justification of institutions, however fundamental, is their bearing on the happiness of mankind. Stability and security, however, are among the conditions that are essential in this regard, and to reconcile them with the need of change there comes about the distinction between the constitution and the laws made under the constitution. The essence of the constitution, whether written or unwritten, is (a) that constitutional changes, unlike ordinary legislation, are abnormal, and (b) that when desired they must be attained by methods prescribed by the constitution itself.²

Thus the definition of obligations reflects the political development already described from custom to authority and from authority to the common good, with the relation of the secular and the religious view intervening in very various ways. When we pass to the problem of maintenance distinctive questions of justice make their appearance.

¹ Deuteronomy is the most famous instance of priestly innovation. It was, however, disguised by its attribution to an earlier date.

² The distinction between the constitutional and unconstitutional was in principle recognised in Athens in the prosecution for unconstitutional action which could be brought against the proponent of a law even if successful. Of the influence of religious authority on the law both in the ancient and modern state it is hardly necessary to speak. It may be pointed out, however, that the modern doctrine of liberty replacing the old separation of the two powers tends strongly to the emancipation of legislation from any ecclesiastical control. The secular rule tends to be the common denominator on which people of all creeds agree. Any further legislation is left to each household of faith to make for itself.

5. The maintenance of obligations has two aspects, the preservation of rights and the enforcement of duties, or more generally of respect for the rule. Sometimes and for some purposes these are two sides of the same thing. For instance, the law gives me a certain security in respect of life and property when it makes known that it will hang the man who kills me, and imprison the thief who steals my purse. But in so doing it is approaching the question not from the side of my rights but from that of someone else's wrongdoing. On the other hand, in an action for damages for the loss of a purse—or a husband—it is just the rights that are considered. The law has not prevented their violation, but it secures compensation to the sufferer, and the fact that a penalty falls upon the wrongdoer is incidental. Again, there are questions of right which do not involve any breach—at any rate any deliberate breach—of law or custom. For instance, there are questions of disputed title, and questions of unintentional injury. Conversely there are breaches of law and custom which interfere with no right except the general right of the community to maintain order, e.g. breaches of the public peace, some forms of immorality, religious and sacral offences. These differences have to be carefully borne in mind in studying the development of justice. In general, law and custom both seek to prevent breaches of rule by punishment, or restraint of liberty, while they protect rights by enforcing reparation for their breach, and in some cases specific performance of what is due. But the threat of punishment for the breach of a right is also, of course, a protection for that right, and reparation may be, and sometimes avowedly takes the form of, punishment. Finally, the violation of a right as such may be looked upon mainly as a matter that concerns the injured person, or it may in itself, if sufficiently serious, be regarded as a breach of the public order, and visited with punishment.

Reparation proper explains itself. The object is to put the sufferer from any breach of his rights in as good a position as he was before. But reparation may be sought in some form of emotional satisfaction. This in its blindest

form is mere wrath and a desire for vengeance. But with wrath is generally mingled a sense of injured pride, which demands above all things to get even with the aggressor. Injured pride must give as good as it has got, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, and then honours are easy. It may even be satisfied with the customary, recognised, compensation, or by voluntary atonement and expiation, which put the wrongdoer in an inferior position. The element of fear, closely attendant on wrath, may be satisfied in similar ways. In these directions reparation is closely interwoven with punishment. The objects of punishment are a matter of controversy. Historically it cannot be doubted that several motives have operated, on the whole in a confused mixture rather than with clear apprehension of their distinct character. First there is the motive of maintaining the public order, which punishment seeks to secure partly by deterrence, partly when the deed is done by the prevention of its repetition, by executing the offender or restraining his liberty. The actual effect of deterrence has been called in question. I content myself here with the remark that rightly or wrongly it has been and is one of the motives of punishment. The maintenance of public order and the safety of society afford the direct motives for the punishment of acts held dangerous to the community like treason or cowardice, and the indirect motive for punishing offences against individuals. For (a) though the particular offence affects an individual it may be such that the offender is held generally dangerous, and (b) if the offender is unpunished it would lead to retaliation and bloodshed. The motive of punishment is here mixed with that of reparation. The law says to the son of the murdered man, "Hold your hand, this is for us to deal with. We give you the satisfaction that you crave, but on condition that you do not seek it for yourself." Where law fails in this respect there are those who will go outside law. We find this consideration operating in some of the simplest societies, and among many civilised peoples to-day when the unwritten law is pleaded as an excuse for self-redress in cases where passion is strongly excited and legal remedies are held

insufficient. Here, then, punishment is motivated by a certain emotional craving for satisfaction with which the bystander sympathises, and this passes into a general principle of vindictive retribution. Crime is held to call for punishment, not merely for the sake of the outward maintenance of social peace, but to restore the inner harmony of the moral order. The punishment should fit the crime. It is that which redresses the deflected balance. It appeases the justly angered God; it expresses the indignation of society. With a slight shift of the point of view it is the criminal's own expiation of the offence, and he may even accept it as such. Half mystically it becomes his redemption, and so considered becomes the starting point of yet another motive, the reform of the criminal himself, a motive which has become prominent in modern discussions, and has had its effect upon penal administration.

Such, historically, seem to be the principal motives involved in punishment, mingled and combined in very various ways. If we reduce them to terms of the simplest emotions involved there is not only the resentment of a sufferer from wrong, but the sympathies of his friends and relations, and even of the public at large. There is anxiety for the public order, fear and awe of divine anger, or other mystical consequences; respect for the majesty of the moral order, a certain emotional satisfaction in the supposed cancellation of wrong by suffering, and finally—a young and tender plant—some shoot of moral regard for the offender himself. All theories of punishment, it may truly be said, arise after the fact. Punishment has an emotional basis, and emotion seeks a justificatory theory. But to those who infer that the theory is mere sophistication it may be pointed out conversely that from the evolutionary point of view the primitive emotion has a utilitarian function. We experience the emotion of resentment when wronged because it is on the whole that kind of emotion which protects us against wrongdoing. We fear the bold, and still more the sly, offender because that sort of fear leads us to protect ourselves. In reasoning about our emotions we merely do what all mental development does. We make ourselves

aware of our doings and to what they tend, so that we may see that the hand we are playing is consistent with itself, and likely to give an issue which regarded on all sides and in all its consequences we deliberately prefer. Sound theories discover the functions of the emotions and put a bridle on those expressions of them which are functionally valueless or worse.

Whether in punishment or reparation justice consists in the impartial application of a general rule, having all the circumstances of the case in view. In dealing with one and the same act it may have both reparation and punishment in view, but the conditions to be taken into account are not the same. In reparation it is the loss to be made good—a loss which is just the same whether caused intentionally or unintentionally by A himself or by a servant for whom he is responsible, by A's criminal act or by his intrinsically venal ignorance or negligence. It may very well be that A's whole estate is held liable for the damage, and so the loss may fall on his heirs or even his creditors. In punishment, on the contrary, the point is A's offence, and in justice, an offence is the act of a man who knows what he is about. Hence just punishment falls only on the intentional offender. Collective and vicarious responsibility are barred, and with them the punishment of the unwitting wrong. Punishment is the infliction of suffering on a responsible wrongdoer by an impartial authority applying a general rule to particular circumstances. Just reparation is the impartial restoration to the sufferer of his violated right or its equivalent. Both are contrasted with the partisan action of the sufferer and his friends by way of revenge or other reparation.

6. The evolution of justice in the first phase of development consists in the gradual establishment of an impartial authority for punishment and reparation. The evolution is complicated by the group formation of society, for there may be impartial justice of a rudimentary kind, e.g. in the primary group, while beyond it there may only be the partisan action, more or less controlled by custom as the case may be, between group and group. Very frequently our

information as to custom within the inner group is defective, and all that we hear about concerns the relations of different groups. Having this constantly in mind, we note first that even with the simplest peoples there are generally some offences punished, apart from any resentment of an injured party, by the collective action of the community, or at any rate of the primary group. There are tribal offences, that is, actions which truly, or in the opinion of the tribe, endanger its safety. Under this head we find for the most part black magic, and especially magic murders—obviously a source of terror to people firmly believing in witchcraft—anything of the nature of treason, sometimes cowardice, violations of ceremonial, particularly of its secrets, and a breach of the rules of exogamy or endogamy which are held to threaten the community with misfortune. In all these cases the motive is clear. The community takes action to rid itself of a danger, or at lowest to make the offender expiate or purge his offence. On the other hand, the violation of what we should deem the most elementary rights of the individual is not generally regarded—at any rate beyond the limits of the primary group—as a tribal offence. To kill or rob a man openly, or to carry off his wife or daughter is an offence against him, and perhaps against his kinsfolk or primary group, but it is for him in the first place to demand and secure reparation. At this stage public justice does not secure personal rights. From one point of view the evolution of public justice can be considered as the process by which the reparation of private wrongs becomes a public responsibility, and in particular the grosser and more deliberate infliction of private wrongs becomes a public offence.

In this development there are several phases, not necessarily successive—for in the multitudinous scraps of very partial evidence from all parts of the world and in all periods of history it is impossible to disentangle any single and consistent order—but phases through one or another of which the movement apparently proceeds. We cannot understand these without looking at the whole matter first from the point of view of the sufferer and his reaction. To begin

with, he may just try self-redress. There may be no rule. He revenges himself if he can and as he can, and with what help he can procure. But in general rules of custom are discoverable. (a) Custom prescribes the character and degree of revenge. It should be life for life, eye for eye, perhaps wife for wife, that is, it is that which makes the sufferer even with the offender and satisfies pride. The exaction of vengeance, however, is dangerous to society, especially when (as we see under the next head) the kindred come into the quarrel, and so alternatives are offered—composition, the payment in goods of damages to the injured party, or expiatory atonement, the offender submitting, e.g. to have spears thrown at him without retaliation. Pride is salved, the offender has paid or submitted, the wrong is written off and the incident is closed. (b) The sufferer does not as a rule stand alone. He calls in his kindred to assist him, and custom bids them respond. Perhaps the entire local group stands solid and takes up the cause against the aggressor from another group. The aggressor in his turn will appeal to his group or kin and the dispute becomes collective. Reparation, not true punishment, is in question and may be sought at the expense of any member of the opposing group. Responsibility becomes collective and vicarious. Indeed, it may be the proper thing that not the murderer, but his father or elder brother—head of his most immediate kin—should be killed, or conversely if it is a woman or a child who has been slain, that a woman or child should be sought out of the enemy group for slaughter. Here, again, mitigations are sought in the interest of the common peace. Ceremonial encounters are arranged which will go through without much shedding of blood. The aggressors' kin may give him up or force him to stand an expiatory encounter. Or finally compensation in goods may be arranged. For this in general the accused group will be collectively responsible, and it will go to the sufferer's group collectively.¹ It is clearly an avenue to peace, but not

¹ Complications arise here from the distinction of kindred and clan. The whole of the individual's kindred on either side up to certain degrees of relationship may figure in the matter, and these do not form one coherent

perhaps a very sound method of protecting rights or punishing crime

In all this it is clear that there are the rudiments of public intervention with the object of keeping the peace. All the while the headman or chief, or possibly a council of older men, will generally be resorted to in minor matters or in the early stages of a dispute, and will try to settle it by conciliation. But the intervention of the community or its chief may be of a more drastic character. In the first place particular crimes may rouse general resentment. Repeated murders, or an attack by an unpopular on a popular person, or a crime attended with any special circumstances of atrocity, may stir public action, and the offender may be lynched. We hear of such cases where there is no settled rule of common intervention, and we may speak of them as 'occasional justice'. Again, the chief or elders may be appealed to for aid. They may come to the assistance of the avenger, or possibly they may merely give him their countenance after hearing his case, leaving him and his friends to secure redress by their own strength. In the former case public justice is well on the way, but the community may still countenance vengeance within prescribed limits. Indeed, we find numerous cases in which a pretty complete system of public justice is established side by side with equally recognised customs of self-help. Again, the community may interest itself in some private offences, e.g. homicide or adultery, but not in others, e.g. theft. In the end, by one way of transition or another, we come to the cases in which all serious aggression on the elementary rights of person and property are treated as public offences, for which punishment or compensation is awarded on recognised rules by some sort of impartial authority. The first step is to secure the community against a dangerous man, the next to keep the peace, and the third to secure all its members in person and property.

entity like a clan, but are a number of individuals of different families. This must weaken the clan system but does not carry us outside the principle of collective responsibility. On this subject see Phillpotts, *Kindred and Clan*.

Such is the development within the community containing several kindreds or primary groups. In these inner groups the development is simpler and quicker because there is no such antagonism of group interests, nor the heavier moral and intellectual strain of a truly impersonal judgment. The smaller and more compact the group the more easily it feels true solidarity. Any homicide or violent aggression within so small a circle is obviously a most serious danger, and affects the feelings of everyone where all are in habitual personal contact. Further, except as a member of the group, the individual has no standing or security in life, and to act against one of his own group is something abnormal. For these reasons crime within the group is rare, and the group if it can find the means will react against it collectively long before any larger community would attempt to do so. Nevertheless, even within the primary group we find a very imperfect and irregular development of justice in the earlier stages.

In any systematic comparison allowance has to be made for deficiencies of evidence, and for the immense variety of detail which informants supply. It being understood that there is a certain element of public justice operating all along the line in the defence of society, the contrast is between cases in which the protection of individuals, families, or groups within the community, is in the main left to self-help, or in the main the concern of the community.¹ Having determined on which side of the line each community is to be placed, we can then review the results for all the communities of which we have information, and compare the percentage of communities in each economic grade in which the one or the other principle predominates (a) in the primary group, (b) in a wider society. The results are given in the following table, which shows the percentage

¹ To determine on which side any given community falls the numerous transitional cases must be apportioned on a consistent method throughout. The reader need not here be troubled with the detailed account of the methods used which will be found set out in the *Simpler Peoples*, chap. III.

of cases in each grade in which the principle of public justice preponderates.—

			In the Primary Group	In a Wider Community
Lower hunters	..	.	18	2
Higher hunters	16	16
Agric I	34	31
Past I	..	.	44	40
Agric II	..	.	49	47
Past II		.	61	61
Agric III	..		74	71

It will be seen that particularly in the case of the wider society there is a marked advance towards public justice as we ascend. We thus find that the development of public justice runs parallel to that of tribal government. With this evidence should be read the witness from the early civilisations, which in every case but that of ancient Egypt give indications of development on similar lines. We may therefore fairly regard the development of thought in its first phase as correlated with the emergence of public justice.

7 The following phases witness an extension and regularisation of public justice whereby several serious limitations and defects are gradually removed. (1) A system of public justice may still admit of composition for crimes, even for murder. Early mediaeval laws, in fact, often set themselves expressly to compel the kindred to accept the *bot*, or money atonement.¹ When the fine goes to the chief it is certainly a true public punishment, but very inadequate in serious cases, and more particularly as an alternative (which the rich could choose) to physical punishment. Thus (2) the distinction between emendable and unemendable offences is an important mark of the stage which public justice has attained, and where homicide, rape, or theft are still emendable we must rank that stage as low. Further (3) the scale of payments is generally determined by gradations of rank, and in some cases (as in the code of Hammurabi) the rank of the aggressor or the victim determines whether the offence is emendable or not. Distinctions of caste, as in India,

¹ In the time of Alfred the aggressor might still elect to bear the feud, but by Alfred's ordinance the ealdorman was required to help in the enforcement of payment (Pollock and Maitland, 1 47)

naturally affect the scale of punishments. Priests or nobles enjoy special immunities.¹ Slaves, though frequently protected against the grossest outrages, are seldom in enjoyment of the same protection as free men, and as much may be said of women in many cases, and of aliens in many more. In fact (4) it frequently occurs that neither slaves, women,² nor aliens can sue or be sued in person. They can appear only through a patron, or in some indirect way. (5) There may be no adequate protection, perhaps none at all, for the mass of the people against the king, great noble, or high official.³ Of these derogations from the full and equal legal protection of person and property of all dwellers within the jurisdiction, some occur in one community, others in another, but until they are all swept aside we cannot say that public justice reaches its maturity. Further, when once established, the methods of criminal justice, particularly in the authoritarian state, are apt to be arbitrary and oppressive. First, as to procedure, in the early stages the ordeal and the oath are freely used, and the first great step forward is the substitution of rational procedure by evidence and argument.⁴ Unfortunately, the very doubtfully 'rational' method of securing confession by torture is frequently found in the authoritarian states, and in the city states is still applied to slaves if not to free men. Secondly, even when torture is disallowed, the accused is often subject to serious disabilities, subjected to indefinite

¹ And sometimes are subject to special penalties.

² Both as regards slaves and women there are great variations. The women could hold property and conduct business both in Babylon and Egypt. In Egypt they could go to law apparently from the days of the Old Kingdom. In Babylon, certainly in later times, perhaps earlier. In Athens a woman, except in trifling cases, had to sue through a guardian. At Babylon in the New Kingdom slaves conducted business, and could sue or be sued. At Athens the slave sued through his master but could obtain judicial protection against his master in case of maltreatment.

³ A condition suggested by more than one account of life in ancient Egypt.

⁴ This procedure, thoroughly understood in the Greco-Roman world, gave way on the fall of the Empire to the earlier methods, and revived gradually with the return of order, especially after the condemnation of ordeals by the Lateran Council in 1215. Champions could still be hired in England in the reign of Edward I.

arrest before trial, and denied complete equality with the prosecution in the conduct of his defence. Lastly, when public punishment finally supersedes composition, it often passes to the extreme of severity. In particular the barbarity of European codes down to the nineteenth century is well known. Personal responsibility is often inadequately defined, collective or vicarious punishments are admitted, and no adequate discrimination is made between the deliberate and the unintentional.

All these points could be illustrated amply from the codes and practices of civilised peoples, most of them together from the more barbaric, one or two of them among the higher grades. Thus even in Athens where there was a complete system of rational procedure, many relics of self-help and of the powers of the kindred remain.¹ The death penalty was frequent. Neither slaves, women, nor aliens had proper status in the Courts, and slave witnesses were regularly submitted to torture. When we come to the modern state as it gradually emerges from feudalism and absolutism we find that one by one the defects above noted are removed, and justice is based more squarely on the conception of what is due to the individual under the conditions of common life. It guarantees equality of protection,² treats money compensation as civil damages and irrelevant to the breach of the law.³ It secures full legal rights and responsibilities for every sane adult, and restricts punishment proper to the intentional or culpably negligent act. It secures full equality for the prosecution and defence, and sets a limit to preliminary detention. It bars revenge—not without difficulty in cases of passion—and tends to reduce punishment to the lowest limit required for the maintenance of order. In these respects it brings the work

¹ See Vinogradoff, *op cit*, p. 177 *et seq.*

² In theory this principle is almost universally recognised, but where the colour line is strongly drawn it is often, and sometimes systematically, disregarded. Such States remain in this respect in the lower class.

³ It is an infringement of this principle that voluntary compensation is allowed to be pleaded in mitigation. It may be added that fines for police offences with prison as an alternative fall very unequally between rich and poor.

of the earlier civilisations to completion. But it also begins to go farther. Thus it endeavours to give punishment a reformatory rather than a degrading character. For the prevention of crime, reliance is placed not on severity, but first on a good police, and behind the police on the improvement of social conditions. Indeed, in direct relation with the intellectual and ethical movement the whole attitude to crime is altered. From being an arbitrary act of a wicked will it becomes rather a natural and predictable consequence of social and psychological conditions, and to eradicate it it is recognised that it is not *ex post facto* on the offender, but *a priori* on the conditions that we must operate. Further, the law extends the area of protection. While in other respects liberty is enlarged, the liberty of the strong to work their will with the weak is restricted. The standard of life is protected and agreements held injurious to it are forbidden. Cruelty, neglect, and immoral traffics become criminal. On the whole the idea of justice is not only consistently carried through, but is enlarged and humanised. Much, doubtless, remains to be done, but the system described is the goal of a systematic effort begun in the latter part of the eighteenth century with the work of Beccaria and Bentham and continued till the present day.

8 From the method of maintaining obligations we pass to the obligations to be maintained, confining ourselves to such matters of general principle as are important in the study of development. In the most general terms we must first distinguish obligations which arise out of birth and position; the inherent rights and duties of king, noble, commoner, serf, or slave; privileges or disabilities of race, nationality, or sex; rights of family or gentile inheritance or the like; in general, rights of status, hereditary or acquired. Secondly, we must mark out obligations arising in or out of mutual dealings, contracts, acquisition of property, marriage, and the like.¹ The definition of status involves

¹ The two classes overlap in that status may be acquired as the result of mutual dealings, and we have then to distinguish dealings by which status is acquired from obligations arising out of status.

the whole structure of the community. In the simplest we may say that apart from age and sex there is only one distinction. One either is or is not a member of the group. This distinction, however, is very important, for on it as our account of justice will have shown all a man's rights and duties depend. He enjoys protection from the group, and from that alone. Sojourners in the group may come under the protection of hospitality or enjoy the sanctity of envoys, but the former they gain only through their host, and the latter only for the occasion. The outsider is in principle rightless. Secondly, as the group is very small, this limitation narrows down the whole sphere of right to a little circle, and one may say—to put it in a somewhat extreme form—gives all status to members of the group and none to anyone else. This bald statement, however, must in general be qualified by two considerations. The primary group has usually regular social relations beyond its borders, and the important status of marriageability is one of them. Secondly, this wider society may form a community, which gives as a twofold status membership of the inner group and membership of the larger community. Our review of justice shows that the former is the main determinant of obligations in the lower stages, but that as we advance protection is more frequently and more fully extended to all members of the community.

Apart from the division of the local or kindred group on the one hand, and the distinctions of age, sex, and marriage divisions on the other, the simplest communities know no difference of status. Even the headman has little power to differentiate him from others. But as we advance in scale of organisation, differences of rank appear. The chief acquires definite power. If his office is hereditary his family shares in his rank. Prominent men become privileged nobles, and perhaps landowners. Industrial classes arise by the side of tillers of the soil, serfs and slaves come into being through war, conquest, trade, birth, and self-commendation; and again, whether through the fortune of war or distinction of race and colour, or mere difference of occupation, hereditary castes are formed. The growing

organisation of the community is established on a basis of subordination in the social order, as we have already seen it to be on the side of government. The relative equality of the primitive group gives way to an increasing differentiation of social rank. The correlation of this change with the economic advance may be seen for the simpler peoples in the following table, which gives the proportion of communities in each economic grade in which (a) a class of nobles, (b) of serfs and slaves, can be distinguished. It will be seen that the proportions increase in close relation with the economic advance, and we may say that the first great phase of development witnesses the emergence of social as well as political subordination.

	serfs and Slaves	Nobility
Lower hunters	0.02	0
Higher hunters . .	0.32	0.11
Agric I ..	0.33	0.03
Past I	0.37	0.20
Agric II ..	0.46	0.15
Past. II	0.71	0.24
Agric III	0.78	0.23

This process is carried farther in the earlier civilisations. It is true that the archaic structure of the village maintains much of the old equality, but upon the village is imposed the state organisation. The newer elements, the king, nobles or organised priesthood, form a superincumbent authority, and where the community has been formed by conquest the successful race becomes a privileged nobility. By capture, trade, or the operation of debt the class of serfs and slaves is increased, and on the whole the development, political, military, and economic, tends to accentuate the distinctions of rank and privilege. Chinese, like Greek, tradition points to a time when there were no slaves. Slaves were few in the old Babylonian kingdom, and became far more numerous later. A similar process goes forward in the Greco-Roman civilisation.¹ Caste, apart from the distinction of Arya and Dasyu, was unknown

¹ See in particular a recent full and impartial discussion of the evidence in Mr Hentland's *Agricola*

in early Vedic times. The four-fold division is once mentioned in a late Vedic hymn. But the full development of caste was a very gradual process. So far the movement of civilisation is all towards a greater hierarchy of classes on a larger scale, but as we advance a counter tendency appears, and that in two forms. On the one hand there were the protests of the spiritual religions and reflective ethics. The Hebrew prophets arise as the champions of social justice. Buddhism is universalist in spirit. Confucianism preaches an ethics of social duty, and insists that the emperor and his officers are the servants and interpreters rather than the masters of the people. Finally, at a later date Islam proclaims the brotherhood and equality of the faithful.¹ On the whole, political and economic tendencies were too strong for these ideals, which tend to evaporate into mere pious recommendations of considerate treatment. On the other hand, a political move to equality was made by the city states, whose inner history both in Greece and Italy is mainly occupied with the struggles of depressed classes for full political enfranchisement. Neither Athenian nor Roman democracy, however, included serfs or slaves in its embrace, yet at Athens there was a considerable measure of protection of slaves both in person and property, and there were revolutionary thinkers who began to attack the principle. Plato has various mitigations of slave status to propose, and thinks that slaves should be taken in war only from barbarian peoples. Aristotle follows him in the view that it is only the slave by nature—the man incapable of rational conduct—who is justly a slave, and this, characteristically, is in general terms the barbarian. In similar spirit the Hebrew reformer had bidden his countrymen take their slaves only from the nations around. Finally, under the influence of Stoic principles, a continual series of Imperial enactments mitigated the harshness of Roman slavery.

Looking beyond the limits of slavery, we may say of the Greco-Italian city state in general terms that the

¹ A Moslem might be held as a slave, but a free Moslem taken captive could not be enslaved. According to one view he might even be safe from slavery by conversion on the battlefield.

endeavour of its democrats was to establish an equality of civic and political rights for all males who were personally free. Neither slaves nor women entered seriously into the consideration of the democrats,¹ and the distinction between citizens and aliens was preserved.² On the other hand, the Stoic ethics which supersedes that of the city state asserts natural equality as a principle, and the Christian Church which supersedes Stoicism recognises all men alike as sons of God, and alike capable of salvation and entitled to the privileges of religion.

9 Thus if differentiation of status is maintained throughout classical antiquity there also emerge doctrines of universalism carrying the general principle of equal rights. Modern social philosophy arose in communities with a long history of social differentiation. It is not necessary for our purpose to describe the class distinctions which the European peoples have known in their multitudinous variations from nation to nation and from age to age, to examine the decline of chattel slavery in Europe and its recrudescence in its contact with coloured races—the rise, extension, and decline of the various forms of unfreedom usually classed as serfdom; the privileges, social, political, and sometimes legal, of nobilities, the immunities of ecclesiastics, or the monopolies of close corporations. But with regard to the idea of equality or partnership in a common good, which, whatever view be taken of its efficacy in the shaping of events, has undoubtedly been a ferment operating in the minds of men, two general considerations may be mentioned as serving to obviate some common misunderstandings.

First, though mankind is morally one, it is and will remain organised in groups of every possible variety of character and size. Men live in families, form partnerships

¹ The position of women was better in aristocratic Sparta, and their theoretic claims were first urged by the aristocratic philosopher.

² The extension of civic rights which was part of the democratic programme of Rome marks an important advance in principle, but politically was not compatible with the structure of the city state, and could only be carried out by the Empire under which its effect was civil, legal, social, and financial—not political. Eventually through military expenditure and financial ineptitude the Imperial society degenerated into a caste system which was a principal cause of its fall.

and associations, belong to churches and nations, and in each capacity enter into specific relations with other members of the same group and are in consequence subject to specific obligations towards them. Equality, or to use a wider designation, the principle of universalism, by no means overrides these specific obligations, but it subordinates them to the deeper and wider obligations of man to man. It does not ask me to love another man's son as my own, but it does bid me in what I may do for my son to refrain from wronging another, and it does exhort me to make of my love for mine a basis of understanding and sympathy for the similar feeling of another. Group morality presses the narrower obligation to the prejudice of the universal. Universalism requires the harmony of all the group obligations with one another, and regards them as so many specific developments of universally applicable principles. Universalism therefore is approached not by levelling out all that the simpler, more direct, and personal human relations have established, but by harmonising them on a general and consistent basis.

Secondly, universalism has nothing to say against the actual differences of human character and capacity. The range of these differences does not diminish, and their effects are even accentuated by larger scope for talent. What universalism has to say in the matter is that their social recognition—whether in terms of rank, power, and money reward—must be governed by social utility. Universalism requires that the needs of men should be met in the order of their importance, and that for this purpose the functions on the fulfilment of which these needs depend should be adequately maintained. Such differences as are necessitated by differences of function are therefore justified, but no more. To give two simple instances only. He who has responsible duties must have commensurate powers, and he who has specially exhausting work requires the conditions of payment and leisure necessary to sustain him. On the other hand, he who does nothing for it has no claim on society beyond the charitable supply and disciplinary administration of his more elementary needs. The society

in which these principles were made effective would not therefore be one in which everybody would remain at the same level, but one in which there would be no difference between them except that due to and required by the special functions which they would be performing.

To the realisation of these principles most modern communities have contributed, (1) equal protection under the law in respect of all fundamental rights,¹ (2) an equality of intercourse, which breaking through privileges and disqualifications of birth, sex, or race, substitutes equal freedom of initiative, agreement, and association. Restrictions on marriage, on migration,² on choice or change of occupation, are removed. Voluntary associations play a larger part in the common life. This freedom is certainly subject to regulations, but they are held to be regulations based not on partial privilege but on requirements of the common good in which all are considered to share. (3) In determining the common good all sane adults have a voice through the suffrage and the practice of free discussion. The suffrage approximates to universality, and if it has not done all that its advocates hoped, or its opponents feared, it has, at least where there is some political experience behind it, secured a many-sided criticism of internal policy.³ (4) The more general and elementary needs of maintenance and primary education are accepted as matter of common responsibility, and some further provision, particularly in the care of the adolescent and the provision of more advanced education, is made to secure equality of opportunity.

With the consideration of equality of opportunity and

¹ This feature has already been considered under head of public justice, and we have noted its partial failure at the colour line.

² Though here there is at present a reactionary tendency due to hyper-excited nationalism.

³ It is less effective in external policy simply because two communities are not one, and therefore the point of view of the foreigner essential to the understanding of the relationship is not properly expressed. There cannot be adequate international politics without an international organ. Since foreign policy impinges on domestic, this defect has hitherto marred the internal development of democracy. It is significant that Labour parties which are most concerned with internal reconstruction are also most whole-hearted in their internationalism.

freedom of agreement we really pass from status to obligations arising out of and regulating mutual dealings, and under this head the general course of development is merely the obverse side of that which has just been outlined. For in the simplest communities the individual as frequently mentioned has very little freedom apart from his group. As the community grows through subordination more opportunities arise for the more fortunate classes, but all agreement, initiative, and association lie under the restrictions involved in the social stratification, and it is only under the civic principle, and therefore in its fulness only in the modern community, that freedom itself becomes the basis of social co-operation. Even here it must be remarked that the conception of freedom as something which works automatically when regulation is removed has proved fallacious. Freedom of contract paradoxically can be used to defeat freedom. There are two parties to a contract, and the uncontrolled freedom of the stronger may be used to the oppression of the weaker. Freedom for both parties can be secured only if the stronger party is prevented from taking advantage of the weakness of the other, i.e. a common freedom must be an equal freedom. Thus equal liberty involves restraint on partial power, a principle which also applies to the power of associations against the common good. To go to the root of the matter, social freedom in the last analysis means not the absence of restraints but the maintenance of conditions under which both in private or in public life intelligence, character, and initiative can most freely develop themselves. Needless to say, such an ideal is nowhere fully realised. Indeed, in criticising our own institutions we are much more conscious of their discrepancies and failures than of their successes. Yet the ideal is not a mere dream of Utopia, but rather the underlying principle of a mass of social effort explaining the removal of restrictions on the one hand and the new restraints involved in constructive legislation on the other, the double movement characteristic of modern democracy.

Thus, to put the whole matter in the broadest terms, the relations of man to his fellows are determined, first

by his identification with his group, then by his position within a differentiated society, and lastly (if we may interpret incomplete efforts by the principle underlying them) by the free use of the rights which the community secures to all its members as the working basis of a good life. In close parallelism the group morality, which is at first an exhaustive statement of recognised obligations making for solidarity within the community, and indifference beyond it, becomes the basis of grave ethical and legal differentiations within the community, and finally begins to be subordinated to principles applicable universally in the relations of man and man.

10 *The Economic Problem*—Within the community the crux of real freedom under modern conditions is set rather in the economic than the political legal or social field. We pass accordingly to the consideration of economic development, though in so complex a subject our limits will hardly allow us to do more than select a few points of importance for brief mention.

The economic structure of society is conditioned by the nature of property, and in especial of property in the means of production, materials, and implements. Among primitive peoples the principle of communism has often been alleged, but as soon as anthropologists and economic historians came to grips with the actual facts, it became apparent that no easy generalisation could be made. In fact, there is no department of comparative inquiry quite so rich in controversy. The difficulty has arisen in part from the inveterate tendency to assume a single line of evolution, and in part from the attempt to describe the customs of simple people in the phraseology of developed law. As to the first point the truth is that in this respect as in others conditions vary from case to case. Development follows different lines, and we should aim rather at describing what preponderates at a given stage or under given conditions than what is universal. As to the second point, in describing the customs of the simpler peoples we must, to be intelligible, take terms from our own language, but we must define

them for the special sphere of their application, without suggesting that they carry all the implications of similar terms in a refined system of law and ethics. Indeed, in the mere act of defining we are doing for primitive man that which it is very improbable that primitive man ever did for himself, and are therefore clothing his ideas with an exactitude which is just what they lack.

Having this in mind, we remark first that the simpler peoples generally recognise rights over things in much the same way as they recognise other rights, i.e. as claims, which if violated give rise to approved methods of reaction, whether by the sufferer or his group or a whole community. That being understood, we find that among the simpler peoples permanent rights in the exclusive use, enjoyment, and control of certain things are recognised within limits which vary a good deal from case to case. The body of such rights we should call property, although some of the incidents of control familiar to us, e.g. bequest, may be unknown. Even when a man is expected to give his knife to anyone who asks for it, and ought not to be seriously annoyed if it is borrowed without leave, it may still be regarded as primarily his knife. True, if such practices are pushed far enough, the exclusiveness which is of the essence of property tends to a vanishing point, but as long as the owner is identified, and has claims as such, we are probably to regard these customs rather as extreme limitations on property prescribed by rules of hospitality, kinship, or good fellowship, than as evidence of original communism.¹ It is otherwise when custom requires a hunter to share his game with an entire group according to specified rules. Here the game seems to be the true property not of the hunter but of the group, be it the kindred or the entire camp who allot it as custom prescribes.

This brings us to the question of common property, which I take to include two distinct points. Common

¹ E.g. among the Andamanese where it is a breach of manners to refuse any gift for which one is asked, it is enough for a man to remark upon a particular tree and it is then regarded as his, and no one will cut it down without his leave. It must be remembered that when a gift is made a return gift is always expected (Brown, *Andaman Islanders*, pp. 41 and 42).

property is that over which several individuals have rights, but which taken together they hold collectively as against the rest of the world. This latter point distinguishes it from no man's property, which is free as air, not held exclusively by any individual or any community, but it is a mistake to make the collective basis the whole of the matter. The individual rights are of equal importance. In its most extreme expression common property means the right of all members of the group to use the object at their will, but in most cases this would lead to inconvenience, and in some, e.g. a limited supply of food, to absurdity. Hence, for indiscriminate rights—what we might call undivided property—we have the right of sharing. Shares, if not at once consumed like food, become for the time private property, and if the time is extended common property may in this way be gradually transformed into private, but as long as the apportionment is temporary, and supervised by the community in accordance with customary rules of universal sharing, we may continue to speak of the property as common.

Among the simpler peoples private property in goods and chattels, clothing, implements, and (generally) huts or houseroom in a combined hut, is as a rule recognised, though sometimes, as remarked above, with severe limitations. But with regard to land—and this is the most important question since land is here the only means of production that counts—it is not so easy to speak in general terms. In a few cases it seems to be right to deny all property in land, for, distances being great and population sparse, tribes, families, and individuals go where they will, and no one says them nay. But in general a tribe, and the groups into which it is divided, will be found occupying or wandering over an area of defined boundaries from which outsiders are excluded unless they come as messengers or to seek hospitality. Within the group there may be no limitation, everyone enjoying the same rights of moving about, setting up his dwelling, hunting, or gathering food. Thus on the one hand every member of the group has the same right of use and enjoyment, while the group as a whole maintains the boundary against outsiders. These are the bare elements

of common property in its fullest sense, the identical and undivided rights of members and the collective exclusiveness of the group as a whole. Land is held in this fashion among the Central Australians, and apparently among many hunters and gatherers¹

Cultivation when it begins may be conducted by a whole community, or (more often) by a joint household as a collective undertaking, the harvest being common store. But often we find plots apportioned to families for the season as described in the *Germania*. Here there is collective disposal of the land which for the season transforms the undivided right into an equal share, rights over the uncultivated area remaining undivided as before. The pasture and the waste are entirely common, and hunting and gathering remain important branches of the economy. But with settled life the house and perhaps a garden attached would become permanent by continued occupation, and with an advance in agricultural methods, and some growth of population, the rough method of clearing a new patch every season would be given up. The cultivable land is distinguished from the waste, and is regularly tilled with a portion lying fallow every second or every third year. People now have a motive for desiring to retain their lot from season to season, and the apportionment acquires a certain permanence, families or joint households rather than individuals being the allottees. The rights of the community remain in various shapes. Generally it retains the waste, and perhaps the pasture, at least after the hay is mown. It may decide any question of alienation or of the admission of a settler, and may resume full property over land left out of tillage, and possibly insist on occasional or periodic distributions. As long as redistribution continues it seems clear that the land is communal property in which the member has an indefeasible share, but when the lots become hereditary we should treat them as in the main private property, even though alienation may be restricted. Such a position may

¹ It has been suggested that this is sovereignty rather than property, but the more grandiloquent term is the less appropriate. The truth is that in relation to land the two ideas are not at this stage fully distinct.

of course be reached either by an encroachment of private interests on common property, or by limitations on private property by the common interest. We must not assume that the movement has always been in the same direction, but must form our judgment from the conditions as a whole, and their relation to analogous cases. Where the waste and the pasture are undivided, and the arable is in inter-mixed strips pointing to a collectively agreed distribution, the indications are that the original basis is communal, particularly as intervening stages which would effect the transition are well known¹

By such transitional stages we could understand the change from communal to private ownership of land, but we are not entitled by the evidence to maintain that this is the course and the one and only course which history has taken. We also find evidences of private ownership at very low grades. Among the Veddas each individual has his own piece of land which descends to his heirs, though it cannot be alienated without the consent of every adult male of the group. Among the Australians private ownership is asserted in several cases, but the facts as reported are not readily intelligible. It would seem that sacral conceptions underlie the Australian customs, and that in practice these work out to common use and enjoyment by the group.² On balance it is probable that the communal principle predominates in the hunting, early agricultural, and pastoral stages.

* Some confusion has arisen in this matter from the simple identification of the common and the collective. Thus Baden Powell (*Village Communities in India*, p. 114) identifies 'common' holding with co-operative tillage and self supply, that is, with collective use only, and on page 105 he regards customary redistribution as a symbol not of common property but of equal individual right. Here again common and collective are identified. The defender of the communal origin of the Indian village would maintain that the equal share is the derivative of the original undivided right. However that may be, it seems impossible to make redistribution consist with true private property. It is an exercise of collective ownership in the interest of individual rights or participation. There will be confusion in controversy unless it is borne in mind that the right of every individual member either to the use of or share in the whole is as much a part of the communal system as the power of the group collectively.

¹ See Malinowski, *Australian Aborigines*, p. 153

For the purposes of any comparative statement the matter is immensely complicated by the fact that there is more than one communism in question. In place of the entire community we may have the clan, or the joint household—often a considerable body, materially exceeding in number the whole of the more primitive group. This kind of communism has been more persistent than that of the village, but it too declines on the whole with civilisation in favour of ownership by individuals or families in the narrower sense¹.

But meanwhile there is a different development which also presents some serious complexities for the comparative student.

In the disposal of common land the chief or headman will often act for the community, and the question which arises, and is sometimes difficult to answer, is whether it is the chief or the people who enjoy the real ownership. Sometimes on examination the chief appears rather as administrator than owner, supervising, for example, the apportionment of lots, but without power to alter the customary distribution. In other cases his ownership appears to be effective, and the cultivator's position depends upon his will, while there are numerous gradations between the extremes. Analogous questions arise about the head of a household who sometimes appears as a true owner, with power of disposal, sometimes as a life tenant, and sometimes as the mere president of a corporation which owns, tills, and enjoys the produce collectively. But, however difficult it may be to determine the true position in any single case, the general trend of social differentiation is clear. There is doubt, as we have seen, about the prevalence of communal ownership in the most primitive groups. What seems universal is access to the land. There is no distinction between a landed and a landless class at this stage, while as we advance we find more and more cases in which ownership is restricted to the chief, or a class of nobles. This is a much more radical change than any of the grada-

¹ I.e. where the land is inalienable, passing by descent from parent to child, or is either divided or goes to one son by family arrangement.

tions between communal and private ownership, for it implies the dependence of one class upon another for the means of subsistence. The mass of the people now in fact become dependent cultivators, slaves, serfs, or tenants of chiefs or nobles.

In drawing up the following table the attempt was made after allowing for all these variations to distinguish between (1) cases in which effective property in land might on balance be called communal whether tribal, village, or gentile, (2) cases in which it might be called several¹ without restriction to any class, and (3) cases in which ownership is restricted to the chief or the nobility. The cases under each head are reduced to a fraction of all the cases analysed.²

	Communal	Several	Restricted
Lower hunters	0.69	0.30	—
Higher hunters	0.80	0.11	0.08
Agric. I	0.64	0.36	—
Agric. II	0.54	0.34	0.12
Agric. III . . .	0.29	0.34	0.37

This table shows no consistent progress from communal to several ownership without restriction of class. In fact, apart from the drop among the higher hunters the proportion of several ownership is nearly constant. Communal ownership, on the other hand, diminishes heavily in the two higher grades, but the gain accrues to chiefs and nobles. With these results should be compared the cases where the use of land is given for some consideration—a rudimentary form of letting. Of these there are none among the lower hunters, two among the higher, one in Agriculture I, four in Agriculture II, and seven in Agriculture III. The two cases among the higher hunters come from the differentiated and relatively advanced fishing peoples of the Pacific Coast, who also supply all the few cases of restriction to nobles or chiefs in this stage. If for communal ownership we were to write free access to the land for every member of the group, the result would be simple. This is universal

¹ Whether true individual property or inalienable.

² The pastoral peoples are omitted, the numbers under the various heads being too small to be of value.

in the simplest societies, and it is only gradually restricted as land becomes valuable. After all, the dominant fact in the lowest grades is that there is plenty of land—*superest ager*. With the growth of population and with agricultural improvements land acquires a value and is appropriated.

The actual use and enjoyment of the land and its fruits, that is, the organisation of production and consumption, is not necessarily collective because the land is communally owned. Among the hunting peoples the actual quest of food is of course determined by the food itself, and often leads them to wander in small parties. A big hunt, however, may be collectively organised, and a great catch, like a stranded whale among the Eskimo, is common booty. Food is in many cases shared either by the whole camp or by a specified kindred, and the distribution goes sometimes by detailed rules.¹ Among the agricultural peoples, also where the land is common, the harvest may be a collective undertaking of the whole tribe, or more often of the kindred, or joint household, who make common stock. In general there is a disposition to make good deficiencies out of plenty, and there is always the duty of hospitality, but in the treatment of the helpless, and aged, and the children there is a good deal of variation. Sometimes the aged are exposed or put to death, but more usually they are well cared for. Infanticide occurs when older children cannot easily be maintained, but the child once allowed to live is held in affection.²

Of trade within the community there is naturally very little within the lowest grades, but both within and still more beyond the limits of the community there is a tacitly understood exchange of gifts. A present is made with an eye to a return gift, which by custom arrives in due course. Between strange communities who avoid open intercourse this develops into the silent trade. A more regular exchange

¹ Among some Australians it is etiquette for the actual captor to take the worst joint.

² Infanticide scarcely occurs among pastoral people—we found only one clear case among thirty-nine communities—and they are equally free from cannibalism and human sacrifice. Infanticide is, as might be expected, commonest among the lower hunters.

of gifts acting through hospitality and guest friendship allows the development of a regular trade resting on tacit understandings which in general are honourably observed.¹ It is easy to see that this custom might develop (or degenerate) into barter, and a regular trade thus arises between communities. Finally, in the higher agricultural and pastoral grades the beginnings of specialised industry, especially metal work, implies the rise of barter to a position of importance within the community as well. Here, however, we have to reckon with another line of development. The noble household may enlarge and differentiate itself so as to include artisans. It may have its own smiths, builders, carpenters, weavers, as well as its ploughmen and herdsmen, and they may be serfs or slaves. The beginnings of this organisation are to be found among some of the simpler peoples,² and it becomes important in the early and middle civilisations, in the Greco-Roman societies, and in the Middle Ages and earlier modern period.

II. We cannot here attempt any general review of economic development under the various civilisations known to history. Any summary statement would raise controversial questions not to be argued within the space available. How in some instances, as in China, the archaic institutions like the patriarchal or the joint family, have stubbornly maintained their hold. How in others land tenure assumed a feudal shape based on the reciprocal functions of service and protection, how in some cases feudal superiority was transformed into ownership, how in other instances the small man on his side became a full proprietor, and then in turn had a struggle for existence with the big estate and the moneylender, how independent craftsmen arose and formed guilds and sometimes hereditary castes, how great houses could carry on business through slaves and freed men, how

¹ The most conspicuous case is the Kula traffic in the islands off New Guinea recently described in the work of Dr Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. For the importance of exchange of gifts both within the group and between groups, see A. R. Brown, *The Andaman Islanders*.

² See Muller-Lyer, *History of Social Development* (Tr. by E. and C. Lake, pp. 164, 168).

merchants could bring free craftsmen into their employment by supplying the material and buying up the finished product; how the contrasts of wealth and poverty give their special colour and significance to the ethical and religious data of 'charitable beneficence'—all this it is difficult to describe faithfully without a wealth of detail which would be inadmissible here. But of the distinctive characteristics of modern industry a word must be said. Our 'system' is generally described as that of 'capitalism.' If this word is used with any distinctive meaning it cannot be taken as importing simply that we use existing wealth in the production of further wealth. That is done by the savage who uses a flint knife that he has chipped roughly to an edge. Capitalism in a distinctive sense imports the employment in the production of goods for sale of those who have not the means of production by some who have or can command this means. This system is unknown among the simplest peoples where the land is accessible to all, and the very simple implements known are no less generally obtainable. But the restricted ownership of land and the subordination of the cultivator to a superior comes into play, as we have seen, among the more advanced of the simpler peoples, and with the growth of population and a settled order on the one hand and of industrial apparatus on the other primitive methods cease to be available. In the development of industry and trade, flocks and herds, slaves, movable property of every description, and eventually money, accumulate in private hands, and both reflect and accentuate the differentiation of occupations and of classes. Genuine capitalism is found in one shape and another in ancient, mediaeval, and earlier modern times. But the great mechanical inventions gave it a new impetus. The apparatus of industry became much more elaborate. Large aggregations of workers became normal; the differentiation of management from manual work and even from high technical skill became more marked. Industry became highly specialised, and that on the basis of subordination—contractual, no doubt, but none the less subordination—of the mass of workers to a superior. If these tendencies

had gone through unrestrained—particularly in association with the laws of inheritance and bequest—they would have given us a system highly efficient perhaps for the production of wealth, and world-wide in the ramifications of exchange, but incompatible with industrial freedom, and not productive of material benefit to all classes concerned. As a fact, however, they had to contend with an awakening social conscience and a growing political freedom. The more helpless classes of workers have received legislative protection in the matters of health, safety, hours, and finally remuneration. The aggregation of workers of the same class with no substantial prospect of rising above it stimulated trade unionism by means of which the more skilled have after many vicissitudes on the whole held their own and obtained some hope of permanent economic progress. Fiscal measures have combated monopoly and checked the accumulation of great wealth by inheritance. Meanwhile the progress of the democratic spirit—made possible on the large scale by the new system of communications—suggested the attempt to use the great industry for common purposes, and so to supersede the whole mechanism of private capital, enterprise, and profit. The limits of this ideal belong to the controversies of the day. As a matter of history its two products are the co-operative system and public, principally municipal, ownership. With these should be considered the growth of information facilitating the intelligent anticipation of movements of world supply and demand, whence comes an incipient organisation of production to meet general needs. All these developments, taken together, and in combination with the stricter legal control of industrial conditions have materially modified the capitalist system. It is, in fact, misleading to speak of 'the capitalist system' as a single definite complex of institutions coming into being at a definite time and destined either to remain in perpetuity or at some definite date to give way to a Socialist or some other system. The reality is a continuously changing fabric, very different in many essential features to-day from what it was, say, in Cobden's time, a system in which unrestricted competition plays

a decreasing part and social considerations a larger. The problem is to reconcile high specialisation and large-scale production for a world market with freedom of mutual benefit as between all the classes concerned. The older freedom of the small proprietor or the independent craftsman does not meet the case. We have become too closely interdependent, and have to go not back towards individualism but onwards to co-operation. The true line of co-operation is still in controversy, and we are not here to advocate any particular view. But though no ultimate solution has been reached, there has been attained a partial reconciliation—at lowest a *modus vivendi*—between high industrial differentiation and social freedom. This is the distinctive characteristic of modern industrial development, and with it goes a change in the conception of property and of the obligation to poverty. In place of the gracious charity of the superior we have the conception of the claim of human need upon a common stock, which is recognised to be the product not merely of the special ability and industry of individuals, but of the general growth of civilisation to which the humble worker has contributed his mite and which the entire living generation owes in great part to its fathers and forefathers.

Economic, like other development, begins with the group innocent of serious internal differentiation. This soon gives way to the distinction of superior and inferior. One kind of freedom may be maintained, or regained, by the independent producer, and one kind of association may preserve the standard and dignity of a craft. Lastly, high industrial organisation so inimical to the independent individual may be bent to the requirements of common life, mutual service and a more social freedom. This appears to be, not the achievement, but the line of industrial advance in the modern world.

12 *The Problem of Internationalism.*—The other great crux of liberty, and indeed of any sort of order, stands outside the bounds of any single community. The growing interdependence of peoples calls for organised relations between

communities, or, in the alternative, a community of the world. On this side the modern state has reached no assured end, but labours in a stormy sea of difficulties which threaten to overwhelm civilisation. In the relations of communities we see the worst side of that unequal and lop-sided development which we recognised at the outset. The simplest communities have not organised mutual war. It is indeed too much to say as some are now saying that the first state of mankind is peace. Doubtless some very primitive peoples, like the Pigmies or the Punans of Borneo are very gentle, harmless folk, but among many others quarrels between groups are frequent, arising mainly either out of the abduction of women or from charges of magic murder. They are feuds rather than wars, and a considerable part of the Australian jurisprudence is concerned with their settlement by mimic and ceremonial fighting with the avoidance of serious bloodshed. Nevertheless it holds true over wide areas that every death, natural or other, gives rise to a charge of murder, if not by a material instrument, then by non-material magic, and under such circumstances relations between groups cannot be uniformly peaceful. Feuds, which are properly acts of an individual or party, pass insensibly into wars organised by an entire community under its chief, and early wars we have seen play a large part in the rise of the authoritarian community. It is to be regretted that on this side we must consider the development of the first phase of thought as associated with the development of war. In this early stage, moreover, war retains the personal character of the feud out of which it evolves. It is waged not merely by the community against the community, but against the individual, and the results of victory are death or enslavement at will of the conquered.¹ Most frequently the women and children are enslaved or adopted in an inferior position, while the men if not held to ransom are slain. We note here and there a certain

¹ As a generalisation it is more just to say that the conquered stand at the will of the victor to be disposed of. They may (as frequently among the North American Indians) be adopted into the conquering tribe. They may also be ransomed and are sometimes set free.

chivalry in war,¹ and recognised customs of truce and peace-making.² So far the rigour of group morality is qualified, but it holds in full of the rightless person of the enemy with those social consequences that have been described above.

In the second great phase of development the political community is larger, stronger, and more fully organised, and its governmental egoism is so much the more insistent. Warfare is a regular consequence of the desire for the extension of power, territory, tribute, or trade. Internal feuds are suppressed—at least they become punishable—but governmental authority requires what we now call cannon-fodder, and what sanction it lacks it can easily borrow from religion. Two mitigations, however, occur. In the East there arose an ideal of peace, partly under the influence of Buddhism, but still more markedly in the ethics of the Confucian School, whose most distinguished disciple, Mencius, is unsparing in his denunciations of militarism. "There are men who say I am skilful at marshalling troops, I am skilful at conducting a battle.³ They are great criminals." That these are not mere words, but represent something real in Chinese mentality would, I think, be admitted by those who know most of that ancient civilisation.

Before Mencius had written, the Greek city states, though living almost in continual warfare, had also developed methods of peaceful settlement. Certain general customs of Hellas had long been recognised though not always observed, which mitigated the barbarity we find in the Homeric age. The philosophers of the fourth century tried to carry them farther and to secure general moderation and restraint at least in war between Hellenic cities. But beyond this the Greeks quite understood the possibilities of arbitration which might always be offered in lieu of an appeal to arms. Agreements for the judicial regulation of

¹ The Arkansas Indians are said to have given a share of their powder to the Chickasaw to fight with them (Waltz, *Anthropologie*, II, 154). According to the same authority (II, 398) the Kaffirs, unlike Europeans, avoided the starving out of an enemy.

² See, e.g. Catlin, *North American Indians*, II, 242.

³ *Mencius*, book VII, part II, chap. IV.

disputes between private citizens of different States were common, and leagues and small federations pointed the way to a broader union than that of the city state. We have therefore among the Greeks the germs of international organisation,¹ at least within the comity of the Hellenic peoples.

The universalism of the world-religions might have been expected to lay the foundations of peace, but on no side has the failure of spiritual religion to organise the affairs of men been so signal and complete. Early Christians might have scruples about military service. Later Christians are discouraged by their own churches from any such doubts. Only the small congregations that have gone back to the actual teaching of the Gospel have raised any effective protest against militarism. In the Canon de Treuga the mediaeval Church sought to combat private feuds, but these were eventually suppressed by the growing power of the State, and the stronger the State grew the more it asserted its illimitable sovereignty. What did happen as the modern system emerged was that war became more definitely "a contention of States through their armed forces,"² from which individuals were to suffer only what military necessity required. Hence it was proper to give quarter, to respect civilians, to pay for property requisitioned, and in victory to impose none but political and financial penalties. To this extent principles of universalism applied to the person of the enemy even in and after a war. These conceptions were elaborated into a system of international law which in general qualified the absolute sovereignty of princes by a code to which as civilised beings all were morally bound—whether it was regarded as a code prescribed by nature or as merely the formal and explicit declaration of the customs followed by civilised men as appropriate to their moral pretensions. Eventually, as elaborated in the Hague Convention, this code made very full provision

¹ Or rather, as Sir P. Vinogradoff says, inter-municipal (*Historical Jurisprudence*, vol. II (Greece), p. 153). The word inter-political, hybrid as it is, would express the relationship exactly.

² Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol. II, p. 63.

for such consideration for humanity to the individual as is consistent with a mortal fight. Unfortunately there were no means of enforcing it, and it was based upon a distinction between the civilian and the soldier, which the Great War proved to be out of date. It turned out that by the hard facts modern war is waged by an entire population, and therefore upon the entire population, and the further applications of science to war are only such as to confirm and extend this truth. In the actual conduct of the war nearly all that had been gained from the days of Grotius onwards was swept away, and the main function of the Hague Convention was to serve each side with a basis of recriminations against the enemy. The maintenance of the blockade after the Armistice was a further departure from every honourable and humane tradition. Finally, the Versailles Treaty, to say nothing of its harshness to private rights and its territorial annexations, imposed such indemnities¹ as could only be exacted by reducing the entire German nation to a kind of economic servitude. Fortunately it was soon discovered² that the whole Treaty had its ridiculous side. In particular, it was seen to be impossible thus to reduce a great industrial people to a tributary position without dislocating the labour markets of the world and undermining the position of the worker in all commercial countries. Hence Europe is slowly awakening to the necessity of a real peace on workable principles.

In the meantime the tyrannical nature of the Treaty smote the League of Nations with infantile paralysis. The League would be difficult enough to maintain if it had come into being under the best auspices. Mutilated by the abstention of one great Power, and the exclusion of two others, paralysed morally by the injustice of the settlement that it has to respect, the League has been kept alive by the enthusiasm of a few men, whose minds are filled with the sense of the world's needs, and by the dimmer and more diffused apprehension of the consequences of

¹ Again I say nothing here of the grave breach of faith involved in the methods by which the amount was arrived at.

² Written before the fatal departure of January 1923.

a renewed war. Its chance is that it may so live as to be born again, a world League whose first work it will be to undo the Versailles Treaty and to assure to all its members an equal standing, to abolish separate alliances and trade preferences, and transform diplomatic intrigue into open parliamentary discussion. There are in the world of to-day the elements of a world polity, there are also the forces making for tyranny, rebellion, confusion, and the ultimate renewal of an even more destructive war. The opposing tendencies seem nearly balanced, and which shall prevail is perhaps a question of time. In this question lies the issue between an advance to an international order which, by relieving the peoples of the burden of hate and fear, may set free ethical and economic forces great enough to carry the race to a height of civilisation hitherto unknown, and on the other hand a recrudescence of warfare in a form calculated to bring the entire structure of civilisation as we have known it to a violent end.

We are not here to enter the realms of prophecy, but in the endeavour to describe the stage actually reached we must take account of strongly marked tendencies, as well as actual results, and of partial as well as complete achievements. It is in this spirit that we must endeavour to measure the advance made in the modern world in organising the relations of communities. The question is complicated by the problems of nationality and of dependencies which technically fall within the sphere of a single political community, but in substance connect themselves rather with relations between communities. For the essence of the claim of nationality is that it should form in some way a distinctive community,¹ and the dissatisfied dependency is asking either for autonomy as a distinct constituent community, or for full independence. Now as to dependencies, modern statesmanship has long recognised the duty of governing them in their own interest as distinct from

¹ If as may happen the claims of the people are satisfied by cultural equality, the distinctive problems of nationality do not arise. It is a racial rather than a national claim like that of the Jews in most lands. By the refusal of equality, however, a racial claim may be forced into the national arena.

that of the paramount power. I do not say that this principle has been more consistently applied than other principles, but it is a recognised rule which in normal circumstances prevails. The further step of abandoning the relation of superior to inferior, and leaving the dependency to determine its own life is a necessary consequence of democratic principle, and has been applied in the British Empire to the white dominions. In India, the leading case of a coloured dependency, the very idea is novel, for the demand for Swaraj is of recent growth, and it encounters all the difficulties of political inexperience, with the addition of the more serious problem of the lack of real unity in the great peninsula. None the less the movement has gone so far that most reflecting men would now tacitly admit that if India is to remain a permanent part of the British Empire, it must be on terms comparable to those of Canada. Upon the whole, we may record a distinct advance to a political system which would transform dependencies in general into free constituents of an extended commonwealth, each with its own status in the League of Nations.

The question of nationality is more difficult because national distinctions disregard geographical contiguity and the interlocking of economic, political, and military interests. But here again the democratic principle requires that weight should be allowed to the desires of a population for unitary and distinctive government, insisting only (1) that this consideration should be equally applied, e.g. to a minority of Germans living among Czechs as to a minority of Czechs living in the Austrian Empire, and (2) that the interlocking interests should not be so disregarded as to cause an industrial deadlock or an intolerable military burden. The Versailles Treaty erred by applying these considerations one-sidedly, and has perhaps created more problems than it has solved, but if we review the history of the question over a century we may fairly say, first that the bare principle of a certain right in a population, not merely to personal but to collective expression, was a novelty, and secondly that considerable advances have been made to its practical recognition.

These advances are the necessary complement of the development of international right from the personal to the collective sphere. We have traced some elements of a sense of intercommunal or transcommunal obligation at all stages. In the modern world from the seventeenth century such obligations were definitely embodied in codes of international law. The more liberal statesmanship of modern times has maintained that any people that can be dealt with as a collective unity—whether as actually organised under a sovereign State, or as a dependency, or as a subject-group with recognisable nationality—should be treated as a *Rechts-subjekt*, on principles of equal right as determined by a common good without reference to force, just as the individual is treated by the State law or by private morals. On this basis and on this alone a world league is possible. Now this principle has certainly not triumphed, neither has it altogether failed. It has been urged by great teachers and leaders, has formed the rallying cry of parties, and not seldom has been carried into partial or even into full effect. On the other hand, it has encountered strong resistance from the opposed principle of force—sometimes stated in very naked terms, more often wrapped in pious expressions—and it has frequently failed. That is, I think, the fair record as it stands up to the present time. The modern world has developed such elements of national and international right as constitute a possible foundation for a world polity. It must be added that when modern are being compared with earlier relations it must be borne in mind that they are literally world-relations carrying with them all the complexities that the extension of scale involves.

Upon the whole, in the first stage of intercommunal society the relations of the small communities are external. In the second, such communities are either amalgamated under a superincumbent power, or the weaker are reduced to dependencies¹ and the stronger quarrel over the question of their disposal. In the third, there are the rudiments

¹ The Roman Empire forms a transitional case owing to its efforts amalgamation on equal terms and its regard for local autonomy

of legality and equal treatment for the group and communal as for the personal life.

The story of social development ends, as we said at the outset, in a double problem. The democratic state of national and supernational extent, as tested by efficiency, scope, and organic character, is the highest form of social organisation yet attained. But it requires an international extension to save it from destruction by militarism, and a solution of the economic problems to carry through the true organic principle by which each man can find the means of making the best of his own life in the service of the community and in nothing else. At bottom the two problems are interwoven, for class ascendancy is the support of militarism, which is also the means of maintaining it, and the 'close state' provides the reasons for maintaining national jealousies and enables class interests to figure as the common good. We cannot review social development as a completed process. It is rather a continuous effort to deal with problems where each solution gives rise to new questions. And yet in the very character of the problems there is evidence of true development.

CHAPTER XII

THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

1. REVIEWING the development of social institutions during the first intellectual phase, we recognise the beginnings of something like an efficient organisation on a larger scale than that of the primary group, but if we observe also the growth of class differentiation, and its effects under the heads of economic organisation, of property and of justice, we realise that the root of this early efficiency and of its increasing scale of operation is political and social subordination. Throughout the higher phases efficiency increases. There is on the whole more of organised government and in a wider area, for what were large communities among the simpler peoples would rank as small ones in the civilised world. Public justice is extended and improved, economic specialisation is greatly advanced. In large measure these developments are effected by increased subordination, social, economic, religious, and political. But, first, the movement of reflection gives rise to spiritual orders which teach a higher life and lay the basis of the moral unity of mankind. Secondly, in ancient Greece, there grows up a form of free government in association with a great cultural development culminating in an elaboration of critical method which constitutes a distinct phase in the advance of thought. The city state of the Greeks constitutes the most striking exception to the general rule which associates enlargement of scale with high civilisation. This is due to the difficulty of reconciling freedom with the diversities of large populations, and the control, demanded by efficiency, from a centre, for in the emergence of larger unities freedom was

in fact lost. It was indeed a privileged freedom—a freedom of the limited citizen class in a restricted community that was reached at this stage. The modern phase of intellectual development arising in communities of highly authoritarian structure witnesses the growth of a larger freedom and more extended partnership, in accordance with which the basis of government, the methods of justice and punishment, the relations of classes, the conditions of industrial life, the provision of elementary needs, and the system of education have been very largely remodelled. In the relations of peoples the same principles have been made the basis of free political organisation of supernational extent and constitute the elements of an international order. In this phase, then, we have the beginnings—whether destined to mature or not—of a synthesis of personal and political freedom with moral universalism, a generalised freedom and equality of partnership in communities efficiently organised on the great scale. This was, in fact, the combination which we found necessary to social development as a complete and balanced whole, and we now see it emerging along with the highest stage of intellectual development though requiring much greater efforts in moral wisdom to secure the advances that it has won. In fine, in the first phase we have development in efficiency and scale on the basis of subordination, in the following phases this development is continued, but the subordination is tempered in one direction by the rise of a spiritual order and the conception of a larger brotherhood, in another by the emergence of a partial and limited freedom. In the modern phase we have the elements, though only the elements of a free and efficient co-operation on a world-scale.

To describe development is never an easy matter, for it involves a distinction of phases which are not only continuous, but also from the nature of the case so related that the later is in a manner contained in the earlier. Hence we are repeatedly disappointed in our differentiations. The thing that we pick as the mark of an advanced stage is shown to exist after a fashion at an earlier stage, and we are again thrown back on the task of differentiating the

fashions or modes of its being. In comparative sociology the difficulty is at its maximum. For we are confronted not with one development but with an indefinite number, partly independent and partly interconnected. Every community has its individual life, and is moved primarily by internal forces. Yet it is also normally in contact with other communities, and a giver and taker of external influences. Within any extensive community again there are distinct centres of which much the same might be said, while beyond any organised community there are groups, an ethnic unity or an area of civilisation which, once more, presents itself after a manner as a whole with a development of its own, and yet on investigation betrays external influences. The task of finding general terms to cover so many complex relations and subtle differences of individuality is immensely difficult, and many would think fruitless and impossible. Communities have risen and fallen. Civilisations have shot up, flourished, and then fallen subject to arrest and decay. Is there, after all, anything of the nature of a general standard by which all may be compared, or any net result of their vicissitudes? Time after time easy generalisation makes shipwreck on hard facts. We think of some particular idea or institution as distinctively modern, and it turns up to our embarrassment in the most remote antiquity. From efficient sanitation to courts of justice, and from courts of justice to the freedom of women, we find archaic achievements which make us wonder whether, after all, there is anything new under the sun. Indeed the problem before man is always the same, and many a good solution has been lost in the downfall of the civilisation which discovered it. Yet in general something survives. In human history as a whole development has occurred. Civilisation is different from barbarism, modern civilisation from ancient, and the differences, many-sided as they are, must stand in some relation to one another. Over and over again as we try to formulate the differences we come upon exceptions which are fatal to any easy simplicity. Yet to abandon the attempt leaves us unsatisfied. We feel that there is growth, and correlated growth, however sadly we may have failed to

describe it. The hypothesis here put forward is that the growth is in the power of co-operative mental energy accumulating through tradition and reflected in the general organisation of society.

The nature of this 'reflection' is intelligible if we consider, first, that all high organisation involves intellectual power, and the more so the larger its scale. But free organisation—the effective co-operation of free men—requires far higher powers, moral or spiritual as well as intellectual, than mere administrative efficiency, and here again scale is important since size means divergence of interests, multiplicities of type, and so many more jarring elements to reconcile. No wonder that freedom started on a small scale and still lives with difficulty in great empires, or that city states offer the chief exception to the general rule that scale increases with civilisation. It is a greater feat for a Pericles to lead free men in a single city than for a Napoleon to organise a continent by autocratic power. It is an even greater feat to lead a free nation, and greater again so to guide a nation as to serve a world commonwealth of free nations. It is not of course freedom alone—which in the sense of simple emancipation from control might mean more slackness or disorder—any more than it is efficiency alone, or size alone that counts. It is the three united—efficient organisation of a great community resting on free acceptance and energetic support by the ordinary citizen—that implies high moral and mental endowment.

We are not to infer that the mental factor is necessarily the cause and the social system the effect, still less that institutions are purposely established for the sake of the good which we may find in them. For the most part institutions we have already insisted are not made, but grow. No Plato or Aristotle planned the Greek city state, and the whole Greek intellectual movement comes historically late in the political development, and is more its effect than its cause. That energy and initiative which made the city state, fostered and matured by the institutions which they produced, blossomed into the creations of literature, art, science, and philosophy. In modern times ideas have

played a larger formative part, but their acceptance and popularity have generally been due to particular social conditions. No one has yet systematically analysed any of the great modern reforms such as the abolition of slavery, the partial humanisation of criminal law, or the series of industrial regulations with a view to the accurate and impartial measurement of the comparative influence of the moral and material or economic factors, and till we have several such investigations before us we cannot pretend to determine the formative strength of ideals. All that we can maintain is that there is a broad correlation between the system of institutions and the mentality behind them, simply because it takes that mentality to establish and work them. If the institutions are sensibly above the intellectual and moral capacity of a people they will break down, if below they will be broken up. But it is important that there is a margin of adaptability within which it may be that good institutions will stimulate the mind to rise to them, and bad institutions will discourage effort, with the result that the mind will lower itself to them. The structure of society, as I have said at the outset, is the proffered solution of a problem. The problem varies, but all the variations are on one theme—the nature of man and the world he lives in. Here the problem may be relatively simple, and there it may be harder. This society may start with antecedent advantages, and that one with special difficulties. But in the main the solution will reflect the available amount of moral wisdom. Indeed, it is only for a high development of such wisdom that the deeper problems become known as such. It is through their solution alone that man can co-operate on the great scale in the largest ends wherein human capacity finds its fullest and most harmonious expression.

2 *Causes of Development and Arrest* —We have seen enough in this limited review to convince us that social development does not move with the assured sweep of a planet in its orbit on a mechanically determined curve. Neither does it resemble the inevitable unfolding of a germ through predetermined stages with harmonious correlation of parts

to an assigned maturity of type. It more nearly resembles a series of efforts to grapple with an obstacle the nature of which is only half understood, and which, in consequence, when forced to yield at one point, returns at another. This image errs partly by over-emphasising the element of conscious purpose particularly in the earlier phases of society, but principally by conceiving the object as external. The obstruction to social development is within, and we can perhaps get the best picture of its general character if we think of a germ capable of development on many sides, but so little organised for the process that instead of the co-ordinated growth in many directions at once, which we find in the living embryo, development on one side or in one direction is a potential source of hindrance to the equally necessary development in some other direction. There is, indeed—to vary the metaphor—a line of possible harmony along which both developments can proceed, and that is the line of progress. But strait is the gate and narrow the way, and few communities there be that find it. The psychical life of the individual is a balance of opposites, and the life of society is even more so. The growth of the individual means the evolution of definitely marked qualities—any one of which may ruin him. If he is without passions, without the keen susceptibilities of love and anger and pride, he is of little account, but if he cannot hold anger and pride and love in due relation to his life as a whole, they will destroy him. Hence, often the poorly endowed nature more harmoniously balanced will survive when the richer perishes. Development involves an ever renewed synthesis of divergent, potentially conflicting, characters at a higher level. It is the same and even more so with society. For in society psychological qualities attain substantive and organised expression, and constantly achieve solid good, which is the enemy of the better. What a fine thing is that solidarity of the primitive kinsfolk, which makes each man ready to die for parent or child and even for nephew and cousin, for any member of the one body. Here is no self; here is the spirit of ready sacrifice spontaneously offered in the sacred name of the community. How neces-

sary is this bond to the protection of individuals and the maintenance of such right as the people understand. Yet it is the source of deep social cleavage, of perpetual bloodshed, often of gross cruelty and unthinking vengeance. As long as it is supreme it renders all larger union ineffective. A people with these sentiments less strongly marked, with less of the feeling for kindred, with a lower spirit, a poorer pride, may perhaps more easily be guided in ways of peace, and form a more enduring society. Not such is the path of true social progress. It follows an arduous course through the full expression of all that fortitude, self-reliance, passion that so readily make for conflict, to the higher order founded on respect for the same qualities in others. But because this is the true path, it is, as said above, not easy to find. Every partial organisation is a necessary step to higher organisation, but is also a centre of resistance to it.

It is much the same if from the rivalry of organisations we turn to the clash of different elements or principles in the life of society. How can we overestimate the social value of a common and assured faith, but how can such a faith consort with that spirit of free inquiry which is the condition of all intellectual development? In the abstract it is easy to see that order and liberty must be reconciled. But there are a hundred wrong ways of accommodating them for one that is right. An ardent nationality calls forth the enthusiasms of a people, awakes its music and poetry, and kindles it to deeds of devotion. It expresses itself also in bitter and misplaced contempt for other nationalities and, if it triumphs in an intolerance as savage as that against which it revolted. How is nationalism to be subdued to the higher issues of humanity without the evaporation of its fervour? There is no progress without passion, and neither order nor progress without the subdual of passion. In fine, the organic development of human society involves a synthesis of opposites, which, when effected, is broken again by the further development of the one limb or the other. That is why we often find a certain harmony in the very simple life which disappears at a higher remove. The gentler, tamer types live happily enough just because

they are not capable of great things But for that very reason we are not to take the tremendous conflicts and widespread horrors of our own time as grounds of despair They issue from qualities of civilised man and highly organised society which are at once the marks of high development and the promise of a fuller harmony

3 These considerations explain the statement of the general conditions favourable to progress which is due to Mr. J M Robertson He points out that the most certain and many-sided progress occurs where we have independent communities in close relation with one another—conditions realised in ancient Greece in mediaeval Europe, and in the modern civilised world Under these conditions there is on the whole sufficient security within each community to give leisure for mental pursuits and opportunity for the consolidation and improvement of the social order, while there is always the stimulus of comparison and competition. Unfortunately, as we have too much reason to know, the same situation is apt to break out in destructive warfare and engenders a permanent attitude of 'offensive defensiveness,' and the problem, as yet unsolved, of the higher development is to secure the stimulus without the risk of dissolution The solution must depend on the formation of a clearer and more diffused social purpose in which the desirability of the higher human interests is a sufficient stimulus, and emulation in their service replaces competition for more selfish ends as the spur of sustained activity It remains true that a system of relatively independent yet interrelated centres of life is most favourably situated for general progress, and that will be true not only of the international order where the self-governing States are the centres, but within each nation where in the same way progress is best maintained if there are many centres of life and focal points of interest, the highest organisation being one which does not obliterate such constituent organisms, but is able to find a place for each of them in the life of the whole The true organic unity is the precise reverse of the Platonic state.

The further condition generally affecting development is

the nature of tradition. Tradition is primarily the continuity of the social life and structure into which each new generation fits itself as it grows up. Now in the case of knowledge this process is simply one of education, which can be carried through in youth. The adult man starts abreast of the best knowledge of his subject, and can spend his manhood in adding to it. This is more particularly true of scientific specialism, less true perhaps of the deeper thought on fundamentals which cannot be simply imparted but has to be lived into. But in pure science and particularly in the detailed application of principles, it is true that each generation stands on the shoulders of the last. No greater effort is required to build on the higher than on the lower level, given the scaffolding of education which raises the worker and his materials to the required point. The same thing holds of applied science, and therefore of the industrial arts. In both cases, given the protection of a stable social order, and one fairly receptive to new ideas or to industrial changes, the advance on these lines is continuous and may be exceedingly rapid. Progress here is additive—it goes by accretion. Hence, also, it is in general continuous. There have been lost arts and possibly lost sciences, but such breaches of tradition have come about not from failure on this specific side of social life, but from some breakdown of the general social structure, such as the fall of the Western Empire.

The case of ethical, religious, and social progress is very different. Take a community which has a certain ethical code reflected in its working customs, and perhaps a higher one taught by the recognised religion. Even the lower of these codes makes no small demand on human nature. It cannot be taught as chemistry can be taught. As to the higher, each man has to learn and learn it again all his life long, and it will only be the very exceptional personality that really lives in the spirit of the whole, and can also add to it some new element of real experience. What can be communicated is the body of codes, ethical, religious, philosophical, expressed in the tradition and as ideas boys may learn them, and men may add to and develop them.

It is on this side, therefore, on the side where it touches knowledge, that ethics have something of the same sort of progress as thought in general. Ethico-religious thought is in fact the summed experience of the race as applied to human ends. But as a living discipline neither ethics nor religion admit of the kind of facile progress which is possible for that which can be taught at school and taken as acquired once for all. They have to be re-created in each new generation. Re-creation is, however, easier than originality, and though each human being starts, so to say, from scratch, with the primitive instincts and powers of untutored humanity, he is ordinarily brought to the standard of his society by the operation of the living tradition. On this standard men and women of moral genius make advances, some of which win slowly to acceptance, and unless some break of tradition is brought about by a catastrophe like war, the constant activity of mind operating through the tradition secures a slow but steady progress.

Passing from the spirit to the body of social institutions, we find tradition working, in the first place, as a conservative force. Every organisation has an inertia of its own, and is at least passively resistant to change. On the other hand, (a) the new idea that is once incorporated in organised form has acquired a local habitation and a substance, so that institutions are the necessary vehicles of progress, and (b) some organisations are under appropriate stimuli found to be animated with a principle of growth. They have a kind of collective egoism which loves power and seeks expansion, and even their natural inertia takes the form of a momentum carrying them forwards. The difficulty then, as one sees with a Government department, is to get them to know where to stop, or how to delimit their work in relation to the functions of other organisations. In the main, however, we must write down social institutions as the great conservative force in tradition. Their work is to consolidate the positions won in the region of ideas, and their general tendency is to oppose innovation whether for good or for evil.

Lastly, in the sphere of imaginative creation, tradition

operates both for progress and decay. By tradition arts have grown rapidly, most conspicuously in improvements of technique, but also in the inspiration of one master by another. But a stage is too soon reached when tradition evolves into traditionalism. A manner becomes imitated, not because it is the best method available but because it is the manner of a celebrated man or a known school. In reaction from this again art breaks up into fancies and whims, and the deliberate search for novelty as novelty and as a means of advertisement, with no regard to intrinsic values. Hence probably in the effect of tradition lies the history of the often repeated rapid rise, maturity, and decay of schools of artistic and literary creation.

Thus the nature of tradition throws considerable light on the inequalities of progress—the relative continuity and acceleration in the advance of positive knowledge and its application to industry, the more halting and uncertain but, on balance, substantial development of the ethico-religious life, the conservatism of positive institutions, and the alternation of progress and decay in the sphere of artistic creation, where tradition has a retrogressive as well as a progressive tendency.

Of any cyclical tendency in human development or any analogy to the growth, maturity, and decay of the animal body, there is no real evidence. The decadence of communities is, in some clear cases, for example that of Venice, due to the shifting of trade routes. In others it is due to the growth of external powers; for example, fundamentally the great position of France from Richelieu to Napoleon III was due to the fact that she was the greatest centrally organised community of Europe. From 1870 to 1918 Germany was the greater and more efficiently organised State. In other cases decadence is due to the growth of parts at the expense of the central principle, leading to an internal disruption. This is one aspect of the fall of the Roman Empire. But the full account of that series of events would take us to the very heart of social theory. From the manner of its formation, the Empire could have no degree of organic character to match the magnitude of its problems. As

Mommsen, in the full spate of his eulogy of Cæsar stays for a moment to admit, it was in this respect incomparably below the smallest city state of Greece or Italy. It is true that thinking men saw the merits of a supreme rule of peace, and that the provinces, as Tacitus admits, recognised the superiority of the Empire as an administrative authority over the republic. It is true that the governing bureaucracy saw the desirability of municipal freedom, and tried not merely to subdue but to weld by Romanisation. Yet the military element was even from the late Republican days preponderant, and no assured loyalty bound widely separated enemies to a common head. Finally, though in the Empire's best days much good and original thought was given to ethics and law, the best minds were of necessity debarred from free political activity and precisely as the troublous period came on were in fact transferring their energies more and more from civic service to the religious life, and to a form of religion which added heresies and schisms to the manifold distractions which were dividing civilisation in the hour of need

Here we touch on another cause of arrest, fissure between the interests, even the higher interests, of men. The religious life may be so conceived as to withdraw the best men and the finest energies from the public service. Art and literature, instead of inspiring public life, may hold aloof from large social interests. Scientific investigation may be biased by class or racial prejudice. Even disinterested social enthusiasms may oppose one another from being unduly narrowed to particular causes. In general terms the growth of a partial interest, whether it be of a group or class of men, or of a particular pursuit, contains a potential menace to the whole, and while the balanced growth of parts is the growth of the whole the disturbance of the balance involves misfortune, arrest, and possibly decay. Thus for social decadence there is abundant explanation in social causes

Of true racial decay there is no clear evidence. The case of Rome, though much talked of, does not stand investigation. The old families that made the republic may have died out,

but the literary complaints of degeneracy familiar in Horace date, if they have any scientific value at all, from the beginning of the Principate, which was not an age of decadence but of remarkable progress maintained for nearly two centuries. The republic was in decadence since the battle of Pydna, while the great republican families were still flourishing, and if under the Empire these families were submerged, there were plenty of vigorous stocks in Italy and the provinces which supplied a succession of able emperors and generals from Trajan downwards. The Empire never lacked able men down to the age of Stilicho and Aetius, not to say that of Belisarius or Narses. It has been suggested that the plague was the cause of the fall of Athens, but there is no evidence that the plague selected the best Athenians as victims, and after the calamity Athens continued the war with success till the Peace of Nicias, and was in fact ruined by the insensate imperialism that launched the Sicilian expedition and the futility which placed it in the incompetent hands of a respectable mediocrity. In short, the causes of a political disaster were themselves political. The larger and more permanent cause of the decline of the Greek city state and of the free spirit associated with it lay in the failures enumerated above and mainly in the failure to reconcile a wider union with the principle of autonomy—a failure going back to the palmy days of the Periclean policy. The separate cities could put up no fight as soon as a great half-Hellenic, half-barbaric military empire arose in the north. On the whole, then, we are to look to social causes for social effects, and not give ourselves over to biological analogies or accept biological explanations which could not in fact be verified without elaborate statistical computations for which the barest data are lacking and which are ill provided by the occasional jeremiad of a literary man.

4 *Conclusion* —The connection between intellectual and social development is rough and indirect, but real and far-reaching. It is rough and indirect because social organisation is not the work of a unitary mind expanding in regular phases from germ to maturity. It is the work of numerous minds, now co-operating, now in conflict, and it is as much

a compromise as a synthesis. Nevertheless, the life of a civilisation reflects, for reasons shown, the stage of mental development which has on the whole been attained therein. But if the growth of mind must ultimately penetrate the social structure, it must be remembered that intellectual development is only one side of this growth, and the extension of organised knowledge is not even the whole of intellectual development. The underlying truth of history is the opening out of the power of mind in man. This is pre-eminently a social process, for there is little evidence of any deep change in individual faculty, and it operates through tradition, mutual stimulus, selection and co-operation. This development has many aspects. One, perhaps the most fundamental, is that sense of its own unity and meaning which, however partially apprehended, lies at the root of ethics and religion, and through them constitutes the spirit of the social structure. Another development is the more strictly intellectual, the effort to find in the world an intelligible order and to subdue natural forces to human needs. We have seen how through the operation of tradition the development can proceed with a sureness and swiftness on this side which is denied to it on others. It is clear that development is uneven, but our hypothesis is that on its various sides it springs from one root and nourishes, so to say, one life. To drop metaphor, the same rational impulse inspires the effort of the intellect and of the moral consciousness, and the expansion of mind in the one direction involves an enlightenment which must tell on others, a larger view, a more rational method, a clearer vision of the position of man in the world order. Fundamentally the thesis is that the principle of the development of mind is one, though its applications are very diverse, and in particular its actual embodiment in mental operations is distinct from its conscious acceptance. Because of these diversities the partial recognition or embodiment of the principle is often the cause of new errors, further conflicts, and fresh obstructions. Because of the ultimate unity of the principle each partial recognition must, such dangers notwithstanding, be on the whole a step towards one and the same end.

INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 315

Social development, which in the last analysis is the expression of mind in the relations of individuals under the conditions of the physical environment, illustrates both the to and fro of the conflict and the underlying unity of the movement. Could the minds of men once adequately grasp the principle as a whole, there would emerge that unitary spirit—not in a metaphysical super-self but in the organic relations of individual souls—from which an orderly and harmonious development would proceed. But human history is not the evolution or unfolding of a unity which was there at the beginning. It would be nearer the truth to put unity at the end. Or may we venture to place it at the summit of the tortuous ascent on which we find ourselves, and to suppose that from that summit, as there would be a larger view, so also there would be a simpler and a surer course?

CHAPTER XIII

SOCIAL LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

I SOCIAL development as here understood, though an organic harmony in ideal is not a physical but a spiritual growth. It is achieved only by the continuous struggle of mind with a problem. The problem is dual. Man has to deal with the physical world and with his relations to his fellows, and this second part of his task includes within it the ultimate difficulty—his relations to himself. The lines of solution too are dual, since the mind can meet a difficulty by overcoming it, or by accommodating itself to it. If the wall is unscalable the latter is the path of wisdom, but if wit devises a way over to venture it is always the path of advance. By the one method or the other every stable social system, every working code of ethics and religion affords a partial solution of the problem. Every partial solution is a point of departure for a better solution. What it leaves out figures eventually as practical opposition or theoretic contradiction, and opposition and contradiction are the stimuli to further advance. But this general statement is subject to three qualifications. (1) the contradiction must not be or appear to be insuperable. The ocean was not a stimulus to the primitive sailor, but an accepted barrier, and so it remained till the introduction of the compass suggested the hope of striking boldly across it. (2) The contradiction must not be met by accommodation unless accommodation implies a true development of the mind itself. The lesson of resignation was good in so far as it taught the individual to merge himself in a wider life, bad in so far as it persuaded man to accept as unalterable con-

ditions which his combined energies could in fact overcome, and indeed to kiss the rod which he should have wrenched from the striker's hand. (3) As mind advances to a clearer conception of its end the purpose itself becomes a sufficient stimulus. The dialectical movement from one half truth to its opposite gives place to a more equable development by extensions of application, enrichments of meaning, and supplements which rather fortify than subvert the central idea.¹ To conceive contradiction as a final necessity to mind is as fallacious as to regard evil as a necessary condition of good. Contradiction which crushes mind in germ is its stimulus in growth and is overcome in its maturity. But the human mind is not yet mature, and the stimulus has still a large part to play.

Mind solves its problems in the first stage by instinct, in the next by trial and error, in the third by applied knowledge. In the field of social relations it is best frankly to admit that we have not advanced beyond the second stage. We have, it is true, various detached bodies of knowledge which it is proper to apply, but where broad social effects are in question we shall show most wisdom by not overrating our knowledge, but frankly admitting that progress must be through trial and error. But shall we ever advance beyond that stage? Can we contemplate, after Comte, a sociology comprehensive in principle and sufficiently elaborated in method to carry out effectually that in which the religions have failed, the just ordinance of life? We come here on questions of principle which are so important for our whole inquiry that they must be specially examined.

2 The claims of sociology to scientific rank are, in fact, disputed not only on the score of an actual immaturity of which no one is quite so keenly conscious as a sociologist, but on the ground of an inherent difference between the social (and with it the mental) on the one side, and the physical world on the other. Science, it is conceived, deals with law. The physical world is the realm of law, and is,

¹ The change is noted after his own fashion by Hegel in passing to the higher stages to the dialectic.

therefore, the appropriate field of science. The world of mind is different. Even if in its lower regions it comes within law's scope, the will is free, and the will is the decisive factor. We can no more foretell the future of society than of any individual because it depends on choices which are not only unforeseen, but unforeseeable. Anything else we can predict if we know all the relevant conditions, but choice we cannot predict because the will which exerts it does not rest upon conditions. It is a cause, and a decisive cause, of effects. But it is not itself an effect of anterior causes. Every act of will thus constitutes a gap in the sequence of cause and effect, frustrates foresight, and reduces the universality of social (and psychological) causation to foolishness.

We need not here discuss this conception of the will. It may suffice to point out that its bearing on the scientific rank of sociology has been quite misunderstood. In the first place, it is not true that science is confined to the ascertainment of laws. There is also such a thing as the scientific determination of particular facts, e.g. the size or weight of the sun, the order of geological succession or of historical events. Science is merely the systematic, detached, and accurate inquiry into truth as distinct from the unscientific thinking which is casual, emotional and rough and ready in its deliverances. In the pursuit of truth science discovers a great many relations which hold uniformly, and these are called laws. Most if not all of these laws state the consequences which follow on certain conditions, and it is only in this form that they hold good as universal truths. If converted into judgments about actual relations in the world of concrete experience, we do not always find them accurate. We find sometimes approximations, sometimes exceptions and irregularities. We seldom find one abstract law operating in all the beauty of its simple reasonableness. Our scientific generalisations, that is to say, are conditional in character, and in the physical world it is only if all the conditions hold that the consequence can be securely predicted. Nevertheless, our knowledge of laws properly used is the basis of whatever mastery we have of the physical

world. We know what the machine will produce if it works normally, and conversely if it is not coming up to expectation we infer a defect and are stimulated to look for it. We know what follows from certain conditions, though we can never be theoretically certain in the concrete that all the conditions, positive and negative, are in operation. Our position in the social field is in principle the same. The economist has no difficulty in showing how and why fluctuations in demand and supply affect price, but when he applies the generalisation to the actual movements in the price of bread in London to-day he labours under the difficulty of showing that all his conditions, including any general tacit assumption, are at work. Among the latter is the assumption that men will buy as cheaply and sell as dearly as they can—an assumption about the motives of men. If this should fail—as in some instances or on some occasions it does—the law of supply and demand would not apply. To say that it is broken or frustrated is an incorrect metaphor. A true scientific law is never broken. What is frustrated is the expectation founded on this law, an expectation of a concrete event coming about in a situation apparently but not really conforming to the condition laid down in the law. Another possibility is that our statement of a law is imperfect, our analysis is incomplete, and though perchance it states the main conditions upon which the consequence depends, it has overlooked some element which is really operative. If this element is in fact present in normal experience the flaw may escape notice for an indefinite time until the limiting case turns up in which it is absent. In this case our statement is frustrated, that is to say, the belief which we entertain that some relation held universally is proved incorrect, but there is no breach of the uniform relation of conditions and their consequences. Lastly, the law may only profess to state a tendency, that is to say, the consequences of certain conditions in as far as they are not distorted by counteracting causes which may or may not be fully specified. Thus there are three senses in which, for example, the law of the dependence of prices on supply and demand may be supposed to fail. First,

it may be an incomplete statement of the conditions upon which the consequence depends, secondly, in a given case some one or other of the conditions which it specified does not exist, thirdly, it may state a tendency which in a given case is overborne by other tendencies. It is clear that in the third case the law properly regarded is, in fact, operative, in the second the law is not really relevant to the case in point; in the first the law is shown to be incorrectly stated. In no case is there any question of a law which is correctly stated being broken, frustrated, or disobeyed.

Now in the field of concrete and very complex facts it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain all the conditions upon which any consequence depends. We can be hardly expected to advance beyond a statement of tendencies, and in any event many residual conditions will remain which at best we could only hope to elucidate by very prolonged inquiry. Nevertheless, all such inquiry, if continued in a scientific spirit, will constantly add to our knowledge of the conditions affecting results. The difference which a true indeterminism of the will would introduce would be simply this, that while in other sciences all conditions might ultimately become known, in psychology and sociology there would always be something unknowable. There would, so to say, be a gap in the orderly sequence whenever the will came into play, just as though in the physical world there were some condition operating which was for ever removed from the sphere of our observation. None the less, upon each side of the gap we could go on with our work, and all our generalisations would hold conditionally on the behaviour of the unknown factor.

But this does not exhaust the matter, for as we arrive at each generalisation it will hold or fail conditionally on a statable operation of the unknown factor. For example, the law of supply and demand holds if and in so far as the human will aims at obtaining the best article at the lowest price. The question then arises, Does the human will so act? Now let us assume every single human will to be undetermined in the traditional libertarian sense. This must

mean that in any given case it is equally probable that it would act in one way or in the opposite way. For if we deny this the will is biased, and therefore at least partially determined. But when any result is unbiased by the known conditions, the probability that it will occur, and the probability that it will not occur, are equal. In a large number of cases it is likely to occur and to fail about an equal number of times, and any great divergence from equality is exceedingly improbable. Hence we arrive at two results. If the will has no definite and uniform direction, then operating among large numbers of persons, it will produce no sensible divergence from the results which would ensue if it did not operate at all. Conversely, if in human choice there is some preponderant tendency observed, that tendency is not unconditioned, but proceeds from determinate elements in the nature of the will itself. Hence in sociology the indeterminateness of the will, if true, does not affect the possibility of establishing laws of cause and effect, with an approximation to certainty and accuracy which advances with every increment of numbers.

3 To this it may be objected that in the life of society there are occasions—sometimes very critical occasions—when the will of one man is the decisive factor. The normal life of society is based on large and massive causes. It is the product of many millions of wills acting each on its own lines under the conditions of the common life. But it may be that at a certain conjuncture this vast complex divides itself into two masses equally balanced. There are two great parties opposed; their strength is so equal that at a given moment one important person holds the balance between them. He makes a speech; he drops a phrase; he takes some executive decision; and the result is that his party, and perhaps the nation, is committed to a certain course. Immediately the whole balance of force is shifted. Just as the slightest breath of wind may decide whether a raindrop shall fall on this side or the other of a water parting, and so find its way into the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, so this single choice of a single individual may be the final determinant of war or peace, and therewith of an

incalculable series of consequences in the life of the world. If the will is indeterminate it may be said no science can deal with such contingencies. One might retort with the question whether on the most stringent determinist assumptions any science which we can really expect to establish could ever deal with such contingencies. We cannot expect to foresee the concrete in such completeness. Yet we do not think medicine unscientific because at a certain stage of a disease the life of the patient may hang so delicately in the balance that a cart going down the street might administer the fatal shock. What the art that is founded on science will do is to take every possible step to shield the patient from any such mischance, and so an applied sociology will shelter society from the casual risks of an infirm will. Determined or undetermined, the individual will has vagaries with which no science can expect to deal within any limits of time that we need consider.

Since in certain conjunctures such vagaries may materially affect the life of a society, we can make no pretension to a forecast of the detailed course of history. Neither can all the laws of biology avail to predict whether Mr. John Smith will live to eighty, or perish of some infectious disease at twenty-one. Medical science might conceivably reach a point at which it could measure John Smith's power of resistance to the hypothetical influenza germ, but if this resistance fluctuates and if the infection on its side is very irregularly diffused in space and time, what science will predict that over a long course of years John Smith will or will not some day encounter the infection just at the moment of insufficient resisting power? Science as we have it at present makes no such pretensions. What it may show is that certain conditions diminish John Smith's risks, and that those who conform to these conditions have a lower death-rate from influenza, and these results, though not so precise as a gipsy's horoscope, have their interest for Smith and are better value for his shilling.

So it is with society. We know many tendencies and many conditional generalisations, and among others we can say this. The greater social causes are not mocked ;

they have their way in one form if not in another. The broad tendencies assert themselves against the little accidental shocks which momentarily disturb the balance of society. Grant that the Great War would not have broken out if in July 1914 the minds of half a dozen men had been other than they were—had been even temporarily swayed by other motives. Would this petty alteration have sensibly dissipated the vast cloud of distrust which overshadowed Europe? Conversely, would war once declared have become the horror that it was if the whole condition of Europe—historic memories, universal fears, credulities, pomposities, pathetic loyalties—had not maintained it against every chance of peace? The historic study of great statesmen does not reveal them as arbiters of events. Intimately considered, they are seen as men who from hour to hour are grappling with the recurrent difficulties of one situation after another, fortunate if when night comes they can be satisfied that they have committed themselves to nothing ruinous, praiseworthy if among all turnings they retain some sense of direction and some principle of honour. There are few whose will is less their own than those whose will seems to control great masses.

Neither the fancied indeterminateness of the will, nor the real vagaries which for practical purposes make it often incalculable, interfere with the power of science to ascertain the general tendencies of social life, and to formulate abstract laws of the dependence of certain consequences upon given conditions. Every nation, every society, will indeed have its own individual history, but this does not prevent it from conforming to general truths applicable to all nations. All general laws apply to individual things, though all individual things differ from one another. The individual is the variation upon the theme which is general—not a distinct and incompatible theme. The proverbial two peas are not exactly alike in every possible respect, yet there are generalisations which hold of peas. The differences of peas of course are slight, and therefore abstract descriptions and general statements may exhaust all that we care to know about them. The individuality of human beings and nations is

rich, and when we have carried definition and generalisation to the limit of our capacity we always feel that much remains behind. That what remains is of such different quality that it can never be apprehended by the intelligence, that it lies in the province of instinct or intuition, and is immune from desecrating reason, is a piece of popular mysticism with no evidence in its favour. The very fact that beyond the qualities that we can name we find something which for the moment we cannot name is proof that we have at least approached the apprehension of it. It is not instinct but intellect which recognises and defines the present limitations of intellectual achievement. It is not instinct but intelligence which informs us that definitions, abstractions, generalisations are evolved from the comparison of individual objects, all of which differ, more or less as the case may be, *inter se*, and which infers accordingly that no set of abstractions will exhaust the individuality of a single thing. This same intellect makes this further inference that if we would know the residual individuality we must carry our work of comparison to the utmost completeness, and we can then tell what is over and what is its significance. Lastly, the same intellect will deny that the residue is unknowable, for it will refuse to limit knowledge to the analysis or combination of abstract terms. I know this man as I know this pea, primarily by direct observation, an observation which does not depend on the comparison which I make between him and others, but on the contrary is part of the logical basis upon which they rest. Finally, the concrete description of a particular society is as truly a scientific problem as the ascertainment of general laws.

4. If at one extreme people deny social science on the strength of human will, at the other they deny efficacy of the will on the strength of science. From the fact that there is law in the movements of society, as elsewhere, they infer that men have nothing to do but wait and watch the law fulfilling itself. Social evolution gets to be conceived as a process going on of itself over the heads of the individual members of society. The domestic industries develop into the great capitalist system, and capitalism

is to develop into socialism without the living generations having a word to say about what is happening to them. Not a word (we should put it) to the purpose, for they utter many words, but all without effect, since the process goes on its predestined course however they may argue. Now the analysis of sociological laws completely dissipates this fatalistic view. It reveals in society no superhuman monster but simply human beings, human minds and bodies, human wills and passions, in interaction with one another and the physical environment. There can be no laws in question but (1) those of the human soul, (2) those of the interactions of human beings one with another, and (3) those of the consequences of such actions. So far as consequences are concerned, the mere knowledge of them puts our will in control just as far and just in the same way as a physical science puts it in control of some material force. Of course it reveals things that we cannot as well as things that we can do. It will show us, for instance, that we cannot alter the laws of arithmetic, or make ourselves richer in the aggregate by diminishing the individual production of riches. But to know our limits is to economise energy, and to know our powers is to have the lever which will move things in our hands. It must then not be any law of things outside will, but a law of the will itself which is supposed to guide social destiny without regard to will. This could only be the case if the law of will were that will is blind or impotent. On the contrary, it is the law of will that so far as undisturbed by passions it endeavours towards whatever ends it sets itself as good. Whence it follows that social ends which investigation shows to be coherent and within the physical compass of human power will be attained as a result of the efforts of even a single man who realises them distinctly enough, and is able so to communicate his enthusiasm to his fellows as to secure organised action in the direction that he desires. It is not will which is powerless, but the individual will, unless it can enter into organised co-operation with others. What seems to be the blind march of events is the net result of the operation of millions of minds working not in concert for a broad comprehensive

end, but each on its own lines for its narrow end. In such a complex there is generally a trend, a balance of tendency one way or another, there is sometimes even a stampede if the same stimulus appeals to numbers at once, but there is no collective thinking, no common understanding of the trend which on the whole all are following. Hence though every individual of the mass is intelligent, the mass as a whole may be called blind, for no intelligence guides it as a whole. Yet there is no tyranny of blind fate over will, nor even of a soulless social body over will, but only of the mass of wills over any one. This may seem fate enough, and tyranny enough to the thinker who sees what things might be, and what very different things probably will be, but let him not complain of sociological law. It is not the nature of law that makes his efforts vain; on the contrary, that law will tell him that the power of human will to mould society is limited only by the clearness and consistency of its aims, the extent to which these aims can obtain support, the knowledge of the right means for securing them, and lastly their physical possibility. It is by this knowledge that he must hope to transform the drift of the mob into the intelligent purpose of organised co-operation. Society, like nature, is to be conquered Baconian fashion, by conformity with the laws of its life. Far from development in independence of the will, all its significant changes are developments of the will, or consequences thereof. Within the limits indicated there is nothing that will cannot by sufficient effort accomplish.

CHAPTER XIV

CONSISTENCY IN DEVELOPMENT

I. UNDERLYING all our discussion of the conditions of development has run the question whether organic harmony is inherently possible. Is there not—the question has been asked in many departments—some inherent inconsistency or maladjustment in things human which for progress involves self-defeat? At least, does not this apply to social progress as here conceived, that is, as something sharable by all mankind, and something involving all sides and relations of life? Progress in this or that respect, it will be readily admitted, is possible, but progress in one direction involves defeat and retrogression in others, at least for us who make our demands so comprehensive. In fact, theories of progress, particularly on humanitarian lines, have been repeatedly confronted since the time of Malthus with objections of this kind, and it is one of the most important functions of sociology in its present stage to weigh these objections very carefully. I propose therefore here to glance at the main contradictions that have been alleged. Some of them we shall see have already been met, others require some further consideration.

We may distinguish contradictions as they turn on biological, economic, political, or psychological conditions. The biological contradiction has played the largest part in social thought. It first took shape in the Malthusian law of population, in virtue of which it was believed that improved conditions of life defeated themselves by causing an increase of numbers. This opinion is no longer tenable, and has given place to the reverse objection that with the

advance of civilisation we are threatened with a diminished birth-rate, especially amongst the most cultivated classes, so that the population is recruited mainly from the weaker stocks

The first part of this prognostication is shadowy. The abnormal circumstances of war apart, there is no danger of such a general fall of the birth-rate as would lead to an actual diminution of population. Where such a fall is threatened as in France, it appears to be due to the operation of laws of inheritance which it is within the powers of a legislature to amend. In mankind as a whole the phylloprogenitive tendencies are sufficiently strong to replenish the race, and so far as they are affected by economic circumstances—apparently the principal factor working with or against them—it must be remarked that if we look on children as commodities their economic value, like that of other commodities, increases with their scarcity.

The difficulty of 'reversed' selection founded on a differential birth-rate, supposedly adverse to the better racial types, has been examined as far as space allowed in Chapter IV. I will only add here that the fate first of the Malthusian doctrine, and then of the theory of natural selection as applied to society (which took its place as the great intellectual stand-by of all opponents of social justice) might be some warning to those who are bent on discovering new weapons in the biological armoury for the same battle. The intelligence of mankind is not so destitute of resources as they suppose. Evils do not work their own remedies, but the knowledge of evils does prompt an active mind to search for cures, and when the elements of truth in the eugenic jeremiads have been sifted from the dross of dislike and fear of popular causes, we shall see whether the better impulse of social improvement cannot turn them to its own purposes.

2. The economic difficulty in its original form was the Malthusian theory under a slightly different aspect. It was held that whatever the improvement in the arts of life, population would always increase to the subsistence limit. In this form the objection needs no refutation, but

in a modified shape it has a more substantial bearing on the problem of raising the standard of life in the less efficient grades. Every industry and every industrial process tends to work down to a margin at which profit ceases. Take one hundred men of degrees of skill distributed on a normal curve of variation, and suppose them all to be paid at the same fixed rate. On the better half there will probably be a profit on this rate which will diminish as we approach the less efficient end, and at some point or other will become zero. Let us suppose that this occurs at the ninetieth man in the order of capacity. This is then the last man of the hundred who will be willingly employed at that rate, and if the ten remaining men are in fact employed and paid the rate, there will be a loss on their work. Let the rate in question be something less than a living wage, and let there be a method of raising it, e.g. by trade union action or by a wages board. Then the margin goes up and stands, say, at the eightieth man. The problem of finding employment for the whole one hundred is so much the more difficult. If all are employed by the State there must, even if efficient organisation be assumed, be a considerable burden of loss, which the more efficient part of the population must bear, and it becomes so much the more difficult to provide an adequate standard of living for the really useful worker. Thus the problem of bringing those below the margin of efficiency within a suitable standard of life is solved by means which threaten to make the standard illusory for a still larger number.

This line of objection is by no means visionary. On the contrary, it represents the substantial difficulty with which democratic economists have had to contend, and which they have not yet solved. The competent have to carry the incompetent. The question is whether the burden can or cannot be adjusted to their strength. The imaginary figures given above are designed to show that it is a question of the percentage of incompetence—the incompetent being understood to be the individual who under no available system of organisation can repay the cost of maintaining him in full efficiency. What percentage of our population

is in this condition? Before the war it was estimated that under the actual conditions from 25 to 30 per cent. of the population fell below the poverty line, but how far this was due to personal defect, and how far to the economic system was a matter of dispute. There are various causes of low pay. On the personal side there is inefficiency in productive power, and there is inefficiency in bargaining power—two very different forms of weakness. Then again there is a medley of causes altogether beyond the individual's control which sum up as inefficiency in the economic system. It remains to be seen how many people would in fact fail to justify a standard living wage by their output if they were protected in the making of the bargain, and more generally if the economic system were such as to secure them the most advantageous employment of their powers with a return proportioned to their output. No precise data exist for answering this question at present, and it can in fact only be determined by experiment. But it may be remarked that the effects of good and bad pay are cumulative in the individual, and from generation to generation—the ill-paid parent bringing up ill-nourished children, who get into the labour market too early and become inefficient workers from the outset. There can be no reasonable doubt that the figure of 25 to 30 per cent would be very heavily reduced by a social organisation devised to secure good or economic conditions for all classes. There must indeed always remain a fringe of incompetence. There are the physically and mentally defective, a small percentage, and above them a percentage of the feeble, or very dull and slow. The number of these who are so weak as to be unable even under improved conditions to 'pull their weight' is the point in question. It can only be determined with any certainty when the economic organisation has been greatly improved, and all that can be said at present is that there is no reason for deeming it so large as to be an intolerable burden on the economic resources of a modern community.

3. A further objection of a broader character is this. Harmony, it may be said, eliminates competition, and competition in one form or another is the indispensable

stimulus of progress. This of course is to assume that the human mind cannot become penetrated with a disinterested desire for the improvement of the race. As this desire in various forms—the love of knowledge, of beauty, and of justice—is in fact a guiding motive to many individuals, the assumption cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. But it may be admitted that even in the pursuit of high objects men sometimes flag and more often fall into ruts unless stimulated by opposition. In this sense the competition of independent centres of activity must remain necessary until the directing minds of the race have a firmer grasp on an adequate synthesis. But let it be admitted that the stimulus of rivalry is indispensable. It remains that there is rivalry and rivalry. There is the rivalry of the keenly contested game, subject to the rules of honourable sportsmanship in which the underlying impulse is one of co-operation in getting the best out of effort, and there is the rivalry that is reckless of means and ready to destroy. All social order puts some limit on the competitive struggle, and the higher the order and the nearer it approaches the spirit of harmony the more fully does it transmute this element of life into an honourable emulation in noble ends. When municipalities begin to be ashamed of a high infantile death-rate, or nations of lagging behind in factory legislation, the spirit of competition is allying itself with progress, and is mellowed in the new association. The desire to do better than another is intrinsically a poor thing, but the desire to maintain oneself at the very best possible is a necessary thing, and it may be only the sight of what my neighbour does which convinces me that my best can be bettered. Briefly, the principle of competition is transmutable, and can be absorbed into a harmonious system.

4. A further social difficulty is prominent in relation to contemporary conditions. We have pointed out that advanced efficiency involving differentiation may antagonise organic growth. How serious is this antagonism? The case against civilisation in general may be put in this way. "Your primitive man lives, no doubt, a hard and

rude life, but he lives as a man, self-dependent, exercising a variety of powers, relying from day to day on living faculties. You take fulness of personality as your aim. Is not such a savage leading a fuller all-round life than the man or woman condemned to mechanical or office routine, a routine which at best engages one faculty and makes but little demand on that? Thus mechanical life is the lot of a great and increasing proportion of your population, and that it should be so is the inevitable consequence of the high specialisation which becomes not less but more necessary. Your two criteria of development are therefore not accidentally but radically discrepant. You can have a simple all-round life without the development of science, industrial arts, and political organisation, or you can have these developments which will raise the life capacities of the few who direct them to a higher pitch, but at the cost of depression to the many. If then there is meaning or value in civilisation, it must lie somewhere in the collective effort as such, not in the enhancement of life for the mass of the individuals partaking of that effort."

The contrast, it must be admitted, plays a large part in history. To a point efficiency is most readily attained by taking short views, dividing men into leaders and led, if not masters and slaves, and treating the led as mere cogs in a machine. But this is to forfeit, so far as all social purposes are concerned, a great mass of potential human energy. Given the same mechanism worked with understanding and by good will, it will command vastly greater vitality. But is it in fact possible so to humanise an elaborate social mechanism? That, it may be said, is the question on which the leading industrial nations are now experimenting. That the industrial mechanism of the present time, more efficient all round than that of the nineteenth century, is also vastly more human, is hardly to be denied. Not only does it provide a more ample leisure for the enjoyment of human relations outside its working, but it is perforce worked with more attention to human needs, and it makes an increasing call on the intelligence and good will of the worker. This last assertion will be

questioned by those who see in the application of machinery an inevitable degradation of labour, but it is the fact that as the automatic principle is pushed through the part of the operative comes to be less mechanical and more and more that of supervising the machine—a function which is neither unintelligent nor uninteresting. Machinery began by displacing the skilled handicraftsman, but as it goes on the tendency is rather to supersede the human automaton, and it is within the power of society to accelerate the process by so penalising the employment of men and women on work of a degrading nature that it will pay to invent and introduce machines to replace them. In more general terms, to be a part of a great social organisation is not necessarily to lose personality. If we can accept the ends of the organisation, and fall in with the spirit of its operations, we feel on the contrary contented and perhaps proud to be parts of a great whole, contributing to ends that we could never execute of ourselves. We can live in the spirit of the whole, even if our own work is of small compass and little intrinsic interest, provided that it is a spirit of free and responsible partnership, something that we are invited to share, not merely bidden to serve. Such a spirit will indeed require specialised organisation for its expression, but it will never allow it to be forgotten that the units of the organisation are men and women who think and feel. It is simply this omission that brings about the contradiction.

5 An alternative way of stating the difficulty would be the familiar criticism that human history shows no real tendency to improvement. The higher civilisations are more efficient, have more command over nature, and are more firmly organised over a wider area. But intrinsically the life which their members lead is not probably better—in some respects it is probably worse—than that of some earlier times. At this point the objection is apt to become rhetorical. Some particular period of history is selected, e.g. Periclean Athens, or thirteenth-century Florence; its beauties are painted vividly in contrast to all that is most sordid in our own time, and the conclusion is drawn that

'we' have not sensibly advanced in so many centuries. The very depressing suggestion is that collective human effort extending over ages has produced no palpable result. The suggestion involves more than one fallacy. 'We' are not the Athenians or Florentines. The continuity is very far from complete. A certain people under a complex of conditions achieve for a time a very rich and many-sided life, which life other, untoward, conditions, internal or external, brought to an end, and it would be fairer to say that 'we' are trying again. Social evolution goes forward in centres which if not wholly unrelated are by no means indissolubly connected. Essentially it is not one movement in its initiation but many, and the unity which it is gradually achieving is rather a late result than an original or permanent basis. Lack of progress is not the persistent failure of a single continuous effort, but rather a phenomenon incidental to the irregular series of achievements and failures among numerous successive efforts. But even the use of the term effort without some caveat involves a fallacy. If humanity as a collective whole had throughout recorded history had nothing but its own betterment in view, and had achieved only what we see, we might well despair. But nothing of the kind has occurred. Human progress as an object is a late birth of time, and even now its conditions are very imperfectly understood. All manner of partial objects have been before the human mind, and in some of these great progress has been made. But many of them have been inherently inconsistent with one another, e.g. the nationalist aims of statesmen, and the sectarian aims of Churches, so that the energy put into them must cancel itself out if it has not done worse. There can be no real test of the possibility of progress through conscious effort until the effort is made, and on the organic view it must be governed by the conception of the race as a whole, and life as a whole, if it is to avoid internal discrepancies. The most important advance that humanity has made consists from this point of view in the very fact that the central problem has in modern times gradually come into the foreground, and we must judge of the possibilities of

a solution not from the failures that have occurred when it has never been properly posed, but from the successes of human effort in solving partial problems of the same nature, e.g. in the establishment of national unity.

The positive theory of progress which emerges from these considerations may be put in this way. The moving force in all development is mind. Mind is from the outset conational, but it is not from the outset purposive, and conation must itself develop into purpose before it can move with sureness to its ends. Mind, again, from the outset is a potential unity in the sense that it moves towards its fellow, but it is also divided from its fellow by the conditions of existence, and by the self-feeling that reflects these conditions. Out of the conflicts and compromises between these antagonisms communities arise in the manner that has been sketched above. The collective mentality of these communities deals with the problems of their existence according to the level of its capacity, and solves or fails to solve them as the case may be. The solution reacts on the structure of the community, favourably in so far as it has been achieved by harmonising the different elements with its central energies, unfavourably in so far as it is achieved by mere suppression. The failure, if the problem is serious, brings the community to the ground, at least in the shape it has hitherto worn. Thus the Greek City States failed to solve the problem of their mutual relations, and lost their status as fully self-governing communities. The Roman Republic failed to solve the problem of securing the loyalty of Army commanders to the Senate and people, and passed into the form of an Empire gradually degenerating into a military despotism. The Empire never adequately solved the problem of assuring the loyalty of distant armies, nor that of securing energy in the provinces compatibly with the unity of the whole structure, and accordingly fell to pieces. New communities take the place of the failures, general ideas of life, religion, and social duty are propagated from one to another, and humanity tries again and again the experiment of ordering its life aright. The condition of assured success is the transformation of the primary

dim efforts of mind into true unity and clarity of purpose. In our own civilisation sanguine thinkers have at times conceived these conditions as sufficiently realised to assure a more steady progress. But the very growth of society—an index of the enhanced power of mind over the conditions of life—has immeasurably deepened and complicated the problems. The modern mind finds itself confronted in especial with the deep-seated class conflict arising out of the economic conditions of the mechanical age, complicated by national antagonisms, racial hatreds, and colour prejudices, essentially of a puerile order, but capable of arousing the strongest passions. The two conflicts play into one another's hands, national antagonisms being called in to silence internal revolt and maintain the system of regimentation which alone can repress the demand for economic and social equality. Of the prospect of solving this double problem, so far as Europe is concerned, it is not at present possible to write hopefully. We must face the possibility of a reversion of Europe to less civilised conditions. The acquired power of applied science is not indeed likely to be lost, but it may come to be used more and more for purposes of mutual destruction through sheer lack of wisdom and self-control amongst men. We are not to put the blame on any automatic process of social cause and effect independent of the human will. It is the failure or misdirection of will itself that is the cause. A tremendous world crisis has developed, without calling forth any great man or men equal to the occasion, while it is the baser elements of the popular mind, and the shallower and shorter views that everywhere find the readiest expression. Humanity has been regarded as a being that lives and learns through the ages. As compared with an individual organism, its hitherto acquired power of assimilating the teachings of experience must be placed somewhere on the level of the sea anemone.

It does not, however, follow that if our present civilisation fails the cause of progress is lost. The reasons for believing in its ultimate success are first and foremost that in human nature the deeper strata are sound, and it is the superficialities that make the misfits. The war, which

was the climax of our follies, revealed depths of devotion and heroism in thousands and millions of men, capacities of endurance, doggedness of resolution, which imply infinite reserves of spiritual energy. That this energy will for ever be locked up uselessly, or liberated only for purposes of destruction through mutual misunderstandings, is inherently improbable. Men, on the whole, mean right, but let their lives be wrecked by petty things, egoisms, vanities, and misunderstandings. Human nature is somehow better than its own performance, a paradox the explanation of which lies in the fact that clear purpose and unified will are the late developments of those primary tendencies which in their dim gropings may merely frustrate one another. Secondly, the emergence of primitive impulses into organised purposes has in history made great advances. Every partial organisation, it is true, is a possible source of danger, formidable in proportion to its very magnitude, yet it is through partial organisation, it seems, that we must ascend to complete unity, and though in the meanwhile we must expect reverses, and possibly calamities, the very fact that so much has been overcome is an earnest of success in the ultimate stages. Thirdly, although it is true that history is strewn with successive efforts and failures, it would be untrue to regard the efforts of the past as useless. Something, after all, is passed on, and the succeeding effort begins at a higher remove, and in its culmination reaches a higher point. In our own time it is probable that the scientific tradition is strong enough to maintain itself, and if that is the case its application to society will ultimately yield that clarity and unity of purpose which for the moment mankind seems to have just missed. If that comes about the Comtist ideal of a self-directing humanity will, after all, be realised.

6. Here it is that we touch the point on which the whole question of permanent progress turns. In his very interesting historical sketch of the "Idea of Progress," Professor Bury leads off by insisting that the question is not one of ideals but of fact, "which man's wishes or labours cannot affect any more than his wishes or labours can prolong life beyond the grave." This is the precise contrary of the

view taken in this book, which sees no cause of progress except in the human mind and will. Yet Professor Bury is so far right that there are very profound and difficult questions of fact underlying the idea of progress. But the principal question is not at bottom whether "the unknown destination towards which man is advancing is desirable," but rather whether man is capable of forming a coherent comprehensive ideal of the destination which is desirable and of guiding his path towards it. It is not a question of the line on which humanity has moved, is moving, and must continue to move, but of the possibilities open to it, and of its own will to choose among them. But this involves three main questions. (1) Can we form an intelligible coherent conception of a Good common to humanity? (2) Can there arise a true, effective, co-operative will directed to this Good? (3) Can such a will control the conditions of life sufficiently to secure its end. In general the purport of the preceding chapters has been to suggest an affirmative answer to all these questions based on the analysis of mind, of social relations, and of the correlation between cognitive, ethico-religious, and social development. From obscure impulses and narrow interests we have traced the advance of mind to clear ideas, wider social relations, comprehensive ends, and enhanced powers. We have never concealed from ourselves that relatively to the true common good all such aims are still partial, and that partial aims, however wide, still conflict with an intensity which is dangerous in proportion to the very strength of the devotion which they command. But we have also seen in the fundamental rationality of mind that which consistently points beyond them to something comprehending and superseding them as they have comprehended and superseded narrower views. Hence for us the further step which is required to that governing principle which alone can make progress secure is merely the continuance of a movement proceeding from the nature of mind

Here Professor Bury might interpolate "Good so far, but are you saying that the will of men ought to accept the common good of humanity as its aim, or that it will do

so? You admit that it is actually absorbed in aims more or less partial and conflicting. Are you saying that it will overcome them, or that it ought to do so? Are your words assertory or hortatory?" The reply is that we here reach the common root of the two moods, the indicative and the imperative. For the nature of the will is to respond to such conceptions of the good as it can form, and in propounding to it an ideal as really good we are at once stimulating the will and maintaining that because our ideal is valid it will be found in the long run to appeal to it. It will conquer all invalid ideals, because they will at some point contradict themselves, while that which is valid will appeal at an infinity of points, and all of these will be found at last to lead to the same centre. This is the final ground for the belief that in ethics good, as in science truth, will prevail.

Yet we have to admit that this tendency can be repeatedly overborne, and we return to the question whether this may or may not happen in our present phase of civilisation. The line of thought which Professor Bury so admirably traces, moved towards the conception that modern civilisation was distinguished from all early civilisations precisely in this—that humanity had become self-directing, that is to say, had formed a conception of its own best life and of the conditions by which it could be secured. Now this conception, as I have elsewhere argued at length, would be the natural term¹ of a development which we can trace not merely in human history, but from the very beginnings of mind in the lowest forms of organic life—a process by which the conditions at first dominating mind from without enter step by step into its consciousness, and so (within the limits of physical possibility) into its control. I think it clear—and Professor Bury's work makes it clearer—that this conception is a distinctive achievement of modern civilisation unknown to antiquity. If we could hold that this

¹ By this I by no means intend that it is the final phase of mental development. On the contrary, if reached it would presumably open out an entirely new vista. I mean that it is the turning point to which the whole trend of past development apparently moves.

conception had been effectively grasped, we could be confident of the future of our own civilisation. But this is the point unfortunately open to doubt. The conception of a self-directed development of mind in man has been apprehended in abstract terms, but no prophet has arisen who can give it that full concrete imaginative statement which would convert it into a guiding force. Much more evidently has to be done to make it real and bring it home even to the best minds. The conception itself stands in need of development before it can direct development, and whether we look at the world of knowledge or of practice we remain in doubt whether the work will be done in time to prevent the disruptive forces from accomplishing their work of destruction.

The inferior forms of society which may rise will always perish in the end, as Plato said, by their inherent vices, or as our account would put it, through their internal disharmonies, while, as indicated above, the valid ideal because valid survives. But here we must glance at one final objection.

It may be urged that the checks and reverses to progress appear even from our own account to proceed from ineradicable elements of human nature. In particular it may be said that there is this contradiction in our own view. We desiderate a harmonious fulfilment of human nature, but human nature contains elements which are radically discrepant, and to fulfil them is to negate harmony. For instance, pugnacity is a radical instinct of mankind which will find its outlet whatever we may do. Thus if men do not fight about one thing they fight about another. A religion of peace kept Europe in constant war for a century and a half. Now, having nothing better to quarrel about, men fight for nationality, which is three parts illusion. Solve the question of nationality and they will find something else to quarrel about, for quarrel they must.

This fatalistic view is one of the results of reducing human nature to the animal level. A sounder comparative psychology emphasises impartially the difficulties as well as the agreements between the human and animal mind.

Instinct, in the higher animals, and especially in insects, a specialised driving force guiding the organisms to ends unforeseen and uncontrollable, is never in adult and sane manhood so separatist and irrational an agency. Men feel themselves swayed by powerful and primitive impulses which they imperfectly understand, but as long as the self remains erect they do not give themselves away. In addition to the direct control of the will the underlying rationality—which is just as primitive and basic as anything else—operates on the content of the impulse itself, shaping it into some approximation of harmony to life as a whole. In particular the elements that make up pugnacity arise from and have to do with thwarted effort, and are the less exuberant in proportion as the sphere of co-operative and harmonious effort extends. The energy of assertiveness which underlies them stands at the centre of life, but for this very reason it does not lose the power to be a master on its own ground, or to turn the rush of primitive emotion into the deeper and calmer current of feeling directed steadily towards its large and rational ends.¹ We saw above that the strife that some think necessary to social progress is in our experience transmuted into higher and more honourable forms of emulation, and so it is on the psychological plane with the impulses and emotions underlying strife. The assertive energy that maintains them stands at the centre of all rational purpose, but for that very reason it does not remain the slave of its first emotions in their crudest form.

In the nature of the mind as in the needs of the body and the structure of society we can see many obstacles to progress. For the nature of evolution in general is such that that which arises to fulfil a necessary function at one stage requires a difficult re-adaptation to fit it to the next

¹ We touch again on the mistaken view that reason is impotent because impulses do not yield to formulæ that express no sincere depth of feeling. Nothing in comparative ethics is more remarkable than the failure of Christianity in its central doctrine of meekness. Its exponents seem wholly without shame in condemning the faithful few who put this doctrine into practice, and this quite as much as any theological difficulty is the reason why the Churches lose authority. Dogmatic teaching having failed with the old Adam, it remains for the next generation to see what scientific psychology may do when it takes a hand.

stage We have not ceased to be animals in becoming men, nor do we easily put off the old Adam when a new man is the needed unit of a higher society But difficulties are not impossibilities, and throughout the world of life the impulse of development has shown its power to absorb the old and transmute it to the service of the new. So will it be with the primitive conditions once necessary in human evolution, and now in their original form mere hindrances on the march

CONCLUSION.

7 Social development as here understood is an integral part of a much more far-reaching process Mind as we know it in experience has its first humble manifestations in the lowest forms of life. We trace it upwards from its vague and fitful impulses to purposes of increasing clarity and wider scope, wherein, before we reach the level of humanity, the relation of the individual to its fellows begins to play a part In man co-operation becomes the dominant factor, and as it overcomes its original limitations we see mind developing towards a true unity. This unity is gravely misunderstood when conceived as a merging of the individual centres in which consciousness has lived from the beginning. It is rather a unity of the true organic type which preserves and develops the constituent units in the plenitude of their individual power, for the final purpose, which becomes clearer as rational development proceeds, is to make a harmony of life, and the nature of this harmony is not to destroy but to fulfil all that can be fulfilled without mutual destruction or arrest. In this aim all partial purposes and all cruder impulses of the successive stages of development find the measure of their justification It is the aim not of the human mind in particular, but of Mind as such, and in its execution the special part of social evolution is the establishment of unity on the scale and in the spirit which the conditions of the problem require. To meet these conditions a synthesis of very opposite elements is necessary, and it is not surprising that there should be many failures, or

even that partial successes should eventually break down. But underlying every effort, and sustaining it with the promise of ultimate success, is that unrelenting impulse of Mind to the fulfilment of its being which in its repeated impacts on limiting conditions holds the secret of development in every field.

INDEX

- Achievement, collective, 171, 172
 Affection, 153, 157
 Agriculture, 21, 218, 251, 270, 275,
 287
Alfred, 270
 Altruism, 161
 Andamanese, 282
 Animatism, 223, 224
 Animism, 223, 224
 Antipathy, 162
 Arabs, the, 238
Aristotle, 235, 238, 276
 Association, 50
 Athens, 26
 Australian Aborigines, 17, 44, 285
- Babylonia, 25, 230, 271
Baden-Powell, B H, 285
Beniham, J, 273
 Biological Conditions, 104-129
 Birth rate, 121
 Brahminism, 231
Breasted, J H, 231
Brown, A R, 282, 289
 Buddhism, 231, 252, 276
Bury, Professor J., 337
- Canlor*, Professor, 239
 Capitalism, 290
Carr Saunders, Professor A M, 15,
 129
 Caste, 117, 118
Cailin, Mr G, 294
 Character, 189
 common, 197
Chesterion, G. F., 163
 Chief, the, 23
 and headman, 20
 of tribe, 20
 China, 230
- Christendom, 29, 77
 Christianity, 240, 242, 245, 341
 Church, the, 29, 295
 Civilisation, 23, 25, 94, 102
 modern, 332
 Class, 274, 275
 Colour line, 257, 272
 Common sense, 225, 232
 Communism, 281
 Communities, relations between, 77,
 88
 Community, the, 41 et seq, 214, 258
 and state, 51
 basis of, 41, 42, chap. III
 efficiency in, 32, 78
 growth of, 45
 organisation of the, 32
 scale of, 32, 33, 76, 77, 78, 84
 the civic, 26, 30
 unity of, 42, 43
 Competition, 331
Comie A, 317
 Conflict, 85
 Consent, 55, 58, 59, 60
 Contract, free, 280, 281
 Co-operation, 40, 71, 75, 86, 87, 154,
 291
 conscious and unconscious, 182,
 183, 184
 Correlation, 218, 219, 313, 314
 Crete, 25
 Cruelty, 165
 Culture contact, 218
 Custom, 45, 46, 47, 48, 187
 growth of, 46
 Cycles, theory of, 311
- Dakota, the, 20
Davids, Professor Rhys, 253
 Decadence, 312, 313
Demolins, M, 102, 103

- Development, 87, 88, 191
 as synthesis, 306, 307, 342
 causes of, 306
 ethical and social, 89, 90
 intellectual, 210
 phases of, 302-304
 social, 37, 72, 73, chap. IV
 Differentiation, 74, 331
 Disease, 103
 Diversity, 118

 Economic System, 329, 330
 Economics, 131
 Efficiency, 32, 35, 74, 75, 80, 81, 82,
 84, 87, 88, 331, 332
 Egoism, 161
 Egypt, 24, 25, 230, 271
Einstein, Professor A., 184
 Emotion, 139, 140, 160, 264
 Empire, 34, 83
 Endogamy, 19, 118
 England, 29, 99, 100, 101, 127
 Environment, 96-104
 the social, 176, 177
 Equality, 34, 243, 279
 Ethical Ideal, 88, 89
 Ethical Principles, 70
 Ethics, 88, 89, 108, 146, 206, 207, 208,
 226, 229, 245
 Eugenics, 111-114
 Excitement, 165
 Exogamy, 19, 43, 44
 Experience, 236
 Experiment, 237

 Family, the, 161
 the enlarged, 17
 the natural, 17
 Fear, 57, 58
 Feeble-minded, 116
 Feeling, 134, 140
 Force, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58
 France, 99, 100, 311
 Freedom, 34, 35, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81,
 82, 84, 252, 304
 Fulfilment, 87
 Function, 53, 68, 69, 78
 Future Life, 19, 228

 Geography, 96, 101
 Germans, 128
 Germany, 127, 311

Ginsberg, M., 15, 219
 God, 234
 Gods, 226, 228
 Good, the, 93, 338
 the common, 172, 244
 Government, 248, 249, 251
 Greece, 25, 77, 98, 104, 232, 235, 254,
 256, 295, 313
Green, T. H., 51
 Group, the, 18, 79, 229
 the primary, 247, 251, 265, 269,
 270, 274
 mentality, 179-187
 Groups, 107, 278
 Guana, the, 22
 Guaycuru, the, 22

Haddon, A. C., 126
 Harmony, 69, 70, 71, 76, 84, 88, 93,
 143, 161, 168, 172, 182, 199
 Hebrews, 231, 276
Hegel, G. W. F., 317
 Heredity, 115, 117, 119, 123, 124,
 146, 147
 Heroic Age, 250
Hobbes, 164
Holm, Professor A., 256
 Human Nature, 61
 Humanity, 245, 273, 336, 337, 339
 Hunters, 218, 251, 270, 275, 287
 Hypothesis, 239

 Ideas, 225
 Ill will, 163
 Imagination, 154
 Impulse, 133, 169
 Impulse-feeling, 132, 135
 India, 128, 231, 233, 253, 254, 298
 Individual, the, 66, 67, 323, 324
 Individuality, 181, 182
 Industrial Revolution, 29
 Industry, arts of, 101, 230
 Infanticide, 288
 Initiative, 82
 Instinct, 135, 136-138, 150, 173, 194,
 341
 Institutions, 48, 49, 50, 170, 304, 305,
 310, chap. XI
 Intellectuals, 120
 Inter-action, 70, 72, 210, 211
 Inter-communication, 104, 308
 Inter-dependence, 65

- Interest, 135, 147, 173, 201, 202
 class-, 202
 cognitive, 166, 174, 219, 220
 constructive, 167, 174
 root-, 136, 141, 142, 166, 173, 174
 social, 150, 155
 Interests, identity of, 61, 62, 63
 Intermarriage, 43, 44
 Internationalism, 292-300
 International law, 295
 Islam, 276
 Italy, 27
- Japan, 99, 127
 Jews, 129
 Justice, 259-273
 public, 266, 268, 269
- Keane, A H*, 126
 Kindred, 18, 19, 23, 40, 41, 43, 44
 King, 250
 Kubu, the, 20
- Land, tenure of, 21
 Language, 177
 Law, 47, 48, 260
 constitutional, 261
 League of Nations, 296, 297
 Liberty, 242
- Macedon, 26
 Magic, 222
Malinowski, Dr B, 15, 222, 285, 289
 Mana, 221
 Mathematics, 237
 Matter, 241
McDougall, Professor W, 15, 18, 57,
 100, 103, 181, 190, 209
M'Iver, Professor, 15, 50, 94, 179
 Mechanism, 66, 74, 75
 Mediaeval Cities, 255
 Mencius, 294
 Mentality, social, 215
 Method, 23, 24
 comparative, 109
 critical, 232
 Migration, 122
Mill, J S., 124
 Mind, 147, 151, 161, 174, 175, 181,
 182, 191, 241, 314, 315, 335, 342,
 343
 in evolution, 204, 205
- Monogamy, 20
 Monotheism, 239
Miller Lyer, Professor F, 219, 289
 Mutual Service, 41, 68, 78, 80, 84
Myres, Professor J L., 215
 Mysticism, 235
 Mythology, 224
- Nationality, 127, 297, 298
 Natural Selection, 105-107
Nieboer, Dr, 218
 Nobility, 287, 289
 North American Indians, 44, 293,
 294
- Obligations, 260
 maintenance of, 262
 Offences, punishment of, 18
Oppenheim, Professor, 295
 Organic character, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71,
 72, 182, 308
 Organisation, 33, 107, 109, 110, 211,
 301, 302
 Organism, 64
Ormsby, Mrs, 15
- Paine, Thomas*, 60
 Party, 192
 Pastoral Societies, 21
 Pasture, 218, 251, 270, 275
 Personality, 33, 67, 182
Phillipotts, Miss B S, 268
 Philosophy, social, 91, 92
Plato, 112, 238, 240
Pollard, Professor, 94
Pollock and Maitland, 270
 Polygamy, 20
 Population, 327, 328
 Power, 85, 86
 Press, the newspaper, 190
 Progress, 36, 37, 107, 111, 113, 309,
 310, 333, 334, 335, 337-340
 Property, 281-292
 common, 281-288
 communal, 21
 private, 22, 285
 Psychological conditions of develop-
 ment, chaps vi, vii, viii, ix
 Psychology, 131
 social, 132
 Punans, the, 18, 293
 Punishment, 262, 263, 267

Purpose, 197, 198, 200

law and, 200 *

Pygmies, 293

Quiggin, A. Hingston, 126

Race, 100, 113, 124-129

Psychology of, 100, 125

Rational Selection, 111

Reason, 143, 173, 200, 201, 205, 207

Reflection, 231, 252

Reflex Action, 133, 154

Religion, spiritual, 27, 108

development of, 206, 207, 226

comparative, 227

Reparation, 262

Responsibility, 265, 267, 273

Restraint, 86

Robertson, J. M., 126, 307, 308

Rome, 27, 28, 256, 277, 299, 312, 313,

335

Rousseau, 61

Russia, 122

Science, 91, 92, 239, 240, 241

Self, 148, 149, 168

Self-assertion, 161

Self-interest, 63, 159, 160, 174

Semang, 20

Sentiment, 139

Sex, 151, 158

Simpler Peoples, the, 41, 217

Singer, Dr C., 238

Slavery, 22, 276, 277

Social Content, 114, 188

„ Control, 81

„ Differentiation, 22, 23

„ Evolution, 31

„ Ideal, 158, 243

„ Laws, chap XIII, 319, 320

„ Nexus, the, 36

„ Principle, 84, 93

„ Relations, 38, 39, 40, 76

„ Structure, 40, 64, 259

„ Theory, 201, 203

Society, 37, 38, 75, 76

and the Community, chap II

origin of, 39, 93, 325

Sociology, 31, 36, 130, 213

methods of, 90-94, 317

Solidarity, 34, 82, 83

Sparta, 26

Specialisation, 69, 72

Spells, 221

Spencer and Gillen, Messrs, 260

Spirits, 19, 226, 228

Spiritual, the, 234

Standard of life, 329

State, the, 26, 50, 51, 52, 53

the civic, 261

the city, 26, 27, 28, 35, 83, 253-256

the modern, 29, 30, 35, 256, 257, 300

Status, 273, 277

Stepniak, S., 122

Stoicism, 276

Subordination, 250

Success, 123

Superman, 116

Survival value, 145

Sympathy, 152-155, 157

Taoism, 231

Thebes, 26

Thought, 141

Torture, 271, 272

Toynbee, Professor A. J., 15

Trade, 288, 289

Tradition, 212, 309

Treitschke, Professor, 33

Trial and Error, 195, 317

Tribe, the, 18, 248

United States, 52, 257

Universalism, 234, 277, 278

Urwink, Professor E. J., 15

Value, 37, 91, 92, 93

Vedda, 17, 19, 285

Vengeance, 267

Vierkandt, A., 114

Vinogradoff, Sir P., 253, 272, 295

Wallas, Professor Graham, 15, 209

War, 22, 24, 110, 249, 293-297, 340

Westermarck, Professor E., 219

Wheeler, G. C., 219

Will, 142, 168, 173, 338

freedom of, 318, 320, 321

nature of, 325, 326

public, 193

the Common, 178, 179, 193, 198

the Individual, 321, 322

the Rational, 169

Women, 26, 120, 121



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

London 40 Museum Street, WC1

Auckland PO Box 36013, Northcote Central, N4

Bombay 15 Graham Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay 1

Barbados PO Box 222, Bridgetown

Buenos Aires Escritorio 454-459, Florida 165

Calcutta 17 Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta 13

Cape Town 68 Shortmarket Street

Hong Kong 105 Wing On Mansion, 26 Hancow Road, Kowloon

Ibadan PO Box 62

Karachi Karachi Chambers, McLeod Road

Madras Mohan Mansions, 38c Mount Road, Madras 6

Mexico Villalongin 32-10, Piso, Mexico 5, DF

Nairobi PO Box 4536

New Delhi. 13-14 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi 1

Ontario 81 Curlew Drive, Don Mills

Rio de Janeiro. Caixa Postal 2537-Zc-00

São Paulo Caixa Postal 8675

Singapore 36 Prinsep Street, Singapore 7

Sydney, NSW Bradbury House, 55 York Street

Tokyo PO Box 26, Kamata

If ever there was a time when fundamental work was required in the philosophy of education, it is the present. Education has become a matter of grave public concern. Demands for its extension and plans for its reorganization abound. It has become rather like the kingdom of Heaven in former times. It is both within us and amongst us, yet it also lies ahead. The elect possess it and hope to gather in those who are not yet saved. But what education is is seldom clear.

A fundamental task of philosophy has always been to clarify our concepts, to answer the Socratic question 'What do you mean?' This question has never been asked systematically at present. Part I of this book attempts to do this and to develop the concept of 'education' here developed to what goes on in educational institutions. Even more important, however, is the question 'How do you know?' The search for truth is particularly urgent and particularly difficult in the present. Education necessarily involves judgments of value and at the moment in England and America education is a topic which arouses moral fervour both inside and outside the profession. Education has become as moralized as marriage and politics.

Parts II and III of this book attempt to provide a proper ethical foundation for education in a democratic society. A positive ethical theory is developed which, it is hoped, will contribute to ethics in general as well as to the ethics of education.

The book is written so that it can be easily understood by the educated public and by teachers on the job and in training, as well as by students of philosophy. It does not aspire to provide simple solutions to complex problems in which issues of fact are closely intertwined with issues of value, but only to provide a clear and coherent basis in ethical theory for the discussion of such issues.

AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND EDUCATION

Cr 8vo

Second Edition

14s 6d net

~~LONDON. GEORGE~~ ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD

